The Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940) undoubtedly occupies a special place in the history of our country, and it must be considered in conjunction with the situation that had developed in the world by that time. From spring to autumn 1939, the situation was heating up, the approach of war was felt. The leadership of the USA, Great Britain and France believed that Germany would attack the USSR. However, Germany was not yet ready for such a step, and soon concluded a military alliance with Italy, directed not only against the USSR, but also against England, France and Poland. To look more decent in the eyes of the world community, the Anglo-French politicians decided to start negotiations with the USSR, during which the Soviet side sought to conclude a military agreement to prevent fascist aggression. To implement this, a plan was developed for the deployment of Soviet troops and the countries participating in the negotiations to jointly repel a possible aggression. The topic of the plan was discussed at a meeting of military missions in mid-August 1939. Our military delegation proposed to develop and sign a military convention, which precisely determined the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft and naval squadrons allocated for joint actions by the contracting parties. Seeing that the British and French delegations were not going to sign such a convention, the USSR was forced to complete further negotiations.
In an effort to exclude the possibility of a war on two fronts (in Europe - with Germany and in the East - with Japan), the USSR accepted the proposal of the Germans to conclude a non-aggression pact. Poland, which had pinned all its hopes on the British and French, refused to cooperate with our country and found itself practically alone, becoming an easy prey for the aggressor. When, after the German attack, the Polish army was on the brink of disaster, Soviet troops undertook a campaign in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, and in 12 days advanced in places up to 350 kilometers. The displacement of the Soviet border to the west had a positive effect on the strategic position of our country. The signing of mutual assistance pacts with the Baltic states in the fall of 1939 also contributed to the increase in the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union.
While the western border was secured, the situation in the northwestern sector remained difficult. Even before the revolution, Finland was part of the Russian Empire, and earlier (more than six centuries) was under the rule of Sweden. In the struggle between Russia and Finland, the issue of access to the Baltic Sea acquired vital importance for the former. In 1700, Peter I began the Northern War with Sweden, which lasted until 1721. As a result of its victorious completion, Karelia, Vyborg, Kexholm, the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, the Gulf of Riga and many islands were transferred to Russia. Having defeated Sweden, Peter I generously ceded Finland to her, but relations between the states were again tense, and in 1808 a war broke out between them, as a result, Finland completely ceded to Russia as an autonomous principality with its own constitution and diet. But these rights were then curtailed by the tsarist government, and Finland turned into one of the outskirts of the Russian Empire.
The right of nations to self-determination proclaimed after the revolution gave Finland a real opportunity to become an independent, independent state. After reviewing the decree of the Finnish Sejm of December 6, 1917 on the proclamation of Finland as an independent state and the appeal of his government for recognition of this, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on January 4, 1918 recognized the independence of Finland. The new Finnish government transferred its distrust of Russia to the Soviet Republic. On March 7, 1918, it entered into a treaty with Germany, after the defeat of which in the First World War it reoriented to the Entente. With regard to our country, the Finnish government maintained a hostile attitude and broke off relations already in May, and later, openly and in disguise, waged a struggle against Soviet Russia.
The victories of the Red Army in the Civil War and over the interventionists prompted the Finns to conclude a peace treaty with Soviet Russia on October 23, 1920. But all the same, relations remained tense, as evidenced by the adventurous attack of armed "volunteer" detachments of shutskors on the land of Soviet Karelia undertaken in 1922. Relationships cannot be called good in the future. P. Svinhufvud (President of Finland from 1931 to 1937), declared that any enemy of Russia should be a friend of Finland.
On Finnish territory, the construction of roads, airfields, various fortifications, and naval bases began at a hasty pace. On the Karelian Isthmus (just over 30 km from Leningrad), our neighbor, using foreign specialists, built a network of defensive structures, which are better known as the Mannerheim Line, and in the summer of 1939, the largest military maneuvers in Finnish history took place here. These and other facts testified to Finland's readiness for war.
The Soviet Union wanted to peacefully strengthen the northwestern borders, but a military way to achieve this goal was not ruled out. The Soviet government initiated negotiations with Finland in October 1939 on issues of ensuring mutual security. At first, the Soviet proposal to conclude a defensive alliance with our country was rejected by the Finnish leadership. Then the government of the USSR made a proposal to move the border, which runs along the Karelian Isthmus, several kilometers to the north and to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the Soviet Union. For this, the Finns were offered a territory in the Karelian SSR, which in its area was several dozen times (!) Larger than the exchange. It would seem that one can agree with such conditions. However, such a proposal was also rejected, primarily due to the fact that Finland was assisted by Britain, France and a number of other states.
The possibility of solving the problem by military means is indicated by the deployment of the Red Army formations carried out in advance. So, the 7th Army, formed by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the Soviet Union on September 14, 1939 in the Kalinin area, was transferred to the Leningrad Military District (LVO) in operational subordination a day later. By the end of September, this army began to advance to the borders of Latvia, and by December it was already on the Karelian Isthmus. The 8th Army, which was deployed on the basis of the Novgorod Army Group, had been redeployed near Petrozavodsk by November, and by December its formations were already at the border with Finland. On September 16, 1939, the Murmansk Army Group was formed as part of the LMO, which was renamed the 14th Army two months later. It is easy to see that simultaneously with the negotiations, the deployment and concentration of troops took place, which was completed as a whole by November 28, 1939.
So, the troops of the LPO have replenished, deployed and concentrated near Finland, but the Finns do not want to sign the treaty. All that was needed was a pretext to start a war. It should be noted that combat missions were assigned to our troops on November 21, 1939. According to the directive of the LPO No. 4717 of November 21, the 7th Army, after receiving a special order, was required, together with aviation and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF), to defeat the Finnish units, seize the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the line of Art. Khitola, Art. Entrea, Vyborg; after that, together with the 8th Army, leading an offensive in the Serdobol direction, building on the success, reach the Lakhta, Kyuvyansk, Helsinki line.
The provocations at the border became the pretext for the war. There were these provocations on the part of the Finns or ours, now it's hard to say for sure. In a note from the Soviet Union dated November 26, 1939, for example, the Finnish government was accused of shelling by artillery that caused human casualties. In response, the Finnish leadership denied the accusations against her and offered to create an independent commission to investigate the incident.
In response to our demands to withdraw their troops deep into their territory, the Finns put forward similar demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops by 25 km. On November 28, a new note followed, which stated that, based on the continuing provocations and insolent Finnish demands, the USSR considered itself released from the obligations of the 1920 peace treaty. The note was published in the Pravda newspaper on November 28 and 29, 1939. In addition, these days various reports are published on the pages of the newspaper, confirming the provocations of the Finnish military. So, in Pravda on November 29, an article was published "New provocations of the Finnish military clique," which said that, according to information received from the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, on November 28 at 17 o'clock on the isthmus between Rybachy and Sredniy Peninsula, five Finnish soldiers, noticing our outfit moving along the border, fired at it and tried to capture it. The outfit began to recede. By the actions of a group that approached from our side, the Finns were driven back into their territory, while taking three soldiers prisoner. At 18 o'clock in the direction of the USSR five times were fired from a rifle. Ours did not answer. On the night of November 30, the LVO troops were ordered to cross the state border.
What did the leadership of the USSR count on? First of all, the Soviet Union did not plan to start a major war, which is confirmed by the initial composition of the troops - only four armies. Being within the framework of a beautiful, but not supported by facts, theory of world solidarity of the working class, the Soviet government naively expected that as soon as our troops crossed the state border, the Finnish proletariat would rise up against its bourgeois government. The Winter War proved the fallacy of such hopes, but the belief in proletarian solidarity, contrary to logic, remained in the minds of many until the Patriotic War.
After the outbreak of hostilities, the Finnish leadership transmitted through the Swedish embassy in Moscow a message to the Soviet government about its readiness to resume negotiations. But V. M. Molotov rejected this proposal, saying that the USSR had now recognized the provisional people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic (FDR), which was created on the territory of our country from the emigre representatives of the Finnish left forces. Naturally, this government was ready to sign the necessary treaty with our country. Its text was published in the Pravda newspaper on December 1, 1939, and a day later an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship between the USSR and the FDR was signed and announced to the Soviet people.
What was the Finnish government hoping for? Of course, it was well aware that if it could not agree, then a military clash would be inevitable. Therefore, straining all forces, they prepared for war. However, military experts considered this training insufficient. After the end of the Winter War, Lieutenant Colonel I. Hanpula wrote that those who prepared for war "in good years" did not consider it necessary to increase the power of the Finnish armed forces, which even lacked weapons and ammunition during the hostilities, for these mistakes the Finnish soldiers paid on the Karelian Isthmus with their blood. The Finnish leadership believed that in their northern theater of war, an offensive could be carried out only in winter or summer. For the directions above Lake Ladoga, it did not bother at all, since it was sure that the Finnish army was better prepared than the Soviet troops, who would have to fight on foreign territory and overcome enormous difficulties associated with providing, while behind the powerful fortifications blocking the Karelian Isthmus, Finnish troops will hold out until the spring thaw. By this time, the Finnish government hoped to receive the necessary support from European countries.
The plans of the Soviet General Staff to defeat the enemy troops were as follows: active operations in the northern and central directions to pin down the Finnish troops and prevent the Finns from receiving military assistance from the Western powers (and there was a threat of landing of troops of other states); the main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the 8th army bypassing the Mannerheim line, the auxiliary one by the 7th army. All this was allotted no more than 15 days. The operation included three stages: the first - the defeat of the Finns in the foreground and the achievement of the main defensive zone; the second is preparation for breaking through this zone; and the third is the complete defeat of the Finnish armies on the Karelian Isthmus and the capture of the Kexholm-Vyborg line. It was planned to achieve the following rates of advance: in the first two stages from 2 to 3 km, in the third from 8 to 10 km per day. However, as you know, in reality everything was different.
The Finnish command concentrated its main forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying here 7 of the 15 infantry divisions, 4 infantry and 1 cavalry brigades, and, in addition, reinforcement units. All these forces became part of the Karelian army of General X. Esterman. North of Lake Ladoga, in the Petrozavodsk direction, was the army corps of General E. Heglund, which included two reinforced infantry divisions. In addition, by December, a group of troops of General P. Talvel was transferred to Vyartsil. The Ukhta direction was blocked by the group of forces of General V. Tuompo, and in the Arctic, on the Kandalaksha and Murmansk directions, the Lapland group of General K. Valenkus. In total, the Soviet troops were opposed by up to 600 thousand Finnish soldiers, about 900 guns, 64 tanks, all these forces were supported by the Finnish fleet (29 ships) and the Air Force (about 270 combat aircraft).
As part of the LVO (commander KA Meretskov), 4 armies were deployed: in the Arctic - the 14th, as part of 2 rifle divisions; in Karelia - the 9th of the 3 rifle divisions; to the east of Lake Ladoga - the 8th of the 4 rifle divisions and on the Karelian Isthmus - the 7th Army, supported by the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.
Combat actions to defeat the enemy are usually divided into 2 periods. The first is counted from the beginning of the offensive of the Red Army formations on November 30, 1939 and ends on February 11, 1940. During this period, the troops operating in the strip from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland managed to advance to a depth of 35 -80 km, close Finland's access to the Barents Sea and overcome the obstacle line of the Karelian Isthmus with a depth of 25 to 60 km and approach the Mannerheim line. During the second period, the Mannerheim line was broken and the fortress city of Vyborg was captured, it ended on March 12, 1940 with the conclusion of a peace treaty.
At 8:30 on November 30, after a half-hour of artillery preparation, the Red Army troops crossed the border and, encountering insignificant resistance, advanced 4-5 km by nightfall. In the future, the enemy's resistance increased every day, but the offensive continued in all directions. In general, only the troops of the 14th Army completed their task, occupying the city of Petsamo in 10 days, as well as the Rybachy and Sredny peninsula. Having blocked Finland's path to the Barents Sea, they continued to push their way into the territory. The troops of the 9th Army, leading an offensive in the most difficult off-road conditions, were able to advance 32-45 km inland in the first week, and the 8th Army in 15 days by 75-80 km.
The peculiarity of the polar theater of military operations complicated the use of large military forces and military equipment. It seemed possible to advance only in some separate directions, which separated the troops and disrupted interaction between them. The commanders did not know the terrain well, which made it possible for the enemy to lure Soviet units and subunits to where there was no way to return.
The Finnish command was seriously afraid of the exit of the Red Army units to the central regions of the country from the north. To prevent this, additional forces were urgently deployed to these areas. For the most part, these were perfectly trained and equipped ski units and detachments. The ski training of our troops turned out to be weak, moreover, the sports skis we had were unsuitable for use in real combat operations. As a result, units and formations of the 14th, 9th and 8th armies were forced to go on the defensive, in addition, some of the troops were surrounded and fought heavy battles. At first, the 7th Army also successfully developed an offensive in its sector, but its progress was greatly slowed down by a strip of engineering barriers starting directly from the border and having a depth of 20 to 65 km. This strip was equipped with several (up to five) obstacle lines and a system of strong points. During the fighting, 12 reinforced concrete structures, 1245 bunkers, more than 220 km of wire barriers, about 200 km of forest heaps, 56 km of ditches and scarps, up to 80 km of roadblocks, almost 400 km of minefields were destroyed. However, the troops of the right flank already managed to break through to the main strip of the Mannerheim line on December 3, while the rest of the army's formations reached it only on December 12.
On December 13, the troops received an order to break through the Mannerheim Line, which was a system of heavily fortified zones and positions. The main strip had a depth of up to 10 km, and included 22 defense nodes and numerous strong points, each consisting of 3-5 pillboxes and 4-6 pillboxes. 4-6 strong points made up a resistance node, usually extending along the front for 3-5 km and up to 3-4 km in depth. Strongholds, pillboxes and pillboxes were connected by communication trenches and trenches, had a well-developed system of anti-tank obstacles and various engineering barriers. The second lane was located 3-5 km from the main one, and had almost 40 pillboxes and about 180 pillboxes. It was equipped similarly to the main one, but with less engineering development. At Vyborg there was a third strip, which included two positions with many pillboxes, bunkers, engineering barriers and strong points.
The troops of the 7th Army hoped to break through the main strip of the Mannerheim line on the move, but they did not achieve results in this attempt, while suffering serious losses. After repelling the attacks of the Red Army, the enemy tried to seize the initiative, conducting a series of counterattacks, but to no avail.
At the end of the year, the High Command (GK) of the Red Army gave the order to stop the attacks and carefully prepare the breakthrough. From the troops of the 7th Army, replenished with new formations, two armies (7th and 13th) were formed, which became part of the created North-Western Front. The directive of the Civil Code of December 28, 1939 determined the methods of training troops, some issues of tactics and organization of command and control, which consisted in the following: to ensure that arriving units are familiarized with the conditions of combat operations and not to throw them unprepared into battle; not to get carried away with the tactics of rapid advancement, but to advance only after careful preparation; create ski squads for reconnaissance and surprise strikes; to engage in battle not in a crowd, but in companies and battalions, echeloning them into the depths and ensuring a threefold superiority over the enemy; do not throw infantry into the attack until enemy pillboxes on the front line of the defense are suppressed; the attack must be carried out after careful artillery preparation, the guns must fire at targets, and not at squares.
Carrying out these instructions, the front command launched preparations for a breakthrough: the troops trained on specially created training fields equipped with pillboxes and bunkers, similar to those that were actually to be stormed. At the same time, an operation plan was developed, on the basis of which the front forces were to break through the defenses in a 40-kilometer sector with the adjacent flanks of the armies. By this time, the North-Western Front had more than two-fold superiority in infantry, almost three-fold in artillery and multiple superiority in aviation and tanks over the enemy.
On February 11, after an artillery preparation that lasted almost three hours, the front's troops launched an offensive. The attack of riflemen and tanks was supported by an artillery barrage to a depth of 1, 5-2 km, and assault groups were blocking and destroying the pillboxes. The first to break through the defenses were units of the 123rd division, which penetrated 1.5 km during the first day. The outlined success developed the second echelon of the corps, then army and front-line reserves were introduced into the breakthrough. As a result, by February 17, the main strip of the Mannerheim line was broken and the Finns withdrew to the second strip. The Soviet troops, regrouping in front of the second line of defense, resumed the offensive. On February 28, following an artillery preparation that lasted for an hour and a half, they together attacked enemy positions. The enemy could not withstand the onslaught and began to withdraw. Pursuing him, the troops of the Red Army reached the city of Vyborg and took it by storm on the night of March 13, 1940.
With the Soviet armies breaking through the Mannerheim Line, the Finnish leadership realized that without Western support, defeat was inevitable. Now the Finns have two options: to accept the conditions of the USSR and conclude peace, or to request military support from Britain and France, that is, to conclude a military agreement with these states. London and Paris have stepped up diplomatic pressure on our country. Germany, on the other hand, convinced the governments of Sweden and Norway that if they could not convince Finland to accept the conditions of the USSR, then they themselves could become a war zone. The Finns were forced to resume negotiations. The result was a peace treaty signed on March 12, 1940.
His conditions completely crossed out possible reproaches that our country wanted to deprive Finland of its sovereignty and restore the borders of tsarist Russia. The real goal of the Soviet Union was indeed to strengthen the Soviet northwestern borders, the security of Leningrad, as well as our ice-free port in Murmansk and the railroad.
The public condemned this war, as can be seen from some publications in the press of those years. However, a number of politicians blame the Finnish government for unleashing the war. The famous statesman of Finland Urho Kekkonen, who was the president of this country for almost 26 years (1956-1981), emphasized that the war was not difficult to avoid, it was enough for the Finnish government to show understanding of the interests of the Soviet Union and Finland itself.
