In the photo, the US Navy aircraft carrier strike group led by the CVN-65 USS "Enterprise" aircraft carrier. In the foreground you can see the Arley Burke-class destroyer DDG-78 USS Porter, behind the aircraft carrier - the DDG-94 Nitze URO-class missile cruiser CG-69 USS Vicksburg. It was at Vicksburg that, in addition to the Link-11/16 channels integrated into the Aegis BIUS, one of the first sets of equipment for the integrated exchange of tactical information of the network-centric naval air defense / missile defense system CEC / NIFC-CA was installed.
The geopolitical ambitions of the world's leading superpowers that have changed over the centuries have been dictating their military-strategic concepts in relation to various economically important regions of the planet for hundreds of years. Now, as we can see, the geostrategic "poles" are firmly entrenched in Western Asia, the IATR, the Baltic and the Arctic region, which led to their immediate militarization by the armed forces of the leading world states, as well as the allies attached to them, which are part of various military-political alliances, who are today the main participants in the "Big Game". Assessing the military potentials of the parties in a major regional or global conflict is a very delicate and difficult task, for the solution of which it will not be enough to simply compare, for example, the quantitative composition and tactical and technical parameters of various types of military equipment of the CSTO and Russia with the same equipment of the North Atlantic Alliance. This will require an integrated approach that combines the analysis of the systemic linkage between units of this equipment in probable combat conditions, taking into account the heterogeneity of mixed groupings of troops. This fact is leading in the consideration of the laws of network-centric warfare.
Today we will try to apply a similar approach to reliably assess the combat effectiveness of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the US Navy in the event of a large-scale military conflict. These types of armed forces of the two superpowers were not chosen by chance, but on the basis of the strategic ambitions of states. Thus, the US Navy plays a key role in retaining Western influence in various regions of the world, pointing to the policy of "absolute hegemony"; and the Russian Aerospace Forces, which have reinforced anti-aircraft and anti-missile components, to a greater extent perform defensive functions in the airspace of our country, as well as tactical and strategic striking qualities required for a proper retaliatory strike against the enemy at close and distant borders from the country: typical defensive the policy applied in the system of the developing multipolar world order.
The impetus for writing this review was the interesting and very progressive opinion of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Navy, Michael Manazir, regarding the methods of modern warfare in the ocean theater, which was expressed at the Sea Air-Space 2016 exhibition. It is on this basis that our further analysis will be built.
Firstly, M. Manazir defined any combat operation successfully carried out in the future not as a result of the superiority of the technologically best URO destroyer, multipurpose nuclear submarine or anti-submarine aircraft, but as a result of a system correctly functioning in battle that detects, tracks, and selects the enemy's most important targets.as well as their correct distribution between all links and individual elements (units) of this system. In this case, even ships and submarines that do not possess the technological superiority of avionics and weapons can gain the upper hand over the enemy thanks to the faster and more efficient buses for transmitting tactical information about the underwater, surface, ground and aerospace situation in the zone of operation of a friendly aircraft carrier strike group. The deputy chief of staff of the American Naval Forces applied the term "aggregated force" to the combat potential of the fleet (from the Latin aggregatio - "accession"), which speaks of the power of all types of ships, submarines, deck and naval aviation linked into a single "combat organism", which is close to the ideal network-centric structure.
Secondly, in his judgments, Michael Manazir relied on the existing naval concepts of "Kill chain", "CEC" and "NIFC-CA" and pointed out the need to move to a new level, embodied in the developed concepts of "Kill web", "ADOSWC "And" NIFC-CU ". What is hidden behind these militaristic abbreviations?
The US military uses the term "Kill chain" as a description of existing strike tactics aimed at preempting an enemy strike, but in general terms, this is a typical tactic of the aggressor. The “Kill Chain” consists of a sequence of actions: target detection, its subsequent classification, identification, distribution and preparation of air / underwater attack weapons for its destruction, “capture”, opening fire and target destruction. This concept has been used in the US Armed Forces for quite a long time, but it allows only one or several network-centrically linked combat units to calculate a template for the effectiveness of destroying a particular target in a short period of time. But in difficult combat conditions, in a thick veil of electronic warfare, when tactical communication systems are overflowing with hundreds and thousands of coordinates of various targets, the "Kill chain" does not provide for accurate transmission of data on the results of a strike on a target to other friendly units belonging to a different branch of the military.
So, for example, if the newest ultra-low-noise multipurpose nuclear submarine SSN-23 "Jimmy Carter" (class "Sea Wolf") inflicts a confident torpedo or missile defeat on an enemy surface ship, but it will continue to stay afloat for a long time, multipurpose carrier-based fighters of the 5th generation The US Marine Corps F-35B or B-1B strategic missile carriers may continue an anti-ship operation against this ship due to the lack of information about its incapacitation, which will lead to an accelerated depletion of ammunition, as well as unnecessary and "unprofitable" from a tactical point of view. "Body movements" of equipment of different types of troops against a single target.
The use of the Kill Chain concept showed many disadvantages even during Desert Storm in 1991. American battalions of Patriot PAC-1 anti-aircraft missile systems, sent to South Asia to fight Iraqi operational-tactical ballistic missiles 9K14 OTRK 9K72 Elbrus, destroyed the British Tornado GR.4 tactical strike fighter with friendly fire, and also the carrier-based multipurpose fighter of the US Navy F / A-18C "Hornet", which were recognized by the operators of the AN / MPQ-53 radar as Iraqi OTBR 9K72 "SCUD" in the initial phase of the trajectory. Due to the systemic inconsistency of actions between AWACS, Patriot and tactical aviation, these events occurred, requiring the modernization of the concept.
The network-centric concept of the 21st century "Kill web" refers to the most promising trends of the American army, and as it should have happened, its embodiment in "hardware" and artificial intelligence began in the Navy, which plays a decisive role for the United States of world domination. It solves all the systemic shortcomings described in the "Kill chain", and, in addition, allows infinitely expanding information-tactical aggregation between various combat elements thanks to the open architecture of the software of modern digital computerized avionics. At the moment, the concept of "Kill web" is gradually being integrated at the level of the link in the AUG of the US Navy, and is represented today by the sub-concepts of naval air defense / missile defense "NIFC-CA" and anti-ship defense "ADOSWC", work is also progressing on the advanced concept of submarine anti-submarine defense " NIFC-CU ". Of particular interest to us is the NIFC-CA anti-aircraft / anti-missile system, which is part of the CEC network-centric system. Thanks to "Cooperative Engagement Capability" (Russian for "collective defense"), various combat elements of the US Navy and the USMC will be able to conduct a full exchange of tactical information about the air situation in a particular theater sector. Also, the structure of the "CEC" will include ground air defense units of the US Marine Corps and, if possible, even anti-aircraft missile systems "Patriot PAC-3".
Thanks to the presence of this system, the capabilities of the integrated fire control complex "Integrated Fire Control" were fully revealed, thanks to which anti-aircraft guided missiles ERINT will be able to hit an over-the-horizon cruise missile, or an UAV for targeting from an F-35B or an E-2D deck aircraft "Advanced Hawkeye ". There are many examples.
NIFC-CA gives the IFC system additional opportunities for comprehensive data exchange, based on the departure from the hierarchical structure of the tactical information exchange network “Link-16” (“TADIL-J”). For the full functioning of "Integrated Fire Control", the new concept provides for the introduction of a new additional radio channel for the exchange of tactical information "DDS" ("Data Distribution System"), which also has a high frequency frequency hopping (pseudo-random frequency tuning). This radio channel is introduced after the integration of specialized REO equipment for the exchange of tactical information on the basis of a single processor "CEP" ("Cooperative Engagement Processor") into the CIUS of the unit;: for NK - this is AN / USG-2, for carrier-based AWACS and U E-2C / D "Hawkeye / Advanced Hawkeye" - AN / USG-3, for PBU of ground divisions of air defense missile systems - AN / USG-5. The demonstration modification of the CEC / NIFC-CA devices was first tested on an aircraft carrier strike group led by the CVN-69 USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier in 1995, later they began to be installed on the Ticonderoga-class URO missile cruisers, and in particular - CG-66 USS “Hue City”, CG-68 USS “Anzio”, CG-69 USS “Vicksburg” and CG-71 USS “Cape St. George ".
The main contractor of all equipment carrying the CEC / NIFC-CA concepts in the US Navy is the same eminent company Raytheon with the support of the Applied Physics Laboratory of the D. Hopkins University. On the state resource news.usni.org, back on January 23, 2014, an interesting analytical review "Inside the Navy`s Next Air War" appeared, where the tactical and technical details of all the above concepts were considered in detail, based on the opinion of Michael Manazir. It shows a very interesting tactical scheme of action of the modern AUG of the US Navy at the time of a strategic aerospace offensive operation on the coastal sector of the enemy's territory, as well as taking into account the NIFC-CA concept.
Pay attention to the intensification of the communication channels between the air and sea units of the American AUG as the distance from the likely impact of the enemy's electronic warfare means
All combat elements are located here according to the "pyramidal" principle. The apex of the "shock pyramid" of the American fleet is represented by the air wing of unobtrusive multipurpose carrier-based fighters F-35B / C, which, in numbers from a squadron (12 aircraft) to an air regiment (more than 24 aircraft), enter enemy airspace and begin to scan the coastal zone and airspace with the help of AN / APG-81 onboard radars for the presence, type and number of enemy ground-based air defense systems and fighters capable of posing a threat to a massive missile-air strike by the American AUG. At the same time, over-the-horizon long-range air battles can be carried out using AIM-120D missiles to distract and exhaust enemy aircraft before and during the main strike. Simultaneously with the implementation of local air-to-air missions, the AN / AAQ-37 "DAS" optical-electronic sighting and navigation system with a distributed aperture will allow detecting a mass of enemy ground and air targets, transmitting all information to the carrier-based electronic warfare and suppression aircraft located far behind Air defense F / A-18G "Growler", which then relay it to the boars that close the air unit "Advansed Khokaev", and also select the most important radio-technical means of the enemy for precision electronic suppression.
The first thing that ensures a sufficiently high information security of the advanced reconnaissance and strike deck bundle "F-35B / C - F / A-18G" is the use of a single highly directional radio channel for the exchange of tactical information "MADL", located in the Ku-band of waves at frequencies from 11 to 18 GHz. The protected frequency hopping radio channel will be switched on literally for a second to transmit information to the "Growlers" on targets located at the front edge of the theater. The F-35B at the time of sending the information package will be located with a 3-5-kilometer drop relative to the F / A-18G, which will partially avoid the suppression of the signal by enemy EW air assets. This low-level and poorly perceptible tactical radio channel was named “Small Data Pipe”, and today it represents the main problem that KRET and other domestic developers of modern electronic warfare equipment should work on. Also noteworthy is the presence of an auxiliary air squadron of carrier-based F / A-18E / F "Super Hornets" flying between the leading Lightnings and Growlers. Why is this done?
Lightnings are far from Raptors, and in the case of independent air combat with such promising aircraft as the Su-35S, T-50 PAK-FA or Chinese J-15S and J-31, they can be completely defeated right in the air. enemy. The first ones will begin a rapid penetration into the air formations of the "Growlers" and "Hokaevs", which will instantly "blind" the entire American AUG. The Super Hornets squadron will be able to temporarily hold the enemy fighters on the front lines of the weakened air pyramid until reinforcements arrive in the form of another Lightning squadron capable of keeping the AUG air patrol safe. Before us is a powerful and full-fledged air component of naval air defense with several echelons and lines of defense.
The central link ("heart") of the air component of the AUG, represented by the "Advanced Hockey", UCLASS deck UAVs and covering them "Super Hornets" (the latter are not shown in the diagram), no longer belongs to the strike reconnaissance air base, but to the command and staff the structure of the aircraft carrier group. For greater safety, radar patrol and guidance aircraft will operate only within the range (under cover) of the Aegis shipborne BIUS with RIM-174 SM-6 ERAM interceptor missiles (ie, 200-250 km from the flagship aircraft carrier), F / A-18E / F a little further (300 - 400 km). Pay attention to the type of data transmission channel from the "Growlers" to the "Hawks" and from the "Hawks to the surface AUG". There is already a full-fledged and “long-playing” decimeter radio channel for transmitting tactical information “TTNT”, which is a backup channel “Link-16 / CMN-4”. Due to the great distance from the enemy's electronic warfare facilities (more than 700 - 800 km), "TTNT", directly in the 200-300 kilometer zone from the AUG, will be stable and protected: the information illumination of the ship's composition is unlikely to suffer.
The American aircraft carrier strike groups themselves will significantly increase their anti-aircraft / anti-missile potential over the next few years by replacing the existing AN / SPY-1D (V) radar antenna post with a promising multifunctional AMDR radar, which instead of 1-channel radar "searchlights" illuminated by AN / SPG -62 will receive full-fledged multi-channel antenna arrays capable of "capturing" several dozen air targets at once. Interceptor missiles RIM-174 ERAM will consolidate the effect thanks to the presence of ARGSN, capable of receiving target designation from Aegis, Growler, and Lightning. It will be quite difficult to overcome the missile defense system of such an AUG: only the Chinese and Russian Air Forces and the Navy will be able to carry out the destruction of such a naval formation within a certain period of time.
An equally important task is a worthy air defense / missile defense of the territory from the strikes of the advanced AUG of the US Navy.
FROM THE NETCENTRISM OF THE FLEET TO THE NETCENTRISM OF THE MILITARY AIR
If the progress of the systemic coordination of the 21st century in the United States to a greater extent affected the main strike component of the army - the naval forces, then in our country it touched precisely the defensive component - the Air Force and Air Defense, because these types of Aerospace Forces should always be ready to "kindly" meet thousands of NATO strategic cruise missiles, as well as hundreds of tactical aircraft armed with stealth anti-radar HARM and ALARM missiles, glide bombs, ADM-160C MALD-J decoy missiles, and sophisticated electronic countermeasures container systems.
Without a doubt, the basis here is made up of numerous anti-aircraft missile battalions and regiments of various modifications of the Trehsotok (S-300PS, S-300PM1, S-400 Triumph, S-300V / V4), Buk-M1 / 2, and also numerous anti-aircraft missile systems of military air defense ("Tor-M1 / V", "Tor-M2", "Pantsir-S1", "Tungusska-M1", "Strela-10M4", "Gyurza", "Igla-S", "Willow", etc.); but without integrated network-centric coordination and support for air defense aviation, all these systems would not look as threatening as we see today.
All this is provided today by a unique automated control system for anti-aircraft missile units at the level of the ACS brigade "Polyana-D4M1" as part of the Air Defense Forces of the Aerospace Forces, as well as the unified battery KP 9S737 "Rangir" as part of the military air defense. "Polyana-D4M1" collects tactical information about the air situation from ground-based radar-AWACS ("Sky-U", "Sky-M", "Protivnik-G", "Gamma-S1", 96L6E, etc.), radar systems "Shmel-M", installed on the basis of the A-50U and other RTR / RER means, and then analyzes their routes, selects the most dangerous and / or priority targets and performs the distribution and target designation of anti-aircraft missile divisions / brigades. High computing characteristics of computerized data exchange and display facilities PBU MP06RPM, KSHM MP02RPM and AWP 9S929 are realized due to modern microprocessor element base with high performance, as well as due to high-speed data transmission modules. "Polyana-D4M1" is capable of "guiding" up to 255 air targets accompanied by the attached radar means, as well as storing in memory information about the coordinates of 500 VCs tracked in the review mode. Information processing is carried out by 8 operators on modern AARM with liquid crystal MFIs, and the command-staff AARM 9S929, equipped with one large-format LCD, helps to organize the information into one visual tactical interface.
The Polyana-D4M1 missile defense link is capable of showing the greatest capabilities simultaneously in conjunction with the powerful 55Zh6M Sky-M radar complex, capable of detecting air attack weapons in near space at distances of up to 1800 km (in sector view mode), as well as with an aircraft AWACS A-50U, capable of detecting remote low-profile low-altitude targets at distances up to 150-200 km. A fully visible closed airspace is established over the covered area. "Polyana" is capable of receiving information simultaneously from 3 sources and transmitting it to 6 consumers, among which there may be: combat control points 5N63S, 54K6E, 9S457M and 55K6E (complexes S-300PS / PM1 / V and S-400 "Triumph "Respectively), as well as military air defense missile systems of the families" Tor "," Tungusska "and" Strela-10 ", but only through the intermediate, integrated into the brigade combat information and control system, UBKP 9S737" Rangir ".
"Ranzhir", to some extent, is also an automated control system, but its throughput, communication range and the number of types of interfaced systems are severely limited. UBKP "Ranzhir" is capable of handling only 24 escorted on the aisle CC, and 48 - monitored, ie. 10 times less than the "Polyana-D4M1", the execution time of one target designation is 5 seconds (for the "Polyana" - 1 second), consumers can only be military air defense, which is why the 9S737 can only participate in the close range of air defense / missile defense, but with a "fat" plus in the form of the main element of defense of the "dead zones" of long-range anti-aircraft missile systems. The tracked "Rangers" also have a second advantage - the deployment time, which is only 5 minutes, for the "Polyana" it can be up to 35 minutes. The complex is capable of simultaneously issuing target designation to 4 consumers, and receiving information from Polyana, AWACS helicopters within a radius of 30 km and from the 9S18M1 Kupol surveillance and target designation radar (Buk-M1 air defense missile system).
Later, developed in 1987, the UBKP "Ranzhir" was deeply improved. The new version was named "Ranzhir-M" (9S737M). Of the main differences from the basic product, it is worth noting an almost 3 times increased throughput along target tracks (it increased from 24 to 60), the implementation time for one target designation decreased to 2 seconds, the number of data exchange channels increased to 5. Thanks to the modernization of the electronic element base, the list of connecting consumers of tactical information also includes portable anti-aircraft missile systems "Igla-S", and later - "Verba", which are supplied with specialized tablets for displaying markers of approaching air targets. In addition to the automatic distribution of target designations from the VKP / AWACS helicopter for the air defense missile system, the 9S737M product is capable of systematizing targets accompanied by 6 air defense systems. For example, if in the close range of the air defense of an anti-aircraft missile brigade there are 3 Tor-M1 complexes and 3 Tungusska-M1 complexes associated with the Ranzhir UBKP, then it is almost completely ruled out that the same air attack weapons can be captured by several the above SAM / ZRAK. This, firstly, reduces the useless missile defense system by 1, 2 - 1, 6 times, and secondly, it increases the useful general target channel of the anti-aircraft missile brigade by about the same amount. "Ranzhir-M" has an enlarged physical storage device for targets detected by radar images: the memory can contain coordinates of 170 surveyed targets. The modernized "Ranzhir-M", developed by the Penza OJSC "Radiozavod" in the 90s, has a tracked chassis GM-5965 unified with the "Tor-M1" complex, while the "Rangir" was based on the MT-LBu chassis.
Operators "Rangir-M" have at their disposal 4 AWPs based on modern computers "Baget-21" (commander, operator of the radar situation and radio operator) and "Baget-41" (additional AWP). There is a topographic reference complex based on GLONASS / GPS, as well as optical-electronic means for video documentation and analysis of target interception by brigade air defense systems.
The photo shows another automated control system of the Russian Aerospace Forces "Baikal-1ME". This ACS is a superior command post over the "Polyany" and "Rangers" and is capable of simultaneously controlling 8 anti-aircraft missile systems with 24 air defense missile systems of the S-300PM1 and S-300V, Buk-M1, etc. families. The instrumental high-altitude ceiling of the "Baikal" operation is 1200 km, and the maximum target speed is 18430 km / h, which indicates its further use in the S-500 "Prometey" air defense missile system.
The latest version of Rangir, created for the modular version of the Tor-M2KM air defense missile system, was first presented at MAKS-2013. The performance of the new element base of the Rangir-M1 UBKP (9S737MK) has reached the performance of Polyany-D4M1: the new unified command post is capable of displaying up to 255 target markers on the MFI, storing 500 in memory. Processing one target designation can take 1 second. The instrumental range of the observed airspace at "Ranzhir-M1" reaches 200 km, which confirmed the software and hardware integration with all modifications of the S-300PM1 air defense system. All previous "Rangers" in conjunction with the "Three Hundreds" did not work. Thus, the personnel of JSC "Radiozavod" embodied in the product 9S737MK all the best qualities of "Polyana" and "Ranzhira", allowing them to work at the far line of air defense / missile defense. The TATA "Ranzhir-M" installed on a wheeled chassis has significantly increased mobility on highways and dry unpaved surfaces, allowing deployment much faster than earlier modifications. In fact, from a unified brigade command post "Ranzhir-M1" has turned into a full-fledged automated control system, equivalent in level to the "Polyana-D4M1", and these two systems will be able to turn our air defense system into a single network-centric, information-rich "organism "Capable of withstanding any aerospace threats from the out-of-bounds enemy.
