In the first half of March 2021, a new turn took place in the fate of the Project 20386 Mercury "corvette" ill-fated for the Navy (before that - "Daring").
PJSC "Severnaya Verf", as they say in official documents, "carried out a technical launch" of the unfinished hull into the water. Well, or more simply, I pushed this monument to how you can't build ships from a building site in order to free it up for building other ships. Before trying to guess what this is connected with, let's briefly recall the history of this project.
At the beginning of "glorious" deeds
In the early 2010s, when the 20380 corvette was replaced by a project 20385 corvette with MTU diesel engines and a RENK transmission, somewhere in the depths of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau, an ingenious plan to create a modular corvette was born. Presumably (in order to avoid conflict situations, we will not say unequivocally) this set of ingenious ideas mainly came to the mind of I. G. Zakharov, Rear Admiral, former head of the 1st Central Research Institute of Shipbuilding, and then - Deputy Chief Designer of TsMKB. I. G. Zakharov has repeatedly stated his views in the press. As an example, let's take the publication of an interview with I. G. Zakharov on the website flotprom.ru in 2012 "The formula of the corvette remains unchanged":
The series of ships of the "Guarding" class is coming to an end, the modernization has passed and the construction of the upgraded ship - 20385 is underway. We already see that the pace of equipment generation change dictates the need to update this ship as well. And somewhere by 2020, we will have to present not just a modernized ship, but a ship of a different generation.
What will make it different?
The ship will become somewhat larger, but it will keep the same cost indicators, and the principle of modularity will be implemented in it.
Another question is that now ships are increasingly involved in special operations. For example, it can be the landing of troops, the deployment of inspection teams to fight pirates or the deployment of humanitarian operations (as a hospital or to evacuate victims of any disasters), mine risk management.
To do this, today we propose to create special rooms - and this is a global trend (we call them transformer rooms), which can be transformed in a short time due to the use of container and other mobile means and allow the ship to solve these problems. This will be their characteristic.
This is how it all began. In 2013 I. G. Zakharov took the post of vice president of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, USC. At that moment, a series of diesel corvettes, which was mastered by the industry with great difficulties, was doomed.
Then the synergy of events began.
First, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral V. V. Chirkov, traveled to the United States, where he was convincingly demonstrated all the advantages of modular LCS ships.
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It is difficult to say why the Americans did this - after all, by that time the concept of modularity was failing with a bang. It is not on purpose that they are so with us, because then Crimea was still Ukraine, and everything in relations with the United States was good? They could not deliberately harm us, right?
It is also unknown whether Viktor Viktorovich believed the Americans. Trusting the Americans is a rather strange idea, in principle, and for the Russian military it is all the more strange, so we will not say anything unambiguously either. But modularity from that moment just burst into our shipbuilding and became mainstream for a long time.
And then Zaslon JSC entered the "topic" - an organization that, in theory, was supposed to supply multifunctional radar systems to the Navy ships. In practice, JSC "Zaslon" supplies the Navy with products (MF-radar), similar to multifunctional radar systems, which, however, in "room" conditions can sometimes reach (when firing SAM MF-radar) in their performance characteristics to the level of the SAM " Wave "of the times of" early Gorshkov "(well, not quite reach, because unlike the MF-RLK, the" Volna "air defense missile systems ensured the defeat of maneuvering targets. Slightly modern engineers did not catch up with their grandfathers).
All specialists knew about these problems in advance, but for the public it will be revealed in all its acuteness later. For anyone interested, you can read the articles of M. Klimov "Thundering" and others. Will our fleet receive effective ships of the near zone " and “The Leaky Umbrella of the Fleet. Technical analysis of the firing of the Thundering " … And then the energy of the guys from "Zaslon" and their "friends" at the Almaz Central Design Bureau became another of the driving forces of the new ship, which was yet to be born.
In 2013, a year before the Crimean events, in the press the following message has slipped:
“The main thing that doesn’t suit us is the too high price and excessive armament - the Kalibr cruise missiles, working against sea and ground targets. Project 20385 does not meet the requirements of the fleet,”the source said. According to him, the estimated cost of one ship is about 14 billion rubles, but in reality it can reach 18 billion. For a corvette with a displacement of 2, 2 thousand tons, although made using stealth technology, this is a lot. The equally modern frigates of Project 11356, which are now being built for the Black Sea Fleet, have a displacement of almost twice as much - 4 thousand tons, and cost the same.
The frigates of this project are ships of the open sea, with a significant range, and the corvettes 20385 are intended for the near sea zone. Sailors believe that such a powerful weapon as the Caliber is unnecessary for these small ships.
Thus, plans to stop the production of corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 began to be implemented even before the Crimea (although later officials claimed something completely different), and the above persons and groups of persons played a significant role in this (although everything was not reduced to them, as to 20386) …
In 2015, I. G. Zakharov, in a joint article with the head of the Almaz Central Design Bureau, A. V. Shlyakhtenko, made an important confession. The article "Corvettes today and tomorrow" in the publication "National Defense" we find the following passage:
“The practice of the second decade of the new century posed a number of new questions for naval sailors and designers of surface combatants. Their essence lies in the significant expansion of the functions assigned to these ships. Now, in addition to the traditional tasks: the fight against surface ships, submarines, air defense, fire support for the landing forces - they must provide search and destruction of mines, patrol and surveillance in the economic zone, protect oil production and fishing areas, conduct search and rescue operations, provide assistance to those in distress, and carry out other missions.
Taking into account the requirements for limiting the displacement and cost of corvettes, the way out of this situation is seen in the idea of using replaceable weapons."
What's the catch?
And the fact is that the listed "series of new questions", together with the previously existing old "questions", does not require any modularity, but requires a small compartment at the disposal of BCH-3, which could store uninhabited underwater vehicles for mine clearance and a small primitive crane for launching them. Another rack with a control panel. Everything. Moreover, as a last resort, all these things can be provided on almost any warship without an additional compartment.
Based on this false thesis, the following sequence of priorities is announced in the article:
1. For the sounded list of tasks, modularity is needed (in fact, not).
2. The most suitable option for modularity is, sorry, container.
3. To put containers into the ship, you need to allocate a large area for them (a compartment in the stern and a helicopter lift, for example).
4. Since a lot of space is needed, the composition of the armament must be reduced, otherwise modularity will not fit (compare armament 20385 and 20386).
5. Also, for the same reason, it is necessary to reduce the crew (and this, obviously, will complicate the fight for survivability in battle, and very much) - for the sake of modularity.
That is, the principle "modularity at any cost, and the rest - as it turns out" was put at the forefront.
At the same time, the need for high speed was justified, which means a gas turbine power plant. We will return to the GEM.
This is how the story began. IG Zakharov wanted modules at any cost, JSC "Zaslon" wanted an innovative radar with antenna canvases in the superstructure. Almaz apparently wanted another new project. A number of people wanted to make money on this. And V. V. Chirkov at a certain moment wanted to agree on all this.
In the fall of 2016, the ship described in the article was laid down at the Northern Shipyard under the name "Daring". Its chief designer was I. G. Zakharov, "in combination". The dream of building a modular ship began to come true.
Cancer tumor
It is worth briefly describing the features of the project for those who did not follow the course of events.
On the ship, instead of GAS "Zarya" used on corvettes 20380 and 20385, there is a modification of "Platinum", the energy of which is significantly lower and the target detection range is also.
The advantages of Platina-M begin when an external low-frequency illumination is used, even with a LFR towed GAS, since its operating range includes lower frequencies than that of the Zarya. But without this, it is significantly inferior to "Dawn".
The 20386 armament composition is almost similar to the 20380 corvette (remember that for the sake of modularity, the armament composition needs to be significantly reduced), with a small difference - the artillery systems are less effective than that of the old 20380, but 4 more anti-aircraft missiles. The rest is the same. Against the background of 20385 with eight "Calibers" (and even "Zircons" in the future), "Mercury" looks frankly pitiful.
The helicopter was placed in an under-deck hangar with a lift, like on an aircraft carrier. This is an expensive and technically complex solution, which is nevertheless necessary - otherwise the containers will not get into the modular compartment. The latter, located under the flight deck, often turn out to be a thing in themselves, since the launching of the payload from these containers is hampered by the overlapping side ports of the boat.
At the same time, a dilemma arose - either a 40-foot container on a helicopter lift, or a helicopter. That is, in fact, for the sake of container modularity, a helicopter is thrown from the ship!
A special problem is the placement of the antenna sheets of the radar complex on the sides of the superstructure, which is made of composite materials.
Many experts believe that due to the inevitable deformations of the superstructure when moving in waves, the canvases will “play”, chaotically changing their position, which will make accurate shooting impossible. True, it may be possible to solve the problem by constantly aligning the antennas. It is possible to find out whether this is so or not, as well as whether it is removable (if the problem turns out to be real), only after the construction of the ship. That is, the Navy has to take the inevitable risk of getting an incapacitated ship, just to find out how it will turn out.
But even if everything works, nothing will work anyway. The ship lacks a long-range target detection radar. At 20385, also with the "Zaslonovsky" radar station, the "Fourke" radar station was abandoned for these purposes. At 20386, the Fourke functionality does nothing. Strictly speaking, it is not at all clear how they are going to shoot from this ship? Moreover, it is even less clear how this ship should hit air targets without radio correction of the missile defense system, which was not originally equipped with multifunctional radar systems from JSC "Zaslon"? There is also no information that the RK SAM is envisaged for 20386.
Placing radar canvases on the superstructure aggravates the situation on the other hand. The Americans came to a similar decision in their time. And then the Chinese. But the fact is that their radar antennas are so huge that they cannot be placed on any mast, this is a necessary measure. And they stand at the same time on high superstructures made of steel, on heavy ships, which reduces the deformations of the hull and superstructures to values that are not problematic for the radar. At the same time, their radio horizon is in any case less than that of the radar on the mast - the antennas were forcedly removed down to the superstructure, and not because they wanted to.
In the case of 20386, they were removed to the "playing" superstructure precisely because they wanted to, the radio horizon on these ships is lowered without any purpose, just so that a box similar to the "Zumwalta" superstructure would rise above the ship, for aesthetic reasons. It was possible to design the superstructure in a different way.
The bottom line is that it will be very difficult to shoot at low-flying targets even when the radar is working. They will simply be detected too late - the antennas are too low.
The main power plant is a major problem. This installation is made in a very strange way for a battleship.
A little clarification needs to be made here.
There are schemes with electric propulsion, when diesel generators or turbine generators on board the ship provide electricity to low-speed main electric motors (PMMs), which run on shaft lines. The advantage of such systems is low noise, which is especially important for anti-submarine ships. Also, in such schemes, sometimes there are no reducers, if it is not necessary to ensure the operation of the gas turbine installation on the shaft line. The downside is the huge mass of low-speed electric motors, hundreds of tons, and their large size.
There are well-known diesel-gas turbine systems, where a gear transmission provides either joint or alternate operation of a diesel engine or a turbine on a shaft.
Systems with partial electric propulsion, similar to those used on the project 22100 border ship, are not applicable on a warship. Their main advantage is that in the patrol mode, the diesel generator is enough for the move, and for power supply, and in the patrol mode, this ensures fuel economy. Such a ship "lives" on patrol course 90% of its "life". The battleship does not have a patrol mode, and the power of electricity consumers is many times greater.
What did the designers of the Almaz Central Design Bureau do?
They went their own, untouched path. The architecture of a diesel-gas turbine plant was taken, that is, a turbine for afterburner, an electric motor for an economy drive and a gearbox that ensures their joint work. Only instead of a diesel engine with a gearbox, a high-speed electric motor was put to work.
That is, the GED here is not a heavy, low-speed machine that can turn the propeller, but a small hummer, the torque of which is raised by the gearbox, and it (which is logical) converts the speed. Less revs - more torque. Such an installation has all the disadvantages of a conventional diesel-gas turbine installation - a noisy gearbox, noisy economical engines (a high-speed GED is not the quietest mechanism). Plus equipment for controlling electric motors.
At the same time, the efficiency of such a scheme is a priori lower than that of a diesel engine operating on a gearbox due to one "extra" energy conversion. This power plant has combined the disadvantages of different types of power plants, but not their advantages.
At the same time, the designers of "Almaz" were not able to supply such engines that would correspond to the required parameters of the ship in terms of power. And they set "what happened."As a result, they missed the power: the applied electric motors are too weak for this ship with the released towed GAS to have a sufficient search speed. And the speed of the economy passage will be low there. The ship's dimensions are larger than that of 20380, and the power of the hydroelectric engines is less than that of a pair of diesels 20380. 20386 has the total power of the two main electric motors - 4400 hp. with., and in 20380 a pair of diesels at a maximum can produce 12,000 liters. with. "Loud" with such power ran at a speed of 20 knots. With what hull, larger in terms of basic dimensions, will the Mercury run without turbines? Of course, part of the "problem" will be played out by the obviously more "high-speed" hull contours. But which one?
Most likely, he will have to constantly walk "under the turbines" in order to have an acceptable speed (including the search speed with the towed GAS "Minotavr"). And this is a significantly increased fuel consumption and, consequently, money. And, most importantly, a radical reduction in range. The fleet usually put such ships on hold, solving problems with more budgetary means.
Here it is worth saying something good about this power plant - it has an inter-gear transmission, which allows the ship to turn two shafts with one turbine. Apparently, the search passage on this ship (if it is completed) will be under one turbine at incomplete power, working on both shafts. But building everything else for that plus is the wrong strategy.
But that's not all.
The 6RP gearbox for this ship should be produced by OOO Zvezda-reductor at the same capacities as the RO55 gearbox for Project 22350 frigates. They also have a lot in common in their design.
And this means the following - in order to produce a series of "corvettes" 20386, the series of frigates of Project 22350 will have to be discontinued. And this is the only serial ship in our country capable of performing tasks in the Far Sea Zone without restrictions. Moreover, it is a truly powerful ship capable of performing a wide range of missions, a carrier of modern guided missiles of the Caliber family, as well as the Onyx and Zircon anti-ship missiles. Comparing it to 20386 is just a mockery. But the navy will nevertheless de facto have to choose.
And this is the main intrigue of 20386 - it is not actually a corvette that is being made, but an extremely poor replacement for the successful frigate of Project 22350. The question is - why?
Similarly, you will have to choose who to "give" the M-90FRU turbines to. They are needed for both 22350 and 20386.
Completing all this horror, we add that this "wonderful" ship is also very expensive.
In the well-known report of PJSC "Severnaya Verf" figure of 29.6 billion rubles, received for this ship, appeared. But the fact is that the lead ship is usually financed not directly through the shipyard, but through the design organization. Thus, it is not all money. Moreover, the volume of rework of this project after 2016 was very large, and it also cost money.
Evil tongues from the relevant circles claim that the cost of this ship is already approaching 40 billion rubles. Meanwhile, a more or less simple diesel corvette, armed much better than the 20386, can even now be built for about 18 billion. And it will be cheaper in operation. The head 20385 at the start of the tests was worth 22.5 billion in 2019 prices.
In fact, the cost (taking into account the ongoing alterations) of 20386 is already very close to 22350, with absolutely disproportionate combat capabilities!
There are rumors that the ship was going to be "chicked" under the "insert" into it of the 3C-14 launcher for "Caliber". If so, then the price tag would be guaranteed to be higher than that of frigates 22350, which are "born in a normal way", in contrast to this "unique" project. And which, unlike him, are real warships.
All this, however, did not stop the project.
History of shame
What was further known.
For two years nothing happened to the ship. And there were chances to stop this project at the cost of minimal losses for the country.
This was written in articles “Worse than a crime. Construction of corvettes 20386 - error " and "Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam".
According to a number of experts, in the period following the publication of the second article, changes were made to the design of the ship.
In 2018, in the fall, the ship began to actually be built. A little later, the Ministry of Defense threw out a trick with its ears - it renamed this ship to "Mercury" and, according to some informed sources (presumably - strictly presumably!) Tried to present to President V. V. this is the bookmark for a new ship. For the history of this alleged scam, see article "The Shipbuilding Mystery of 2019, or When Four Equals Five" … The scam, however, presumably "did not take off", and allegedly it was necessary to pass off the icebreaker "Ivan Papanin" for the promised President the fifth ship of the DMZ, which is not really intended for the DMZ, although it has a long range.
In parallel with this "sawmill" TsMKB "Almaz", using the "backlog" created during the design of 20386, began an attempt to enter the development of ships of the 1st rank, presenting an enlarged version of "Mercury" with a reinforced composition of weapons. About this in the material "Is the rework of the 20386 project contemplated?".
All this time, the Navy defended the concept of 20386. Correspondence with the Navy regarding this project is given in the article “A victory of common sense: the corvettes are back. Bye for the Pacific .
Meanwhile, the corps of the "Mercury" continued to stand at the "Severnaya Verf" in an incompletely formed form. It is reliably known that the supplier of 6RP gearboxes for this miracle ship (OOO Zvezda-Reduktor) has just started assembling this gear. That is, in a finished and tested form, it will not appear tomorrow.
Zvezda-Reducer, which is the only manufacturer of gearboxes for naval power plants in the country and suffers from ineffective control, is handing over new designs, not to say that quickly. Optimistic calculations show that the gearbox may be ready this year. Pessimistic - what's next.
Let's repeat an important point - the enterprise started manufacturing 6РП after the power required to create this transmission was temporarily "freed" from the production of components for gearboxes for the next frigate of Project 22350. And this despite the fact that frigates are being built, and gearboxes are needed for them … The miracle corvette crosses the road to normal ships, but there is nowhere else to delay - the hull cannot wait for the main power plant forever.
In addition, there may be questions about other parts - about the composite superstructure, which, at large dimensions, must be rigid enough to carry the radar canvases. And on the very RLC, which is made by the same people who made the complexes for "Thundering" and "Aldar Tsydenzhapov", with all the ensuing consequences.
And finally, at the "Severnaya Verf", apparently realistically assessing the prospects of the "ship of the future", they simply pushed its hull out into the water. So that it doesn't take up space. We carried out a technical descent.
Effects
Now the "monument" will not be in the boathouse, but at the wall. This is really the first good event with Russian corvettes since 2016.
Why good?
Because a building site has been freed up, on which something useful can theoretically be built.
The Mercury hull will have to stand for a long time. Even if Zvezda-Reductor resolves the issue with the gear transmission this year (which is not a fact), even if other systems and components are ready, now it will be necessary to wait for a new place for completion. And one should not think that the launching of the Strogo will definitely solve something - it is quite possible that the reduction gear will not yet be ready for this moment. And when it’s ready, it’s not a fact that there will be free space.
The death of this project will be an unconditional boon for the Navy. Let's not forget that thanks in large part to this project, we have not laid ships of the near sea zone capable of fighting submarines for almost five years.
This "Daring-Mercury" was the reason for this, because society would have to explain it like this: after the hyped super-ship of the future, it had to take a step back. Now, ordinary people have simply forgotten about the advertising of those years, and the enthusiasts who follow the shipbuilding are too few in number to create a negative public opinion for the Ministry of Defense. 20386 has been erased from the consciousness of the people, now it is time to erase it from reality.
The damage from this project to the country's defense was phenomenal.
For the money, this is the loss of two full-fledged diesel corvettes, be they rationally designed. This money has already been wasted. And they cannot be returned. But it is better to lose this money than to lose both of it and more money that will be needed to complete the project. And they will be needed, and a lot. The same guys from "Zaslon" sincerely believe that their defects and marriage can be eliminated only at the expense of the state. And they are not alone.
In terms of time, as mentioned above, this is a loss of five years, during which nothing was done for our anti-submarine defense. Generally.
Now that everything is already to such an extent obviously, the Ministry of Defense just needs to find an opportunity to finish off this project, write off the costs and forget about it as a bad dream. Build something different, sane on this case, or cut it into metal, and that's it. Firing a few switchmen, jailing a few more, and closing the issue for good.
It's a shame. Yes, and it is indelible. But attempts to torture the "Mercury" all the same will end in even greater disgrace. And it will also be indelible, just more. It will be tough politically. And it will not do without prejudice to the careers of many. But an attempt to finish building this ship will end in even greater damage to the same quarries. After all, then there will be tests, and the final price tag will be approximately clear. And then what to do? And on top of all this will be the real time for which this ship was built. In this case, our effective leaders have nothing to lose: we must "cut without waiting for peritonitis."
It's time to just stop denying the obvious and move on. Moreover, all those involved have already mastered the budget. The money has been received. Those who propelled this ship no longer need it. And those officers who still stop this scam will no longer have serious problems in the service because of discontent with them among "respected people". Well, if only a little. Dear people have already got what they wanted, mostly. And none of them wants to stand under the rubble of this undertaking.
The exception is I. G. Zakharov, who wanted a modular ship, and did not receive it. But something can be solved with this.
After all, everyone knew what was behind this project, so why wait?
The Ministry of Defense has a whole series of corvettes on its way, with inoperative radar systems, and a manufacturer who will never be able to finish them. An entire non-combatant fleet.
There will be enough problems without Mercury, and it is better not to aggravate them.
