The creation of hypersonic aircraft (GZLA, with a speed of more than 5 M) is one of the most promising areas for the development of weapons. Initially, hypersonic technologies were associated with the emergence of reusable manned aircraft - high-altitude and high-speed civil and military aircraft, aircraft capable of flying both in the atmosphere and in space.
In practice, projects for the creation of reusable GZVA faced enormous difficulties both in terms of the development of multi-mode engines that allow takeoff, acceleration and stable flight at hypersonic speed, and in terms of the development of structural elements capable of withstanding enormous temperature loads.
Despite the difficulties with the creation of manned and unmanned reusable aircraft, interest in hypersonic technologies did not weaken, since their use promised huge advantages in the military sphere. Taking this into account, the emphasis in development has shifted to the creation of hypersonic weapon systems, in which the aircraft (missile / warhead) overcomes most of the trajectory at hypersonic speed.
Some might say that ballistic missile warheads can also be classified as hypersonic weapons. However, a key feature of hypersonic weapons is the ability to carry out a controlled flight, during which the HZVA can maneuver in height and along the course of movement, which is inaccessible (or limited available) for warheads flying along a ballistic trajectory. The presence of a hypersonic ramjet engine (scramjet engine) on it is often called another criterion for a "real" HZVA, however, this point can be questioned, at least in relation to the "disposable" HZVA.
GZLA with scramjet
At the moment, two types of hypersonic weapon systems are being actively developed. These are the Russian project of a cruise missile with a scramjet engine 3M22 "Zircon" and the American project Boeing X-51 Waverider. For hypersonic weapons of this type, speed characteristics are assumed in the range of 5-8 M and a flight range of 1000-1500 km. Their advantages include the possibility of placing on conventional aircraft carriers such as Russian missile-carrying bombers Tu-160M / M2, Tu-22M3M, Tu-95 or American B-1B, B-52.
In general, projects of this type of hypersonic weapons are developing in Russia and in the United States at approximately the same pace. The active exaggeration of the topic of hypersonic weapons in the Russian Federation led to the fact that it seemed that the supply of "Zircons" to the troops was about to begin. However, the adoption of this missile into service is scheduled only for 2023. On the other hand, everyone is aware of the setbacks pursuing a similar American program X-51 Waverider by Boeing, in connection with which there is a feeling that the United States is significantly lagging behind in this type of weapon. Which of the two powers will be the first to receive this type of hypersonic weapon? The near future will show it. It will also show how far behind the second participant in the arms race.
Another actively developed type of hypersonic weapon is the creation of hypersonic gliding warheads - gliders.
Hypersonic gliding aircraft
The creation of a planning-type GZLA was considered back in the middle of the 20th century. In 1957, the Tupolev Design Bureau began work on the design of the Tu-130DP (long-range glider) unmanned aerial vehicle.
According to the project, the Tu-130DP was supposed to represent the last stage of a medium-range ballistic missile. The rocket was supposed to bring the Tu-130DP to an altitude of 80-100 km, after which it separated from the carrier and went into a gliding flight. During the flight, active maneuvering could be carried out using aerodynamic control surfaces. The target hitting range was supposed to be 4000 km at a speed of 10 M.
In the 90s of the XX century "NPO Mashinostroyenia" came up with an initiative proposal to develop a project for the rescue rocket and space system "Prizyv". It was proposed by the beginning of 2000, on the basis of the UR-100NUTTH (ICBM) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), to create a complex for providing operational assistance to ships in distress. The estimated payload of the UR-100NUTTH ICBM was a special aerospace rescue aircraft SLA-1 and SLA-2, which were to carry various life-saving equipment. The estimated delivery time for the emergency kit was to be from 15 minutes to 1.5 hours, depending on the distance to those in distress. The predicted landing accuracy of gliding aircraft was to be about 20-30 m (), the payload mass was 420 kg for the SLA-1 and 2500 kg for the SLA-2 (). The work on the "Call" project did not leave the preliminary study stage, which is predictable, given the time of its appearance.
Hypersonic gliding warheads
Another project that fits the definition of "hypersonic planning warhead" can be considered the concept of a controlled warhead (UBB), proposed by the SRC im. Makeeva. The guided warhead was intended to equip intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The asymmetric design of the UBB with control provided by aerodynamic flaps was supposed to allow changing the flight trajectory over a wide range, which in turn ensured the possibility of hitting strategic enemy targets in the face of opposition from a developed layered missile defense system. The proposed design of the UBB included instrumentation, aggregate and combat compartments. The control system is presumably inertial, with the ability to receive correction data. The project was shown to the public in 2014, at the moment its status is unknown.
The Avangard complex announced in 2018, which includes the UR-100N UTTH missile and a hypersonic gliding guided warhead, which is designated as Aeroballistic Hypersonic Combat Equipment (AGBO), can be considered the closest to being put into service. The flight speed of the AGBO complex "Avangard" according to some data is 27 M (9 km / s), the flight range is intercontinental. The approximate weight of AGBO is about 3.5-4.5 tons, length 5.4 meters, width 2.4 meters.
The Avangard complex should enter service in 2019. In the future, a promising Sarmat ICBM can be considered as the carrier of the AGBO, which presumably will be able to carry up to three AGBOs of the Avangard complex.
In the United States, they reacted to reports of the imminent deployment of hypersonic weapons by intensifying their own developments in this direction. At the moment, in addition to the above-mentioned project of the X-51 Waverider hypersonic cruise missile, the United States plans to quickly adopt a promising ground-based hypersonic missile weapon system - the Hypersonic Weapons System (HWS).
The HWS is to be based on the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB), a universal guided maneuverable gliding hypersonic warhead, created by the US Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories for the US Army, Air Force and Navy, with the participation of the Missile Defense Agency. In the HWS complex, the Block 1 C-HGB hypersonic warhead will be launched to the required height by a universal solid-propellant ground-based missile AUR (All-Up-Round), placed in a transport-launch container about 10 m long on a two-container ground towed mobile launcher. The range of the HWS should be about 3,700 nautical miles (6,800 km), the speed is at least 8 M, most likely higher, since for planning hypersonic warheads, speeds of the order of 15-25 M.
The C-HGB warhead is believed to be based on the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) experimental hypersonic warhead, which was flight tested in 2011 and 2012. The AUR rocket is also possibly based on the booster rocket used for the AHW launches. The deployment of HWS complexes is planned to begin in 2023.
Planning hypersonic warheads are also being developed by the PRC. There is information about several projects - DF-ZF or DF-17, designed for both nuclear strikes and destruction of large well-protected surface and ground targets. There is no reliable information on the technical characteristics of the Chinese planning GZVA. The adoption of the first Chinese GZLA is announced for 2020.
Planning GZLA and GZLA with scramjet engines are not competing, but complementary weapons systems, and one cannot replace the other. Contrary to the opinion of skeptics that strategic conventional weapons do not make sense, the United States is considering GZLA primarily in non-nuclear equipment for use within the framework of the Rapid Global Strike (BSU) program. In July 2018, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Michael Griffin said that in a non-nuclear configuration, GZLA could provide the US military with significant tactical capabilities. The use of GZLA will allow striking in the event that a potential enemy has modern air defense and missile defense systems that can repel attacks from cruise missiles, combat aircraft and classic short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Guidance of HZLA in a plasma "cocoon"
One of the favorite arguments of critics of hypersonic weapons is their alleged inability to carry out guidance due to the plasma "cocoon" formed when moving at high speeds, which does not transmit radio waves and prevents the acquisition of an optical image of the target. The mantra about the "impenetrable plasma barrier" has become as popular as the myth about the scattering of laser radiation in the atmosphere, almost 100 meters away, or other stable stereotypes.
Undoubtedly, the problem of targeting a GZLA exists, but how insoluble it is is already a question. Especially in comparison with such problems as the creation of a scramjet engine or structural materials resistant to high temperature loads.
The task of targeting the HZLA can be divided into three stages:
1. Inertial guidance.
2. Correction based on data from global satellite positioning systems, it is possible to use astrocorrection.
3. Guidance in the final area at the target, if this target is mobile (limited mobile), for example, at a large ship.
Obviously, the plasma barrier is not a hindrance for inertial guidance, and it should be taken into account that the accuracy of inertial guidance systems is constantly growing. The inertial guidance system can be supplemented with a gravimeter, which increases its accuracy characteristics, or other systems, the operation of which does not depend on the presence or absence of a plasma barrier.
To receive signals from satellite navigation systems, relatively compact antennas are sufficient, for which certain engineering solutions can be used. For example, the placement of such antennas in the "shaded" zones formed by a certain configuration of the housing, the use of remote heat-resistant antennas or flexible extended towed antennas made of high-strength materials, the injection of a coolant at certain points of the structure, or other solutions, as well as their combinations.
It is possible that transparency windows can be created in the same way for radar and optical guidance devices. Do not forget that without access to classified information, only already declassified, published technical solutions can be discussed.
If, however, it is impossible to "open" the view for a radar station (radar) or optical-locating station (OLS) on a hypersonic carrier, then, for example, the separation of the HZVA in the final flight segment can be applied. In this case, 90-100 km away from the target, the HZVA drops the guidance unit, which is decelerated by a parachute or otherwise, scans the radar and OLS, and transmits the updated target coordinates, the course and speed of its movement to the main part of the HZVA. It will take about 10 seconds between the separation of the guidance block and the hit of the warhead on the target, which is not enough to hit the guidance block or significantly change the position of the target (the ship will travel no more than 200 meters at maximum speed). However, it is possible that the guidance unit will have to be separated even further, in order to increase the time for correcting the flight path of the HZVA. It is possible that with a group launch of the HZLA, a scheme of sequential reset of guidance blocks at different ranges will be applied to sequentially correct the coordinates of the target.
Thus, even without having access to classified developments, one can see that the problem of the plasma "cocoon" is solvable, and taking into account the announced terms for the adoption of the GZVA into service in 2019-2013, it can be assumed that, most likely, it has already been solved.
GZVA carriers, conventional planning GZVA and strategic nuclear forces
As mentioned earlier, conventional missile-carrying bombers can be carriers of GZLA with scramjet, with all the advantages and disadvantages of this type of weapon.
As carriers of hypersonic gliding warheads, solid-state (mainly in the United States) and liquid-propellant (mainly in the Russian Federation) intercontinental and medium-range missiles are considered, capable of providing the glider with the launch altitude necessary for acceleration.
There is an opinion that the deployment of GZLA on ICBMs and medium-range missiles (IRM) will entail a proportional reduction in the nuclear arsenal. If we start from the existing START-3 treaty, then yes, but the reduction in the number of nuclear charges and their carriers is so insignificant that it will not have any effect on the overall level of deterrence. And given how quickly international treaties are falling apart, there is no guarantee that START-3 will continue, or the permissible number of nuclear charges and delivery vehicles in the conditional START-4 treaty will not be increased, and strategic conventional weapons will not be included in a separate clause., especially if both Russia and the United States are interested in it.
At the same time, unlike nuclear weapons, planning conventional GZLA as part of the Strategic Conventional Forces can and should be used in local conflicts, to defeat high-priority targets and to carry out VIP-terror actions (destruction of the enemy's leadership) without the slightest risk of losses from their own armed forces.
Another objection is the risk of a nuclear war in any launch of an ICBM. But this issue is also being resolved. For example, within the framework of the conditional START-4, carriers with conventional warheads will have to be based on certain, mutually controlled sites, on which nuclear weapons will not be deployed.
The best option would be to abandon the deployment of nuclear-armed planning GZVA altogether. In the event of the outbreak of a large-scale conflict, it is much more effective to bombard the enemy with a large number of conventional warheads, including those with a partially orbital trajectory, as will possibly be implemented on the Sarmat ICBM. In the conditional START-4 it is quite possible to increase the permissible number of nuclear warheads to 2000-3000 units, and in the event of a sharp increase in the effectiveness of the US missile defense system, withdraw from this treaty and further increase the arsenal of nuclear weapons. In this case, strategic conventional weapons can be left out of the brackets.
With such numbers of nuclear warheads, 15-30 Avangards will not solve anything. At the same time, if there are no gliders with nuclear warheads, then, taking into account the trajectory of their flight, no one will confuse the launch of planning conventional GZVA with a nuclear strike, and accordingly there is no need to warn about their use.
GZLA reusable carriers
When Igor Radugin, the chief designer of the Soyuz-5 rocket, joined S7 Space, he was asked whether the projected Soyuz-5 launch vehicle (LV) would be a disposable one, to which he replied: “A disposable rocket is just as effective like a disposable plane. To create a disposable media is not even marking time, but a road backward."
The article "Reusable missiles: an economical solution for a Rapid Global Strike" considered the possibility of using reusable launch vehicles as a means of launching conventional gliders. I would like to add a few more arguments in favor of such a decision.
Based on this, it is easy to understand that long-range aircraft made two sorties a day. For strategic missile-carrying bombers, with a range of 5,000 km (which, in combination with the range of a GZLA with a scramjet engine, will give a radius of destruction of about 7,000 km), the number of sorties per day will be reduced to one.
Private aerospace companies are now striving for this figure - to ensure the departure of a reusable launch vehicle once a day. An increase in the number of sorties will lead to a simplification and automation of preparation and refueling procedures, in principle, all the technologies for this are already in place, but so far there are no tasks in space that require such an intensity of flights.
Based on the foregoing, the reusable launch vehicle should be considered not as a "returning ICBM", but as a kind of "vertical bomber", which, due to the climb, allows the means of destruction (planning hypersonic warheads) to obtain a flight range, otherwise provided by the radius of the aircraft - missile bomber and launching means of destruction (hypersonic cruise missiles).
There was not a single serious invention that a person would somehow not use for military purposes, and reusable launch vehicles will face the same fate, especially since, taking into account the altitude to which it is necessary to bring the planning GZVA (presumably about 100 km), the design The launch vehicle can be simplified up to the use of only the reversible first stage, the Baikal reusable rocket booster (MRU), or the creation of a “vertical bomber” project based on the Korona launch vehicle project of the S. Makeeva.
Another advantage of reusable carriers may be that their equipment will only mean non-nuclear warheads. Spectral analysis of the launch vehicle torch at launch and the features of the flight trajectory will allow a country that has a space element of the missile attack warning system (EWS) to determine that a strike is being delivered not by nuclear, but by conventional weapons.
Reusable carriers of the GZLA should not compete with conventional missile bombers either in terms of tasks or in terms of the cost of hitting targets, since they are fundamentally different. Bombers cannot provide such promptness and inevitability of a strike, the invulnerability of the carrier, as gliding HZVA, and the higher cost of planning HZVA and their carriers (even in a reusable version), will not allow to provide such a massive attack that missile carrier bombers will provide
Application of conventional planning GPLA
The use of conventional planning GLA is discussed in the article "Strategic conventional forces".
I just want to add one more application scenario. If hypersonic gliding warheads are considered to be as invulnerable to enemy air defense / missile defense forces as it is believed, then conventional gliding warheads can be used as an effective means of political pressure on hostile states. For example, in the event of another provocation by the United States or NATO, it is possible to launch a conventional planning GZVA from the Plesetsk cosmodrome at a target in Syria through the territory of our good friends - the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, and Turkey too. The flight of the GZLA through the territory of the allies of a potential enemy, which they cannot prevent, will be like a slap in the face with a pull and will give them a completely understandable hint about interference in the affairs of the great powers.
