Let us determine how it would be correct to conduct zeroing in the battles of the Russo-Japanese War. In this case, we will consider a duel situation, that is, a one-on-one battle, without concentrating fire from several ships at one target.
As you know, after the Battle of Tsushima, cannons ruled the ball in the sea for many years, and artillery work has been significantly improved since the Russo-Japanese War. Therefore, I will take as a standard the "Rules of the Artillery Service No. 3 Fire Control for Naval Targets" (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules"), published in 1927 and which were part of the Charter of the Artillery Service on the ships of the RKKF.
During these years, Soviet ships were armed with artillery systems, in general, similar to those that were on the ships of the Russo-Japanese War era. It is clear that the guns had a more advanced design, but on destroyers and cruisers they were still located in deck or deck-shield mountings. And the casemates of the Sevastopol-class battleships were to a certain extent similar to those that many of our old battleships had.
The fire control system, of course, has stepped far forward, but nevertheless, the main provisions of the "Rules" could well have been implemented on the "dotsushima" materiel, albeit with somewhat less efficiency. At the same time, the "Rules" were drawn up not only on the basis of the experience of the Russo-Japanese, but also of the First World War. Consequently, the recommendations of the "Rules" can be viewed as a kind of ideal, which was worth striving for when organizing a fire fight in the Russo-Japanese War.
About correct shooting
The "rules" gave the definition of sighting: this is the finding with the help of a series of test shots or volleys of the correct sight, rear sight and VIR-a (the magnitude of the change in the distance to the target). After the specified amendments are determined, zeroing ends and shooting begins to hit the target. But due to the fact that the accuracy of the corrections is not absolute, and the enemy (and the shooting ship) can maneuver, the fire fight is an alternation of zeroing and shooting to kill.
Zeroing was to be carried out exclusively with volley fire. The most advantageous was a volley of 4, 5 or 6 guns. Exceptions to this rule could only be due to the physical impossibility of providing so many guns in a salvo. But even in this case, if the gun is rapid-fire, it was prescribed to quickly release two or three shells so that, even firing from one or two guns, "imitate" a four-round salvo.
Of course, in order to aim, you must observe the fall of your own shells. In this question, the "Rules" describe in great detail what the fire controller can and cannot see.
High-explosive shells usually explode on impact, giving the raised water column a gray tint. Armor-piercing - they do not break on the water. Between the fall of the projectile and the moment when the splash arose, no more than 2-3 seconds pass, regardless of the caliber of the projectile. But for 305-mm guns, the burst lasts 10-15 seconds, and for medium-caliber guns - no more than 3-5 seconds.
When conducting sighting, the position of the sun is important. If the splash is against the background of the sun, then it seems dark, disappears faster and is less visible. If the sun is on the shooter's side, then the splash is white and is clearly visible. Enemy hits will usually not be visible unless the projectile explodes from the outside. In this case, a flash and clouds of black smoke will be noticeable, which will make it possible to distinguish the hit from the shots of enemy guns (- Approx. Auth.).
Bursts of undershot projectiles are always clearly visible against the background of the target. But flights can be hidden by the target and completely invisible even in good weather. If the weather is "hazy", then the bursts of flights can merge with the sky up to complete invisibility.
The aim of zeroing is to cover the target, which occurs if part of the bursts showed undershoot, and the other part - overshoot. In order to achieve coverage, you first had to take the target in the fork, when one volley would show an undershoot, and the second - a flight. However, everyone interested in naval war already knows this principle, and I will not describe it in detail.
An extremely important nuance. In order to determine coverage, undershoot or overshoot (the latter are called fall signs), it is necessary that the gun has the correct horizontal aiming angle or rear sight. The thing is that if the splash from the fall of the projectile did not rise against the background of the ship's hull or behind it, but to the side, then it is extremely difficult to determine whether such a fall resulted in a flight or undershoot - it is extremely difficult, in most cases it is impossible. That is why the "Rules" explicitly prohibit the identification of signs of falling volleys in the event that at least some of the bursts are not in the background of the target.
And then a snide question arises. As mentioned above, a cover is a volley, part of the bursts of which is observed against the background of the target, and the other part - behind its silhouette. But how to determine this happy moment, if hits on the enemy ship may not be visible, and the bursts behind the target ship are difficult to distinguish and may not be noticed?
The "Rules" give a very simple answer to this. The number of hops is judged based on the absent bursts. Suppose we are firing a four-gun salvo and only see two bursts in the background of the target. Then it should be considered that the other two bursts lie behind the target and the cover has been achieved. And this is, of course, correct. If the shells fell with an error on the whole, they would most likely still be visible away from the target. Since they are not visible, it means either they hit the enemy ship, but did not give a visible gap, or lay down behind it, but in either case, we can talk about covering. Well, when the cover is reached, you can open fire to kill.
I would like to note two very interesting points. The "rules" do not require mandatory zeroing with high-explosive shells, but shooting to kill, like zeroing, must be carried out in volleys. Why?
The "Rules" do not contain a direct answer to this question, but taking into account all of the above, it is easy to figure out the following. Taking into account that the "Rules" indicate the color of the burst given by the last burst of a high-explosive projectile, and the possibility in some (not all) cases to observe the burst of the projectile when it hits the target, the advantage of using high-explosive projectiles when zeroing in is self-evident.
But in most cases, the target will be hit by armor-piercing shells (let's not forget that we are talking about 1927), which will not color the bursts and will not be visible when hitting the target ship. At the same time, it is still necessary to evaluate the results of shooting to kill in order to catch the moment when, for one reason or another, the enemy came out of the cover and zeroing should be resumed.
Thus, if the ship, in general, is going to shoot armor-piercing shells, then its artillery fire manager must be able to evaluate the results of the shooting and adjust the fire when firing armor-piercing shells. Which will not give a colored splash and will not be visible when hitting the enemy. And the easiest way to do this is if the shooting will be carried out in volleys. Then, having correctly selected the rear sight and guided by the bursts that have risen against the background of the ship, it will be possible to understand when the target is covered, without even seeing hits and bursts behind the target ship.
What prevented the artillerymen from coming up with such a technique before the Russo-Japanese War?
When did the need for zeroing arose?
Let's start by stating the simple fact that sighting as a tool of naval firefighting became necessary only with an increase in the distance of this very battle. In the "Organization of the Artillery Service on the Ships of the 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet" by F. A. Bersenev (hereinafter - "Organizations …") it was indicated that when firing at a target 30 feet high (9, 15 m), the direct shot range was 10 cables … Thus, in the good old days of the 19th century, when naval battles were supposed to be fought at a distance of 7-15 cables, there was no need to introduce a uniform technique of sighting by the fleet.
Of course, firing tables existed and were used by artillery officers. But at short distances, it was relatively easy to determine the parameters of the target. In addition, when the projectile flies for only a few seconds, even a fast ship will not significantly change its position in space. So, at 20 knots, the ship travels a little more than 10 meters per second.
In other words, in those days it was enough, knowing the course and speed of your ship, to determine the course and speed of the enemy, based on the tables, give the appropriate corrections for the sight and rear sight and open fire. If, nevertheless, a mistake has occurred and the enemy is not hit, then at a distance of one and a half miles the result of the shooting will be clearly visible, and the corrections will be intuitive.
So, for a correct assessment of our methods of sighting in the Russo-Japanese War, it is extremely important to understand that sighting, as a method for determining distances, was a relatively new and not worked out business for our sailors. And, frankly, the views on the sighting of the bulk of Russian naval officers were very far from reality.
How did our naval officers see the sighting on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War?
Let us consider what Lieutenant Colonel V. Alekseev reported about the sighting in his work "Basic principles of organizing control of ship's artillery in battle." This small book was published, for a second, "by order of the General Naval Staff" already in 1904. Why is it worth watching this particular work?
Dear A. Rytik pointed out in the article “Tsushima. Factors of accuracy of Russian artillery that:
“By the beginning of the war with Japan, the Rules of Artillery Service on Navy Ships, published back in 1890, were hopelessly outdated.
New fire control techniques were developed independently in individual fleets, squadrons, squads, or even ships. In 1903, a training artillery detachment successfully fired at the command "Management and action of ship artillery in battle and during exercises" drawn up by the flagship artilleryman of the Pacific squadron A. K. Myakishev. But neither the main naval headquarters, represented by ZP Rozhestvensky, nor the naval technical committee of the fleet, represented by FV Dubasov, gave further progress to this document."
Of course, everything was so. But, according to A. Rytik, the impression is that the solution to the issue lay on the surface, and only the inertia of our "functionaries" in admiral's epaulets in the person of ZP Rozhestvensky and FV Dubasov prevented us from adopting an effective fire control system.
In fact, the following happened. The rules drawn up in 1890 were indeed completely outdated, and the fleets at the end of the 19th century received the latest military equipment, including rapid-fire guns, smokeless powder, etc. Of course, the sailors reacted to this, and the Marine Technical Committee was buried under a tsunami of all kinds of notes, reports and documents on the organization of artillery fire, developed by individual fleets, squadrons and even ships. Lieutenant Colonel V. Alekseev wrote about this.
By the way, the footnote states:
What is characteristic - all the mentioned "brochures" were compiled by officers-practitioners. But, as often happens in such cases, these works contradicted each other, and it was unclear which of them should be preferred. Of course, it was possible to take as a basis what was common in these works, the basic principles to which all or the overwhelming majority of naval artillerymen were inclined. Lieutenant Colonel V. Alekseev came to the conclusion that: "Such principles do exist, and this note is devoted precisely to their clarification and presentation."
Thus, V. Alekseev's "note" was not his personal opinion on naval artillery issues, but an analysis and a short essay of numerous works by many officers of the fleet. What, in fact, this document is valuable.
V. Alekseev quite rightly pointed out that sighting is not a method of shooting, but a “method of checking or determining the distance,” although, of course, the definition given by the “Rules” of 1927 is by no means more accurate and correct. But, according to V. Alekseev, zeroing had numerous and ineradicable drawbacks and was possible only in cases when:
1) it is possible to distinguish the fall of one's own shells from those of others;
2) the distance changes slowly and indefinitely;
3) when there is time for zeroing (!).
Hence V. Alekseev makes a truly mind-blowing conclusion:
Accordingly, V. Alekseev recommended at distances of 10 cables or less to fire at the eye gauge, and over 10 cables - at the rangefinder, and only "in special cases" - at zeroing.
In the yard, I repeat - 1904.
Article 1 of the Introduction from the "Rules", published in 1927, that is, the very first lines of this guiding document read:. In other words, zeroing is an absolutely necessary stage in clarifying the distance to the enemy and other target parameters. And before the Russo-Japanese War, many of our artillery officers did not see the need for zeroing at all, believing that it was possible to switch to rapid fire immediately, upon receiving the data of the rangefinder station and calculating the necessary corrections to them.
Understanding all this, we will see the instructions for organizing the sighting for the 2nd Pacific Squadron in a slightly different light than the one presented to us by the respected A. Rytik.
How were 2TOE ships targeted?
Initially - in full accordance with the "Organization of Artillery Service on Ships of the 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet", compiled by Colonel F. A. Bersenev. I will note some of the features of this document:
1. Zeroing at a long distance is obligatory, and the responsibility for conducting it rests with the fire controller. The latter determines all the necessary amendments and reports the sight and rear sight to the plutong, which carries out the zeroing. The independent change of the sight and rear sight by the commander of the plutong or his subordinates is strictly prohibited.
2. The “fork” principle is not used for zeroing. Instead, if the enemy approaches the targeting ship, then you should first achieve undershoot and then, adjusting the sight so as to gradually reduce the distance between the splash and the enemy ship, achieve a cover (close hit at the side), and then proceed to fire to kill … If the enemy moves away, it is necessary to act in the same way, but instead of undershoots, seek a flight.
3. Zeroing is done with single shots.
What can I say here?
All the measures outlined in the first paragraph are undoubtedly progressive and fully correspond to post-war practice, but this cannot be said about the second and third points. I already wrote above about the need for zeroing in volleys. As for the “fork” principle, it is worth noting that, although in the “Rules” arr. 1927 and provides as many as 3 options for zeroing, they all use the "fork" method - the only difference is in the methods of taking the target into the "fork".
The first shooting in Madagascar of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, carried out according to these rules, turned out to be a failure. I am not inclined to blame this solely on the shortcomings of the zeroing method, but, obviously, they played a role too. However, based on the results of the shooting, which took place on January 13, 1905, Z. P. Rozhdestvensky issues an order (No. 42 of January 14, 1905), which establishes the principle of the "fork" as mandatory:
“When zeroing in, one should, without throwing the first round, by all means throw the second one and, if the first one lies to the right, then by all means put the second one to the left … Having taken the target at least in a wide fork, one should dispose of the third shot after thinking it over”.
Thus, the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron corrected one of the two main shortcomings in the work of FA Beresnev.
The result was not slow to affect the next firing, which took place on January 18 and 19, 1905. Lieutenant P. A. Vyrubov 1st, who served on the Suvorov, can in no way be attributed to the supporters of Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky. The characterization that he gave to the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron is extremely negative. Nevertheless, P. A. Vyrubov wrote about the Madagascar shooting:
“On the 13th, 18th and 19th, the whole squadron went out to sea and fired at the shields. The first shooting was poor, but the second and especially the third were great. It's obvious how we need practice. The 12-inch turret fired especially well: the bow, for example, laid 5 out of 6 shells, so the admiral of Togo would have to sign for receiving them in full."
Again, one should not look for the reason for the increase in the accuracy of shooting of our ships solely in the zeroing method, but, obviously, it also played a role, making it possible to more accurately determine the distances, which is why 305-mm shells began to hit the target more often.
Thus, we can say that the zeroing technique used by the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in Tsushima had only one fundamental drawback - it was produced not in volleys, but in single shots.
How critical was it for us?
On the benefits of zeroing in volleys
Let's start with the fact that shooting in volleys allows you to more accurately determine the distance and movement parameters of the enemy ship.
According to the "Rules" of 1927, the coverage was considered reliable only when at least 2 bursts were visible on both sides of the targets. If there is only one, then the covering is recognized as unreliable, but there were also migratory and non-flying covers (when most of the bursts fell behind or in front of the target). Obviously, such observations were of great help to the firing officer in adjusting the fire.
And it is just as obvious that it is impossible to obtain such information by firing a single projectile. If the projectile went undershot, this is noticeable and understandable, but if the splash is not visible, then it is impossible to say whether it was a flight or a cover, since the projectile could hit the target. It turns out that if it was impossible to observe the flights, the artilleryman had only to return to the method described in the "Organization …", that is, to achieve undershoot and then each next volley to bring the splash closer to the side of the enemy ship. But for this it is necessary not only to distinguish well the bursts against the background of the target body, but also to notice the distance between the burst and the target, which was far from always possible. And in case of a mistake, opening fire to kill meant just throwing out shells in vain.
Therefore, it should be assumed that the firing accuracy of Russian ships in Tsushima strongly depended on how well the target was observed and on the fall of their own shells.
If the Mikasa was seen well, then they shot at it quickly, approximately at the same time as the Japanese shot at the Suvorov. If at about 14:30 "Eagle", having transferred fire to "Iwate", well observed the fall of its shells, then the accuracy of its shooting was such that the latter had to maneuver out of the fire. But in a number of cases, bursts from the falls of their own shells were not visible. For example, the senior artillery officer of "Nakhimov" Gertner 1st showed:
“As soon as the distance became 42 cab.,“Nakhimov”began firing, first at the“Mikaza”, and when he left the angle of fire, then on the abeam. Installation of the sight was given on the basis of the readings of both rangefinders, but it was not possible to shoot by sighting because of the invisibility of the falling shells."
Obviously, such shooting could not be particularly accurate.
Thus, sighting in volleys has undeniable advantages, which is why it was subsequently adopted everywhere.
As for the Japanese, they practiced sighting in volleys, and, as far as I could understand, it was done this way. The volley was fired not by all artillery at once, but only by a separate plutong. In cases where the distance of the battle was large enough, then only heavy guns could carry out the zeroing, however, in Tsushima, for the most part, there was no need for this.
Reasons for Better Shooting Accuracy of the United Fleet
Let's start with a simple one - the Japanese gunners were corny more experienced. Two battles with the Russian fleet, apart from small skirmishes, obviously gave them combat experience that the Russian artillerymen of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons did not have and could not have. But now we are analyzing not experience, but methods of firefighting. And here the Japanese had four important advantages:
Firstly, these were high-explosive shells that exploded when they hit anything - even into the water, even into the enemy's ship, and gave a high splash and columns of black smoke. Accordingly, it was easier for the Japanese to zero in, and there was a significant range of distance, in which the Russian ships no longer had the opportunity to zero in, and the Japanese, thanks to the good visibility of the explosions of their shells, still retained this possibility.
Secondly, this is shooting in volleys, which made it possible to quickly and more accurately determine the necessary corrections to the sight and rear sight. All explanations have already been given above, so I will not repeat myself.
But there was also a very important "third", namely - the Japanese and zeroing, and fire to kill were fired with the same high-explosive ammunition.
Why is it important?
As follows from the "Rules" of 1927 and as common sense tells us, gunfighting is not limited to artillery combat, but is just beginning. That is why the "Rules" also demanded firing to kill, as well as zeroing, in volleys - so that one could assess whether the enemy had come out from under the cover, and stop the fire to kill in time, again switching to zeroing. In principle, the Japanese artillerymen in Tsushima did not have such a problem - they both aimed and fired to kill with the same high-explosive shells. But the Russian gunners, even if they had at their disposal effective "smoky" shells for zeroing, would still have to switch to shooting to kill upon completion. That is, to use steel shells with pyroxylin filling, which did not explode when dropped into water and whose explosions would not be visible when enemy ships were hit.
If the Japanese incorrectly determined the parameters of the target by zeroing in, this was evident during the transition to shooting to kill. Our gunners would be deprived of this advantage in any case, even if they had high-quality land mines for sighting. In all cases, when the fall of "smokeless" Russian shells was poorly observed due to distance and weather conditions, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the moment when the Japanese ship left the cover. The Japanese, obviously, did not have such problems. More precisely, not that they did not have at all - they were also, of course, limited by weather conditions, but, of course, all other things being equal, the Japanese officers distinguished the results of their fire at a greater distance than ours.
In other words, the use of high-explosive shells gave the Japanese an advantage in accuracy, not only in sighting, but also in the process of fire to kill. The artillerymen of the United Fleet were well aware of the hits on the Russian ships and understood when the fire to kill ceases to be effective. In this case, they could either clarify the parameters of the target by zeroing in, or, if this was difficult due to the concentration of fire on the targets of several other ships, transfer the fire to another Russian battleship.
The payback for the advantages in accuracy that the constant firing of high-explosive shells gave is obvious - the Japanese shells practically did not penetrate armor. But, as I described earlier, despite this drawback, Japanese land mines gave masses of fragments and provoked fires, which effectively reduced the artillery potential of Z. P. Rozhestvensky's ships, disabling the centralized fire control, and in some cases, the artillery pieces themselves. …
There is a point of view that if the Japanese had used high-quality armor-piercing shells in Tsushima, the Russian ships would have died much earlier. I fully agree with this, but by using landmines they achieved a strong weakening of Russian fire and thus “bought” themselves additional time, during which they could shoot our ships with almost impunity.
And finally, fourthly, the Japanese navy had more advanced telescopic sights, which I mentioned in the previous article.
The reader may wonder why, among other reasons, I did not mention the defiant black and yellow coloring of the Russian ships, which, in the opinion of the Russian officers, strongly unmasked them and made it easier for the enemy to zero in on them. However, oddly enough, I did not find reliable confirmation of this opinion.
So, for example, Shcherbachev 4th pointed out:
“Although the distance to Iwate was 32 to 36 cables, it was very difficult to shoot at it; all the ships of the enemy were completely painted with a grayish-olive color, completely merging with the background of the misty and hazy horizon and the smoke that drifted across the sea."
There were other indications that already on 50 cables the Japanese ships turned out to be practically indistinguishable against the background of the sky and the sea. But the Japanese also complained about poor visibility interfering with shooting. So, the commander of "Yakumo" indicated in the combat report:
"In this daytime battle, due to the dense fog at a distance of over 6000 m, it was difficult to clearly observe the enemy ships, [and] from time to time [and] at 6000 m there was a lack of clarity [visibility]."
Even if we count in artillery cables, it still turns out that we are talking about a distance of 32, 8 cables! That is, the Japanese experienced difficulties in observing our ships at the same distances as we did.
In addition, there is one more consideration, which at first glance is very logical, but I have no confirmation of it. There is a lot of evidence that Japanese shells, when hitting the water, gave not only a splash, but also a column of black smoke. This smoke, of course, was clearly visible, but …
But was it so clearly visible against the background of the black sides of our battleships?
Still, black on black in poor visibility conditions is not so easy to make out. And it is possible that Z. P. Rozhestvensky, planning to protect his ships from night attacks with black and yellow paint, did not make a big mistake and did not make it easier for the Japanese to shoot as it is commonly believed today.
Well, the reasons for Japanese superiority are clear.
It remains only to figure out what the Russian admirals could and could not do in the preparation of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons, in order to somehow neutralize the Japanese advantage.
