For fire support and ground attack, the 40th Army Air Force had well-armed and protected Mi-24s. True, their number at first was extremely small and in the newly formed 40th Army Air Force in the first war months there were only six units. One can see in this the short-sightedness of the leadership, however, apparently, the reasons were of a more mundane nature: the directives of the high command provided that when troops were deployed, it was almost exclusively by the forces of local military districts, TurkVO and SAVO (paratroopers from the central districts to the 40th armies were not included). Meanwhile, the air force in the southern direction, which was considered "rear", was very limited. There were few helicopter units here, and there were very few combat helicopters (for example, in the 280th OVP at the location in Kagan near Bukhara, there were two of them, and then the very first model of the Mi-24A).
Mi-24P in flight over the suburbs of Kandahar. 205th OVE, autumn 1987
After it became clear that the army was in the midst of an armed struggle and open hostilities could not be avoided, the situation began to be corrected by the most energetic methods. On February 1, 1980, the aviation units received an order to lift restrictions on the consumption of ammunition. To strengthen the air grouping, it was necessary to attract combat helicopters from other military districts. On February 29, with the help of the Anteyevs of transport aviation, a squadron of Mi-24D helicopter regiment from Rauhovka (ODVO) was transferred to TurkVO, which immediately left for Afghanistan, starting to operate from the Bagram airfield. Next, another helicopter squadron was transported to the Tajik village of Moskovsky to work in the northern regions of Afghanistan. She was stationed in Kunduz and on June 27, 1980 was officially included in the 40th Army Air Force.
A squadron of Mi-24D from the Transcaucasian 292nd OBVP settled in Jalalabad (a year later, in the summer of 1981, the regiment was replaced by the newly formed 335th OBVP). As part of the 50th OSAP, formed according to the directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense of January 4, 1980 at the base in Chirchik, the presence of a combat helicopter squadron on the Mi-24 was immediately envisaged. A pair of regimental Mi-24Ds flew their first combat sortie from Kunduz on March 11, 1980. By the end of the month, the regiment flew to Kabul, from where it worked until the end of the war, constantly having one Mi-24 squadron. Another combined helicopter squadron, numbering two dozen Mi-8 and Mi-24, arrived in Kunduz at the end of 1980.
In total, the 40th Army Air Force by January 1982 had 251 helicopters, including 199 "combat" helicopters, as stated in the document of the Air Force Main Directorate of the Air Force (apparently, there was an inaccuracy in terminology and meant all armed Mi-8 and Mi-24). Nevertheless, the lack of the Mi-24 remained perceptible, which explains the protracted practice of using the "eights" for strike purposes. In the absence of combat helicopters in most parts of their tasks, they had to solve the same Mi-8, albeit not in the best way adapted for this. In the aforementioned operation to destroy the Dushman base in Rabati-Jali at the beginning of April 1982, an entire armada of two helicopter regiments was involved, but not a single Mi-24 was among them - they simply were not at the Kandahar base at that time.
Later, combat helicopters were supplemented by other army aviation units already in Afghanistan. In mid-February 1982the Mi-24D squadron was included in the Kandahar 280th OVP. Since April 1982, the Mi-24 squadron became part of the 181st OVP in Kunduz. As a result, almost all army aviation units in the 40th Army Air Force, from regiments to individual squadrons, received Mi-24 helicopters (with the exception of advisory helicopters, which had only transport aviation, whose tasks were not directly involved in hostilities by definition) …
Another, and very significant, organizational and staffing measure was the transfer of helicopter units and subunits to reinforced wartime staff. By the end of the summer of 1980, all helicopter squadrons in Afghanistan were manned with five flights of four helicopters each - instead of the previous four-link. Accordingly, in the squadrons, there were 20 helicopters instead of 12-16, as it was before (the number could differ both up and down, according to circumstances - for example, after losses or, conversely, recovery after an accident of "unaccounted for" machines, moreover, the side number of the downed helicopter, with an eye on the unkind omen, was never assigned to a new one). To replenish the helicopter units in Afghanistan, according to the new states, it was necessary to find crews and equipment in different districts, "combing" literally through the entire army aviation. In early August 1980, 72 helicopter crews for the Mi-8 and Mi-24 with equipment were assembled at the base in Kokayty, which flew to Afghanistan on the 16th of the same month and were distributed to the 40th Army Air Force units.
The start of combat work of the Mi-24 was accompanied by hefty problems due to both lack of experience and the characteristics of the machine itself, multiplied by the specifics of Afghan conditions. The high speed qualities and maneuverability of the Mi-24 were achieved due to the higher specific load on the main rotor (in area it was one and a half times less than that of the "eight"), which did not have the best effect on takeoff and landing qualities and carrying capacity. During combat maneuvering at high speeds, the "striped" one with its high aerodynamic load on the rotor blades was subject to the dangerous phenomenon of "pick-up" with overload overload and breakout modes. The unexpected behavior of the helicopter was perceived as loss of control and disobedience of the machine.
Flight helicopter pilots of the 181st Airborne Forces Manzhosov and Sholokhov from the 3rd squadron of the regiment. The Mi-24V carries OFAB-250-270 bombs and B8V20 blocks. Kunduz, December 1984
The helicopter sag at the exit from the dive was noticeable. When performing energetic maneuvers, the car could bury itself, losing height and slipping on a bend. Energetic control during maneuvers, braking and avoiding obstacles led to dangerous situations - uncoordinated maneuvers, getting into a difficult spatial position, propeller hits on the tail with an inevitable transition to an emergency situation. In combination with the lack of power and throttle response of the engines in mountainous conditions, stalling flow and "drag" control, piloting of the Mi-24 was significantly complicated, which was especially noticeable in comparison with the lighter and more "flying" Mi-8.
Local features contributed to their share - poor landing sites with limited approaches, flights in narrow mountainous areas with unsatisfactory conditions for maneuver, the meteorological situation itself with many orographic disturbances, unexpected air currents and turbulence throwing the helicopter onto the rocks. Many gorges looked like real "stone bags", having no way out, and air currents blew in different directions on the neighboring slopes - rising from the one heated by the sun and descending from the one remaining in the shade. In addition to the difficulties in piloting, the cramped conditions and rather strong winds affected the use of weapons: the pilot had very little time to assess the situation and aim, and the air currents literally "blew off" the missile salvo and carried the dropped bombs.
Fortress near Kandahar, which served as a haven for local gangs and an object of constant work for helicopter pilots
Technicians and pilots of the 181st OVP are engaged in the procurement of building materials. With the almost complete absence of wood and other materials, boxes from under rockets are disassembled into planks for arranging, and a bomber from a bar was also in great demand. Kunduz, autumn 1983
Fire training took its due place in the training of combat helicopter crews. Practically no one had the skills of combat use in the local difficult conditions, and practically no one had the practice of piloting in such an environment: the pilots who arrived from the Odessa steppes had previously seen the mountains only at a resort in Minvody. The lessons were worth a lot of losses, mainly due to accidents. By the end of 1980, the Air Force of the 40th Army had lost 21 Mi-24 helicopters (even more than the Mi-8, of which 19 were lost). The bulk of them were lost not at all for combat reasons and without any fire damage. In particular, in the Kunduz squadron, half of the available Mi-24s were defeated in all kinds of flight accidents - from errors in piloting to getting into difficult conditions. In particular, in December 1980, the Mi-24 taking off lifted a snow whirlwind with its propeller and, when the pilots lost visibility, flew into the nearby Mi-6s, chopped the extreme helicopter with its blades and fell right there.
The first helicopter pilot to die in Afghanistan was a Mi-24 flight engineer, Senior Lieutenant A. N. Saprykin. On January 21, 1980, his helicopter conducted aerial reconnaissance and came under fire. The pilot, who was performing his ninth combat mission, was seriously wounded and died two days later in the hospital. Three weeks later, on February 13, the Mi-24 of Captain S. I. Khrulev from the 292nd regiment, which crashed together with the crew. This Mi-24 was the first lost in Afghanistan and the first combat loss of aviation of the 40th Army.
At the same time, in a combat situation, the Mi-24, with its powerful armament and protection, had clear advantages, being a machine created and adapted specifically for strike operations (although the opinion about its superiority was repeatedly disputed, and many preferred the Mi-8MT for most tasks, considering the "twenty-four" overweight and insufficiently maneuverable in high mountains). Nevertheless, the specificity of the battlefield took its toll, and gradually the share of the Mi-24 increased to almost half of the helicopter fleet, and mixed flights of pairs Mi-8 and Mi-24, complementing each other, entered into practice. Already in the Panjshir operation in May-June 1982, 32 Mi-24 helicopters were involved - almost all of the then available. It is indicative that with the saturation of the 40th Army Air Force with G8 combat helicopters, who had previously acted as “jack of all trades”, they began to be involved much less frequently to perform strike missions, yielding this role to more adapted “crocodiles”. Over time, the participation of the Mi-8 in air support for quite understandable reasons decreased even more, and since 1985 the share of sorties for such missions has not exceeded 10-12%. According to the Mi-8 pilot-navigator Senior Lieutenant A. M. Degtyarev, who arrived at the 50th OSAP in November 1985 and served there until January 1987, during these fifteen months “they used bombs only twice, they destroyed the bridge near Asmar and in the operation in the Kunar Gorge, however, they were bombed conscientiously. working with ten Mi-8s and throwing four OFAB-250s. Blocks were also used infrequently, the specifics of missions were different, most of the sorties were for transportation, supply of posts, target designation, which is why even unnecessary farms were removed and flew without them."
"Main caliber" - high-explosive bomb FAB-250M62 in the parking lot of the 4th squadron of the 181st OVP. Kunduz, autumn 1983
Mi-24 cover the transport convoy on the way to Kabul
Since this practice became common and the Mi-8 pilots in most sorties entrusted the provision of fire cover and support to the accompanying "crocodiles", the army commander even pointed out that the equipment of the helicopters corresponded to the combat situation and that, in case of an unforeseen development of events, they did not turn out to be "unarmed. ". In particular, it turned out that the helicopters involved in the "Veil" system, which flew to fight the caravans, often went "empty", although the inspection teams usually needed air support. By order of the 40th Army of December 11, 1987 No.it was ordered that the helicopters participating in reconnaissance and patrol actions be properly equipped and for this purpose without fail "to designate targets, as well as to destroy identified firing points, equip the Mi-8MT with landing groups with two UB-32 units."
Organizational measures were, as they say, a profitable business and accompanied the entire course of the Afghan campaign in accordance with the changing situation. The materiel, including weapons, as a system that primarily determines the effectiveness of a combat helicopter, also showed its peculiarities in intense combat work.
Charging helicopter units with S-8D missiles. 262nd OVE, Bagram, summer 1987
The envisaged possibilities of placing an assault force on board the Mi-24 (at that time the concept of using a combat helicopter as a "flying infantry fighting vehicle" was popular) turned out to be unclaimed. As well as at home, in practice this was hampered by the low bearing properties of a rather heavy armored vehicle with a set of weapons (empty, it weighed almost 1.5 tons more than the Mi-8). With paratroopers, the Mi-24 became clumsy, and dwarfs were more suitable for placing soldiers in the cargo compartment - its height was only 1.2 m. In Afghanistan, the implementation of such plans was also hampered by a general deterioration in flight performance, especially sensitive with the specific features of the Mi-24 …
One of the few examples of the use of "crocodiles" in such a capacity was the flights of Kunduz vehicles in the first war year: having decided to use the available capabilities, from time to time they took on board the Mi-24 from Major Kozovoy's squadron from the neighboring 56th Airborne assault brigade. To enhance the firepower, four soldiers with light machine guns were placed on board, who fired through the side vents in the windows. Their presence added an extra half a ton, but in the winter months this did not particularly affect the "volatility" of the helicopter. It is not known how much of this undertaking justified itself, but during one of the sorties, the helicopter of Captain Glazyrin landed on an emergency in the mountains, and seven people of the crew and shooters turned out to be with him at once. Captain Valiakhmetov's Mi-24 got hooked to the rescue, picking everyone up at once. How the rescued were accommodated in a cramped compartment the size of a "Zaporozhets" is known only to them, but together with "their" rifle group there were 14 people on board at once. The helicopter, however, was able to perform a vertical take-off from the mountain platform and deliver everyone to the airfield.
Equipping the blocks with S-8 missiles. With a shell in his hands - Lieutenant of the armament group of the 205th OVE A. Artyukh. Kandahar, summer 1987
Difficult operating conditions soon revealed a number of shortcomings in the Mi-24 armament and, above all, in its USPU-24 rifle mount. The high rate of fire of the four-barreled machine gun YakB-12, 7 in 4000-5000 rds / min (it was not for nothing that it was called "high-rate") and an impressive second salvo of 3.6 kg (for comparison: the DShK with the same caliber - only 0, 5 kg) were achieved by a significant complication of the design. The rotating block of barrels with the help of a kinematic mechanism was set in motion by a kind of gas-powder motor that used the removed powder gases. The fire from the machine gun was conducted by the operator pilot with the help of the KPS-53AV mobile sighting station, which provided weapon guidance and firing with the necessary adjustments for speed, angular movement and others required for aiming (the station in the operator's cabin was curiously called "stern", retaining the letter "K" in the name of the prototype borrowed from long-range bombers). The pilot could also fire, but only when the machine gun was installed in the forward position along the axis of the machine and used as a stationary one, while aiming at his ASP-17V sight (on the Mi-24V, on the previous Mi-24D they used a simpler sight - PKV type) …
In flight - Captain Belyaev's Mi-24P from the 205th OVE. The helicopter carries a conventional version of weapons for reconnaissance and search operations from a pair of B8V20 blocks and two ATGM "Shturm"
The machine gun was rightfully considered a formidable weapon - its impressive salvo had a powerful destructive effect both in manpower and in cars in dushman caravans, spreading even a half-meter thick blower, impenetrable by S-5 missiles. During normal operation, the machine gun deserved the most positive feedback from the pilots. Andrey Maslov, who flew as an operator on a Mi-24V in the 50th regiment, described his impressions of working with a machine gun as follows: “His rate of fire is such that he cuts the car in half. Armor-piercing incendiary bullets even pierce the armored personnel carrier, give a burst - and a swarm of red fireflies is carried away into the distance, even in the daytime it is clearly visible. God forbid getting caught in his turn - only arms and legs fly from a person. It hits exactly, we somehow ran into the "bearded" on a hill, I noticed the "spirit" sitting at the entrance to the cave and managed to get ahead, shot him offhand. The line went right through it, and then I did not see, the sand fountains, and the whole cave boiled with dust. When you enter the combat course, the target trembles in the crosshair of the sight and after pressing the trigger in the cockpit it smells of powder smoke, for some reason I remember films about the war and it seems that this is not with you, but with someone else …"
At the same time, the YakB-12, 7, with its rather complex device, turned out to be sensitive to overheating and pollution - everyday satellites of combat work. Powder soot settled in the gas engine, the system worked at the limit in terms of temperature and durability of the nodes, which was known before (with 1470 rounds of ammunition, the instruction limited the queue to a maximum of 400 shots "followed by breaks to cool the weapon for 15-20 minutes", Otherwise, heating threatened with an explosion of primers and cartridges). At home, where practice firing was infrequent, and cartridges were few, these shortcomings did not become a problem, but in a combat situation where the shot exceeded all standards, the YakB-12, 7 became a source of incessant complaints.
The Mi-24P is firing a cannon: fountains of explosions are visible in front of the vehicle. Region of the Black Mountains near Kandahar, autumn 1987
The machine gun jammed, the gas engine jammed, the kinematics suffered. The high rate of fire required the same feed rate of the tape, which stretched along the winding sleeve, and it often broke when jerking. The use of special double-bullet cartridges, developed for the YakB-12, 7 and capable of doubling the density of fire, entailed failures due to poor sealing of bullets in the muzzle of the cartridge case: when the tape jerked, they loosened, went skewed and more than once led to swelling and rupture trunks. In the 50th regiment, which began combat work in the spring of 1980, thanks to the perseverance of the armament service, it turned out that a fair amount of the failures were factory reasons and that the YakB-12, 7 helicopters did not pass the shooting tests laid down at the time of delivery. There were failures of the control system (tracking synchromesh synchronization and electric aiming drives), in which the machine gun hit away from the line of sight and did not return to the neutral position. Getting rid of the defect, the machine gun was sometimes fixed along the axis of the helicopter, and the pilot fired from it with the help of his ASP-17V automatic sight.
Repeatedly workmen came to fix the defects, the design bureau tried to solve the problems, but the results remained modest. However, partly the malfunctions were caused by harsh operating conditions and not always full-fledged supervision of the weapon, which required too much attention in intense combat work, and the YakB-12, 7 clearly did not tolerate maintenance "on condition". In the summer of 1982, in the 4th squadron of the Kandahar regiment of 20 Mi-24 helicopters, machine guns worked normally only on seven machines, earning the ironic decoding of their name "Allegedly shoots."The situation remained almost unchanged in subsequent years, when a significant part of the machine-gun "twenty-fours" were supplanted by the cannon Mi-24P.
According to A. Maslov, “in May 1986, due to an inoperative machine gun, we had to fly without it at all. At that time we were working in the Chakarai area, hammering one village, and at the most interesting moment my machine gun jammed. After the flights until late at night, they fiddled with him, everyone was smeared, they were tired, but they did not do it. I had to call the gunsmiths from Kabul, they flew in, dug and dug with a machine gun, they did not fix anything, they took it off altogether and threw it into the cargo compartment. We flew with a hole in the place of the machine gun, there was a lot of air in the cockpit. The next day, the specialist finally broke the machine gun for us. When we returned to the base in Kabul, we replaced it with a new one."
With the advent of the powerful NAR S-8 with new B-8V20 blocks, first of all, they tried to equip machine-gun machines, compensating for the unsatisfactory operation of the machine gun with long-range rockets. By the spring of 1987, in the detachment of the 205th separate helicopter squadron, attached to the special forces in the same Kandahar, the only Mi-24V remained, on which the YakB-12, 7 could not stand it for several days without another refusal. According to the recall of Lieutenant A. Artyukh, who was in charge of weapons, “the machine gun pulled our whole soul out of us, it was not possible to achieve its stable operation and we even had to get a second one in order to change the jammed one. Nothing helped - not regular cleaning, not packing and lubricating the belts. Departure without refusal, we already considered good luck, and it happened that he wedged twice a day. Then, suddenly, the belt was cut off again, but the machine gun did not jam and suddenly began to work normally. We were afraid to breathe on it, did not touch or clean, only replenished the tape. What happened remained unclear, but he fired perfectly for a month and a half until the helicopter was shot down on February 16 …"
The appearance of the Mi-24P with the GSh-2-30K double-barreled cannon in the 9A623K version, which differed in the barrels extended by 900 mm from those used on the Su-25 attack aircraft, made it possible to remove most of the problems inherent in machine-gun vehicles. The fixed installation got rid of defects in the guidance system, but the fire could now only be fired strictly along the course, aiming the weapon at the target with the whole vehicle, and this role was assigned to the commander (which caused a certain jealousy of the operators who remained on the "bench"). A fair amount of power and recoil even led to a tail lift and a loss of speed when firing, and sometimes shocks knocked out the AZR and equipment.
Depending on the tactical situation and the nature of the target, the pilot could choose the fire mode at his own discretion. Avoiding long bursts that "took away" the helicopter, they usually fired by setting the switches to the "Burst short / slow pace" position and, having gotten used to it, could limit the fire to single shots. The accuracy of the fire was also excellent: the cannon made it possible to conduct aimed firing up to a two-kilometer range, and at normal distances of several hundred meters, an experienced pilot chopped down a tree or felled a camel in a caravan with one or two shells. A full ammunition of 250 rounds was almost never taken, being content with 150 shells: with reasonable use, they were quite enough, and the gain of a hundred to one and a half kilograms of weight in flight had a positive effect on the maneuverability and acceleration characteristics of the helicopter.
Park day in the 4th squadron of the 181st AFP. The work is being carried out on a helicopter with suspension bombs and charged blocks. The machine gun that had refused the day before has been removed, and there are no frames for the "Storms" either. Kunduz, October 1983
The Mi-24V crew of the 4th squadron of the 181st OVP - pilot Efimenko (right) and operator Pryamoye. The helicopter carries OFAB-100-120 bombs and B8V20 blocks. Kunduz, October 1983
Heavy belts were loaded with cartridges with 400-gram high-explosive fragmentation-incendiary projectiles OFZ-30-GSh and tracer OFZT-30GSh, as well as special "multi-element" ME projectiles. The latter contained 28 bullets each in packets with an expelling charge, which retained destructive power 400 m from the point of explosion of the projectile. Unlike machine-gun ammunition, the cartridge belt was more convenient to lay, filling it into the cartridge box that was folded back together with the gun (however, in the difficult work of the armament service, convenience was a relative concept). According to V. Paevsky, “usually the tape was laid directly from the boxes in which it was brought to the helicopter, without being associated with any devices - it is both faster and easier. Before charging, it was supposed to be abundantly lubricated with cannon grease No. 9, after which two or three of us picked up a weighty and greasy, all in grease, a tape that strives to fold under its own weight in a fan now outward, then inward - by the way, each link with a projectile pulls about a kilogram … You hold this weight on your hands, and the "playing" tape pinches your fingers and nails until they turn blue; I didn’t take off my watch - count it’s gone, I have changed from a dozen during my service on the Mi-24P”.
The BR-30-GSh armor-piercing explosive shells were used little: there were no targets for "blanks" with a small 14.6-gram explosive charge. The fuse designed to meet the armor did not fire when it hit a weak obstacle, and the projectile could pierce the car through and through without exploding, and the gaps on the ground, along which the fire could be adjusted, were almost invisible due to the same low high-explosive effect. due to the small amount of explosives.
The GSh-2-30K cannon remained the favorite weapon of both pilots and gunsmiths, although during intensive work it did not do without failures. The reasons could be wear of parts, careless stuffing of belts, dirt and sand on the cartridges, clogging the receiver and the gun compartment. According to the regulations, compulsory cleaning was prescribed no later than the next day after use, and after every 600 shots - cleaning the gun with its removal from the machine and complete disassembly (laborious and energy-consuming task, but, moreover, not very effective, because after a couple of days the tape receiver and the kinematics were again clogged with dust, which turned the grease into a dirty mess). Folk remedies and ingenuity came to the rescue: the gun, without disassembling it, was completely washed in kerosene from dirt and soot, and the mechanism was twitched several times, removing only the gas pistons that set the automatics in motion for more thorough cleaning.
To protect the receiver from dirt, the tape was abundantly stuffed with grease, and it went into the gun literally like clockwork, and dirt and carbon deposits, along with the used grease, flew out. At the same time, "wedges" were practically excluded: in the 205th OVE in the fall of 1987, the gun on one of the Mi-24Ps worked for several months without a single refusal and purges, firing 3000 shells!
The convenient location of the gun simplified its maintenance, and the electric ignition of the capsule guaranteed against accidental shots, which are not so rare with machine guns. Safety was not the last concern: when jammed, a projectile stuck in the chamber usually had to be chopped into pieces, pulling it out piece by piece.
There was a case when the cannon helped to save the helicopter on the ground: the Mi-24P who had landed on the forced Mi-24P was surrounded by a gang, and Captain V. Goncharov decided to use a weapon more powerful than the machine guns of the PSS group. He had never fought on foot, but he had a cannon at hand. The helicopter was manually turned in the direction of the attackers, the pilot took a seat in the cockpit and gave a turn. The "spirits" lay down, hiding behind stones, then they began to run across, getting up from the other side. Hanging on their tail, the soldiers turned the helicopter from side to side, and the pilot fought off the spooks in short bursts until help arrived.
Some of the cannon vehicles carried a laser rangefinder coupled with a sight computer. A fairly compact device was made on the basis of marine binoculars, adapted for this purpose. The range finder significantly improved the conditions for solving the sighting problem, giving out the range to the target instead of the previous "eye" method of determining the firing distance, which had a positive effect on the accuracy of the fire.
Mi-24P is preparing to fly to cover the airbase. Bagram, December 1988
The Mi-24 could carry up to four missile units, but this option was considered an overload option. Each equipped block weighed more than a quarter of a ton (260 kg), and after the missiles were launched, they remained hanging on the suspension in a shaped "sieve", significantly adding aerodynamic resistance, which is why the matter was usually limited to a couple of blocks. Since for aiming and aiming when firing the NAR, it was required to "direct" them by maneuvering the entire vehicle, fire control from the blocks was transferred to the commander. The possibility of firing the NAR by the operator with guidance at the sighting station was also envisaged, since there was also a control knob in its cockpit, which made it possible to pilot the machine in the event of the commander's failure. In this case, all weapons control was switched to the operator's cabin.
"Division of labor" was envisaged when using bomber weapons: in this version, the helicopter could carry up to four bombs of 100 or 250 kg, or two of 500 kg. On the Mi-24D, the operator carried out the bombing with the help of his KPS-53AV station, the pilot could drop bombs only in emergency mode. On the Mi-24V and cannon vehicles with a more advanced automatic sight of the ASP-17V pilot, the commander could also carry out aimed bombing. For aimed bombing on the Mi-24D and Mi-24V, the VSB-24 onboard firing and bombing computer was used, which was usually used in a semi-automatic mode (working in an “automatic” in the mountains gave too many misses).
Pilot Mi-24 E. E. Goncharov, who served in the 181st Kunduz Military Regiment, said: “Some said that sighting in the mountains is useless, so people invent all sorts of ways, draw crosshairs on the windshield and so on. Even during the preparation, they pointed out: "in the mountainous area, ASP-17V and VSB-24 are not used, since the operation in automatic mode is unreliable." We had to work from a height, keeping higher than the reach of small arms, and the sight gave quite normal results. It was necessary, of course, to adapt: at first, the bombs were placed with an accuracy of up to a hundred meters, or even more, but after a couple of months they began to hit the target, and then it even became possible to reduce the strike groups - three of the four bombs fell with direct hits. The actions of the crew during normal operation of the sight are greatly simplified. The operator puts the sight mark on the target, turns on the mode and follows the target, keeping the mark on it. At the pilot on his sight, the indicator indicates the position of the target, to the left or to the right, and he tries to guide the helicopter on the combat course according to the instructions of the indicator exactly through the target, keeping the speed and altitude (visually, he cannot see the target, since it immediately goes under the helicopter). The calculator gives a buzzer at the right moment, and the operator only has to press the reset button. When you get your hands on, there is no need to spend bombs on “zeroing in”, and even unnecessary conversations on the air are not needed with the target designation group and the gunner."
However, others relied more on a well-aimed eye and skill, performing bombing according to their landmarks, aiming at the tip of the high-pressure gun or the lower edge of the bulletproof glass and reasonably indicating that the result is important and "you need to hit, not aim."
The usual equipment option for the Mi-24 was a combination of two blocks and two 100 kg bombs. Loading a helicopter with blocks and bombs of 250 kg was used less often. In particular, according to data for 1984, such weapons were carried by the Mi-24 only in 16% of sorties (after all, the helicopter became half a ton heavier). The bombs were always hung on external holders, since the wheels of the main landing gear prevented them from rolling up to the inner ones.
"Five hundred" were used infrequently, mainly when absolutely necessary. A helicopter with such a load became heavy and clumsy, and even when the bombs were suspended, they were too heavy and it turned out to be impossible to handle them manually. In addition, after the bombing, the helicopter was left with only one machine gun: blocks were not taken due to overload. In Kandahar, during the entire 1982, the FAB-500 bombs on the Mi-24 were used only four times. In one such case, in November 1982, Captain Anatoly Chirkov from the well-known "Aleksandrovsk squadron" struck an Islamic committee assembled in one of the villages. The purpose was a large adobe drying house, where the local leaders conferred. The object looked like a real fortress, but the "five hundred" with the first blow covered it and destroyed it together with the "activists".
Dushmansky duval after a helicopter attack. A trench and bomb craters are visible nearby. Outskirts of Kandahar, autumn 1987
In Ghazni in May 1987, they almost did harm to themselves with heavy bombs. At night, the on-duty group went up to call the guard battalion to strike at the gang seen nearby. The target was indicated with a flashlight. FAB-500 hung on the Mi-24 in the evening, and they worked with them in a highlighted place. The pilots had just arrived with replacements and, unknowingly, were throwing bombs in one gulp and from a low altitude. The helicopters were thrown a hundred meters, fortunately, without being hit by shrapnel. On the ground they were already met by the squadron commander: "Five hundred" set aside, henceforth - only 250 kilograms and one by one. " It turned out that the gaps lay not far from the residential town, everything was shaking there and glass flew out in the modules.
In the course of modifications on the Mi-24 of all modifications used in the 40th Army Air Force, the possibility of suspension of MBD2-67u multi-lock bomb racks was provided. Using a pair of such holders, the helicopter could carry up to ten bombs of 100 kg caliber (four on each of the holders and two more on the free wing assemblies). The accuracy of such bombing turned out to be low, but a similar version of the weapon, nicknamed the "hedgehog", found application in mining. A pair of helicopters ensured the laying of a sufficient number of powerful bomb "mines" in the right place, laying two dozen "hundred parts" near a hostile village or dushman camp and reliably blocking any movement on the approaches to them. For the same purpose, the Mi-24s were being finalized for the installation of small cargo containers KMG-U, which could carry both mines and small bombs used for mining. Each KMG-U contained 1248 PFM-1 mines. With the suspension of four KMG-U, the helicopter could sow a vast area with imperceptible "butterfly" mines, in the strip of which the area and density of mining depended on the unloading mode, set by the control of the container, which had four different intervals of ejection of blocks with ammunition - from 0.05 to 1, 5 sec.
Full ammunition for the YakB-12, 7 machine gun was 1470 rounds. 262nd OVE, Bagram, summer 1987
Space-detonating aerial bombs (ODAB) were also used on helicopters - a new weapon and at that time unknown to anyone. Taking the opportunity to test them in a combat situation, ODAB was put into action already in the first year of the war. In practice, however, it turned out that the ammunition of an unusual device containing a liquid explosive, requiring a whole system of charges to disperse and detonate a detonating cloud, is rather capricious and sensitive to external conditions. The formation of the explosive fog could be influenced by the temperature, density and humidity of the surrounding air, as well as by the wind, which prevents the creation of an optimal concentration of aerosol that envelops the target. As a result, not all of the dropped bombs went off (according to the experience of the Americans, who first tested the volumetric explosion of ammunition in Vietnam, from 30 to 50% of such bombs exploded at all).
Apparently, the first use of the ODAB from helicopters took place in August 1980 by the pilots of the Mi-24 Kunduz squadron. Eliminating the Dushman ambushes in the Faizabad Gorge, the helicopter pilots worked in a squad, in which the leading pair carried two ODAB-500, and the trailing pair carried missile blocks. Zamkomeska Alatortsev described the organization of the raid in the following way: “We walked at an altitude higher than usual, holding at 300 meters, since the ODAB has no fragments, the new building has a lot of entrapment and when triggered, these pieces of iron fly up 200 meters. The bombs themselves are also some unusual, ingots with a rounded snout, like barrels, with contents squishing inside. We were told that during the ODAB tests, not everything went well, something in the filling did not work as it should and could not detonate. We decided that it would be possible to support the process with missiles, and so it happened. After the drop, a cloud rose below, even seemingly heavy and viscous, and missiles from the wingmen immediately entered this oily mist. Bless you exploded, helicopters were thrown, only teeth snapped. The explosion also does not look like ordinary bombs, from which only a dusty fountain and a smoky cloud, and here - a flash and a ball of fire, swirling for a long time below. The shock wave at the bomb is harder than that of the usual ones, and with fire it finishes everything down there. The effect is a combination of shock pressure, such as high explosive pressure, and high temperature. The paratroopers told later that the "spirits" who remained in place were in a terrible state - burnt corpses, with broken eyes, who survived - and those shell-shocked, with torn lungs, blind and deaf."
On board the Mi-24P, reinforcements from the corners and reinforcement of the side, which were required due to the high recoil of the gun, are clearly visible. In the cockpit is the helicopter flight technician Iosif Leshchenok. 205th OVE, Kandahar, autumn 1987
With the successful use of ODAB in an Afghan situation, it turned out to be an even more effective weapon than other ammunition. An incandescent cloud of a volumetric explosion penetrated into caves and mountain crevices, covered stone deposits and labyrinths of duval with a fiery blow, overtaking the enemy where he was invulnerable to conventional means. ODAB also found application in the landing of airborne assault forces, when, before the landing of helicopters, it was required to quickly and over a large area eliminate the mine threat. The dropped ODAB passed through the site with a shock wave front with high pressure, instantly freeing it from mines.
It was supposed to store ODAB with sensitive contents, protected from direct sunlight and overheating. In fact, there were no sheds in the ammunition depots, and it was good if the bombs were covered from the sun with at least a tarpaulin (“Americans have that soldiers, that spoiled bombs, give them air-conditioned warehouses”).
However, the use of ODAB was impeded not only by the features of the device: it turned out that this weapon, in addition to its effectiveness, managed to earn a reputation in a number of conflicts as "inhumane", as causing excessive suffering to people. The UN managed to stigmatize the volumetric explosion ammunition as contrary to the accepted norms of warfare. In 1976, the Geneva Emergency Committee on Conventional Weapons adopted a resolution recognizing ammunition for a volumetric explosion as a type of weapon that requires a ban on qualification grounds. Although none of the countries possessing such weapons even thought to part with them, the opinion of the international community had to be taken into account. In case of the arrival of journalists and all kinds of foreign representatives who from time to time appeared in Afghanistan on humanitarian missions, they tried to remove the bombs away from the prying eyes and fight only in a "humane manner."
The destruction of manpower remained the primary task of the anti-guerrilla war: the NAR S-5S and S-8S, stuffed with blocks of steel feathered arrows of 1100 and 2200 pieces, respectively, went into action. Shooting them, however, required careful maintenance of the range so that the bundle of "buckshot" retained its destructive power and did not scatter in vain. The use of ammunition, which "indiscriminately" solved everything in its path with a shower of arrows, also contradicted a number of international conventions, which is why the command of the 40th Army Air Force, being guided by orders "descended from above", either prohibited them or allowed them again, although the pilots highly appreciated it is a weapon of "local mass destruction". Helicopter pilots in Faizabad in the winter of 1981 once brought fifty boxes of S-5S. They shot them in a day, asking for more. Instead of ammunition, the chief of the regiment's armament service rushed in, demanding that all the missiles with "nails" be returned immediately. Out of six hundred pieces, he could only be shown two, "crooked" ones, which were stale only because they did not climb into the trunks.
Rocket blocks for 57-mm projectiles of the S-5 type since 1982 began to replace the new launchers B-8V20 for more powerful NAR type C-8 with a caliber of 80 mm. Under them, the machines in service were being finalized, and the helicopters of the new series immediately received more modern weapons. The superiority of the new rockets was so convincing that to speed up the rearmament of aircraft with them, a special directive government document appeared - the resolution of the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues under the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 27, 1984 on the accelerated introduction of the NAR of the S-8 family. With reference to the Afghan experience, it was required to increase the release of new missiles, increasing production volumes by reducing the production of 57-mm shells.
However, the C-5 did not stop using until the last days of the war.
Armed soldiers Shiraliyev and Khazratulov unload the cannon before cleaning. Next to the tools is a cartridge with an armor-piercing explosive shell extracted from the breech. 205th OVE, Kandahar, autumn 1987
Shells of various types and models were used, and from time to time, among the imported ammunition, NAR of the earliest samples came across. To spend the accumulated supplies, the logisticians cleaned up warehouses in the Union, and even the C-5 of the first modifications, which looked like real rarities, were brought in to the unit. Such products were distinguished not only by low power, twice inferior in destructive effect to more modern models of the family, but also required much more time and effort in preparation: each such rocket, before charging, had to be equipped with a fuse that went separately, which was screwed into the case with a special key. Considering that 64 missiles had to be prepared for one helicopter alone, one can imagine how much trouble it cost. There were even shells of modifications C-5M and C-5K of the 1950s model, which had their own electric plugs, each of which had to be inserted into the corresponding connector of the unit when charging, and the unit itself had to be pre-equipped with a set of additional parts. Many of these "antiques" twenty years ago and at home did not have time to find, and how to handle them - remembered only veterans of arms groups. The newer shells had a built-in fuse and required much less worries, being immediately ready for use.
Some Mi-24s were modified for the installation of large-caliber rockets S-24 and S-25, as well as S-13, used in five-charge blocks. The advantage of large-caliber missiles was the impressive range of targeted launch, which made it possible to hit targets from a safe distance without entering the enemy's air defense zone, however, the widespread use of such weapons was hampered by the peculiarities of the missiles themselves, equipped with a powerful engine, the operation of which could cause a surge in the helicopter's power plant. When the heavy NARs were launched, the vehicle was literally overwhelmed with a rocket "powder gun" gas train, and for firing it was required to carefully maintain the parameters of the helicopter's flight, when the missiles were launched, putting its engines into a reduced mode.
In the 50th OSAP, four Mi-24s were reequipped for heavy S-24 missiles in 1984, part of the 335th OBVP, 280th and 181st OBVP helicopters underwent a similar modification. There were also such machines in the 262nd, 205th and 239th separate squadrons. Launches were entrusted only to the most experienced pilots, and then heavy shells were used only from time to time, when it became necessary to defeat targets protected and covered by an anti-aircraft shield. In addition to high accuracy, the projectiles provided a significant area of destruction, especially when equipped with the RV-24 non-contact radio fuse, which detonated the projectile over the target, showered with thousands of fragments from above, from the most unprotected side.
In the 50th OSAP for the entire 1984, 50 S-24 launches were made. In Lashkar Gakh, in the area of responsibility of the 205th OVE, Mi-24 missiles were occasionally equipped with S-24 missiles, which flew out in search of dushman caravans.
In the Kandahar 280th regiment, work with the S-24 led to an incident, directly with shells and not connected, but ended in a helicopter breakdown. In August 1987, a group of Mi-24 flew to strike in the morning, but when setting low against the sun, one of the helicopters touched a dune and "plowed" the ground. The impact was so sensitive that the pilot's door and the operator's hatch jammed. I had to smash the lanterns with machine guns to get out. In justification, it was said that the car was pretty overweight with a suspension that pulled for a ton. Nevertheless, the pilots were subjected to "the highest measure", written off from flight work in the aircraft controllers. The victims could consider that they were still lucky: the helicopter was pretty deformed from the impact, turning out to be literally a twisted corkscrew. The repair team struggled for a long time to restore it, but no one dared to fly the "invalid", and he was written off to one of the schools as a visual aid.
The use of the even more impressive S-25 was completely limited to a few test launches. Not all planes could carry a 400-kilogram projectile, and on a helicopter the descent of the C-25 was accompanied by such a trail of flame and a roar that everyone unanimously decided that this was not a helicopter weapon.
Equipping the Mi-24 with a guided weapon system set it apart from other types of aircraft and helicopters that were part of the 40 Army's Air Force. Combat helicopters were the only ones who had such weapons for quite a long time - until 1986, when guided missiles began to be used on Su-25 attack aircraft. However, in subsequent years, guided weapons on attack aircraft did not become widespread and were used only sporadically, being quite expensive weapons. It trusted only the most trained pilots.
In contrast, almost all Mi-24 crews could operate guided missiles, and the helicopters carried ATGMs literally in every flight. To a decisive extent, this was facilitated by the sophistication of the guided weapons complex, its good development by combat crews, as well as the low cost in comparison with other types of guided weapons. ATGMs had high efficiency, good accuracy and high destructive power with a significant firing range, which was practically limited only by the possibility of visual visibility of the target.
At first, however, the use of ATGM was infrequent. So, for the entire 1980, the number of used ATGMs was limited to 33 units. During this period, there were mainly Mi-24D helicopters in Afghanistan. This modification carried the 9P145 Falanga-PV missile system with a semi-automatic radio command guidance system, which was quite effective and provided a firing range of up to 4000 m. helicopter behavior. The bulkiness of the "Phalanx" also affected the preparation of the machine. The ATGM was delivered in a heavy sixty-kilogram box, which had to be dragged to the helicopter, with all the precautions to remove the rocket, deploy and fix the wing, check the air charge, the condition of the tracers and pipelines, the letter and code of the guidance system, and then install the weighty product on the guides, connect the connector, fix it and remove the clamps from the handlebars. The whole procedure took 12-15 minutes.
Helicopter Mi-24V, prepared for departure to patrol the airfield. Bagram, 262nd OVE, autumn 1988
An example of fuselage painting on the Mi-24V. By the end of the war, similar drawings were carried by other helicopters of the 262nd OVE
Soon, more modern Mi-24Vs began to arrive at the unit, featuring new pilot equipment instead of the old simple collimator sight, as well as a new generation 9K113 Shturm-V missile system with 9M114 supersonic missiles. The advantage of "Shturm" was not only increased accuracy and range, brought up to 5000 m, but also a successful solution for the rocket, delivered directly in a launch tube container, in which it was suspended from a helicopter. Plastic pipes were easy to transport and store and extremely undemanding in preparation: to install the "Shturm" it was enough to place the container on the supports and turn the handle to close the locks.
The missiles themselves were supplied in the Shturm-V and Shturm-F variants with a five-kilogram cumulative and high-explosive warhead. The latter had a volumetric detonating equipment with liquid explosives, in the device of which it was possible to get rid of the shortcomings of the first samples of such ammunition, and was significantly more reliable and efficient. It is curious that in the ranks many did not even know about the rocket stuffing, believing that it carries a conventional high-explosive charge ("Shturm-F" differed from the anti-tank cumulative version by a noticeable yellow stripe on the launch tube).
The ATGM was launched by an operator who guided the missile with the aid of the Raduga-Sh sighting system (the Mi-24D used the equipment of the former Raduta-F phalanx configuration). Having detected the target using the optics of the guidance device, the operator transferred it to a narrow field of view and then only kept the mark on the target, and the radio command line itself guided the missile until it hit. The installation of an optical observation head on a gyro-stabilized platform helped to keep the target in sight and hold the mark imposed on it, and the supersonic speed of the rocket reduced the duration of its flight before meeting the target and, accordingly, the time the operator was busy in guidance to several seconds (before the helicopter had to remain on a combat course twice or three times longer, which was unsafe in case of anti-aircraft influence of the enemy). Stabilization of the field of view during guidance allowed the helicopter to perform anti-aircraft maneuvers with evasion from the target direction up to 60 ° and rolls up to 20 °. Some problems for sensitive equipment were caused by the operation of a machine gun and especially a cannon: a roaring weapon shook the machine; due to vibrations, hydraulic dampers were leaking, and the working fluid flowed into the targeting device located right there, flooding the optics. The “Rainbows” block had to be untwisted and cleaned of oily liquid (who were lazy enough to unscrew the plugs, drain the liquid and somehow wipe the glass with a cotton swab on a wire).
Launch of S-24 missiles from the Mi-24. A single launch of heavy projectiles was usually recommended as less affecting the operation of helicopter engines.
The pilots highly appreciated all these advantages of the ATGM, and the Shturm became a very popular weapon. The destructive effect of the rocket was sufficient to deal with a variety of targets - from cars in dushman caravans to firing points and shelters. At the same time, it did not play a special role, a high-explosive rocket or a cumulative one was used - the power of a charge capable of penetrating half-meter armor was more than enough to smash a duval or other structure. It was common practice to fire ATGMs from extreme distances, of the order of 3500-5000 m, including anti-aircraft weapons to clear the zone of action for the strike group. High-explosive "Assaults" became especially effective when defeating caves, in which the entrenched enemy was practically invulnerable for other means, and his fire from there turned out to be destructively accurate. The limited volumes ideally facilitated the operation of the rocket filling with the most effective development of a high-explosive strike.
On the massive use of ATGMs already in 1982evidenced by the scale of their use in the Panjshir operation: during the period from May 17 to June 10 this year, in less than a month, 559 guided missiles were used (on average, a dozen and a half for each Mi-24 that participated in hostilities).
The hitting accuracy of the ATGM on small objects such as a truck was about 0.75-0.8, and on buildings and other similar targets it was practically close to unity. An interesting remark was contained in one of the reports on the effectiveness of equipment and weapons: the pilots interviewed complained that the use of ATGMs was restrained by "an insufficient number of suitable targets." As an example, the actions of the helicopter crew of the squadron commander of the 181st OVP Lieutenant Colonel N. I. Kovalev, who destroyed eight rebel targets with eight Shturm-V missiles in a month of combat work on the Mi-24P, i.e. each missile was laid right on target (Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kovalev died with his entire crew on June 1, 1985 in a downed helicopter that exploded in the air after the DShK was hit).
There were many examples of the successful use of "Shturm", including in duel situations against firing points and anti-aircraft weapons. In August 1986, a flight of helicopters of the 181st regiment under the command of Major A. Volkov flew out to strike the shelter of the local leader, "Engineer Salim". A kishlak in the mountains near Puli-Khumri, which served as a base for dushmans, had good anti-aircraft cover. With this in mind, the attack was planned using an ATGM, and the flight itself was scheduled for early morning. On the very first call of the Mi-24, Senior Lieutenant Yu. Smirnov, the "Shturms" were planted directly into the structure, burying its inhabitants in the dusty ruins.
Several times ATGMs were used "for their immediate purpose", to combat armored vehicles - armored personnel carriers and tanks that fell into the hands of the dushmans. On January 16, 1987, the helicopter pilots of the 262nd OVE were tasked with destroying an armored personnel carrier captured by the dushmans, from which they fired at security posts near the Bagram airfield. A flight of Mi-24 was lifted into the air, in three rounds of anti-tank guided missiles that fired at the target and to guarantee that they had worked out with cannon fire and volleys of the NAR, after which they reported with satisfaction from neighboring posts about the onset of "peace and quiet." A couple of months later, the Mi-24 unit flew out to suppress the annoying firing point near Bagram. All helicopters fired four "Shturms"; returning pilots reported the observed hits exactly in the windows of the blower.
Confirmation of the effectiveness of the "Shturm" on the Mi-24V, as well as the sighting complex with good capabilities on it, was the prevalence of the "striped" of this modification, which soon "survived" the former Mi-24D. So, by the fall of 1984, the only Mi-24D remained in the Kunduz 181st OVP, which they tried not to send on combat missions, using it as a liaison and "postman".
The original revision was carried out in the fall of 1987 in Kandahar, where a dozen machines received two APU-60-1 launchers each for the R-60 missiles borrowed from fighters. These missiles, created for close air combat, were supposed to be carried by helicopters in case of encounters with "spiritual" planes and helicopters, reports of flights of which from the Pakistani side appeared from time to time, but it was not possible to meet them "alive". For air targets, the R-60s were intended on the left pylon, the right APU was tilted down so that its thermal seeker could capture a ground "hot" target - a fire or a car engine. According to the results of tests of the R-60 on helicopters, however, it was known that missiles against such air targets with low thermal contrast are not very effective and are capable of capturing someone else's helicopter from a maximum of 500-600 m, and even less piston "intruder".
P-60s were also installed on the Mi-8, but the author does not know anything about the success of their use.
In addition to increasing the effectiveness of the weapon, attention was paid to its reliability. Managed to increase the resource of many systems and their "performance" as a response to stressful operating conditions. The list of innovations and improvements was endless - from new types of ammunition to more "hardy" grades of steel and electronic components base, capable of withstanding the most severe operating conditions.
Among the problems that have not been resolved, it was necessary to include the provision of night work. The need for sorties to search for the enemy, who felt freer under the cover of darkness, remained urgent all the time, but the share of sorties, and most importantly, their effectiveness, were small. To highlight the impact site, the helicopters carried 100-kg luminous bombs (SAB), which gave a torch with a luminosity of 4-5 million candles for 7-8 minutes (enough time for a couple of attacks). If necessary, it was possible to illuminate the target immediately, launching special NAR C-5-O along the course, hanging powerful torches on parachutes in 2500-3000 m in front of the helicopter. However, for the strike, it was first necessary to detect the target, and the helicopter pilots did not receive sufficiently effective night vision devices and night sights. During the patrols, night driving goggles for the PNV-57E equipment were used, but in them it was possible to see only a general "picture" of the terrain at a short distance. They tried to work with tank sights, but they had a limited range, distinguishing a vehicle at a distance of 1300-1500 m. Night observation devices of scouts also had a low resolution.
They had to rely on moonlit nights, a keen eye and good luck, which made it possible to notice a sneaking caravan or a campfire. Such sorties were entrusted to the most experienced crews, and yet their effectiveness remained low, and the consumption of ammunition was irrational. In the morning, no traces of the attacked enemy were usually found at the site of the strike (if anything remained after the raid, the survivors had time to take away weapons and other goods). At the same time, the risk of bumping into a rock in the darkness or hitting another obstacle during a maneuver was too great, which is why night work was now and then prohibited, making an exception only for round-the-clock patrolling of the well-known surroundings of garrisons and airfields, which protected them from shelling and sabotage. …
Another constantly operating and, in the literal sense, vital factor was the improvement of the Mi-24's security. Reservation of the Mi-24 was recognized as good: in addition to overhead steel armor screens on the sides of the pilot's and operator's cabins (contrary to popular beliefs, the armor of the helicopter was exactly the invoice and was attached to the structure from the outside with screws), the crew was covered with front bulletproof glasses of impressive thickness, and the pilot's seat was equipped with an armored backrest and armored headrest. The armor on the hoods also protected the engine units, the gearbox and the valve body.
Nevertheless, with the increase in the number of enemy fire weapons, helicopters were increasingly subjected to shelling, the caliber and power of anti-aircraft weapons grew, the number of hits multiplied, becoming a real and very tough test for vulnerability and revealing the weaknesses of a combat helicopter. As for the protection of the crew, most of the bullets fell on the operator's cab located in front, the armor of which could not always withstand large-caliber weapons. Of the bullets "taken" by the armored protection of the operator's cabin, 38-40% pierced it, while the pilot's share was half as much, 20-22%. Even without a through penetration of the armor, the blow of a heavy bullet from the DShK or ZGU was able to knock out a mass of secondary fragments from the rear side of the armor plate, which posed a considerable danger: small steel "chips" flew like a fan into the cockpit, causing injuries to the pilots and sieving equipment, electrical fittings and other cockpit stuffing. In no case were the powerful frontal armored glass penetrated by bullets and shrapnel, even when hit by bullets with a caliber of 12.7 mm. At the same time, the return of helicopters with multiple traces of bullets on the bulletproof glasses was noted (in one such case, marks from six bullets remained on the glass, which turned it into a crumb, but never got inside).
In most cases, the operator suffered from damage in the composition of the crews. However, no matter how cruel it sounds, the best protection of the commander was calculated and decisive, having its own rational justification for the survival of both the machine itself and the crew: a pilot who retained his working capacity could reach home even on a damaged helicopter and if other crew members were out of order. while his death or even injury did not promise such an outcome (up to 40% of helicopter losses occurred precisely because of the defeat of the pilot).
During the Panjshir operation, on its very first day, May 17, 1982, two Mi-24s were shot down at once. The cause of the defeat in both cases was aimed fire from the DShK on the cockpit, which led to loss of control, collision with the ground and destruction of helicopters. Another car came under anti-aircraft fire at an altitude of 400 m, but the bullets went into the cockpit, breaking the glass and wounding the pilot. The flight crew was rescued: the flight technician made his way to the commander and provided him with assistance, and the operator intercepted the control, and he brought the crippled helicopter home.
The armament group is engaged in charging a cartridge strip for the Mi-24P cannon. Usually, sparing time and effort, they placed an incomplete ammunition load of 120-150 rounds, which was enough to complete most of the tasks.
Delivery of cartridge belts for helicopters of the 205th OVE. The vehicle is a propulsion trolley - there were no other means of mechanization in the squadron. Kandahar, summer 1987
Loading the cartridge belt for the YakB-12, 7 machine gun of the Mi-24V helicopter. In the Afghan climate, the cold morning quickly gave way to the heat of the day, which makes the people involved in the work look extremely diverse, combining winter hats and boots with shorts and summer panamas.
Mi-24V in flight over the Panjshir gorge. The helicopter carries blocks B8V20 and "Shturm" with a high-explosive warhead marked with a yellow stripe on the launch container. 262nd OVE, summer 1987
When returning from a night reconnaissance flight on October 1, 1983, the Mi-24 of the Jalalabad 335th OBVP fell under concentrated fire from grenade launchers and machine guns. The hits crushed the propeller blades, cut the control rods and engines. The blow also fell on the cockpit. At his workplace, the operator Lieutenant A. Patrakov was seriously injured, and a week later died of his wounds in the hospital.
On April 22, 1984, during an operation to seize dushman warehouses near the Aybak village in the area of responsibility of the 181st Airborne Forces, the Mi-24 who were covering the landing were under fire from the disguised DShK. Shooting was carried out from the caves on the side of the mountain, point-blank. The first stage went through the host's helicopter. Having pierced the side, two large-caliber bullets wounded operator V. Makarov in the arm (as it turned out later, 12 cm of the elbow joint was crushed). The lieutenant, who was barely 23 years old, lost consciousness, but then came to his senses and continued to help the commander in flight as best he could (after spending almost a year in hospitals, he returned to duty and flew again).
Covering the evacuation of the wounded near the village of Alikheil near Gardez on August 16, 1985, a pair of Mi-24Ps of the Kabul 50th OSAP was engaged in suppressing enemy firing points. As it turned out, the dushmans had well equipped positions and had not only small arms, but also large-caliber installations. The flight commander, Captain V. Domnitsky, described what happened in the following way: “At the exit from the attack - another blow to the helicopter, and again this nasty, pungent smell of burnt metal in the cockpit … gas, the lever hardly stretches. He raised his hand, and on the back of it there were a dozen or so holes and blood was oozing out of them. Immediately I found two fragments in the leg above the knee, and on the left side of the side, it turned the fuel system control panel. On the ground, after turning off the engines, they found that the DShK bullet pierced the helicopter from the bottom-side, then the folded back armored head (even, clean hole), then knocked out a decent hole in the armored back of the chair (upon impact, the thought still flashed that the flight technician was pushing), bounced into the left side, mixed the switches and wiring of the fuel system, again ricocheted off the overhead outer armor on board, hit the cockpit ceiling and so on … They found her in a parachute chair. Then they pulled out 17 fragments from my hand”.
Despite the injuries (fortunately, minor), on the same day, Captain Domnitsky again took to the air in his helicopter. However, fate had already made its choice: having prepared for the meeting, the enemy was waiting for them at the same place where the Mi-24 again came under targeted fire. The helicopter shook from the blows of the DShK, one of the engines was shot through, after which it remained only to pull for an emergency landing. Having plopped down on the winding path along the slope, the only more or less level place below, the helicopter took down the landing gear and fell to one side, burying itself in the ground. The pilot-operator S. Chernetsov had to break the glazing with a machine gun in order to pull out the commander and the flight technician.
A month later, on September 14, 1985, in the same helicopter squadron of the 50th OSAP, the Mi-24 operator Lieutenant A. Mironov was killed. During the operation in the Kunduz area, the mission was carried out in the north, near the border, faced with heavy enemy fire. The hit fell on the side of the front cockpit, and the blow was unusually strong. Commander S. Filipchenko was able to land the helicopter, but no one could understand what had struck the car, whose side was gaping with many holes, the cab armor had a mass of dents several centimeters in size, as if from a large shot and like burned holes, and the body of the deceased operator was literally riddled. Apparently, the Mi-24 was hit by an RPG shot, the cumulative grenade of which was even capable of penetrating a tank. When firing at helicopters, dushmans used RPG fragmentation equipment from a long distance, with the calculation of grenades triggering on self-destruction, which took place at a distance of 700-800 m. At the same time, an air blast was carried out without a direct hit, giving a directed and powerful fragmentation strike capable of causing multiple damage.
A reminder of the formidable "storm" in the 335th OBVP was kept by the armored helmet of aircraft technician A, Mikhailov, who was killed on January 18, 1986, already on the landing course, by a sniper bullet that pierced through the side of the helicopter and the helmet. In another case in Ghazni, the ZSH-56 titanium armor saved the pilot, retaining an impressive dent from the slipping queue (but not protecting him from the ridicule of his colleagues - “not every head can resist the DShK!”).
As an emergency measure, in the first military year, additional armored glass for cabins began to be installed on the Mi-24. Since the pilots in their workplaces were open to the very forearms, in the cockpits on the sides, from the side of the inner surface of the blisters, special glass blocks made of armored glass were attached in frames on brackets. However, this revision turned out to be not very successful: the useful volume of the cockpit in the blister zone decreased almost 2 times, the view deteriorated due to massive frames, which the pilots literally touched their heads. In addition, the bulletproof glasses were very massive, giving a weight gain of 35 kg and affecting the centering. Due to its impracticality, this option was soon abandoned (by the way, they also abandoned part of the booking in the cabins of the Eights in favor of maintaining visibility, which is no less important in a combat situation than security and weapons).
In the course of modifications, the pipelines of the oil and hydraulic systems were additionally shielded with five-millimeter steel sheets, the tanks were filled with a polyurethane foam sponge, which protected from fire and explosion. The tail rotor control cable was spread on different sides of the tail boom in order to reduce its vulnerability (before, both cables were pulled side by side and there were multiple cases of their simultaneous interruption by a bullet or shrapnel). In addition to the mandatory EVU, "Lipa" and ASO traps (without which, as they said, "Baba Yaga would not fly in Afghanistan"), there was also a place for active defense means.
Consequences of the incident with the helicopter of Captain Nikolaev from the 262nd OVE. After being hit by a bullet from the DShK, the helicopter lost its directional control, but managed to sit down and entered the hangar already on the run. The vehicle was seriously damaged, but soon returned to service, Bagram, March 1987
At the site of the death of the Mi-24V near Gardez. The helicopter crashed, colliding with a rock in a "stone bag", the operator captain 3. Ishkildin died, the commander Captain A. Panushkin was wounded. 335th OBVP, December 10, 1987
A perceived disadvantage of the Mi-24 was the lack of a stern firing point. At home, this did not interest anyone, but in a combat situation it began to cause criticism, especially in comparison with the Mi-8, whose "tail" was covered. The impressions of the pilots were also confirmed by statistics: avoiding getting under fire from the front, the enemy tried to hit the helicopter from unprotected rear angles. Thus, the glazing of the Mi-24 cockpit accounted for only 18-20% of the damage from bullets from the front hemisphere, versus 40-42% for the Mi-8 (this was partly due to the smaller glazing area of the "twenty-four"). With regard to damage to the power plant, this dependence was even brighter: the dust-proof cocks of the air intakes, which met bullets coming from the front, received hits from the Mi-24 1.5 times less often than from the Mi-8 (16-18% versus 25-27%).
The provision of "eights" with fire protection of the rear hemisphere (which the enemy soon became convinced of from his own experience) in many cases forced the dushmans to refrain from shooting from previously attractive stern angles. The presence of a tail machine gun gave obvious advantages in tactical terms: the number of hits on departure from the target of the Mi-8 was twice less than that of the Mi-24, at which fire could be fired in pursuit fearlessly and without risking "surrender" (in numbers: The Mi-8, at the exit from the attack, received 25-27% of hits, while the Mi-24, while retreating from the target, received 46-48% of hits from their total number).
Covering the helicopter from fire from vulnerable directions on the Mi-24 was carried out by a flight technician who was in the cargo hold. It was extremely inconvenient to shoot from the vents, as envisaged by the creators of the helicopter, due to the limited view and the firing sector. To widen the opening during firing, the opening doors of the troop compartment were used, which made it possible to direct the fire sideways and backward. A machine gun (usually the same reliable PKT) was held in the landing cockpit, with fire from which the flight technician protected the helicopter at the exit from the attack, when the target went under the wing, disappearing from the field of view of the pilots, or turned out to be to the side during a combat turn.
For quite a long time, machine guns had to be taken from broken Mi-8s or bargained from neighbors, and only over time they entered the state (usually one for each helicopter of the squadron, plus one spare). Many crews were not limited to one barrel and took two machine guns each, protecting both sides and not wasting time transferring fire. An impressive arsenal was accumulated on board, just in case they also took a light machine gun with them (it was impossible to fire from the PKT from the hands). In addition, each of the pilots, in addition to a personal pistol, always had a compulsory machine gun - "NZ" in case of an emergency landing or a parachute jump (in order not to lose it, it was often fastened with a belt to the thigh). Navigator-operator A. Yachmenev from the Bagram 262nd OVE shared the painful feelings he experienced: once, getting into the cockpit, he hung up the machine gun on the air pressure gun and, forgetting about it, took off. He caught himself in the air, not feeling the usual heaviness from the side, but looking around, he noticed: "AKS was left behind, dangling in front of his nose, but you can't get it … I felt like naked …"
Household flight technicians grabbed captured machine guns in reserve, and the additional armament of the Mi-24 depended only on the crew's ability to procure and install additional weapons. All kinds of "self-made" modifications were widespread - stops and sights, up to sniper ones. The disadvantage was the inconvenience of firing from a low cockpit, where you had to bend over or kneel down. Captain N. Gurtovoy very elegantly solved this problem in the 280th regiment, having got hold of a seat from the "eight", which he adapted to the central post of the troop compartment and, without getting up, turned on it from side to side when transferring fire.
Mi-24P captain G. Pavlov, shot down at Bamian. After the failure of the hydraulic system and control, the helicopter was crashed during an emergency landing. Housekeeping flight technician picks up a PC machine gun from the cockpit. 50th OSAP, June 18, 1985 Skillful and well-coordinated actions helped the pilots survive in an emergency, but the commander managed to get out of the cockpit only by breaking the glass
From right to left: operator Malyshev, crew commander Pavlov and flight technician Leiko
Broken on takeoff in Farahrud Mi-24V. Operator V. Shagin died, commander Petukhov was seriously injured. 205th OVE, June 9, 1986
Since structurally, both doors of the troop compartment by means of rods swung up and down together ("providing quick and convenient landing and disembarkation of paratroopers", as it was said in the description of the machine), there was nothing to support the machine gun in the doorway, and the flight technicians had to be smart and know the hardware, disconnecting the door opening drive so that the lower sash stays in place. Later, the door opening system was finalized, providing the standard ability to open only the upper sash.
In normal flights, the machine gun removed from the side lay in the cockpit. The PKT with a sensitive electric trigger required caution - it was worth touching it for the shooting to start right in the cockpit. On the "eights", where the machine gun remained on the gun mount all the time, "looking" outward, there were no such problems, but on the Mi-24 such incidents sometimes occurred. In one such case, in the 280th OVP, a flight engineer from the crew of Major A. Volkov, throwing a machine gun from side to side, stuck six bullets into the cockpit ceiling. In another case, under similar circumstances, the bullets that went up were shot through the helicopter engine. On September 8, 1982, a flight technician, removing a machine gun, “as a result of a violation of safety measures when handling weapons, opened unintentional firing towards the cockpit of the flyer, firing 15-20 shots, as a result of which more than 500 wires of weapons systems, equipment and electronic equipment were destroyed, units were damaged helicopter control and electrical systems”.
A reliable PKT machine gun was used to protect the helicopter from the side views. In the photo - a machine gun on a mounting frame
Flight technician Mi-24 is engaged in stuffing cartridge belts for PKT. The machine gun itself lies nearby on the threshold of the cockpit. Ghazni, 335th OBVP, autumn 1985
In the general statistics of Mi-24 losses, more than half of the accidents had catastrophic consequences (with the death of pilots), accounting for 52.5% of the total, while almost two-thirds of such cases (60.4% of the number of accidents) were accompanied by the death of all those who were on crew members on board.
In order to prevent the loss of flight personnel, at the end of January 1986, it was ordered to fly the Mi-24 with a crew of a pilot and an operator limited to two people, leaving the flight equipment on the ground, since the pilots were able to cope with their duties even without him. With regard to the effectiveness of his work as a gunner, unity was not observed: somewhere they considered such a cover necessary, while others, especially with the advent of MANPADS, considered him a whim and bluntly called the onboard technician "hostage". There was some truth in this. Opportunities to cover his car at the "beetle" were really quite limited: he could fire only in lateral directions, along the traverse of the helicopter flight, while the most vulnerable rear hemisphere remained unprotected.
At the same time, in an emergency when the vehicle was hit, the flight engineer had much less chance of rescue than the pilot and operator, whose workplaces were much better adapted to emergency escape from the helicopter and had the opportunity to "go overboard" directly from the seats. At the same time, the onboard technician had to get out of his place in a narrow aisle behind the commander's seat, in a falling uncontrolled car, get to the doors of the troop compartment and open them, trying not to hook the pylons and suspension blocks sticking out in dangerously close proximity under the wing during a parachute jump. As a result, there were multiple cases when the pilot and the operator managed to escape, and the flight technician died, remaining in the falling car (in the 50th OSAP at the end of 1984, in such situations, two flight technicians were killed in the downed Mi-24 in just one week, while the rest of the crew survived). In the general statistics of losses, the death of this category of flight personnel in the crews of the Mi-24 happened more often than the pilots and operators. In the end, such cases had their effect, and the order to reduce the crews seemed to be quite reasonable. However, it was not observed everywhere, and often flight technicians still flew as part of crews. On the Mi-24 border aviation, which had a different subordination, such an order, apparently, did not apply at all, and their crews continued to take off in full force, often with an additional gunner on board.
Flight technician G. Kychakov behind the PKT machine gun mounted on the lower flap of the landing compartment of the Mi-24
Captain N. Gurtovoy in the Mi-24V landing cockpit, equipped with a swivel seat with a downed "eight". Kunduz, 181st OBVP, spring 1986
The Mil design bureau also proposed its own version of the additional equipment of the helicopter. In 1985, instead of improvised rifle installations to protect the Mi-24, a stern firing point was developed, having tested it on the Mi-24V (serial number 353242111640). A large-caliber machine gun NSVT-12, 7 "Utes" was installed on the helicopter, which made it possible to fight on an equal footing with the Dushman DShK. The gun mount was equipped in the stern under the tail boom: at the back it was open, and on the sides it had abundant glazing to view the rear hemisphere. Since the rear of the helicopter's fuselage was occupied by the lower fuel tank and racks with radio equipment, which hindered access to the shooter's workplace, a kind of tunnel from the cargo compartment was erected to the installation, and rubberized fabric "pants" hanging down was attached to the gunner's feet. Taking place, he found himself twisted in cramped space under overhanging blocks and boxes of equipment, control cables and a tail rotor shaft rotating over his head.
The structure turned out to be very cumbersome and inconvenient, moreover, the overview of the shelling sector was also unsatisfactory. When shown to the authorities, a certain colonel from the staff wished to personally test the novelty. The office size let the chief down - when trying to get to the machine gun, he was tightly stuck in a narrow passage and had to be removed from there backwards. In addition to the layout flaws, the equipment of the "firing position" in the stern adversely affected the alignment of the helicopter, with the ensuing consequences for maneuverability and controllability. Even after revising the installation with access from the outside, due to obvious shortcomings, it was declared unfit for operation. In the ranks, the lack of rear protection was somewhat compensated for by the completion of the pilot's rear-view mirrors, similar to those tested on the Mi-8, but mounted inside the cockpit, taking into account high flight speeds.
A story about the armament and work of helicopter aviation in the Afghan war would be incomplete without mentioning the participation of Kamov's rotary-wing aircraft in the campaign, which remained a practically unknown page of the events of that time. It was not at all about testing new equipment in a combat situation, such as the Ka-50, which was being worked out at that very time: the machine of an unusual scheme and concept that had just risen into the sky was then in its "childhood" age and it had enough problems with fine-tuning that did not allow make risky attempts to put her into battle. Nevertheless, from time to time, Ka-27 and Ka-29 helicopters appeared in Afghanistan, which were already in service. In addition to the fleet, Kamov helicopters served in the border aviation, being in demand in the border guard districts in mountainous areas, where their high power-to-weight ratio, excellent carrying capacity, altitude and rate of climb, as well as resistance to the influence of the usual wind in the mountains, fair and side wind turned out to be beneficial. The compactness of coaxial machines was not least suitable for the peculiarities of work in confined mountain conditions (Kamov helicopters had a 16-meter main rotor - a third less than the Mi-8 propeller).
Kamov helicopters were in the aviation of the Transcaucasian Border District, in particular, in the 12th separate regiment, whose units were located in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The first squadron of the regiment at the Alekseevka airfield near Tbilisi had several Ka-27s, in the second squadron, located in Kobuleti, there were two Ka-27s and two Ka-29s. The regiment's crews were constantly involved in work in Afghanistan on missions lasting 45 days, supporting and replacing fellow border guards from the Central Asian and Eastern districts. The Kamov helicopters, which from time to time worked in the border areas (according to the stories, they happened to appear in Shindand), also participated in these tasks, but the author does not have reliable information about their participation in hostilities.
This is not the end of the history of improving weapons during the "helicopter war" in Afghanistan. In addition to the emergence of new types and systems of weapons, sighting equipment underwent changes, components and assemblies underwent modifications, their reliability and efficiency increased, defects were "caught", and these painstaking work aimed at maintaining the proper level of machines accompanied it all the time of operation.
A rifle mount to protect the rear hemisphere of the helicopter, tested on the Mi-24V (machine gun removed). There was a large landing hatch on the left side of the unit.
