Russian weapons and military equipment attract the attention of foreign experts and sometimes become a reason for controversy. A few days ago, the next topic of discussion was the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system. First, the Swedish Defense Research Agency criticized the system, noting its shortcomings and problems. Then the American edition of The National Interest "stood up" for the Russian development and pointed out the weaknesses of the Swedish report. Such controversy - even if it does not receive a continuation - is of certain interest.
From a FOI point of view
The exchange of views was prompted by a recent report by the Swedish Defense Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI). On March 4, FOI released a document titled Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2 / AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications "-" Is the bubble bursting? Russian system of limiting and preventing access in the Baltic region: opportunities, countermeasures and consequences”. The topic of the report was the potential of the Russian armed forces in the Baltic Sea region, including anti-aircraft weapons.
The FOI report is of great interest and is recommended for familiarization, but in the context of recent events, one should focus only on its chapter "Russian capabilities in the Baltic region" and the section "Air defense systems" (3.1 Anti-air systems, p. 27). In it, Swedish experts give their opinion about the S-400, and it was this complex that became the main topic of the section.
FOI recalled a brief history of the S-400 system, and also touched on the topic of characteristics and capabilities. Already at this stage, conclusions followed. So, with reference to the foreign press, it is argued that the 40N6 long-range intercept missile, having a range of up to 400 km, has repeatedly failed in tests and has not yet been put into series. From this, it is concluded that in the near future, before the appearance of serial missiles of a new type, the complexes will have to use products borrowed from the older S-300 air defense systems.
The authors of the report indicate that the S-400 radar is capable of handling a large number of air targets. The complex also has medium-range missiles with active homing heads, suitable for attacking low-altitude targets - cruise missiles or aircraft weapons. At the same time, it is argued that the limited range of such missiles, combined with the characteristic difficulties of intercepting low-altitude objects, leads to a reduction in performance. The range of interception of cruise missiles or other similar targets is reduced to 20-35 km, depending on the nature of the terrain.
Swedish experts draw a specific conclusion from this. The FOI claims that the S-400 complexes, before the appearance of serial 40N6 missiles, cannot create a full-fledged A2 / AD zone in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. However, such air defense systems can be viewed as a threat to tanker aircraft, transport workers and other large vehicles moving at medium and high altitudes at ranges of the order of 200-250 km from anti-aircraft systems. Also, the targets of the air defense missile system can be fighter-bombers trying to break through to them at low altitudes - within a radius of several tens of kilometers.
The 40N6 missile will be able to attack targets at altitudes of 3-10 km, however, for this, the anti-aircraft battery needs to connect third-party surveillance and detection systems. External target designation will allow the anti-aircraft complex to attack targets beyond the radio horizon. It is noted that the creation of such an integrated system, including various radars and air defense systems, is an extremely difficult task - even the US Navy was able to build it relatively recently. Swedish analysts believe that Russia, due to known problems of recent decades, is not yet in a position to create a similar system.
The report also contains interesting calculations. If the firing range of the S-400 reaches the declared 400 km, then the area of responsibility of the complex has an area of 500 thousand square kilometers. When the range is reduced to 250 km, the area of the covered area is reduced to 200 thousand square kilometers - 39% of the maximum possible. The use of missiles with a range of 120 km reduces the area of the region to 9% of the maximum, and missiles with a range of 20 km cover only 0.25%.
Areas of responsibility of Russian radars
FOI reminds that the S-400 complex is not without its drawbacks. So, as part of the air defense system there is only one fire control radar. The number of long-range missiles in one battery is limited, and after they are used up, the air defense system needs to be recharged. These features of the complex can be taken into account by the enemy when organizing an attack.
The authors of the report remind that complexes of the S-300 or S-400 type in war conditions are priority targets for the enemy, and they will try to disable them in the first place. To protect against possible attacks, long-range air defense systems are supplemented with short-range systems. The most modern Russian development of this kind is the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system. At the same time, incidents with the destruction of such equipment by enemy missiles are mentioned.
This concludes the consideration of the S-400 in the Air Defense Systems section. Elsewhere in Bursting the Bubble? Swedish specialists are again studying the identified shortcomings of the Russian air defense systems, including in the context of the construction of defense and the organization of A2 / AD zones.
Considering Russian anti-aircraft systems and other weapons, as well as the organization and deployment of formations, FOI draws conclusions about the potential of the Russian armed forces as a whole. Analysts believe that the combat potential of the Russian army in the Baltic Sea region is exaggerated. In particular, such errors are based on incorrect assessments of the air defense system built using the S-400 air defense system.
The National Interest's response
The American edition of The National Interest, known for its craving for Russian weapons, could not ignore the Swedish report. On March 9, it published an article "Is Russia's S-400 a Paper Tiger or a Real Air Force Killer?" - "Is the Russian S-400 a" paper tiger "or a real killer of the Air Force?" The author of this article, Charlie Gao, reviewed the FOI report and found weaknesses in it.
First of all, Ch. Gao drew attention to the theses on the use of 40N6 missiles at maximum range. Indeed, when shooting at 400 km, a problem arises in the form of a radio horizon. This problem is solved using over-the-horizon radar or by interacting with other detection means. The source of data for preliminary target designation can be airborne early warning and control aircraft.
ZRK areas of responsibility
The FOI report claims that modern over-the-horizon radars cannot effectively interact with air defense systems. Such conclusions are drawn from articles by David Ax for War Is Boring, as well as publications in the Swedish press. In a 2016 article by D. Ax, it was mentioned that early low-frequency over-the-horizon radars had low resolution, insufficient for interaction with missiles.
Ch. Gao recalls that even an insufficiently accurate radar can still be used to launch a missile into the target area, after which it must include its own active radar seeker. At a distance of about 30 km from the target, the missile defense system will be able to start an independent flight and solve the task. However, the Defense Research Agency believes that such a missile attack will not be accurate enough. The author of The National Interest, on the contrary, considers this method of work to be a real threat to enemy aircraft.
AWACS aircraft are distinguished by greater accuracy in determining coordinates. The Russian Aerospace Forces have more than 20 aircraft of the A-50 family, capable of finding air targets at distances of up to 800 km - twice the range of 40N6 missiles. Ch. Gao points out that in this case, the interaction of the AWACS aircraft and the air defense missile system can become a problem. The Russian side did not openly discuss or demonstrate such capabilities of its equipment, and the FOI believes that it is extremely difficult to obtain them.
However, the American author recalls the existence of such systems. So, the MiG-31 interceptors, even during the Cold War, could monitor the air situation and exchange target data. Also, aircraft could send information to ground complexes. This means that Russia has the necessary groundwork and is quite capable of creating new systems of interaction in the field of air defense. Nevertheless, organizing the interaction of ground complexes and aircraft can indeed be a daunting task.
Ch. Gao believes that the FOI exaggerates the ease of disabling the S-400. The report states that several dozen missiles and false targets can "overload" the air defense system and force it to spend all its ammunition. However, this does not take into account the fact of interaction of anti-aircraft systems. S-400s are always covered by short-range complexes. Swedish experts reminded about the Pantsir-C1 air defense missile system, but immediately wrote about its low efficiency.
The National Interest recalls that in Syria, "Pantsiri-C1" acted independently and relied only on their own components. When working together with the S-400, the short-range complex can receive target designation from it. The development of new missiles for the "Pantsir" is also underway, with the help of which it will be possible to increase the ammunition ready for use. For direct cover of anti-aircraft batteries, complexes of the "Tor" family can also be used, which have certain advantages.
There is information about the ability of the S-400 to identify detected objects and distinguish real threats from false targets. In this case, the long-range air defense system will be able to identify real aircraft and weapons and reduce the consumption of ammunition. Targeting for "Pantsir-C1" should also take this factor into account.
Thus, the "overload" of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system turns out to be much more difficult than the FOI writes. However, not a single system of this kind is immune from a massive attack with a breakthrough in defense.
The author of The National Interest criticized the theses of the Defense Research Agency on the S-400 anti-aircraft complex, however, on the whole, he agrees with the general conclusions of his report. According to Ch. Gao, the report provides a good analysis showing how the Russian 2A / AD system is currently being re-evaluated in the Baltic region. However, at the same time, the Swedish specialists underestimated the Russian air defense systems.
Article versus report
Russian defense potential attracts the attention of specialists from different countries. On the basis of the available data, they try to present the real capabilities of the Russian army in certain directions. For example, the Swedish Defense Research Agency recently conducted an analysis of Russia's capabilities in the Baltic Sea region and released its report on this topic.
The authors of the report showed that the generally accepted opinion about the Russian potential may not correspond to the real state of affairs. One of the evidence in favor of this was the reasoning about the potential of the S-400 anti-aircraft systems. However, at the same time, the Swedish specialists made a number of serious mistakes, which could not fail to attract attention. As a result, The National Interest came up with an analysis of the weak points of the FOI report.
The situation around the FOI report and the S-400 air defense system clearly demonstrates several trends. First, it is obvious that Russian defense power and its individual components remain the subject of interest for foreign analysts and journalists. First of all, this is due to issues of a military-political nature. Second, even serious analytical organizations sometimes make significant errors that can lead to incorrect conclusions. Fortunately, there are specialists and publications abroad that can point out mistakes.
Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2 / AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications :
