The problems that Russia has with the navy should not block from us how much we really need it. And it is best to prove this with specific examples.
The example of the role of the fleet in the Syrian war was not the only one, it was simply the most ambitious. For contrast, it is worth turning to "small" - an example of a separate small-scale operation, in which Russia would not be able to do without the Navy, and a failure in which would potentially be fraught with grave consequences.
It's about a story that is still full of mysteries: the capture and release of the bulk carrier Arctic Sea.
How it all began
On July 21, 2009, the Uglegorsk-class dry cargo ship, then named Arctic Sea, left the Finnish port of Pietarsaari with a cargo of timber for Algeria. The vessel was supposed to reach the port of Bedjaya on 4 August. Everything went normally, as usual.
On July 24, at 2:10 am, people with weapons broke into the wheelhouse. They were armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and pistols. Later it turned out that they boarded from an inflatable boat that overtook the ship in neutral Baltic waters. The attackers tied up the crew, simultaneously beating everyone who resisted, while one of the crew members knocked out the teeth with the butt of a machine gun.
The attackers explained, in heavy accent English, that they were from the Swedish drug police. One of them even had a patch on his clothes that said Polis ("Police" in Swedish), but it was clear that this was not the police. No police work like that.
The crew was tied up and locked in cabins.
Subsequent events resembled a bad action movie. The invaders forced the crew to lead the ship bypassing Europe - where it was supposed to go. When it was required to contact the British Coast Guard in the Pas-de-Calais on 28 July, the crew was forced to do so. After passing the Pas-de-Calais, the vessel continued to move around Europe and in the Bay of Biscay its AIS terminal was disabled. The ship was lost.
Later, on August 3 (according to "fresh" press data at that time, a day earlier, but this is not important), the owner of the Finnish company "Solchart", which owns the ship, Russian citizen Viktor Matveyev, received a call from someone who said that he (the caller) and his 25 "soldiers" captured the ship, and if they do not receive the ransom, they will begin to kill the crew members. It became clear that the ship was not just lost, but that it had been hijacked and hostages aboard. The ransom amount was $ 1.5 million. Similar requirements were passed on to the cargo owner, a Russian company. The company turned to the FSB.
On August 4, the ship did not appear at the port of destination.
On August 11, 2009, Matveyev made a statement to the press, from which it followed that the panic button was broken on the ship, emergency buoys were stolen, and that he had turned to the Russian Foreign Ministry. Soon the information reached the very top. The next day, August 12, the Kremlin press service reported that President Dmitry Medvedev had instructed Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov to take measures to find the bulk carrier. By that time, the order to begin the search for the Arctic Sea had already diverged among the performers.
So those who had to stop the development of this drama entered the arena.
From a solo voyage to the fight against "pirates"
The only force capable of finding a hijacked dry cargo ship somewhere in the World Ocean was the Russian Navy.
The sailors had little information. The point at which the AIS was turned off was known. The speed at which the ship could sail from this point was clear. It was clear how much fuel and water were on board, and how long the Arctic Sea would be able to stay at sea. The intelligence of the Navy carefully analyzed the data received from the naval aviation and from the auxiliary ships of the fleet at sea, from the power structures of foreign states. So, the Spanish Coast Guard reported that the dry cargo ship did not pass the Strait of Gibraltar, which means that it was not worth looking for it in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO also searched for the ship, including from the air. Slowly, hour after hour, the search area narrowed. At some point, he turned out to be small enough to be combed by a warship.
Fortunately, there was such a ship near the desired area. It turned out to be the Ladny patrol ship of the Black Sea Fleet.
A few days before the events described, "Ladny" calmly followed to the Strait of Gibraltar with the goal of later turning north and joining the naval forces, which were supposed to participate in the strategic exercises "West-2009". The ship was commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Alexander Schwartz. On board was a group of senior officers of the Black Sea Fleet, including the deputy commander of the surface ships division, Captain 1st Rank Igor Smolyak, and the chief of staff of the anti-submarine ships brigade, Captain 1st Rank Oleg Shastov. On board the Ladnoye was a detachment of marines under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ruslan Satdinov.
The ship was not far from Gibraltar when the order came to look for a dry cargo ship. According to the intelligence of the Navy, "Ladny" should have turned not to the north, as envisaged by the plan of the campaign, but to the south, to the waters of the Central Atlantic relatively unfamiliar to the Black Sea people, where none of the crew of the "Ladny" had ever been.
And already on August 14, "Ladny" already was not far from the stolen bulk carrier.
Two days later, the Ladny was able to catch up with the Arctic Sea. On the night of August 16-17, 300 miles from Cape Verde, in the tropical darkness of the night, Ladny approached the dry cargo ship. There was a demand to stop the cars and go into a drift. The wife of the leader of the hijackers, Dmitry Savin (Savins), later claimed that her husband called her and said that the Russians were threatening to open fire if the ship did not stop. According to Russian sources, Ladny only used a pair of red signal flares.
And then the invaders threw out their trick - they introduced themselves as the North Korean vessel Jon Jin 2. The person who spoke to "Ladny" even imitated a Korean accent. But the commander of "Ladny" did not believe in this idea, contacted the Main Headquarters of the Navy and reported. In Moscow, with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was quickly possible to contact representatives of the DPRK and find out where the ship with that name is actually located. It turned out that it was in a completely different place. This information, like the description of the North Korean vessel, was passed on to Ladny. Although the Ladnoye was used to fire flares to inspect the stopped ship, the night did not allow to inspect it in detail, but at dawn it immediately became clear that this was not a Korean - neither the size nor the number of cranes matched the description of the Korean ship. Yes, and the letters with which the name was written on board were uneven, were not on the same level, and there were some non-standard, as if applied in a hurry at random. The overtaken dry-cargo ship itself resembled the Arctic Sea "one-to-one."
A new round of negotiations followed during the morning of 17 August. The commander of Ladnoye understood that a full-fledged assault on a dry cargo ship would be difficult - there was no helicopter on board the TFR, it could not carry it, and it was better not to send the marines for this, although they were more or less well prepared. Moreover, there were few of them. Negotiations looked like a much more profitable option.
And the Black Sea sailors succeeded in their plans. After lengthy negotiations, the pirates surrendered and accepted the demands of the Ladny commander - to go down into the whaleboat together with the crew members, without weapons, wrap white rags over their heads as an identification mark and then surrender in this form.
The hijacking drama is over. On the same day, A. Serdyukov reported to D. Medvedev that the cargo ship had been released.
From the commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation No. 1272-25-08-2009:
On August 18, the Russian Embassy in Cape Verde requested permission for the Ladny patrol ship to enter the territorial waters of the Republic of Cape Verde in the area of about. Sal, and on the same day, permission was obtained. On August 19, at about 12:00 local time, the ship arrived and stopped at the roadstead of about. Sal.
With the aim of transporting 11 crew members and 8 detainees from the patrol ship to Moscow for further investigative actions to the airport on. Sal on August 17 and on the night of August 18-19, two military transport aircraft of the Russian air force Il-76 arrived. On board were an investigation team and a unit of Russian military personnel.
Official permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cape Verde was obtained, and by 19:00 on August 19, all eight detainees and eleven crew members were transferred on board a military transport aircraft of the Russian Air Force. On the same day at 21:00 and 22:00 local time, military transport aircraft of the Russian Air Force flew to Moscow, where they arrived in the morning of August 20.
On the night of August 20, the patrol ship Ladny also left Cape Verde and headed towards the dry-cargo ship Arctic Sea, which was drifting in the Atlantic Ocean 250 miles south-west of Cape Verde. On board the latter are four crew members to keep watch and several servicemen from the patrol ship Ladny for escort purposes.
Further events are described in the press - frankly, the leadership of the Russian Federation and law enforcement agencies, after the brilliant release of the ship by a warship of the Black Sea Fleet, did not act brilliantly, showing insufficient organizational skills. It got to the bankruptcy of the ship owner. But the main thing (the release of the ship and the capture of the hijackers) has already been done.
And the crew of the ICR "Ladny" did it.
Concluding the story about the actions of the Navy in this story, let us say that the return of the Arctic Sea back to the line, its supply and the transition to the Mediterranean were also provided by the ships and vessels of the Navy - SMT "Iman", sea tugs and "Ladny" itself.
Black ops in the Baltic, or a little about what it was
The investigation could not fully disclose who was behind the hijackers. They themselves told delusional versions that did not correspond to reality in any way. Thus, it is obvious that the gang was used in the dark. They knew the minimum that would allow them to hijack and hijack the vessel, but apparently had no idea what to do next. According to the Sunday Times, which interviewed the crew members of the hijacked dry cargo ship, the bandits planned to leave the ship within a few days from the moment of the seizure and prepared a lifeboat for this. According to the same crew member, when the Ladny caught up with the Arctic Sea, the bandits were already broken and knew that this was the end. Apparently, therefore, there was no assault.
Nevertheless, the investigation succeeded in identifying one of the organizers of the seizure. It turned out to be the former head of the Estonian Security Coordination Bureau (Estonian secret service) Eerik-Niiles Cross … In early 2012, Cross was put on the international wanted list. However, there is a versionthat it was also used "in the dark".
And then the pirates began to confess. And one of them, a citizen of Latvia Dmitry Savin, who later received seven years for piracy, issued the name of the customer of the seizure of the bulk carrier - the former chief of the Security Coordination Bureau, Erik-Nils Cross.
Cross was framed by order from Moscow
Cross and Savin owned small stakes in the Pakri Tankers shipping company - about 5% each. Of course, they had income, but they apparently did not cover their expenses. And once Cross allegedly told Savin that they could make good money together. The scenario is as follows: Cross reports on a dry cargo ship carrying expensive weapons, and Savin prepares a team that will have to seize the ship and deliver the weapon to the intended buyer. This is where the figure of the former KaPo chief Alex Dressen reappears in history. The fact is that none other than Dressen, and told his former colleague Cross about the Iranian S-300 on board the bulk carrier. According to Dressen, he also had a buyer. There was little to do - to seize the ship and take it to the place of a future deal.
It was at this very place that Cross turned from an Estonian intelligence agent who had bothered Moscow so much into an international pirate. Of course, Dressen knew very well that there were no S-300s aboard the Arctic Sea and could not be. He also knew that Cross would not for a moment doubt the information provided by such a high-ranking person. And Cross willingly swallowed the bait, even though his eminent British and American intelligence officers were preparing him. To the great joy of Russian intelligence.
Of course, the Estonian authorities are aware of Dressen's role in the dirty story with the scout pirate Cross - now, after the failure of the former chief of the KaPo. For this reason, Tallinn held their own trial over Cross, and the side of the former intelligence chief was taken by the Estonian prosecutor Lovely Lepp and the deputy of parliament Marko Mihkelson. As a result, Cross was found not guilty, which, however, had no effect on the Russian claims and the cancellation of his international wanted list. Cross was framed? To a certain extent, yes. But it was Cross, and not anyone else, who was behind the pirate seizure of the Arctic Sea, tempted by easy money.
Here, however, it is necessary to make a remark. Cross, of course, using his old connections in the dispatch structures, could provide Savin with weapons and give all the necessary information. However, when Savin and his gang found nothing but wood on board, they had to leave. The idea of obtaining a ransom as a result of a pirate seizure of a ship in Europe should have alerted the "pirates", so to speak. In addition, it is known that they were not even able to give any details to which the ransom would have to be transferred.
In addition, the very idea that this very Cross so annoyed “Moscow” that they dealt with him in such an intricate (to put it mildly) way, smacks of madness. Everything could be done much as simpler - even if you believe that this clown from the point of view of specialists in "secret wars" (let's call a spade a spade) could really annoy someone. It is necessary to separate facts from interpretations, though.
What we know for sure.
The organizer of the seizure (visible) was, apparently, the former high-ranking head of the Estonian intelligence services Eerik Cross. Cross previously had extensive experience working with the Americans, including in Iraq. They recruited performers who had no previous experience in this kind of business. But they easily coped with the hijacking of the ship. If someone does not understand the meaning of this fact, then let him try to "drive" the ship on a motor boat on the high seas (even seeing it at the AIS terminal), secretly approach the side and climb on board with a weapon on the move. Note that the boat had to be delivered there somehow, as well as the weapon. All this suggests that the pirates, somewhere, at least a little bit, were trained before going "on business", and organized their transfer into neutral waters with a boat and weapons. And this requires resources that retired Cross could not have possessed. Further, the episode described by the crew members with the plans of the invaders to leave the ship. From the outside it looks as if the hijackers "on the go" were given a new input, and so that it was absolutely impossible to refuse. What kind of introductory was it and who gave it?
Further, the ship followed to an area from which in fact there were only two roads - either to Africa or to the Western Hemisphere. Where did he go? Why exactly there?
Well, the end of the chase was marked by the complete loss of the meaning of what they were doing by the bandits, which led to their voluntary surrender to the Russian Navy. From the outside, it reminds a lot of the loss of connection with the organizers - the bandits could have simply been "abandoned" by those who had previously conducted them, which led to ridiculous wanderings across the Atlantic until the fuel and water were almost completely consumed.
Further in the story was "blown up smoke" - to this day, from one source to another, the version about the involvement in the hijacking of the Israeli special services wanders. But it is “framed” in such an idiotic way that it is impossible to believe in it, in the way it is presented by the press. The theory according to which Russian missiles were allegedly sent to Iran from Finland, thrust into ballast tanks (!), Also, to put it mildly, does not shine with consistency and harmony.
We still don't really know what it was. And we will not find out at least until Eric Cross is interrogated in the UK, and maybe even after.
But one thing is quite obvious - when such information chaos occurs around an armed action, it means that the action is backed by a special service that knows how to confuse tracks well. A special service capable of training a gang of terrorists, supplying it with automatic weapons, taking it to the desired area of the sea, landing on a boat with weapons and ammunition, forcing, after the seizure of the ship, when there is no turning back, to act according to some other plan, and then confuse everything traces so that the ends cannot be found.
The hijacking of the Arctic Sea was part of some kind of "black" operation, the full plan of which we can only guess. The operation, the organizers of which for some reason needed a dry cargo ship with a Russian crew, owned by a company run by a Russian citizen, for some reason they needed to hijack it either to southern Africa or to the Western Hemisphere … to do what? And one of the perpetrators was a former head of one of the most pro-Western intelligence services in the world with experience working with Americans in Iraq.
These are facts. And Israel, looking for Iranian missiles in the ballast tanks of a dry cargo ship that left Finland by the Latvian unemployed, or Russia, which arranged such a corps de ballet in order to kick more painfully an Estonian retiree entangled in finances and women, is just dust in the eyes.
Incidentally, this does not mean that this unknown secret service was not Israeli, it means that the explanations of the press about Israel's involvement are implausible - and this is not the same thing.
We do not know (yet do not know) who was behind the abduction of the bulk carrier. We have no idea what would have happened if the organizers had gotten what they had in mind to the end. How many victims would there be? What would this result in for our country? We do not know. But we know who very convincingly put an end to the Arctic Sea voyage.
About "Ladny" and the Navy in general
SKR "Ladny", a Project 1135 combat ship, could not be attributed to the most modern ships even during construction, although it had a good GAK at that time and a good anti-submarine missile system. But the ship could not carry the helicopter, it can strike at surface ships either with anti-aircraft missiles or with the help of 76-mm cannons, that is, at close range. He could never repulse massive air strikes. Anti-submarine watchdog with functionality cut down without a helicopter.
Nevertheless, the ship turned out to be quite good - seaworthy, high-speed and with a good range, capable of hunting submarines in shallow waters off the coast, in the far sea zone, and in the ocean too, albeit with an eye on the excitement. These ships have long been the "workhorses" of the Soviet Navy, and after the Russian Federation.
The task that Ladny received in August 2009 was, to put it mildly, not his. If the invaders of the ship began to kill the hostages, the assault on the ship would be in question; there was no helicopter on board "Ladnoy" from which it was possible to suppress the bandits with machine-gun fire, as happened during the assault on the tanker "Moscow University" by the marines. Marines from "Ladnoye" would have to climb the ship from boats, attacking an enemy comparable in number, not much worse than armed. Then, when the dry cargo ship was released, the sailors, who provided the crew members with their bunks, had to live in combat posts - there was no other place.
But something else was important - firstly, this ship was. He was at the right time and in the right place, on his way from one sea to another across the open ocean. Secondly, its commander, one way or another, solved the problem in an almost ideal way - reducing to zero the existing shortcomings of Ladnoye, which speaks of the importance of training naval officers, and that sometimes their training turns out to be more important than the equipment they use. have. Thirdly, and this is a very important point: "Ladny", like all "Burevestniks" of Project 1135, is a very fast ship by modern standards, it is, in principle, one of the fastest ships with a displacement hull in the Navy. And one of the fastest warships in the world at the moment, still. And fourthly, this is far from the smallest ship, its displacement is 3200 tons, and the contours allow you to navigate with great excitement. Formally being a ship of the far sea zone, it can mainly carry out tasks in the ocean.
Apologists for the "mosquito fleet", "patrol ships" and the like should ponder. No RTOs and similar trifles could catch up with the Arctic Sea. The "patrol ship" of project 22160 could not catch up with him, moreover, he simply would not have been in that place at that time, if it had existed in those years - no one would have sent this misunderstanding to strategic exercises. And the plus in the form of having a helicopter on board would not "play" in these conditions. The problem would not have been solved. And it was quite real, and there are no guarantees that in some variations it will not be repeated in this or that region of the planet. What would we do with an all-offshore fleet in 2009? what will we do with him if such a seizure is repeated in the future?
Moreover, if events happened to go differently, the superiority of Ladnoye over the ships that we are building now would be even more complete - at least it is much easier to stop a large ship with a pair of 76-millimeter paper than with one single cannon, even if even 100 mm.
The story with the Arctic Sea confirms once again: we need a surface fleet, and it must be a fleet capable of performing tasks in the distant sea and ocean zones. And we need more ships, even if they are outdated, but that make it possible to always have at least an old TFR in the zone of potential crisis. This means that it is necessary to repair and modernize old ships to the maximum and "pull" them until it becomes possible to replace them with new ones. And these new ones should be able to operate far from home.
Today we can take such a lesson from the history of the seizure of the Arctic Sea dry cargo ship. Even without connection with the one who organized its capture in reality.
