At the end of May 2016, a number of Russian media published information that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the return to Israel of a tank captured by Syrian troops during the First Lebanese War, and on June 4, a controversial article appeared on the Military Review: Steel Grave: why an Israeli tank from Kubinka will go home. Unfortunately, this article contains a number of technical inaccuracies, and the very history of the capture of an Israeli tank by the Syrians is superficially covered.
In this publication, based on available sources of information, an attempt is made to objectively understand what an Israeli tank is and to highlight the history of its appearance in the Tank Museum in Kubinka (Moscow region). Apparently, we are talking about the return to Israel of the tank "Magah-3" - seriously modernized and adapted to the local specifics of the American M48. Deliveries of M48 tanks to Tel Aviv began in the early 60s, since at that time the Americans formally supported the arms embargo against Israel, they had to go for tricks. The tanks were not transferred directly from the United States, but from the Bundeswehr's tank fleet. By the beginning of the Six Day War, the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) had about 250 M48 tanks of various modifications. In battle, Israeli tanks had to face the Egyptian T-34-85, IS-3M and Jordanian M48. Thanks to their high professional skills, courage and heroism, Israeli tank crews often managed to emerge victorious in battles at the cost of serious losses. So, only Jordan left about 100 of its M48s on the battlefield, a significant part of these machines was subsequently restored and entered service with the IDF.
Based on the results of the battles, in order to improve the combat and operational characteristics, it was decided to modernize the M48. The upgraded tank was named "Magach" (Hebrew: מגח, English Magach), most often "Magah" is translated as - "battering ram". First of all, tanks of early modifications were modernized, it was about increasing firepower, increasing the range, mobility and technical reliability. The M48A1 modernized in Israel received the designation "Magah-1", the M48A2C - "Magah-2", the most radical and largest in terms of the number of converted machines was the "Magah-3". Apparently, such a tank is still in Kubinka.
The American 90-mm gun was replaced by the British 105-mm L7, the bulky commander's cupola became a low-profile Israeli production. The gasoline engine was replaced by a diesel Continental AVDS-1790-2A with a capacity of 750 hp. with. The previous General Motors CD-850-4A transmission was replaced by a new Allison CD-850-6. A non-flammable fluid was used in the hydraulic system. The upgraded tank received new sights and more advanced Israeli-made radio sets. To combat enemy infantry, additional Belgian-made machine guns were installed on the tower.
Tank "Magah-3"
By the beginning of the Yom Kippur War, the six tank brigades of the IDF had 445 Magakh-3 tanks. Israeli tank losses during this war were very significant. During the week of fighting, Israel lost 610 tanks, more than half of them were modernized M48s, the Egyptians lost 240 tanks, mostly T-55.
According to Israeli data, Egypt captured about 200 tanks, some of which were to be restored. With the increased power of the 105-mm gun compared to the base M48, the Magah-3 armor could not withstand the guns of the Soviet self-propelled guns SU-100, the IS-3M, T-54, T-55 and T-62 tanks.
Israeli tanks knocked out in the Sinai
The Israeli tankmen were very much annoyed by the anti-tank weapons of the infantry: RPG-7 and ATGM "Baby". The Arabs practiced anti-tank ambushes and "fire bags". Thus, the Israeli 401st Brigade, ambushed by the 18th Egyptian Infantry Division, lost 81 out of 104 tanks. Israeli tank crews called the ATGM operators "tourists" because of the suitcase (container) for carrying and launching the ATGM.
ATGM "Baby"
In general, the tanks "Magakh-3" in terms of security and firepower were equivalent to the Soviet T-55. The outcome of the battle in duel situations, as a rule, was decided by the positional advantage, the level of training of the crews and the moral and psychological qualities of the tankers.
Based on the results of their use in the Yom Kippur War, a number of improvements were introduced on the Magah tanks. The most notable innovation, which was supposed to reduce the vulnerability of Israeli tanks to cumulative weapons (ATGM and anti-tank grenades), was the ERA BLAZER reactive armor (explosive reactive armor).
Israel, having experience in large-scale battles using tanks and suffering heavy losses in the 1973 war, was the first to equip its combat vehicles with dynamic protection (ERA), although research in this area in the 50-70s was carried out in the USSR, the USA and the FRG. But in countries that are "trendsetters" in the field of tank building, they decided to do with all sorts of screens and combined multilayer armor made of materials of different densities.
Elements of the Israeli DZ
The official priority in the field of remote sensing, protected by patents, belongs to the United States. In 1967, the Americans were the first to apply for the design of dynamic protection. The first generation DZ element consisted of two metal plates and a thin layer of explosive between them. DZ "Blazer" containers were hung over the main armor of the tank. When the cumulative ammunition hit, the explosive in the container detonated, and the outer plate, under the action of the explosion products, flew at an angle towards the cumulative jet. Thus, the cumulative jet was destroyed, and the main armor of the tank did not penetrate. After the installation of additional reactive armor, the mass of the vehicle increased by 800-1000 kg, but the vulnerability from light infantry anti-tank weapons became significantly less.
On June 6, 1982, Israel intervened in a long-running civil war in neighboring Lebanon. The Israeli armed forces' operation was named Peace for Galilee. In it, in addition to other armored vehicles, tanks "Magah", equipped with dynamic protection, were involved. By that time, "Magakh-3", in addition to 105-mm guns, were armed with three machine guns of 7, 62-mm and 52 or 60-mm auxiliary mortars. It should be said that placing mortars on tank turrets was Israeli know-how. With the help of mortars, it was possible to launch flares and fight against manpower located behind the folds of the terrain.
The ground operation was attended by about 90 thousand Israeli troops, 1240 tanks and 1520 armored personnel carriers, which is many times higher than the number of Syrian and Palestinian forces in Lebanon. The main goal of the Israeli army during this campaign was to destroy PLO bases and contain the influence of Syria. After the IDF units took Beirut, the PLO armed formations left the country and moved to Tunisia. Despite some successes, Israel suffered significant losses by the standards of this small country in that war and was unable to achieve all of its goals. After the invasion of Lebanon, Israel's international reputation has deteriorated. This was mainly due to the casualties among the Lebanese civilian population. The Syrian armed forces never left Lebanon, and the PLO was replaced by the Hezbollah organization, created with the support of Iran.
The fighting in Lebanon in 1982 was carried out on a large scale, in which large forces of tanks, artillery and aviation were involved on both sides. Despite the fact that in Israel itself, Operation Peace for Galilee was not considered a war, in its scale it certainly was. According to Israeli data, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the IDF lost 654 people. In various sources, the losses of the PLO and Syrian troops are estimated at 8-10 thousand people, several thousand more civilians died from artillery shelling and bombing. The casualties included several Israeli tankers who went missing during the night of June 10-11, 1982. Then the tanks "Magakh-3" of the 362nd tank battalion of the 734th tank brigade of the IDF, moving towards the intersection, south of the settlement of Sultan-Yaakub, due to ineffective reconnaissance and misses of the command ran into the superior forces of the Syrians. It is worth dwelling in more detail on what the 734th Tank Brigade was and why it suffered losses.
The final mobilization of the 734th Tank Brigade, staffed with reservists, was completed only on June 8, when the IDF units had already entered Lebanon. A large part of the brigade was staffed with students of religious schools - "negotiated yeshivas". According to the agreement concluded between the yeshiva and the army, the army sends students to the yeshiva who combine Torah study with military training for three years, and after graduation they serve in combat units for a year and four months. Typically, graduates of military yeshivas serve in separate units, where the daily routine takes into account the hours of prayer.
Actions of Israeli troops in the east
At the beginning of the operation, the 734th Tank Brigade was in reserve in case large-scale hostilities began against Syria. It was planned that the brigade would conduct an offensive against the main positions of the Syrians in the area of the Beirut-Damascus highway. On the afternoon of June 9, one of the brigade's battalions began to move in this direction, but was attacked by Syrian Gazelle anti-tank helicopters. And at night on the positions of the battalion was struck by the MLRS "Grad". The other battalions of the brigade were still in reserve. On June 10, a brigade in the vanguard of the advancing forces of the 880th Division began to move towards the north of the village of Kefar-Meshkhi. On the evening of June 10, the commander of the 362nd battalion, Iru Efron, received an order to move his tanks north and set up barriers south of Sultan Yaakub. In addition to the Magakh-3 tanks, the convoy had several M133 armored personnel carriers, mortarmen, signalmen, infantry and scouts from the brigade reconnaissance company moved on them.
Israeli tanks of the 734th tank brigade move to Sultan Yaakub
Due to the haste and uncoordinated actions of the command, no one warned that another Israeli battalion went along the highway east (that is, to the right of them). As a result, the tankers of the two Israeli battalions mistook each other for the enemy and opened fire. This led to the loss of 2 tanks, five tankers were killed and two were injured. At this moment, the commander of the 734th tank brigade, Michael Shahar, in conditions of a lack of intelligence information, decides to send the 362nd battalion to control positions 3 km south of the turn to Ayta El-Fukhar.
Having received a new order, the commander of the 362 battalion, Ira Efron, continued to move in a northern direction, being in the firm belief that there was no enemy in this area. In fact, the road along which the Israeli tanks and motorized infantry moved was controlled by the vanguard of the 3rd Syrian division.
While advancing to the specified area, Ira Efron made a gross mistake at about 01:30 local time, he slipped past the desired point and went deeper into the territory occupied by the Syrians. The disoriented commander of the 362nd Battalion missed the turn he needed at Kamed El-Luz and headed for the turn at Ayta El-Fukhar. When passing the fork, the Israelis came under fire from the Malyutka ATGM and RPG-7. Apparently, several head tanks received hits, but due to the presence of the Blazer DZ on them, serious damage was avoided.
Not realizing that he is already at the entrance to Sultan-Yaakub and mistaking what happened as an ordinary ambush, Ira Efron decides to slip through it. He reports the "ambush" to the brigade commander by radio and orders the battalion to move forward at maximum speed. The first two companies skip the fork and pass 1, 5−2 km without hindrance. The third company and part of the infantry, having come under heavy fire and having lost one tank, take up defensive positions in the ruins of an abandoned village. Soon, two Israeli companies, deepening into the Syrian defenses, came under fire from tank guns and also lost one tank, and were forced to stop at the foot of the village of Sultan Yaakub. This is where hell began for the Israelites.
Here is what Avi Rath, one of the tankers who survived this battle, recalls:
After advancing a few kilometers, we found ourselves surrounded by Syrians on all sides. It was already quite late at night, and then the most difficult hours of my life began. Suddenly, dozens of rockets fired from different distances fell on us at the same time. I saw a Syrian commando lying 20 meters from the road and setting fire to our tank 200 meters in front of me. Hellfire was being fired at us from all directions. We did not manage to immediately understand where they were shooting from. We found ourselves in a valley with hills on the left and right and a village in front of us. At first, the shooting was conducted only from the village and from the right, but then we discovered fire from the left and behind. We did not notice each other (it was 01:30 am) and did not understand what was happening. Only after a few minutes of confusion did we begin to recover. We hear screams on the radio: “Where are you? … and where are you? Signal me with a flashlight … - complete chaos.
Harel Ben-Ari, a machine gunner in the motorized infantry, reports:
Suddenly shells start to explode around, and I notice behind me our tanks, which were defeated. We must continue to advance. I hear orders on the radio and try to understand them. I don't know yet what death looks like. We continue to advance, firing at sources of fire, bypassing the destroyed enemy tanks. I notice three Syrian soldiers running but not firing near our armored personnel carrier. I do not shoot at them - I still cannot shoot at people from such a short distance. A few minutes later, the tank behind us is defeated and lights up, illuminating everything around. I also notice the Syrians lying in a ditch near the road. Now I shoot without a doubt. You need to think quickly and effectively, pushing feelings into the background. In those seconds, something changed in me - I am no longer the same person.
Israeli tankmen and infantrymen managed to repel the first onslaught of the Syrians and even destroy several BMP-1s. The battalion commander Ira Efron did not understand that his battalion was in the depths of the Syrian defenses, and still took what was happening as an ordinary ambush. However, it soon became clear that this was not an ambush, another half hour passed, and the fire only intensified, and the losses grew. An attempt to link up with the forces of the third company failed and the battle formations of the Israelis were mixed. Under these conditions, Ira Efron gave the order to the tank commanders to organize themselves into groups by location (the tanks were mixed, and it was not possible to act in the original composition of platoons and companies) and to take up a perimeter defense in order to prevent the Syrian infantrymen armed with RPG-7 from within the range of an aimed shot. Due to the fact that Ira Efron incorrectly determined his location, the brigade command misjudged what had happened. Brigade Commander Michael Shahar was firmly convinced that the battalion could not face large Syrian forces, and ordered Ira Efron to "Pull himself together and stop the hysteria." At that time, the 362nd battalion had lost at least three tanks.
Finally, heeding the insistent requests of the battalion commander, Michael Shahar agreed to send him help. He ordered the commander of the neighboring 363rd Battalion to take one company with him and go to Ira Efron to "bring him back to normal." Not realizing the seriousness of the situation, the battalion commander of the 363rd battalion with a detachment consisting of a tank company and five M113 armored personnel carriers was ambushed. Heavy fire was opened on the detachment, and several tanks were hit. As a result, the forces of the 363rd battalion, which had moved to the aid of Ira Efron, themselves fell into a difficult situation and were fragmented. Some of the tanks found shelter in the ruins of the village, where the surviving infantrymen and tanks of the third company of the 362nd battalion were already hiding. They had to repulse the attacks of the Syrians, who did not abandon their attempts to destroy Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers from the RPG-7, which had wedged into their defenses.
After the help sent to the 362nd battalion itself was in a difficult situation, the brigade commander Michael Shahar realized the seriousness of what was happening and reported to the division. The division commander Lev Giora immediately subordinated the battalion directly to the division and personally dealt with the problem. But at that moment, the main forces of the 880th division were linked in the battle with the 3rd Syrian division. At dawn, it became finally clear that the 362nd Battalion was surrounded by large Syrian forces, and with every minute the chances of breaking out of the encirclement were diminishing. Due to the fact that shells and cartridges were running out, the battalion under the command of Ira Efron could simply not have time to wait for help. In this situation, deputy commander Michael Shahar and battalion commander Ira Efron, after consulting, decided to break through on their own. At this moment, the Syrian troops launched another attack. During the battle, the tank of the platoon commander Zohar Lifshits gets a direct hit in the tower. At the same time, Zohar Lifshits died, and the gunner Yehuda Katz was seriously wounded. The loader left the tank and was picked up by another tank. But the tank itself remained on the move and did not catch fire. When other soldiers from the company tried to help the wounded gunner, the unexpected happened - the driver Yehuda Kaplan, who had lost his composure, started the tank and rushed south, towards the exit from the valley. Seeing on its way another knocked out Israeli tank, he came to his senses and left the damaged car, joining the tankers hiding near the road. The bodies of the two remaining soldiers in the tank were lost (the body of Lifshits was returned by the Syrians, and Katz is still considered missing). By this time, the Israeli battalion had already lost 5 tanks.
After the command of the 880th division came to understand that the position of the soldiers of the 362nd and 363rd battalions in the Sultan-Yaakub area was hopeless, they were provided with artillery support. Caught under massive artillery fire, Syrian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were forced to leave their positions. At the same time, units of the 880th division began to break through to help the blocked Israeli battalions, but they met on their way the barriers of Syrian commandos with light anti-tank weapons. After the loss of two tanks and three armored personnel carriers, the command ordered Ira Efron to break through on his own under the cover of artillery fire. To provide artillery support, about 100 105-155-mm guns were concentrated in the area. They put a continuous curtain of fire between the Syrian troops and the Israelis leaving the encirclement.
Avi Rath reports:
We were ordered to pack up on the road and drive south. It was a frantic ride, I pressed the gas all the way. If only to get out of here, and I try to squeeze the last drop of speed out of the tank. So all tanks - press and fly. They shoot at us, and we shoot everything that is left. It was a short trip - only 3-4 km, but it seemed to us that the road had no end.
Despite powerful artillery support and top speed, several vehicles were hit and two more Israeli tanks were lost. At 09:15, the last Israeli tank left the valley, and at 11:00, all the remaining equipment of the brigade entered the division's location outside the range of the Syrian anti-tank weapons.
According to official Israeli data, the IDF in the battle for Sultan Yaakub lost in killed: 5 soldiers of the 362th battalion, 3 soldiers of the 363rd battalion and 10 soldiers from the 880th division. 7 tanks of the 362 battalion, 1 tank of the 363 battalion and 2 tanks from the 880 division were lost, 4 tanks "Magakh-3" were captured by the Syrians. Three Israeli soldiers: Zachariah Bomel, Yehuda Katz and Zvi Feldman are missing. The losses of the Syrian army are unknown. The capture of four Israeli tanks, the capture and disappearance of several Israeli soldiers in the Sultan Ya'akub area was one of the saddest events for Israel in the First Lebanese War. Corps commander General Avigdor Ben Gal took full responsibility for the failure.
After the end of hostilities in November 1983, Israel exchanged 4,700 captured militants for six Israeli soldiers. In June 1984, in exchange for three captured Israeli soldiers, three Israeli citizens and 5 bodies of soldiers, Israel handed over to Syria 291 Syrian soldiers, 74 bodies of Syrian soldiers and 13 Syrian citizens. In May 1985, Israel released 1,150 Palestinian militants in exchange for three Israeli soldiers captured by Ahmad Dajabril's group. One of the soldiers was captured during the battle at the Sultan-Yaakub cross.
It is noted that thanks to the reactive armor "Blazer" managed to avoid much more serious losses. Many Israeli tanks that took part in this battle received several hits from the Malyutka and RPG-7 ATGM missiles. Subsequently, the Israeli tanks "Magah-3" captured by the Syrians with a hinged DZ were demonstrated in Damascus, and one vehicle was transferred to the USSR.
In the Soviet Union, a captured tank, and in particular containers of reactive armor, underwent a comprehensive study. All the ammunition was not used up in the "Magakh" and from it they fired at the T-72 at the range. As a result, it was decided to urgently strengthen the forehead of the T-72 hull with an additional armor plate. It is generally accepted that it was after a thorough study of the Israeli DZ that similar protection appeared on Soviet tanks. For Soviet specialists, mounted dynamic protection against cumulative ammunition was not something new. Work on this topic has been carried out since the late 50s and full-scale samples of the Soviet DZ were created, which were successfully tested. But the top commanders of the Soviet armored forces, who went through the war on the T-34, in every possible way resisted the "hanging of explosives on the armor." Only after reading the reports of Soviet advisers in Syria and the Magah-3 tank was their inertia broken, and in 1985 the complex was adopted by the Soviet army. According to its characteristics, DZ "Contact-1" was in many ways superior to "Blazer". Unlike 20 standard sizes of Israeli "reactive armor", the 4S20 reactive armor element was unified for all main tanks that existed at that time. The Soviet DZ "Contact-1" was lighter and had a significantly smaller area of weakened zones.
During the Soviet era, the Israeli "Magah-3" was in a "closed", inaccessible to the general public, part of the tank collection in Kubinka. After the doors of the museum were thrown open for everyone in 1996, and organized excursions were started there, information emerged that the Israeli tank received from Syria allegedly contained the remains of Israeli soldiers. As it turned out later, this was a local folklore, which, for the sake of a joke, was in all seriousness introduced to museum visitors. But the relatives of the Israeli soldiers who went missing in 1982 took this very seriously and began to demand that the IDF command and the Israeli leadership return the tank, which is the "grave". According to a statement released by the Israeli Prime Minister's press office, Benjamin Netanyahu raised the issue during a meeting with the Russian president in Moscow. Israel has received an official notification from the Russian side that the request has been granted and the tank will be returned.
The Israeli prime minister's press service reports that an IDF delegation is currently in Moscow to agree on the return procedure and technical details. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Chief of the IDF General Staff Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot, motivating the request for the return of the Israeli tank, expressed the opinion that "this combat vehicle has historical value, including for the relatives of the servicemen who went missing in that battle." The fate of three Israeli soldiers who went missing on the night of June 10-11, 1982: Zechariah Baumel, Yehuda Katz and Zvi Feldman is still unknown. It is noteworthy that Israel offers a cash prize of $ 10 million for information about each of them. The relatives of the missing servicemen were officially notified about the return of the captured tank.
The combat vehicle handed over by the Syrians in the early 80s for a long time was one of the most interesting museum exhibits in Kubinka near Moscow. The value of the Israeli tank "Magah-3" lies both in its combat biography and in the fact that there are no other vehicles with reactive armor "Blazer" in the museum collection in Kubinka. It is clear that Vladimir Putin took this step, wishing to demonstrate the friendliness and openness of Russia. It remains to be hoped that the leadership of the State of Israel will adequately assess the gesture of goodwill and find an opportunity to compensate for the gap that has formed in the exhibition. It seems that the Israeli main battle tank "Merkava" would look very good in Kubinka.
The author is grateful to Oleg Sokolov for his help in preparing the publication.
