Russia vs America
Probably, only a very lazy person did not write about the “new Cold War”. In fact, it is naive to believe that Russia and the United States will measure their nuclear arsenals, as they did half a century ago. The capabilities of the countries are fundamentally different: this is clearly visible in the military budgets. According to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, in 2017 the US defense budget was $ 610 billion, while the Russian defense budget was $ 66 billion. This difference, in general, affects the tactical potential of the armed forces more than the strategic one. Still, the American nuclear shield, on the whole, appears to be more modern and, more importantly, more secure.
Recall that the US nuclear triad is based on UGM-133A Trident II (D5) solid-propellant ballistic missiles (SLBMs). They are based on fourteen Ohio-class strategic submarines. The Americans converted four more boats to carry cruise missiles. Each of Ohio's strategic boats carries 24 ballistic missiles: no other submarine in the world boasts such an impressive arsenal, and no other SLBM has as many capabilities as the Trident II (D5). However, the Americans also have their own difficulties. The Ohio itself is far from a new third-generation submarine (now, recall, both the United States and Russia are already exploiting the fourth with might and main). Ideally, these boats need to be replaced, but so far there is nothing corny. The Columbia project is stalled.
In principle, for a guaranteed retaliatory strike, Russia would have had enough mine-based and mobile-based land-based nuclear complexes. However, with all the advantages of the existing systems, such complexes are more vulnerable than strategic submarines. This is partly due to the return to the now canceled "nuclear train", designated "Barguzin", which, by the way, also had conceptual flaws associated with vulnerability. In general, there is nothing more tempting than having an invisible and silent nuclear arsenal in the nuclear triad, which, moreover, will be able to change its deployment.
Old boats, old difficulties
The problem for Russia is that the existing submarines of the second or third generations of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin" are outdated. The fact that China built its Project 094 Jin boats with an eye on the Soviet school of shipbuilding does not mean anything. Rather, he says, but only that the Celestial Empire did not have other technologies (say, American). The Dolphin is far from the quietest submarine. It is believed that an old American Los Angeles-class submarine detects a Project 667BDRM submarine in the Barents Sea at a distance of up to 30 kilometers. Presumably, "Virginia" and "Seawulf" will have this indicator even better.
This is not the only problem. Each submarine of Project 667BDRM carries sixteen R-29RMU2 Sineva missiles. With all their advantages, the use of liquid-propellant missiles is fraught with a number of risks in comparison with solid-fuel missiles, such as the already mentioned Trident II (D5). Maintenance of liquid-propellant rockets requires a lot of equipment that increases the noise of a submarine. And working with toxic fuel components increases the risk of an accident that could turn into an almost global tragedy. Recall that it was the depressurization of the rocket tanks that led to the death of the K-219 submarine.
Salvation is in the Bulava.
In this sense, the solid-propellant Bulava, which, as we know, is inferior in throwable weight to the American Trident and has a number of technical problems, still seems to be a much better option than the old missiles, even if they have been modernized. "Bulava" has a range of up to 11 thousand kilometers, a launch weight of 36, 8 tons, and a throwable weight of up to 1, 15 tons. The missile is capable of carrying six individually guided warheads. For comparison, the Trident II (D5) has a throw weight of 2800 kg.
Why is there such a big difference in performance? As Yuri Solomonov, the general designer of the Topol and Bulava, said at one time, a decrease in the missile's payload is associated with an increase in its survivability, including with a low active flight phase, when the rocket's main engine is running and it can be well observed and destroyed at an early stage. stage. "Topol-M and Bulava have an active area 3-4 times less than domestic missiles, and 1.5-2 times less than American, French, and Chinese missiles," Solomonov said.
There is, however, a more trivial reason - the banal lack of funds for a more powerful missile. It was not for nothing that in the Soviet years, they wanted to equip the Borey with a special version of the solid-propellant P-39, which had a throwable mass comparable to that of the Trident and the total power of warheads, significantly exceeding the indicators of the Bulava.
Let us recall, by the way, that each new Borey submarine must carry sixteen R-30 Bulava missiles. In total there are three boats in service now, and while maintaining the pace of construction, they will become a completely equivalent replacement for the Dolphins, as well as the heavy Sharks of Project 941, which de facto have already sunk into oblivion (now only one such boat is in operation, it converted to "Bulava").
The main problem of the Bulava is not a small throwable mass or a relatively small destructive effect, but a high percentage of unsuccessful launches. In total, since 2005, more than 30 test launches have been carried out, of which seven were recognized as unsuccessful, although many experts focused on many partially successful launches. However, even taking into account the novelty, the high failure rate cannot be called something unique. So, the aforementioned R-39 of the first 17 launches failed more than half, but this did not put it into service, nor, in general, normal operation. If it had not been for the collapse of the USSR, the rocket could theoretically have served for more than a decade. And "Bulava", most likely, would never have appeared.
If we try to summarize what has been said, the plans to urgently look for a replacement for the R-30 look too harsh and unnecessary. Recall that in June 2018, it was reported that the missile was still accepted into service. And in May of this year, the RF Ministry of Defense showed unique footage of preparation for the launch and simultaneous launch of four R-30 Bulava ballistic missiles. It is unlikely that one or the other would be possible if the missile was "raw", incapable of combat, or so unsuccessful purely conceptually that its use could not even be discussed.
Obviously, the Bulava will become the backbone of the naval component of the Russian nuclear triad, at least for the coming decades. At the same time, all kinds of "childhood illnesses" that are inherent, in principle, to any new technique, especially so complex, will be gradually eliminated. At the same time, the ground component of the Russian nuclear triad will remain its basis in the foreseeable future. Just what are the efforts aimed at the projects "Burevestnik" and "Avangard".
