This year, the Russian army celebrated the 30th anniversary of the combat service of the Topol mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK). The path to the birth of this unique system turned out to be very difficult. As an employee of the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering, I know this in great detail, which I would like to share with the readers of NVO.
In 1975, work began on the Temp-2SM complex - the creation of a MIRV. A preliminary design was issued and the necessary ground testing was carried out, after which the work was stopped. In the same year, work was carried out and in December a preliminary design for this complex was released.
HOW DETERMINED THE COMPOSITION OF UNITS
Employees of the head department of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, given that an increase in the launch weight of the Temp-2SM2 rocket inevitably led to the creation of a new launcher (7- or 8-axle, which was also a question to be determined during the development of the preliminary design), conducted an analysis of the possibility maintaining the required survivability of the division, which by this time already consisted of 11 vehicles. Strange as it sounds now, the main question was the possibility of creating instead of highly specialized diesel power plants, dining and dormitory machines and security vehicles of one type of a universal combat alert machine attached to each of the combat vehicles of the complex. Having convinced of the possibility of creating such a machine that would provide the required autonomy both for power supply and for the life of personnel, the leadership of the institute approved the option of building a complex with spatial separation of a division of three batteries and a control panel of the division.
The next severe limitation that we adopted during the design was that, as part of a two-vehicle launch battery (PU and MOBD), the launcher would be fully autonomous for combat use. On the PU, it was proposed to place an autonomous diesel unit, the fuel system of which was combined with the chassis engine with a guaranteed daily supply of fuel for the operation of the diesel unit after the march. The natural next step was to ensure the possibility of launching missiles from any point on the patrol route with the placement of the navigation system on the launcher and the assignment to the ground control system of tasks for the operational calculation of flight missions.
The next and, as life has shown, the main issue was the issue of building management of autonomous launchers. At first, it seemed tempting to create a system for remote control of radio channels developed by Nikolai Pilyugin (proceeding not only from technical, but also "political" relations between the chief designers). However, common sense prevailed, and for further development it was proposed to place Taras Sokolov at the APU of the final link of the missile forces and missile weapons combat control system developed by NPO Impulse (this was the name of the enterprise after its transfer to the Ministry of General Machine Building). It should be noted that the ground control system did not remain "dull". In one of the cabins of the APU, it was planned to place the control panel, which provided the task of operating modes and documentation devices. The deployment of VHF communication means, radio channel receivers for combat control and the actual combat control equipment on the APU was envisaged in a single post of combat control and communications, the development of design documentation for which and the manufacture of prototypes was undertaken by NPO Impulse.
Thus, the composition of the divisions of the regiment of the Temp-2SM2 complex in the technical proposal approved in December 1975 by the chief designers of MIT and NPOAP proposed the following:
- PKP regiment consisting of 6 vehicles (combat control vehicle, 2 communication vehicles, 3 combat duty vehicles) against 9 vehicles in the Temp-2S and Pioneer complexes;
- PKP battalion, consisting of 4 vehicles (combat control vehicle and communication vehicle, unified with one of the regiment's PKP communication vehicles);
- starting battery consisting of 2 vehicles (autonomous launcher and starting battery).
The regiment has 3 divisions with 3 starting batteries in each. In total, the regiment has 36 machines of 6 types, of which 9 are APUs. For comparison: in the regiment of the Pioneer-UTTH complex there are 42 machines of 10 types, of which 9 are launchers. It was envisaged that the battalion could carry out combat duty both in a dispersed form and jointly with the PKP and starting batteries at the same position. The possibility of carrying out combat duty of any subunit was ensured in the event of a refusal in it of one combat duty support vehicle. If one of the battalion's PKPs failed, the control of its launchers was taken over by the regiment's PKP. The number of entries to the APU for receiving orders increased from 1 to 6.
In this form, the technical proposal was presented to the Missile Forces, received its approval, and after the publication of directive documents on the creation of the complex in July 1977, it was reflected in the tactical and technical requirements for the development of the complex.
In connection with the clarification in 1979 of the direction of work on the complex as the modernization of the RT-2P rocket, the complex was called RT-2PM ("Topol"). Customer index - 15P158.
The following circumstance should be noted here. Somewhere between 1975 and 1977, outside the framework of the creation of all missile systems, the Rocket Forces and the Ministry of General Chemistry decided to create a new generation of automated combat control systems (ASBU "Signal-A" for separate TTT and separate funding). When signing the TTT of the Ministry of Defense for the Temp-2SM complex, the chief designers formulated the requirements for combat control equipment as follows: "The equipment of the ASBU links of the missile complex should be developed taking into account the TTT on the ASBU and provide …". In the approved version of the TTT, it was written: "The ASBU equipment of the missile complex should be developed according to TTT on ASBU and provide …"
Who could then know that the periods of the creation of the Topol missile complex and the combat control equipment included, on the one hand, in its composition, (and on the other hand, the same equipment was called the lower links 5G, 5D, 6G and 7G of the combat control system " Signal-A ") will not coincide so dramatically.
WARNING BELL
At the initial stage of development, everything looked simple. MIT had no disagreements with military unit 25453-L. The Institute issued to NPO Impulse the private technical specifications for the use of regimental and divisional units and the development of a command post and communications for the APU, agreed with the military missions. NPO Impulse agreed with the developers of the complex machines (KB Selena and OKB-1 PA Barrikady) on the placement of equipment. All this allowed the entire cooperation to carry out preliminary design.
Then the first bell sounded. In the Conclusion of the Rocket Forces, it sounded that the presented materials were not approved by the chief designers and did not correspond to the TTT for the ASBU system. It turned out that the temperature requirements for the equipment are more stringent in the TTT at the ASBU than in the requirements on the part of the developers of the units. There were also discrepancies between the compositions of the NZU equipment included in the TTT for the system, and the compositions agreed with the designers of the units (reverse channels of the RBU). I cannot but describe in detail how a way out of this situation was found. In my opinion, it illustrates the complete constructiveness of work at this stage of joint work between industry and military unit 25453-L.
In the office of the head of the Seventh Directorate, Major General of Signal Corps Igor Kovalev, interested representatives at the working level gathered, wrote one page of text in about 20-30 minutes (what is the discrepancy and what should be guided by in further work), after which they dispersed. After 10 days we received a document without any changes, with our signatures (without the signatures of our leadership), but entitled "Minutes of a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Missile Forces" and with his approving signature. The issue was removed from the agenda forever.
The question of the appearance and provision of combat control equipment for the beginning of joint flight tests was just as easily resolved. It should be borne in mind that the first three launches of mobile Topol missiles, in accordance with international obligations, were to be carried out from a converted silo launcher, where all ground equipment was non-standard or was abnormally placed. True, this limitation was in effect only for the third quarter of 1981, and we were 1, 5 years behind in terms of time, but no one dared to change the decisions made. As a result, the first launch of "Topol" was carried out on February 8, 1983 from a converted silo launcher of the RT-2P rocket using the corresponding equivalents of combat control equipment in the silo and the temporary command post 53-NIIP MO (Plesetsk cosmodrome). The next two missile launches were carried out according to the same scheme.
However, by the end of 1983, it was necessary to proceed to the fourth launch - the first launch from a mobile launcher, and there was no combat control equipment either for the APU or for the command posts. The need for inventions is tricky - the equivalents of the combat control equipment of the combat control were rearranged from the silo into the empty bunker of the mobile PU 15U128, routine checks of the rocket at the technical and launch positions were set from the control system control panel, which was nominally located at the APU, and the commands to launch the rocket - from the same equivalent placed in that temporary CP. The division's PKP were not involved in the launches. So 5 more missile launches were carried out. Prototypes of the PKP of the Zenit division and the PKP of the Granit regiment with laid cables and empty racks of combat control equipment were tested at the Krasnodar Instrument Plant of systems on issues that did not require the functioning of the combat control system. The 15U128 launchers (with an empty bunker with combat control equipment) and the 15V148 MOBD were tested at the 53rd NIIP MO. Acceptance tests of the chassis and transport tests of the rocket were also conducted there.
THE PATIENCE OF THE LEADERSHIP IS STILL BROKEN
The development of the Signal-A equipment began from scratch on a new element base. In the pilot production of NPO Impulse, there was practically no equipment necessary for the manufacture of equipment. The capacity of the pilot plant was clearly insufficient.
In these conditions, the Ministry of General Chemistry as a whole paid clearly insufficient attention to this issue. The fifth head of the Ministry of General Affairs, first of all, the first deputy head of the head of the head office, Yevgeny Chugunov, did what they could, but no one could eliminate the gap, I would even say, jump over the abyss.
Serial production of the Signal-A equipment was entrusted to the Kharkiv PO “Monolit” (Instrument-making plant named after TG Shevchenko), later the production of regimental units of the system was transferred to the Kharkiv PO “Kommunar”. For the manufacture of individual blocks, the Kiev Radio Plant and the Omsk Production Association "Progress" were also involved.
Taking into account the limited capabilities of NPO Impulse, by decisions of the Ministry, PO Monolit was involved in the manufacture of prototypes of equipment. The efforts of the Ministry of General Affairs were also used to equip the production of serial factories and the experimental plant NPO Impulse. In a fairly short time, despite the fact that notifications for changing the design documentation were traveling from Leningrad to Kharkov, in my opinion, by cars (I mean not only speed, but also their number), the NPO Impulse stand was equipped with prototypes of equipment. The military representation of the PO "Monolith" has become a face, not a back, to the situation.
However, despite all the measures taken, already at the beginning of 1984 it was very clear to all specialists that a series of equipment, and accordingly the entire complex, in 1984 was out of the question. In MIT, individual specialists were, without advertising, the study of other possible schemes for the construction of the Topol complex. NPO Impulse, primarily in the person of the chief designer Vitaly Melnik, prepared one after another decisions on the "stages …". The Moscow Institute submissively signed them until May 1984, then they were considered and approved by the Rocket Forces. After that, almost instantly, the employees of the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering presented the extracts from the projects of the military-industrial complex solutions on the number and delivery times of the NZU equipment, necessary for the implementation of the required deadlines for the complex, and … everything was over. Naturally, I do not know what and how the leadership of the Seventh Directorate reported to its superiors and what the leadership of the GURVO reported to the top.
The Temp-2SM mobile missile system is ready for launch.
Photo of the site www.cdbtitan.ru
The patience of the leadership of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering snapped only when, in the next decision on "stages …", providing for "the division on duty only through wire communication channels", someone in the Rocket Forces, without agreement with the MIT, added that "duty is carried out only at the checkpoint permanent deployment ".
It should also be noted that in accordance with the directive documents for the Speed complex, the serial production of which was planned to begin two years later, the unification of ground equipment was prescribed not with the Topol complex, but with the Pioneer complex.
In the first decade of June 1984, after consulting with their ministers, Alexander Nadiradze and Nikolai Pilyugin sent a short (no more than 10-15 lines) letter to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Ustinov, suggesting that, due to the delay in working out "some" systems, to start deploying the complex " Poplar "with the provision of duty according to the scheme of the" Pioneer "complex.
It is well known what happened next: "strengthening" of the leadership of the GURVO and NPO Impulse, consideration of the state of affairs on the development of the ASBU "Signal-A" at a meeting with the Minister of Defense of the USSR.
I will only remind you that according to this scheme, all 8 regiments (15P158.1 complex) of the 1984-1985 program were put on alert. According to the same scheme, missile launches (both test and serial control) were carried out in 1985. For the equipment of the NZU complex "Topol", a separate solution introduced a refined stage of creation - links 7G and 6G with an incomplete program version (the so-called version 64K) and the interface of link 6G with link 5P of the serial PKP regiment "Barrier-M" (complex "Pioneer-UTTKh").
THERE IS NO RETURN
The lag in the development of the Signal-A system in 1985, and its failure to test this year, also created a great deal of uncertainty regarding the 1986 program. In this regard, I cannot but recall the words of the new head of the GURVO, Alexander Ryazhskikh, quoted in his memoirs, that, expressing in a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Vladimir Tolubko (therefore, this conversation took place in the first half of 1985), his concern that the entire program of the complex can be deployed according to a wired scheme, he received an answer from Vladimir Tolubko that neither he nor anyone in the country was able to delay the deployment of missiles.
But back to the 1986 program. It should be noted that, at the insistence of the Rocket Forces, new modifications of the chassis (index 7917) and the launcher (index 15U168) were developed, which made it possible to improve the conditions for the presence of personnel on the launcher, but the timing of their introduction into mass production was not determined.
The developers of the complex, of course, had concerns that if it was necessary to develop a modification of the PU 15U168 if the timing of the introduction of the new chassis and the Signal-A equipment did not coincide, then it must be planned in a timely manner. And in the minutes of one of the working meetings in the Ministry of Defense Industry, Alexander Ryazhskikh and Alexander Vinogradov made a working note that these elements should be implemented on the launcher at the same time, starting with the first serial launcher of the 1986 program. As a result, it turned out that there is simply no way back for the industry and the GURVO.
At the experimental stand of NPO Impulse, the regimental scheme of the equipment was finally assembled, and in parallel with the ongoing testing, the first, bench stage of joint tests was started. And here a new significant consequence of the fact that the system equipment was created on a new element base appeared. Failures of microcircuits (primarily the so-called electrolytic corrosion) were so widespread that one could only dream of achieving any acceptable performance indicators.
Then, on the initiative of the GURVO, it was decided that out of the four serial regiments of the 1986 program, the first regiment would be transferred "to work out the combat and operational characteristics of the complex" and later transferred to the training center of the range.
The joint tests of the Topol complex were led by the State Commission for Testing the Complex, chaired by the First Deputy Head of the GURVO, Lieutenant General Anatoly Funtikov, and the Signal-A system tests, including the system links included in the complex, were led by the State Commission for Testing the System under chaired by the First Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Igor Sergeev and the subcommittees appointed by them. Even we, industrial workers, sometimes had hard times. And if we add here a third party - the head of the GURVO?
Without describing in detail here the period of delivery of the first launchers of the 1986 program to PA Barricades, I will only say that all nine APU 15U168 arrived at the Plesetsk test site in the first ten days of August. The first inclusions began - with negative results.
FIRST SHELF BECAME TEST
Let me put here a small analysis of the principles of constructing the experimental stand of NPO Impulse, and, accordingly, of the stands of serial plants in comparison, for example, with the complex stands of the control system at NPO Automation and Instrumentation and serial plants of control systems. The complex stand of the control system is necessarily completed with standard elements of the power supply system and other standard systems or equivalents of on-board and ground systems interfaced with the control system, developed and manufactured by enterprises - developers of the corresponding systems. This makes it possible to work out, first of all, at the stand, the interface of adjacent systems with the control system, the compliance of the interface parameters of the systems with the previously agreed protocols and, if necessary, clarify the interface parameters with the necessary modifications before entering the field tests.
The experimental stand of NPO Impulse did not meet these criteria. Elements of the power supply system were purchased at random, equivalents of radio equipment, control systems and other systems were developed and manufactured by NPO Impulse itself. This could lead (and sometimes led, due to the different understanding of the developers) to the inconsistency of the combat control equipment with the interface protocols agreed with the adjacent systems, and from working out the issues of pairing the ASBU equipment with adjacent systems, the testing stage began after the equipment was installed in the standard places in the complex units.
According to the results of the tests, the road was opened for three subsequent regiments to carry out work on putting them on combat duty, which was carried out practically on time (the first regiment - in 1987, the next two - at the beginning of 1988). In January 1987, a joint decision was made on the procedure for carrying out work on the Topol complex in the current year and its appearance. It was envisaged to add the 5G link complex (and, accordingly, the PKP of the Granit regiment) to the NZU nomenclature and to increase the NZU software level (version 96K), which fully ensures the implementation of all requirements for ensuring combat alert in all the combat readiness of combat units of the Topol complex provided for by the Rocket Forces. . Bench testing of the equipment was again planned at NPO Impulse with the transition to field tests as part of one division and the PKP regiment, and only then the full regimental composition of the complex. For the proving stage of testing, the Ministry of Defense allowed the use of the equipment of the first serial regiment, but unlike the previous year, further sending of the regiment to the troops was envisaged to be put on alert.
Here I want to make a small digression about the specifics of work in 1987 at MIT and at the Seventh Department. At the beginning of the year, changes took place in the structure of the complex department of the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering - on the basis of the Department of Combat Control and Communication, a cluster of three departments was formed (later an independent department was formed). The employees of the Seventh Directorate, which still consisted of four departments (three for R&D and one serial), had a large additional burden to control the implementation of measures by electronic industry enterprises to improve the reliability of the element base, agreed upon after a meeting of the head of the GURVO and the Minister of the Electronic Industry. For other subdivisions of MIT and GURVO, the topic "Topol complex as an ROC" was practically closed in connection with the fulfillment of all the tasks facing these structures.
Works at the NPO "Impulse" booth according to version 96K were progressing with some lag. It should be noted that during the development of the equipment, not only software was augmented. Hardware modifications of a large number of blocks were also required and implemented.
All this threatened to disrupt the entire 1987 work program. This required clarification of the direction of work. In September, formally on the initiative of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (and the head of the Seventh Directorate, Viktor Khalin, was the gray cardinal), an appropriate decision was made, providing for the proving of the testing stage in full regimental composition in November – December 1987.
THE SYSTEM DOES NOT ROLL
When all the subdivisions of the complex were in the field, two Topol missiles were launched, while the second launch was carried out with an imitation of the division's PKP failure. The state commission recommended the complex for adoption by the Soviet army, but it was required to implement about 80 comments and recommendations, about 30 of which - before being put on alert. Later, the subcommittee on testing soil NZU of the State Commission for testing the "Signal-A" system supplemented the condition for the acceptance of the equipment into service to carry out additional tests of one division for reliability.
In the first decade of March 1988, with the personal participation of Viktor Khalin, the effectiveness of the implementation of the top-priority improvements was confirmed, which made it possible to begin a full-scale transfer of equipment to the troops of all regiments of the 1987 program and carry out work to put them on alert.
In September 1987, tests of the NZU equipment as part of one regiment for reliability were successfully completed, which finally made it possible to recommend the Topol complex for adoption by the Soviet Army. And this was carried out on December 1, 1988 with the release of the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
The implementation of the full version (version 256K) of the Signal-A system equipment and their state tests as part of the vehicles of one experimental division were completed only in 1991. This version was not launched into the Topol complex series, but created the necessary groundwork for the next generation of missile systems.
Another lyrical digression. In my opinion, the experience of creating the NZU of the Signal system practically confirmed the “Pilyugin's law”, which states that one emergency launch gives more experience than a dozen normal ones.
In addition, and this opinion of mine is shared by all my colleagues at MIT, a system cannot be created. The system is something amorphous. In fact, sets of equipment are being created, each of which has its own design documentation, its own creation time, etc. Of course, they should be linked by unified documents on the system, but an important factor is the linking of the development of equipment with the development of objects, where this equipment is included, an understanding of the specifics of the application of these objects. In my opinion, the first chief designer of the ASBU, Taras Sokolov, understood this well (in contrast to some who replaced him in this post).
And one more consideration, which I cannot relate to all hardware developers, but which certainly applies to all Signal-A hardware developers I know. I do not know what influenced this (complexity, timing, organization of work), but in the NPO Impulse system there was not a single person for any equipment who thoroughly and comprehensively knew all the equipment. For each analysis of the causes of failures or abnormal work, it was necessary to involve at least three specialists who knew their "piece" for each equipment. I am writing this in this article for a reason. The fact is that under these conditions, strange as it may seem, the military acceptance officers became real complexists, whose opinion meant a lot both for the GURVO employees and for the industrial workers. I, of course, cannot name all of them, but I simply owe some of them - Boris Kozlov, Anatoly Blazhis, Igor Ustinov, Vladimir Igumnov, Igor Shtogrin. I think that it is no coincidence that Igor Ustinov and Vladimir Igumnov, after their retirement, are now heads of the NPO Impulse.
