Anti-missile defense of the PRC. The first stage in the creation of the Chinese missile defense system "Project 640", which started in the second half of the 1960s, was the construction of Type 7010 and Type 110 radar stations. coordinates and issuance of target designation to interceptors. Within the framework of Project 640, several promising areas were identified:
- "Project 640-1" - the creation of interceptor missiles;
- "Project 640-2" - anti-missile artillery pieces;
- "Project 640-3" - laser weapons;
- "Project 640-4" - early warning radars.
- "Project 640-5" - detection of warheads during their entry into the atmosphere using optoelectronic systems and the development of satellites that record the launch of ballistic missiles.
Development of interceptor missiles in China
The first Chinese anti-missile system was the HQ-3, created on the basis of the HQ-1 anti-aircraft missile system, which in turn was a Chinese copy of the Soviet SA-75M air defense system. The missile, designed in China to combat ballistic targets, outwardly differed little from the B-750 SAM used in the SA-75M, but was longer and heavier. However, it soon became clear that the anti-aircraft missile, created to combat aerodynamic targets at medium and high altitudes, is not suitable for hitting warheads flying at hypersonic speed. The overclocking characteristics of the anti-missile did not meet the necessary requirements, and manual target tracking did not provide the required guidance accuracy. In connection with the use of a number of technical solutions of the HQ-1 air defense system, it was decided to develop a new anti-missile system HQ-4.
Chinese sources say that the weight of the HQ-4 missile defense system was more than 3 tons, the firing range was up to 70 km, and the minimum was 5 km. Height reach - over 30 km. The guidance system is combined, at the initial stage, the radio command method was used, at the end - semi-active radar homing. To do this, a target illumination radar was introduced into the guidance station. The defeat of the ballistic missile was to be carried out by a high-explosive fragmentation warhead weighing more than 100 kg, with a non-contact radio fuse. The acceleration of the anti-missile in the initial section was carried out by a solid-fuel engine, after which the second stage was launched, which worked on heptyl and nitrogen tetroxide. The missiles were assembled at the Shanghai Mechanical Plant.
On tests in 1966, the interceptor missile was overclocked to 4M, but control at this speed was extremely difficult. The process of fine-tuning the anti-missile was very difficult. Many problems arose with refueling with poisonous heptyl, the leaks of which led to serious consequences. Nevertheless, the HQ-4 complex was tested by firing at a real R-2 ballistic missile. Apparently, the results of practical firing were unsatisfactory, and in the early 1970s, the process of fine-tuning the HQ-4 anti-missile system was stopped.
After the failure with the HQ-4, the PRC decided to create a new anti-missile system HQ-81 from scratch. Externally, the interceptor missile, known as the FJ-1, resembled the American two-stage solid-propellant Sprint missile. But unlike the American product, the rocket, created by Chinese specialists, in the first version had two liquid stages. Subsequently, the first stage was transferred to solid fuel.
The final modification of the FJ-1, submitted for testing, had a length of 14 m and a launch weight of 9.8 tons. The launch took place from an inclined launcher at an angle of 30-60 °. The operating time of the main engine was 20 s, the affected area in range was about 50 km, the interception height was 15-20 km.
Prototype throw tests began in 1966. The refinement of the Type 715 anti-missile and fire control radar was severely inhibited by the "Cultural Revolution"; it was possible to start FJ-1 controlled launches at an anti-missile range in the vicinity of Kunming in 1972. The first tests ended unsuccessfully, two missiles exploded after the start of the main engine. It was possible to achieve reliable operation of the engines and control system by 1978.
During control firing, conducted in August-September 1979, the telemetric anti-missile missile managed to conditionally hit the warhead of the DF-3 medium-range ballistic missile, after which it was decided to deploy 24 FJ-1 interceptor missiles north of Beijing. However, already in 1980, work on the practical implementation of the PRC's missile defense program was stopped. The Chinese leadership concluded that a national missile defense system would cost the country too much and its effectiveness would be questionable. By that time, in the USSR and the USA, ballistic missiles were created and adopted, carrying several warheads of individual guidance and numerous false targets.
In parallel with the development of the FJ-1, the FJ-2 interceptor missile was created in 1970. It was also intended for close interception, and had to fight attacking warheads at a distance of up to 50 km, in an altitude range of 20-30 km. In 1972, 6 prototypes were tested, 5 launches were recognized as successful. But due to the fact that the FJ-2 anti-missile was competing with the FJ-1, which entered the acceptance test stage, work on the FJ-2 was curtailed in 1973.
For long-range interception of warheads of ballistic missiles, the FJ-3 was intended. The development of this anti-missile missile started in mid-1971. Tests of a long-range, mine-based three-stage solid-propellant interceptor began in 1974. To increase the likelihood of intercepting a target in near space, it was envisaged to simultaneously aim two anti-missiles at one target. The anti-missile was to be controlled by the S-7 on-board computer, which was later used on the DF-5 ICBM. After the death of Mao Zedong, the FJ-3 development program was discontinued in 1977.
Work on the creation of anti-missile artillery guns
In addition to interceptor missiles, large-caliber anti-aircraft guns were supposed to be used to provide anti-missile defense of local areas in the PRC. Research on this topic was carried out within the framework of "Project 640-2" by the Xi'an Electromechanical Institute.
Initially, a 140-mm smoothbore gun was designed, capable of sending an 18 kg projectile with an initial velocity of more than 1600 m / s to an altitude of 74 km, with a maximum firing range of more than 130 km. On trials that took place from 1966 to 1968, the experimental gun showed promising results, but the barrel resource was very low. Although the height reach of the 140-mm anti-missile cannon was quite acceptable, when using a projectile without a "special" warhead, even when coupled with a fire control radar and a ballistic computer, the probability of hitting a ballistic missile warhead tended to zero. It is worth recalling that the minimum caliber of serially produced "atomic artillery" projectiles is 152-155 mm. Calculations showed that a 140-mm anti-aircraft gun in a combat situation will be able to fire only one shot, and even with the deployment of dozens of guns in one area and the introduction of conventional rounds with a radio fuse into the ammunition load, it will not be possible to achieve acceptable efficiency in this caliber.
In connection with these circumstances, in 1970, a 420-mm smooth-bore gun, which in Chinese sources is referred to as the "Pioneer", was received for testing. The weight of the anti-missile gun with a barrel length of 26 m was 155 tons. Projectile weight 160 kg, muzzle velocity over 900 m / s.
According to information published by Global Security, the gun fired unguided projectiles during test firing. To solve the problem of an extremely low probability of hitting the target, it was supposed to use a projectile in a "special design", or an active-reactive fragmentation projectile with radio command guidance.
When implementing the first option, the developers faced objections from the command of the Second Artillery Corps, which was experiencing a shortage of nuclear warheads. In addition, the explosion of even a relatively low-power nuclear weapon at an altitude of about 20 km above the covered object could have extremely unpleasant consequences. The creation of an adjustable projectile was hampered by the imperfection of the radioelement base produced in the PRC, and the overload of the institutes of the "Academy No. 2" by other topics.
Tests have shown that the electronic filling of the corrected projectile is capable of withstanding acceleration with an overload of approximately 3000 G. The use of special dampers and epoxy casting in the manufacture of electronic boards raises this figure to 5000 G. Taking into account that the overload value when fired from a 420-mm gun " Pioneer "exceeded this figure by about two times, it was required to create a" soft "artillery shot and a guided artillery projectile with a jet engine. By the late 1970s, it became clear that anti-missile weapons were a dead end and the topic was finally closed in 1980. A side result of field experiments was the creation of parachute rescue systems, which, without damage to the measuring equipment, returned shells with electronic filling to the ground. Later on, developments in rescue systems for experimental guided missiles were used to create reusable capsules for spacecraft.
Western sources say that the technical solutions implemented in the anti-missile cannons came in handy when creating a large-caliber artillery gun, which in its design resembles the Iraqi Babylon super-gun. In 2013, at a training ground located north-west of the city of Baotou, in the Inner Mongolia region, two large-caliber guns were seen; according to some experts, they can be designed to launch small-sized satellites into low-orbit orbits and test artillery shells at high speeds.
Laser anti-missile weapon
When developing anti-missile weapons, Chinese specialists did not ignore combat lasers. The Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics was appointed as the organization responsible for this direction. Here, work was carried out to create a compact accelerator of free particles, which could be used to hit targets in space.
By the late 1970s, the greatest progress was made in the development of the SG-1 chemical oxygen / iodine laser. Its characteristics made it possible to inflict fatal damage on the warhead of a ballistic missile at a relatively short distance, which was mainly due to the peculiarities of the passage of a laser beam in the atmosphere.
As in other countries, the PRC considered the option of using a disposable nuclear-pumped X-ray laser for missile defense purposes. However, to create high energies of radiation, a nuclear explosion with a power of about 200 kt is required. It was supposed to use charges placed in a rock mass, but in the event of an explosion, the release of a radioactive cloud was inevitable. As a result, the option with the use of a ground-based X-ray laser was rejected.
Development of artificial earth satellites as part of the missile defense program
To detect ballistic missile launches in China in the 1970s, in addition to over-the-horizon radars, satellites were designed with equipment that detects the launch of ballistic missiles. Simultaneously with the development of early detection satellites, work was underway to create actively maneuvering spacecraft capable of destroying enemy satellites and warheads of ICBMs and IRBMs in a direct collision.
In October 1969, a design team was formed at a steam turbine plant in Shanghai to begin designing the first Chinese reconnaissance satellite, CK-1 (Chang-Kong Yi-hao No.1). The electronic filling for the satellite was to be manufactured by the Shanghai Electrotechnical Plant. Since they could not quickly create an effective optoelectronic system for detecting the flare of a launching rocket in China at that time, the developers equipped the spacecraft with reconnaissance radio equipment. It was envisaged that in peacetime, the reconnaissance satellite would intercept Soviet VHF radio networks, messages transmitted over radio relay communication lines and monitor the radiation activity of ground-based air defense systems. Preparations for launching ballistic missiles and their launch were supposed to be detected by specific radio traffic and by fixing telemetry signals.
The reconnaissance satellites were to be launched into low-earth orbit using the FB-1 (Feng Bao-1) launch vehicle, which was created on the basis of the first Chinese ICBM DF-5. All launches were carried out from the Jiuquan Cosmodrome in Gansu Province.
In total, from September 18, 1973 to November 10, 1976, 6 satellites of the SK-1 series were launched. The first two and last starts were unsuccessful. The duration of the stay of the Chinese reconnaissance satellites in low orbits was 50, 42 and 817 days.
Although there is no information in open sources about how successful the missions of the Chinese reconnaissance satellites of the SK-1 series turned out to be, judging by the fact that in the future the emphasis was placed on devices that take photographs of the territory of a potential enemy, the costs did not justify the results obtained. In fact, the first reconnaissance satellites launched in the PRC were in trial operation, and were a kind of "trial balloon". If spy satellites in China in the early 1970s were nevertheless able to be put into low-earth orbit, then the creation of space interceptors was delayed for another 20 years.
Termination of work on the "Project 640"
Despite all efforts and the allocation of very significant material and intellectual resources, efforts to create an anti-missile defense in China have not led to practical results. In this regard, on June 29, 1980, under the chairmanship of Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee Deng Xiaoping, a meeting was held with the participation of high-ranking military personnel and leaders of major defense organizations. As a result of the meeting, it was decided to curtail the work on the "Project 640". An exception was made for combat lasers, early warning systems and reconnaissance satellites, but the scale of funding has become much more modest. By that time, leading Chinese experts came to the conclusion that it was impossible to build a 100% effective missile defense system. A certain influence was also exerted by the conclusion between the USSR and the USA in 1972 of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. The main motive for curtailing the program of creating a national missile defense system in China was the requirement to reduce defense spending and direct the main financial resources to modernize the country's economy and the need to improve the welfare of the population. Nevertheless, as subsequent events showed, the leadership of the PRC did not abandon the creation of weapons capable of countering a missile strike, and work on improving ground and space means of early warning of a missile attack did not stop.
