Recently, the Russian media have been actively discussing the possibility of Russian assistance to the PRC in improving missile defense (ABM) and missile attack warning systems (EWS). This is presented as another breakthrough in strengthening Russian-Chinese military cooperation and as an example of "strategic partnership". This news aroused a lot of enthusiasm among patriotic readers, who, due to insufficient information, believe that China does not have its own early warning system and there are no developments in missile defense. In order to dispel widespread misconceptions about the capabilities of the PRC in this area, based on the information that is freely available, we will try to analyze how China has advanced in defense against a nuclear missile strike and timely warning of an attack.
The main directions of improving the Chinese strategic forces in the 1960s-1970s and measures to reduce damage from a nuclear strike
To make it clearer how and in what conditions the first early missile warning radars were created in the PRC, let us consider the development of the Chinese strategic nuclear forces (SNF) in 1960-1970.
The aggravation of relations between China and the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s led to a series of armed clashes on the border between the countries, using armored vehicles, barreled artillery and MLRS. In these conditions, both sides, who recently announced "friendship for the ages", began to seriously consider the possibility of a full-scale military conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons. However, the hotheads in Beijing were largely cooled by the fact that the USSR had an overwhelming superiority in the number of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. There was a real possibility of delivering a decapitating and disarming surprise nuclear missile strike against Chinese command centers, communications centers and important defense facilities. The situation for the Chinese side was aggravated by the fact that the flight time of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) was very short. This made it difficult to timely evacuate the top Chinese military-political leadership and extremely limited the time for making a decision on a retaliatory strike.
Under the prevailing unfavorable conditions, in order to minimize possible damage in the event of a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, China tried to carry out the maximum decentralization of the military command and control bodies. Despite the economic difficulties and the extremely low standard of living of the population, very large underground anti-nuclear shelters for military equipment were built on a large scale. At a number of air bases in the rocks, shelters for heavy bombers H-6 (a copy of the Tu-16), which were the main Chinese strategic carriers, were carved out.
Simultaneously with the construction of underground shelters for equipment and highly protected command posts, the Chinese nuclear potential and delivery vehicles were being improved. The test of a Chinese nuclear bomb, suitable for practical use, was carried out on May 14, 1965 (explosion power 35 kt), and the first test discharge of a thermonuclear explosive device from an N-6 bomber took place on June 17, 1967 (explosion power more than 3 Mt). The PRC has become the fourth largest thermonuclear power in the world after the USSR, USA and Great Britain. The time interval between the creation of atomic and hydrogen weapons in China turned out to be less than in the USA, USSR, Great Britain and France. However, the results obtained were largely devalued by the Chinese realities of those years. The main difficulty was that in the conditions of the "Cultural Revolution", which led to a decline in industrial production, a sharp decline in technical culture, which had an extremely negative impact on the quality of high-tech products, it was very difficult to create modern aviation and missile technology. In addition, in the 1960s and 1970s, China experienced an acute shortage of uranium ore required for the production of nuclear warheads. In this connection, even with the required number of delivery vehicles, the capabilities of the Chinese strategic nuclear forces (SNF) were not highly evaluated.
Due to the insufficient flight range of the N-6 jet and the low rate of their serial construction, the PRC carried out a partial modernization of the long-range Tu-4 bombers supplied by the USSR. On some machines, the piston engines were replaced by the AI-20M turboprop, the production license of which was transferred together with the An-12 military transport aircraft. However, the Chinese military leadership was aware that the chances of bombers with nuclear bombs to break through to Soviet strategic targets were small, and therefore the main emphasis was placed on the development of missile technology.
The first Chinese medium-range ballistic missile was the DF-2 ("Dongfeng-2"). It is believed that during its creation, Chinese designers used the technical solutions used in the Soviet P-5. The DF-2 single-stage IRBM with a liquid-propellant jet engine (LPRE) had a circular probable deviation (CEP) from the aiming point within 3 km, with a maximum flight range of 2000 km. This missile could hit targets in Japan and in a significant part of the territory of the USSR. In order to launch a rocket from a technical state that corresponded to constant readiness, it took more than 3.5 hours. On alert there were about 70 missiles of this type.
After the refusal of the Soviet leadership to provide technical documentation for the R-12 MRBM, the Chinese government in the early 1960s decided to develop its own missile with similar characteristics. The DF-3 single-stage MRBM, equipped with a low-boiling liquid rocket engine, entered service in 1971. The flight range was up to 2500 km. In the first phase, the main targets for the DF-3 were two US military bases in the Philippines: Clarke (Air Force) and Subic Bay (Navy). However, due to the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations, up to 60 launchers were deployed along the Soviet border.
On the basis of the DF-3 IRBM in the late 1960s, a two-stage DF-4 was created with a launch range of more than 4500 km. The reach of this missile was enough to hit the most important targets on the territory of the USSR with a 3 Mt warhead, in connection with which the DF-4 received the unofficial name "Moscow rocket". With a mass of more than 80,000 kg and a length of 28 m, the DF-4 became the first Chinese silo-based missile. But at the same time, it was only stored in the mine, before the launch, the rocket was lifted with the help of a special hydraulic lift to the launch pad. The total number of DF-4s delivered to the troops is estimated at approximately 40 units.
In the late 1970s, tests of ICBMs of the heavy class DF-5 were completed. A missile with a launch mass of more than 180 tons could carry a payload of up to 3.5 tons. In addition to a monoblock warhead with a capacity of 3 Mt, the payload included means of overcoming missile defense. The KVO when launched at a maximum range of 13,000 km was 3 -3, 5 km. Preparation time for DF-5 ICBMs for launch is 20 minutes.
The DF-5 was the first Chinese missile with an intercontinental range. It was developed from the very beginning for a mine-based system. But according to experts, the level of protection of Chinese silos was much inferior to Soviet and American ones. In this regard, in the PRC, there were up to a dozen false positions per silo with a missile put on alert. On top of the head of a real mine, fake fast-demolishing buildings were erected. This should have made it difficult to reveal the coordinates of a real missile position by means of satellite reconnaissance.
A major drawback of the Chinese MRBM and ICBM, developed in the 1960-1970s, was their inability to participate in a retaliatory strike due to the need for lengthy prelaunch preparation. In addition, the Chinese silos in terms of the level of protection against the damaging factors of nuclear weapons were significantly inferior to the Soviet and American missile silos, which made them vulnerable to a sudden "disarming strike." However, it should be recognized that the creation and adoption by the Second Artillery Corps of the DF-4 and DF-5 silo-based ballistic missiles was a significant step forward in strengthening the Chinese strategic nuclear forces, and was one of the reasons for the creation of a missile defense system around Moscow capable of protecting against a limited number of ballistic missiles.
After the adoption of nuclear weapons in the PRC, aviation became its main carrier. If the fine-tuning and adoption of ground-based ballistic missiles in China, albeit with difficulty, but coped, then the creation of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces did not work out. The first submarine with ballistic missiles in the PLA Navy was the diesel-electric submarine pr. 031G, built at Shipyard No. 199 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur under the project 629. The submarine in disassembled form was delivered in parts to Dalian, where it was assembled and launched. At the first stage, the submarine with side number 200 was armed with three liquid-propellant single-stage R-11MF missiles, with a launch range from the surface position of 150 km.
Due to the fact that the license for the production of the R-11MF in the PRC was not transferred, the number of delivered missiles was insignificant, and they themselves quickly became obsolete, the only missile boat of the project pr. 031G was used in various experiments. In 1974, the boat was converted to test the JL-1 submerged ballistic missile (SLBM).
In 1978, a nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles (SSBN) of Project 092 was laid down in China. The SSBN of Project 092 "Xia" was armed with 12 silos for storing and launching two-stage solid-propellant ballistic missiles JL-1, with a launch range of more than 1700 km. The missiles were equipped with a monoblock thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of 200-300 Kt. Due to many technical problems and a number of test accidents, the first Chinese SSBN was commissioned in 1988. The Chinese nuclear submarine Xia, apparently, was not successful. She did not conduct a single military service and did not leave the internal Chinese waters for the entire period of operation. No other boats were built in the PRC under this project.
The history of the creation of the Chinese early warning system
For reasons that are not entirely clear, it is not customary in our country to widely cover the history of the creation of high-tech defense products in China, this fully applies to radar technology. Therefore, many Russian citizens are inclined to think that the PRC has recently taken care of the development of early warning radars and missile defense interceptors, and Chinese specialists have no experience in this area. In fact, this is not at all the case, the first attempts to create radars designed to record warheads of ballistic missiles and means of destruction of ballistic missile warheads were made in China in the mid-1960s. In 1964, the PRC national missile defense program was officially launched, known as the "Project 640". According to information published in official Chinese sources, the initiator of this project was Mao Zedong, who expressed concern about China's vulnerability to nuclear threats and said in this regard: "If there is a spear, then there must be a shield."
Specialists trained and trained in the Soviet Union were involved in the development of the anti-missile system, which at the first stage was supposed to protect Beijing from a nuclear missile strike. However, in the course of the Cultural Revolution, a significant part of the Chinese scientific and technical intelligentsia was subjected to repression, which caused the project to stall. The situation demanded the personal intervention of Mao Zedong, and after a joint meeting of the highest party and military leadership, which was attended by more than 30 high-ranking scientists, Premier Zhou Enlai approved the creation of the "Second Academy", which was entrusted with the responsibility for creating all elements of the missile defense system. Within the framework of the academy in Beijing, the "210th Institute" was formed, whose specialists were to create anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons. Radar facilities, communication equipment and information display were under the jurisdiction of the "14th Institute" (Nanjing Institute of Electronic Technology).
It is clear that the construction of even a local anti-missile defense system is impossible without the creation of over-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars for the timely detection of ballistic missile warheads. In addition, radars are required that are capable of continuously tracking targets in the area of responsibility and coupled with computers to calculate the trajectories of warheads of IRBM and ICBMs, which is necessary for the issuance of accurate target designation when guiding interceptor missiles.
In 1970, 140 km north-west of Beijing, the construction of the Type 7010 early warning radar began. THE USSR. It was also planned to build two more stations of the same type in other regions of the PRC, but due to their high cost, this could not be realized.
According to information published in the Chinese media, the radar operating in the frequency range 300-330 MHz had a pulse power of 10 MW and a detection range of about 4000 km. The field of view was 120 °, the angle of elevation was 4 - 80 °. The station was capable of tracking 10 targets simultaneously. A DJS-320 computer was used to calculate their trajectories.
The Type 7010 radar was commissioned in 1974. This station, in addition to being on alert, was repeatedly involved in various experiments and successfully recorded the experimental training launches of Chinese ballistic missiles. The radar demonstrated its rather high capabilities in 1979, when the calculations of the Type 7010 and Type 110 radars were able to accurately calculate the trajectory and fall time of the debris of the decommissioned American Skylab orbital station. In 1983, using the Type 7010 early warning radar, the Chinese predicted the time and place of the fall of the Soviet satellite "Cosmos-1402". It was the emergency satellite US-A of the Legend maritime radar reconnaissance and target designation system. However, along with the achievements, there were also problems - the lamp equipment of the Type 7010 radar turned out to be not very reliable and very expensive and difficult to operate. To preserve the functionality of the electronic units, the air supplied to the underground premises had to be removed from excess moisture. Although a power line was connected to the radar of the early warning system, during the operation of the station, for greater reliability, power was supplied from diesel power generators that consumed a lot of fuel.
Operation of the Type 7010 radar continued with varying success until the end of the 1980s, after which it was mothballed. In the second half of the 1990s, the dismantling of the main equipment began. By that time, the station, built on electric vacuum devices, was hopelessly outdated.
Currently, the area where the first Chinese early warning radar is located is open for free visits, and organized excursions are carried here. The antenna with the PAR has remained in the same place and is a kind of monument to the first achievements of the Chinese radio-electronic industry.
A radar with a movable parabolic antenna Type 110 was intended for accurate tracking and target designation of missile defense systems being developed in the PRC. This radar, like the Type 7010, was designed by specialists from the 14th Nanjing Institute of Electronic Technology.
Construction of the Type 110 radar station in the mountainous part of the southern province of Yunnan began in the late 1960s. To protect against unfavorable meteorological factors, a parabolic antenna with a mass of about 17 tons and a diameter of 25 is placed inside a radio-transparent sphere about 37 meters high. The weight of the entire radar with a fairing exceeded 400 tons. The radar installation was located at an altitude of 2036 m above sea level in the vicinity of the city of Kunming.
A dual-band monopulse radar operating at frequencies of 250-270 MHz and 1-2 GHz was put into trial operation in 1971. At the first stage, high-altitude sounding balloons, aircraft and low-orbit satellites were used to debug the station. Soon after the start of the first tests, the radar with a peak power of 2.5 MW was able to accompany the satellite at a distance of more than 2000 km. The accuracy of measuring objects in near space turned out to be higher than the design one. The final commissioning of the Type 110 radar took place in 1977, after state tests, during which it was possible to accompany and accurately determine the flight parameters of the DF-2 ballistic missile. In January and July 1979, the combat crews of the Type 7010 and Type 110 stations performed practical training of joint actions to detect and track warheads of DF-3 medium-range ballistic missiles. In the first case, the Type 110 accompanied the warhead for 316 s, in the second - 396 s. The maximum tracking range was about 3000 km. In May 1980, the Type 110 radar accompanied the DF-5 ICBM during test launches. At the same time, it was possible not only to timely detect the warheads, but also, based on the calculation of the trajectory, indicate the place of their fall with high accuracy. In the future, in addition to being on alert, the radar, designed to accurately measure coordinates and plot trajectories of warheads of ICBMs and MRBMs, actively participated in the Chinese space program. According to foreign sources, the Type 110 radar has been modernized and is still in working order.
The developments obtained in the design of the Type 110 radar were used in the late 1970s to create radars known in the West as REL-1 and REL-3. Stations of this type are capable of tracking aerodynamic and ballistic targets. The detection range of aircraft flying at high altitudes reaches 400 km, objects in near space are recorded at a distance of more than 1000 km.
REL-1/3 radars deployed in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang Province monitor the Russian-Chinese border. REL-1 radar in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region targets disputed sections of the Sino-Indian border.
It follows from the foregoing that in the first half of the 1970s, the PRC succeeded not only in laying the foundations for nuclear missile forces, but also in creating the prerequisites for creating a missile attack warning system. Simultaneously with over-the-horizon radars capable of seeing objects in near space, work was under way in China on over-the-horizon "two-hop" radars. Timely notification of a nuclear missile attack, combined with the possibility of radar tracking of warheads of ballistic missiles, gave the theoretical possibility of intercepting them. To combat ICBMs and IRBMs, Project 640 was developing interceptor missiles, lasers and even large-caliber anti-aircraft guns. But this will be discussed in the next part of the review.
