In previous articles, we examined the possible threats to the Russian nuclear shield that may arise as a result of the deployment of a global missile defense system (ABM) by the United States and the delivery of a sudden disarming strike by them. In this case, a situation may arise when the reaction time of the Russian missile attack warning system (EWS) will not provide the possibility of a retaliatory strike and it will be possible to count only on a retaliatory strike.
We examined the resistance of the air, land and sea components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF of the Russian Federation) to a sudden disarming strike.
The materials considered above made it possible to form the optimal appearance of the ground, air and sea components of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.
The time has come to collect all this into a single system, to consider the optimal number and ratio of nuclear charges within the components and individual types of weapons of strategic nuclear forces, as well as solutions that can reduce the burden on the country's economy during the implementation of promising strategic nuclear forces.
Basic requirements for prospective strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation
1. Creation of conditions under which an adversary's delivery of a sudden disarming strike against the Russian strategic nuclear forces will require him to use all available nuclear charges without a guarantee of achieving the desired result (destruction of the Russian strategic nuclear forces).
2. Guaranteed retaliatory strike in the event of a sudden disarming strike by the enemy, overcoming existing and future missile defense systems.
3. To unleash the offensive potential of the strategic nuclear forces in order to force the enemy to reorient the available resources for defense from a sudden decapitation attack from our side.
As a basis for calculating the required number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, we initially accept the current limitations of 1,550 nuclear warheads (nuclear warheads) imposed under the START-3 treaty; in the future, they can be revised with a proportional change in the composition of the strategic nuclear forces discussed below.
We will not take into account the limitations imposed by START-3 and other similar treaties on the number of delivery vehicles, means of concealment, etc. The proposed solutions and quantitative characteristics can be taken into account in subsequent START treaties or other agreements, if any.
Ground component of strategic nuclear forces
Stationary ICBMs in silos
The basis of nuclear deterrence should be light intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) placed in highly protected silo launchers (silos), since only ICBMs in silos are practically impossible to destroy with conventional weapons (we do not consider bunker bombs due to the fact that their carrier should fly up practically close to silos). Based on the available information that in order to defeat one ICBM in a silo, with a 95% probability, two W-88 nuclear charges with a capacity of 475 kilotons are required, the number of ICBMs in a silo should be equal to half of the enemy's deployed nuclear charges, that is, 775 silos.
In the comments to the material on the promising ground component, the opinion was expressed that the country simply would not pull such a number of silos and ICBMs. The following data can be cited to this objection:
“In order to save time in the deployment of a new generation of missile systems, the USSR government decided to build silo launchers, command posts and other infrastructure elements necessary to ensure the daily operation of missile units until the missile tests are completed.
These measures made it possible to carry out rearmament in a short time and put new missile systems on alert. In the period from 1966 to 1968, the number of ICBMs put on duty increased from 333 units to 909. By the end of 1970, their number reached 1361. In 1973, ICBMs were in 1398 silo launchers of 26 missile divisions."
Thus, in two years almost 576 silos were created in the USSR, and in five years their number was 1028 units. For about 10 years, 1,298 ICBMs were put on combat duty in silos. It can be argued that Russia is not the USSR, it cannot afford such volumes. There are several objections to this: technologies have changed, for example, drilling, the creation of silos, the dimensions of automation and power mechanisms, solid-state ICBMs are simpler and cheaper than liquid ICBMs deployed at that time.
A promising light ICBM should be equipped with one nuclear warhead (nuclear warhead), with the possibility of additional installation of two more nuclear warheads. Instead of two additional nuclear warheads, two heavy decoys should be placed, including electronic warfare equipment, as well as jammers in the optical and infrared wavelength ranges. The presence of two "spare seats" on the ICBM will allow, if necessary, to quickly increase the number of deployed nuclear warheads from 775 to 2325 units.
For promising ICBMs, it is necessary to develop highly protected silos of high factory readiness, when silos are completely or in the form of modules manufactured at the manufacturing plant and in this form is delivered to the installation site. After the installation and connection of communications, the silo is poured with high-strength concrete into the technological cavities and can be put into operation.
Silos 15P744 of high factory readiness were manufactured back in the Soviet years for strategic missile systems RT-23. The protective device (roof) and the power cup with the equipment were manufactured at the manufacturing plants - Novokramatorsk Mechanical Plant and Zhdanovsk Heavy Engineering Plant, were fully equipped with the necessary units, depreciation, electrical equipment, service sites, were tested, and assembled were transported by rail to the installation site … Installation and delivery of silos for state tests on such technologies were carried out as soon as possible.
There is no doubt that progress in technology and a reduction in the size of ICBMs will make it possible to create silos of high factory readiness at a lower cost, with greater speed and in a more secure design.
Also silos should be equipped with a built-in unified command post. To reduce the number of calculations, silos with ICBMs should be combined into clusters of 10 units with control of one calculation for the entire cluster, with the automation of operations similar to the way it is implemented on nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs). High reliability of communication between silos should be ensured by laying protected communication lines in horizontal tunnels of small diameter, laid between silos at the maximum depth, according to the physical scheme "lattice", with a logical combination of equipment according to a fully connected topology of a computer network (full graph). The calculation can be placed arbitrarily in one of the silos, and periodically change the location within the cluster.
Depending on the economic capabilities of the state, the number of silos exceeds the number of deployed ICBMs by about two times. The main task of building an excessive number of silos is to reduce the likelihood of hitting an ICBM by creating uncertainty about its location in a particular silo at the current time. Checks within the framework of contractual obligations should be carried out according to the principle of clusters, including "N ICBMs + Nx2 silos," while the rotation of ICBMs within the cluster should be allowed without restrictions.
In silos that are not used for the deployment of ICBMs, interceptor missiles with nuclear warheads, designed to break through the US missile defense space echelon, should be placed in transport and launch containers (TPK), unified in external dimensions and interface with the TPK ICBM.
A missile defense breakthrough should be carried out by the implementation of the principle of the "nuclear path" - the advance detonation of anti-missile nuclear warheads at altitudes of 200-1000 km, and then the detonation of a selected number of nuclear warheads in certain parts of the trajectory.
Launched with a Thor rocket, a 1.44 megaton W49 nuclear warhead was fired 400 kilometers above Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
The almost complete absence of air at an altitude of 400 km prevented the formation of the usual nuclear fungus. However, other interesting effects were observed with a high-altitude nuclear explosion. In Hawaii, at a distance of 1,500 kilometers from the epicenter of the explosion, under the influence of an electromagnetic pulse, three hundred street lamps, televisions, radios and other electronics were out of order. A glow could be observed in the sky in this region for more than seven minutes. He was observed and filmed from the Samoan Islands, located 3,200 kilometers from the epicenter.
The explosion also affected spacecraft. Three satellites were immediately disabled by an electromagnetic pulse. The charged particles that appeared as a result of the explosion were captured by the Earth's magnetosphere, as a result of which their concentration in the Earth's radiation belt increased by 2-3 orders of magnitude. The impact of the radiation belt led to a very rapid degradation of solar batteries and electronics in seven more satellites, including the first commercial telecommunications satellite Telstar 1. In total, the explosion disabled a third of the spacecraft in low orbits at the time of the explosion.
Mobile PGRK
The second element of the ground component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation should be mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK), disguised as civilian cargo vehicles, which should be created taking into account the developments in the PGRK "Courier". The small-sized ICBM placed in the PGRK should be unified with the silo version, similar to how it was done in the Topol ICBM and the Yars ICBM.
The main problem limiting the use of PGRK is the uncertainty in understanding whether or not the enemy can track their location, including in real time. Proceeding from this, and also from the fact that a relatively unprotected mobile complex can be easily destroyed by both conventional weapons and reconnaissance and sabotage units of the enemy, the PGRK cannot act as the main element of the ground component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, based on the need to diversify risks, as well as to maintain competencies in this area, PGRK can be used as the second element of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces in an amount equal to 1/10 of the number of ICBMs in silos, that is, their number will be 76 machines. Accordingly, the number of nuclear warheads placed on them in the standard version will be 76 units, and 228 units in the maximum version.
Marine component of strategic nuclear forces
SSBN / SSGN projects 955A / 955K
At the first stage, the configuration of the naval component of the prospective strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is determined by the construction of Project 955 (A) SSBNs. Since the creation of a navy (Navy) capable of providing the deployment and cover of SSBNs in remote areas of the oceans is currently seen as an almost impossible task, the optimal way to increase the survival rate of SSBNs is to increase their number, up to the supposedly planned 12 units, with a simultaneous increase in the operational stress coefficient (KOH) to 0, 5. That is, SSBNs should spend half the time in the ocean. To do this, it is necessary to reduce the maintenance time between cruises, as well as to ensure the availability of two replacement crews for SSBNs.
The continuation of the series of SSBNs of Project 955A by a series of nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (SSGNs) of the conditional project 955K, with a visual and acoustic signature of the original project, will make it possible to make the work of the enemy's anti-submarine forces as difficult as possible, increasing the likelihood of survivability of SSBNs and their retaliatory strike against the enemy.
The placement of SSBNs in closed bastions is extremely ineffective, since in any case they will be located on the very border of the country, the degree of their protection before the start of the conflict can be assessed very conditionally, and ballistic missiles of submarines (SLBMs) launched from under the water can be hit by ships Missile defense "in pursuit", in the initial phase of the flight. Presumably, if there is political will, it is possible to complete the construction of SSBN / SSGN projects 955A / 955K by 2035.
On 12 SSBNs with 12 SLBMs on board each, 432 nuclear submarines can be placed, based on the installation of 3 nuclear submarines per 1 SLBM. The empty seats should be loaded with a set of missile defense penetration means, similar to that used on silo ICBMs and ICBMs of the PGRK. If necessary, depending on the maximum possible number of nuclear warheads on an SLBM, which can be 6-10 units, the maximum number of deployed nuclear warheads can be 864-1440 units.
The survival of SSBNs and SSGNs must be ensured at the expense of the enemy's inability to provide watch and tracking of all our submarines. For a year-round wait for going to sea, tracking and escorting 24 of our SSBNs / SSGNs, the enemy will need to attract at least 48 nuclear submarines (nuclear submarines), that is, almost all of its nuclear submarine fleet.
Project "Husky"
At the second stage, the creation of a universal nuclear submarine in versions with ballistic missiles (SSBN), SSGN and a hunting submarine can be considered. For placement in the arms of a universal nuclear submarine, a promising small-sized SLBM should be developed, based on the solutions used to create a promising light silo ICBM and ICBM PGRK, maximally unified with the specified ICBMs. Given the smaller dimensions of the carrier - a universal nuclear submarine, its ammunition should be about 6 SLBMs with one or three nuclear submarines on each.
The construction of a universal nuclear submarine should be carried out in a large series - 40-60 units, of which 20 should fall on the version with an SLBM. In this case, the total number of nuclear warheads on an SLBM will be 120 units, with the possibility of increasing to 360 units. It would seem a clear regression compared to highly specialized SSBNs of Project 955 (A)?
The supposed advantage of the Husky project nuclear submarine of the conventional fifth generation should be significantly greater secrecy, which will allow them to act more aggressively, try to get as close as possible to the enemy's territory, which will, if necessary, inflict a decapitation strike from a minimum distance, along a flat trajectory. The task of the naval component of the promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is to exert such pressure on the enemy, in which he will be forced to reorient his resources - equipment, people, funding, to defense tasks, not attack.
When a universal nuclear submarine is detected, the enemy will never be able to be sure that he is tracking - the carrier of SLBMs, cruise missiles or anti-ship missiles, and to organize year-round control of the exit and escort of all 40-60 nuclear submarines, at least 80-120 enemy multipurpose nuclear submarines will be required, which is more than all the countries of the NATO bloc put together.
Aviation component of strategic nuclear forces
The lack of stability in the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces against a sudden disarming strike, the vulnerability of carriers at all stages of flight, as well as the vulnerability of their existing weapons - cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead, makes this element of the strategic nuclear forces the least significant from the point of nuclear deterrence.
The only possible option for the practical application of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is to use it to put pressure on the enemy by threatening to move to its borders and attack from a minimum distance. As an armament for the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces, the most interesting option is an air-launched ICBM, for the launch of which a converted transport aircraft should be used - a promising aviation ballistic missile complex (PAK RB).
The advantage of this solution is the visual and radar similarity of the PAK RB with transport aircraft, as well as with other aircraft based on the same project - tankers, air command posts, etc. This will force the enemy air force to react to the movement of any transport aircraft as they do now when it detects a strategic bomber. At the same time, financial costs will increase, the resource of enemy fighters will decrease, and the workload on pilots and technical personnel will increase. In fact, the launch of airborne ICBMs should be possible without leaving the borders of the Russian Federation.
Given the novelty of the solution, the number of PAK RB should be minimal, about 20-30 aircraft with 1 air-launched ICBM on each. A promising airborne ICBM should be maximally unified with a promising silo ICBM, an ICBM PGRK and a promising small-sized SLBM. Accordingly, the number of nuclear warheads will be from 20-30 units in the minimum version, to 60-90 units in the maximum.
It may turn out that the implementation of the PAK RB will be too high-risk and costly, as a result of which it will have to be abandoned. At the same time, there will be little use in a nuclear conflict from classic missile-carrying bombers with cruise missiles. The existing, under construction and prospective Tu-95, Tu-160 (M), PAK-DA can be used extremely effectively as carriers of conventional weapons, and as an element of strategic nuclear forces can be considered as a "backup plan of the contingency plan." On the other hand, the crediting of one missile-carrying bomber as one nuclear charge makes their existence as part of the strategic nuclear forces "legally justified", allowing them to deploy 12 times more nuclear warheads than they are counted under the START-3 treaty.
Based on the foregoing, it is proposed to leave the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces unchanged, "legally" to leave it in the strategic nuclear forces, counting as 50-80 nuclear warheads, and in fact to use it as intensively as possible for strikes with conventional weapons in current conflicts
Savings paths
The construction of strategic nuclear forces is a significant burden on the country's budget. However, in conditions when the conventional forces of Russia are significantly inferior to the forces of the main enemy - the United States, not to mention the entire NATO bloc, the strategic nuclear forces remain the only protection that guarantees the sovereignty and security of the country. And, of course, the more the enemy is interested in destroying this defense.
What measures can be taken to reduce the burden on the country's budget during the construction of promising strategic nuclear forces?
1. Maximum possible unification of equipment and technologies. If the “first pancake,” the unification of the Topol ICBM and the Bulava SLBM, came out lumpy, this does not mean that the idea is flawed in principle. It can be assumed that the main obstacle to unification is not technical problems, but competition between manufacturers, the difference in the requirements and regulatory documents of different departments and branches of the armed forces, the inertia of continuity - "we have always had this." Accordingly, the basis for unification should be the development of unified documents and regulations, of course, adjusted for the specifics of the activities of each type of armed forces.
In some cases, unification may be more important than reducing the cost of some products. What does it mean? For example, some equipment for the Navy requires protection from sea water and salt fog, and this requirement is not critical for ground forces. At the same time, making a product with protection from sea water and salt fog is more expensive than without it. It would seem logical to make different equipment. It is by no means a fact, it is necessary to study the issue comprehensively, to see how an increase in the number of production of protected products will affect their cost. It may turn out that it will be cheaper to make all products protected in aggregate than to make separately protected and unprotected equipment.
2. Inclusion in the terms of reference (TOR) as the main requirement for extended service life and minimization of the need for maintenance (MOT). You can slightly compromise the achievement of the maximum possible characteristics, by extending the service life. For example, conditionally, nuclear warheads with a capacity of 50 kilotons, with a service life of 30 years, are better than nuclear warheads with a capacity of 100 kilotons, with a service life of 15 years. The same applies to product weight, energy consumption, etc. In other words, reliability and service life without maintenance should become one of the most important requirements of the technical specification.
3. Reduction of the types of complexes in service with the strategic nuclear forces
What can and should be abandoned during the construction of strategic nuclear forces? First of all, from any exotic, to which specific complexes such as "Petrel" and "Poseidon" can be attributed. They have all the disadvantages of their carriers in the context of resilience against a sudden disarming strike. They are also of little use for decapitation due to their low speed. In other words, the swing will be a ruble, and the blow will be a penny.
This also includes proposals for the deployment of strategic underwater complexes in inland water bodies. For example, we deployed an ICBM in Lake Baikal. Where is the guarantee that the enemy will not learn to find containers with ICBMs in the water column? How to prevent him from throwing small-sized underwater drones into Baikal, capable of carrying out an autonomous search under water for a long time? Close the whole lake? Drive SSBNs into Baikal? Not to mention, we are thus exposing the world's largest source of fresh water. And how to conduct checks on the number of deployed ICBMs under water?
It is also necessary to abandon heavy missiles, BZHRK and other monstrous complexes. All of them will be expensive and will always be the # 1 target for the enemy in the first strike. It's one thing to spend 2 nuclear warheads on a light ICBM with 1 nuclear warhead, another thing to spend 4 nuclear warheads on a heavy missile with 10 nuclear warheads. In which case will the enemy win? The situation with the BRZhK is even worse - it can be destroyed with conventional weapons, while its camouflage capabilities are worse than that of the PGRK disguised as civilian cargo vehicles.
Ratio and quantity
Taking into account the above points, the prospective strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation may have the following basic composition:
Strategic Missile Forces:
- 775 light ICBMs in silos with 775 nuclear warheads (up to a maximum of 2325 nuclear warheads);
- 76 PGRK disguised as civilian cargo vehicles with 76 nuclear warheads (up to a maximum of 228 nuclear warheads);
Navy:
- until 2035, 12 SSBNs with 432 nuclear warheads (maximum 864-1440 nuclear warheads);
- after 2050, 20 universal nuclear submarines with 120 nuclear submarines (maximum 360 nuclear submarines);
Air Force:
- 50 existing / under construction / prospective missile bombers with 50-80 nuclear warheads (under the START-3 treaty), or with 600-960 nuclear warheads (in fact).
As we can see, in the proposed version, the minimum number of nuclear warheads is even less than that stipulated by the START-3 treaty. The difference can be compensated for by installing additional nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, or, much better, by increasing the number of ICBMs in silos.
The total number of nuclear warheads that we must be ready to accept in the conditional START-4 treaty should be calculated on the basis of the total number of nuclear warheads that must survive in a sudden disarming attack by the enemy, the nuclear warheads spent from them needed to break through the missile defense "nuclear path", and the remaining nuclear warheads necessary to inflict unacceptable damage to the enemy.
Again. The basis of the strategic nuclear forces should be the most lightweight and compact ICBMs placed in highly protected silos of high factory readiness. Only they can withstand the blow of non-nuclear high-precision weapons, which the enemy can rivet by tens of thousands, using it not only himself, but also by equipping his allies
The number of ICBMs in silos should be equal to ½ YABCH deployed by the enemy. Silos with ICBMs should be supplemented with reserve silos, in case the enemy sharply increases the number of deployed nuclear warheads (for example, due to the return potential), or an increase in the characteristics of the enemy's nuclear warheads, which will allow him to hit one ICBM in a silo with one of his nuclear submarines with an acceptable probability. In the event of a sudden disarming strike by the enemy, he will have to hit all silos, since the location of a real ICBM inside a silo cluster will not be determined.
All other components of the strategic nuclear forces can be built optionally - PGRK, SSBN, missile bombers, etc. Their importance for nuclear deterrence, provided the previous point is implemented, will be significantly less important.
A little more history to understand what volumes the USSR could handle:
“By the second half of 1990, the Strategic Missile Forces were armed with 2,500 missiles and 10,271 nuclear warheads. Of this number, the main part was made up of intercontinental ballistic missiles - 1398 units with 6612 charges. In addition, in the arsenals of the USSR there were warheads of tactical nuclear weapons: ground-to-ground missiles - 4,300 units, artillery shells and mines up to 2,000 units, air-to-ground missiles and free-fall bombs for the Air Force aviation - more than 5,000 units, winged anti-ship rockets, as well as depth charges and torpedoes - up to 1,500 units, coastal artillery shells and coastal defense missiles - up to 200 units, atomic bombs and mines - up to 14,000 units. Total 37,271 nuclear charges."
conclusions
The promising strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, implemented on the basis of light ICBMs in silos, will be most effective as a means of nuclear deterrence in the context of the possibility of the enemy delivering a sudden disarming strike under the cover of a global missile defense system, up to the beginning of the massive deployment of space weapons systems by the enemy capable of defeating highly protected silos without the use of nuclear charges.
In this case, the strategic nuclear forces will have two paths. The first is a dead end, when in the absence of comparable space technologies it will be necessary to implement an extensive path of development - a quantitative increase in all components of the strategic nuclear forces by 2-3 times, i.e. the total number of warheads can be about 3000-4500 units and more, up to the level of the USSR. But this will devour all the resources of the economy - we will turn into North Korea.
And based on this, in the most distant future, after 2050, the second, intensive way of development will be effective - the space expansion of the strategic nuclear forces. This is a long and difficult path, but the groundwork for it needs to be created now.
What problems can stand in the way of the US desire to deliver a sudden disarming strike under the guise of a global missile defense system? This is primarily a problem of large and complex systems. It is impossible to be 100% sure that all systems on D-day and H-hour will work and work with the required efficiency. And given the stakes in the nuclear-missile confrontation, it is unlikely that anyone will dare to rely on "maybe".
On the other hand, there is a risk of an escalation of any conflict or the emergence of such an external or internal situation in the United States itself, when its leadership considers the risk acceptable, therefore, it cannot be completely ruled out that the "fas" command will be given away. The only solution is to create such a nuclear missile shield, which the enemy will not dare to try for strength under any situation.
