On March 23, 2017, the II Military Scientific Conference “Robotization of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” will be held at the Patriot Convention and Exhibition Center (Kubinka, Moscow Region).
In anticipation of the event, the AST Center offers to get acquainted with the translation of the article “Waiting for breakthrough technologies? Submarine Autonomous Systems and the Challenges of Naval Innovation”published by the School of International Studies. S. Rajaratnam at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (Waiting for Disruption ?! Undersea Autonomy and the Challenging Nature of Naval Innovation by Heiko Borchert, Tim Kraemer, Daniel Mahon). The article talks about the development of unmanned underwater vehicles and robotic systems in the United States, Russia, China, Norway and Singapore.
Waiting for breakthrough technologies?
Submarine Autonomous Systems and the Challenges of Naval Innovation
In October 2016, more than 40 organizations from 20 countries gathered on the west coast of Scotland for an event called UnmannedWarrior, the first large-scale demonstration of more than 50 air, land and sea unmanned systems organized by the Royal Navy. Great Britain. This event made it possible to assess the current state of the state-of-the-art systems of the British Navy, as well as get an idea of the battlefield of the future. [1]
The UnmannedWarrior event was a testament to the growing military importance of unmanned systems. The most common is their use in airspace - about 90 countries and non-state actors around the world use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). [2] The sharp increase in demand gives the impression that remotely controlled, automated and autonomous systems are becoming widespread in the military. [3] However, care must be taken as events in the air, land and sea are moving at different rates (see Table 1). It is important to take these differences into account when assessing the possible strategic effect of the above systems on regional stability and the future nature of hostilities. This prevents hasty conclusions, such as those arising from ongoing political discussions, which could lead to premature decisions to ban the development, acquisition and use of the systems concerned before their full potential is unlocked. [4]
Given the somewhat exaggerated nature of today's discussion about unmanned systems, this paper looks at the mechanisms of military innovation in order to serve as a cautionary note about the current and future use of autonomous submarine systems. The article begins with the premise that autonomous subsea systems cannot be considered an inevitable and disruptive technology, as many believe. [5] In particular, this is due to the nature of the existing threats, a limited set of missions for unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), as well as technical capabilities. [6] For submarine autonomous systems to become a disruptive technology, navies need to understand how technological capabilities can be translated into operational benefits. This will require representatives of the Navy, industry and science to better understand the relationship between operational need, cultural factors, organizational and resource requirements, and technological capabilities.
Table # 1
This argument is developed in the article in several stages. It begins with a description of current and potential future FVA operations in various countries. After a brief discussion of the future landscape of naval conflicts, which is necessary to understand the possible growth in the importance of underwater unmanned systems, the article examines the key motivations and driving forces for the development of submarine autonomous systems, and provides a review of the literature on the issue of naval innovation. The final part contains the main conclusions and recommendations for the future advancement of subsea autonomous systems.
Present and future of missions using underwater autonomous systems
NATO and non-NATO navies use unmanned underwater vehicles for a variety of limited missions. In order to illustrate existing practices, this chapter talks about the United States, Russia, China, Singapore and Norway, since in each of these countries, specific features can be identified that justify the use of BPA. The discussion will show that the implementation of mine action and reconnaissance (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, ISR) are standard practices. Anti-submarine warfare, combat operations against surface ships, and the provision of underwater and coastal protection arise as additional missions.
United States
The fear of losing technological superiority over a potential adversary is a key element in the US military strategy debate. This problem stems from the current geostrategic and geo-economic environment, the growing risk of global technology diffusion, and the increasing importance of commercial technology to the military. Against this background, competitors capable of organizing reliable A2 / AD (anti-access / area denial) zones represent the most serious challenge to US military planning. [7] These competitors constrain the United States' freedom of action in strategically important regions, increase the costs of military intervention, call into question US deterrent capabilities, and thus may undermine solidarity with allies by raising doubts about US readiness and determination to provide security guarantees. [8]
According to the US naval strategy for 2015, the maritime services must provide access, ensure strategic containment and control of the sea space through the organization of local superiority, the projection of force (in the broadest sense) and ensuring security at sea. [9] These strategic goals also shape the tasks for the submarine fleet, which is essential for strategic deterrence. While the US Navy continues to strive for submarine superiority, military planners recognize that ambitious regional powers are aiming to create A2 / AD zones that could undermine the US strategic advantage. [10] In addition, there is a significant capability gap, as “the submarine strike power of the fleet will fall by more than 60 percent by 2028, compared to the current level.” [11] The negative consequences of this trend are exacerbated by "gaps in anti-submarine defense" associated with the fact that the US Navy and the Coast Guard are "not yet ready to respond to the use of unmanned underwater and ground vehicles by enemy forces, terrorist and criminal organizations" in US waters. [12]
Given the centrality of technology to American strategic thinking, innovations such as the Third Offset strategy and other concepts serve as responses to the trends described above. [13] The main goal is to provide advanced technological solutions to the troops for use in training and combat operations as soon as possible. This has influenced the United States' approach to submarine autonomous systems since 1994, when the US Navy published the UUV Master Plan, which included the use of submarine autonomous systems for mine action, information gathering, and oceanographic missions. The first operational deployment of these systems took place in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2004, the US Navy published a new UAV plan that had a global impact on naval thinking about submarine autonomy. In particular, the updated version of the document described a number of possible missions, such as reconnaissance, mine and anti-submarine warfare, oceanography, communications and navigation, information operations, immediate strike, patrol and support of naval bases. [14]
However, this plan was ahead of its time and was not properly implemented due to the lack of determination on the part of the naval leadership, resources and adequate procedures for the advancement of submarine autonomous systems. [15]
Since then, however, the situation has changed dramatically. According to the United States Department of Defense's Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038, the Defense Department's Financial Planning Department foresees total spending on unmanned submarine systems in the amount of $ 1.22 billion, 352 million of which will be directed to research and technology, 708 million for procurement and about 900 million for operation and maintenance. [16] In addition to the allocation of significant financial resources for submarine autonomous systems, certain changes were made in the structure of the Navy. In May 2015, Rear Admiral Robert Girrier was named the first director of unmanned weapons systems. This was followed by the appointment of a (retired) Brigadier General as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Navy for Unmanned Systems in October 2015. [17]
Despite a broad approach to the topic of submarine autonomy in general, the US Navy has narrowed the range of possible missions using submarines, focusing on mine action. For this purpose, several national systems have been developed, such as the Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (autonomous underwater vehicle for preparing the battlefield), various mine countermeasures for ships in the coastal zone, and autonomous underwater vehicles (APA) for mine countermeasures. The second area of use of the APA is reconnaissance, for which several platforms have also been developed, the most famous of which is Boeing's Echo Ranger. In addition to these specially designed systems, the US Navy also uses off-the-shelf solutions such as the REMUS system, manufactured by Hydroid (a subsidiary of Kongsberg Maritime) primarily for reconnaissance purposes, and SeaFox, a mine action system manufactured by the German company Atlas Elektronik. Anti-submarine warfare with the use of autonomous systems is the third, slowly developing direction. For these missions, the US Navy is considering the use of large autonomous submarine systems such as the Echo Ranger and unmanned surface vehicles (UAVs).
In general, the US Department of Defense has "aggressively" invested in the development of unmanned systems. In addition to investing in autonomous platforms and payloads for them, the US Navy is funding technologies that make the underwater space more suitable for autonomous systems. For example, submarine navigation, positioning and communication networks, advanced deployment submarine power supply systems were created. [18] In addition, the US Navy is adopting a family of systems approach that allows the development of a suitably sized UUV with a variety of payloads. [19] Currently, launches of UUVs are being tested from surface and underwater platforms [20], and the possibility of launching them from fighters is also being considered. [21] Different launch options are important, since the US Navy is interested not only in using single UAVs, but also in deploying coordinated groups (“swarms”) of them in various fields.
Existing submarine concepts are having a profound impact on the US approach to autonomous submarine systems. In this regard, UUVs are considered mainly as separate multipurpose systems that expand the possibilities of using submarines and surface ships. This approach is best embodied in the current American vision of Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV), which are capable of not only completing their own missions, but also launching smaller vehicles. As the US Navy strives for multitasking, its focus is gradually shifting from autonomous platforms to payloads that they can carry. The payload is expected to be compact and flexible enough to simultaneously meet the requirements of various missions such as reconnaissance, mine action and anti-submarine warfare. Consequently, the US Navy is also placing greater emphasis on integrating UUVs into launch platforms, as highlighted by recent trials with Coast Guard ships and Virginia-class submarines.
Russia
Russia is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation in the field of foreign and security policy. The country's new national security strategy and military doctrine portrays the West as a key strategic rival, while the countries of Central and East Asia are seen as partners and allies. The new maritime doctrine, adopted in July 2015, follows the logic of this reasoning and departs from the regional balance that was previously observed. In the future, this is likely to lead to more assertive Russian action in the High North and Atlantic. [22]
All this also affects the directions of development of the Russian Navy. The navy is a key strategic deterrent that was largely neglected in the 1990s. The 2014 modernization program helped to end the steady decline of the Russian fleet. [23] This program, among other things, introduces new weapons systems, command and control systems, and also highlights the growing role of unmanned systems. In addition, great importance is attached to the modernization of the submarine fleet, which was in dire need of increased attention. This is due to the fact that about two-thirds of Russia's nuclear submarines are inaccessible due to ongoing repairs and modernization work. [24]
The Russian Armed Forces gained insight into the benefits of using unmanned systems during recent conflicts, such as in Georgia in 2008. Since then, Russia has stepped up efforts to develop and implement such systems in all areas, since they allow avoiding human losses, and also illustrate the high technological level of the armed forces. Against this background, unmanned underwater vehicles [25] are part of the state procurement program, as well as the program of modernization and scientific and technological development of the Navy. In addition, the military recently adopted a plan to develop robotic and unmanned systems. [26]
Russia is one of the few countries that emphasize protection as a key factor in the development of BPA. In particular, the Russian Navy uses autonomous systems in search and rescue operations, as well as to strengthen harbor protection. Mine countermeasures and anti-submarine warfare are additional missions for the UAV. In the future, Russia plans to expand the range of use of submarine robots to conduct reconnaissance missions, combat surface ships and enemy UUVs, mine action, coordinated launch of UUV groups against especially important enemy targets, detection and destruction of maritime infrastructure (for example, power cables). The Russian Navy, like the US Navy, considers the integration of UUVs into nuclear and non-nuclear submarines of the fifth generation as a priority. [27]
Current assessments of Russia's interest in autonomous submarine systems tend to overlook the fact that the country is looking back at nearly five decades of tradition and experience in developing such technologies. The Soviet Union was able to supply scientific UUVs for export to China and the United States. The internal turmoil of the 1990s led to the almost complete collapse of this technological area. However, thanks to export projects, Russian developers managed to survive. In the early 2000s, the Russian Navy needed to turn to foreign suppliers in order to acquire new UAVs, as a result of which Saab, Teledyne Gavia and ECA gained access to the Russian market. However, today the country seeks to notice foreign systems with models developed and produced in Russia, such as the Obzor-600 BPA developed by the Tethys Pro company or the mine action solutions of the GNPP Region. In addition, Russia has launched several research projects focusing in particular on underwater communications and surface object detection.
In general, the Russian experience in the field of BPA is based on scientific organizations in the structure of the Russian Academy of Sciences, while industrial enterprises still play an auxiliary role. Russia is currently working to bring its own technologies back to the export market. Local observers assume that when exported, the mine defense ship Aleksandr Obukhov will be equipped with autonomous submarine systems GNPP Region. [28]
China
How China is gradually integrating into the international system has a bearing not only on the country's internal stability and prosperity, but also on how neighboring countries respond to Beijing's growing influence. While China is likely to accept that Washington is still a key player in the world, Beijing is willing to offer itself as an alternative to the United States. [29] Chinese President Xi Jinping seems more prepared than his predecessors to pay for domestic growth by dealing with international tensions. [30] This is also reflected in the growing confidence in the leadership that China is becoming increasingly equipped to sustain its push for action with appropriate military and non-military means. [31]
The People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) is central to the Chinese understanding of the foundations of a powerful state. [32] National defense objectives and the eventual battle for Taiwan continue to play an important role in the PLA's military planning, but China's dependence on land and sea transport routes is an additional factor in the strategy of military use. This goes hand in hand with China's willingness to project power in strategically important regions and invest in strengthening A2 / AD's ability to protect those regions. [33]
The PRC Navy clearly reflects this paradigm shift. Traditionally organized to protect China's coastline and territorial waters, the Navy intends to expand its presence in international waters through increasingly demanding maritime operations. [34] These two vectors of development are closely interrelated, since the large international role of the Chinese Navy depends on the protection of national sovereignty in territorial waters. This requires close cooperation between the Navy and the Chinese Coast Guard. [35] Growing international ambitions also highlight the role of the submarine fleet, whose nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines are a key element of China's nuclear deterrence. China is investing heavily in strengthening its submarine fleet and has renewed cooperation with Russia for the same purpose. Despite the progress made, China demonstrates strategic vulnerability in the underwater sphere, especially with regard to anti-submarine warfare. This explains new Chinese initiatives such as the “underwater great wall,” reminiscent of the US hydroacoustic anti-submarine system in the Atlantic Ocean. [36]
Against this background, China understands the strategic importance of unmanned systems in all areas. As Michael Chase notes, the Chinese vision for unmanned systems not only follows the American one, but also emulates it in many ways. [37] From a Chinese perspective, unmanned systems enhance existing capabilities as operations that are inappropriate for manned platforms have become more controllable. [38] In addition, casualty avoidance is important because of the interconnectedness of the one-child policy, the possible loss of these children in combat, and the implications this can have on internal stability. Regional characteristics, such as the lack of underwater capabilities in China's southern neighbors, may prompt Beijing to take more daring action - testing innovative concepts for the use of unmanned systems underwater. [39]
China's use of UUVs is deliberately entering a "gray zone" between commercial, scientific and naval operations. Three broad areas of application emerge: protection of the country's coastal zone and military infrastructure, in particular, submarine bases and maritime communications; mine action using autonomous systems; exploration of resources on the shelf. Chinese experts are also discussing additional missions such as anti-submarine warfare, the use of UAVs against military and commercial submarine infrastructure, hydrography, search and rescue operations, and the protection of artificial islands. Sometimes Chinese experts also consider options for equipping the UAV with weapons. [40]
China's defense industry is opaque, but it looks like there are about 15 development and research teams working on the BPA. It is important to note that all major institutions are part of key shipbuilding conglomerates - China State Shipbuilding Corporation and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. The Navy is believed to be the main sponsor of most of the projects, but support may also be provided by Chinese utilities interested in offshore exploration. The Navy is using the Zhsihui-3, a China-designed UAV for search and rescue and mine action. In addition, various systems have been imported from abroad or produced jointly with partners. The UAV cooperation with Russia is focused on research projects, but it can be assumed that these projects were useful for the Navy as well. [41]
Singapore
Due to the small area of the territory, the geostrategic position of Singapore is unstable. Consequently, the city-state combines containment and active diplomacy with maintaining a balance in relations with China and the United States. Regional prosperity and integration into the global economy are two major strategic factors affecting Singapore's national security and military development. The country's naval forces are a key instrument for ensuring the safety and stability of sea communications. In this context, the underwater sphere is of particular importance. Singapore is investing in a submarine fleet, but it is also concerned that the growing number of submarines in the region could jeopardize regional shipping and maritime infrastructure. Therefore, the Singapore Navy recently launched an initiative to exchange information related to submarine operations. [42]
Singapore is a high-tech country, with cutting-edge technology in the DNA of its military. Since the manpower is limited, autonomous systems increase the existing capabilities of the armed forces. However, the country's culture, associated with geostrategic isolation, limits the technological "appetite" of the armed forces, thereby moving away from the development of systems that can jeopardize the regional balance of power. Thus, offensive use of autonomous systems is not on the agenda. [43]
Technological maturity and operational advantage are two key parameters used by the Singapore Armed Forces to assess the readiness of new technologies. Therefore, the use of the Singapore Navy's unmanned underwater vehicles is currently focused on mine action. Singapore is considering additional missions such as anti-submarine warfare, hydrography and the protection of maritime infrastructure. The use of UAVs for reconnaissance may look like a deterrent to neighboring states, which is why Singapore is considering purely defensive purposes. [44]
Singapore's defense ecosystem is made up of high-performing government institutions, research institutions at local universities and the defense industry, of which ST Electronics is a major player. Research organization DSO National Laboratories developed the Meredith autonomous underwater vehicle, and ST Electronics developed the AUV-3 submersible. ST Electronics is also collaborating with the National University of Singapore to develop the STARFISH system. For undisclosed reasons, the Singapore Navy did not procure these nationally developed systems. [45] In contrast, the mine countermeasures ships in service with the Singapore Navy were equipped with imported systems such as Hydroid's REMUS, as well as the K-STER I and K-STER C from the French company ECA. [46]
Norway
Norway's foreign and security policy is grounded in a culture of peaceful conflict resolution and emphasizes the strategic role of the United States as an irreplaceable partner to Oslo. [47] The country's geostrategic position, its dependence on the maritime economy and its common border with Russia influence defense policy. Great importance is attached to national and collective defense. While recent events in Europe further reinforce these strategic priorities, the Norwegian military is not meeting the new alert requirements. This prompted the head of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense to demand massive structural changes that will lead to a significant redeployment of personnel, increased readiness of troops for combat deployment and a significant increase in the defense budget, as stipulated in the long-term defense plan adopted in July 2016. [48]
Against this background, operations in the coastal zone and on the high seas were two key parameters for the development of the Norwegian Navy. Today, the Norwegian navy is still ready to conduct operations on the high seas, but the current focus on national and collective defense sets slightly different priorities. It also affects the future size of the fleet, which will be significantly smaller than today. It will include, among other things, five frigates, three logistics and logistics ships, and four submarines. The main task of submarines, in this case, is containment in the waters of Norway. On February 3, 2017, Norway selected Germany as a strategic partner with the aim of signing an agreement on new submarines in 2019. This will allow Norway to replace six Ula-class submarines with four new U212NGs built by the German company ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. [49]
In the current transitional phase, the main focus of the military leadership is on the introduction of new large weapons systems and the maintenance of the internal balance of the Norwegian armed forces. In this regard, autonomous systems are viewed from the point of view of reducing costs and risks for the armed forces. However, the Norwegian forces still lack a unified approach to the question of the impact of autonomous systems on existing military concepts, tactics and procedures. Among all the branches of the Norwegian armed forces, the Navy is the most advanced user of autonomous systems, acting in cooperation with the local industry and the research institute of the Ministry of Defense FFI. Key technologies are being developed by FFI and will be commercialized by Kongsberg. In addition, the oil and gas industry in Norway is in favor of improving subsea autonomous systems, providing funding for the development of appropriate technologies. [50]
Today mine action is the main mission type for autonomous underwater systems in Norway. The Navy is convinced of the value of systems such as Hydroid's REMUS and FFI's HUGIN. Representatives of the submarine fleet, on the other hand, are less interested in autonomous vehicles. Based on the existing experience, FFI is considering additional possibilities for using the APA in the future, for example, for intelligence gathering, anti-submarine warfare, and underwater camouflage. By 2025, the Norwegian Navy's mine action service will gradually phase out specialized surface ships and replace them with mobile groups of autonomous vehicles, ready to be launched from various platforms. The question of whether submarines should be equipped with built-in modules with autonomous vehicles is currently being discussed. [51]
The future of maritime conflicts
In the context of the redistribution of the world order, competition is growing in the field of freedom of navigation and access to strategically important territories. Countries such as Russia, China, and Iran are responding to the nearly unlimited ability of the United States to project power around the globe by building up A2 / AD capabilities, as well as promoting narratives in the public arena that legitimize their actions. As a result, the essence of marine territories changes as systemic risks grow - ideas about the basic rules, norms and principles begin to diverge, which leads to the “balkanization” of the marine environment, while various zones of influence in the sea are expanding to the detriment of the global nature of the water areas. This is important as the marine environment is an important artery of the global economy, facilitating international trade. In addition, the strategic importance of coastal areas is growing due to trends such as changing demographics and increasing urbanization, all of which are happening against the backdrop of the need for global interconnections in these important but vulnerable areas. Thus, an image of new conflicts at sea emerges:
The marine environment is becoming increasingly congested as coastal urbanization expands and a growing number of governmental and non-governmental actors use the sea for various purposes. The congestion of the waters means that it will be difficult for the armed forces to avoid clashes with the enemy, especially when they expand buffer zones through the implementation of the A2 / AD concept. Consequently, transactions become more risky. This increases the need for new weapons systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, that can take on these risks in order to avoid contact with the enemy and go to another water area.
The congested sea lanes also mean an increasingly erratic movement, which plays into the hands of those looking to hide. This, in turn, requires a clear distinction between those who use identification systems ("transponders") and those who deliberately avoid detection. Consequently, there is a growing need for data exchange and cooperation between countries and different departments. This should develop at the interregional level, as well as include different environments - thereby, it will be possible to resist the hybrid actions of the enemy.
Digital connectivity is also magnifying the impact of congested and chaotic waters. Communication is an important factor for networked maritime and submarine forces, since the value of each sensor or reconnaissance equipment is determined by its degree of integration into the overall C4ISR network - command, control, communications, computers, reconnaissance, surveillance and reconnaissance. However, this is also the Achilles' heel of network-centric forces, as lack of communication can significantly reduce the effectiveness of the operation or even lead to its failure. This is very important, as non-state actors have recently demonstrated the successful use of low-cost technologies and self-developed methods in order to qualitatively increase their opportunities for interconnection.
All of this implies that in the future, the marine environment will become a place of even greater competition. According to researcher Krepinevich, the arms race in the field of powerful radars and sensors will lead to the emergence of "neutral territories", where only "opportunities for long-range reconnaissance and long-range strikes of the two countries will intersect." As the facts show, this process is already taking place, since advanced A2 / AD systems combine underwater sensors, underwater platforms, as well as surface ships with air defense, coastal, space-based systems, as well as operations in cyberspace. This combination increases the risk of loss during a potential invasion. However, this can also provoke the frequent use of unmanned weapons systems in order to thereby overcome the problem of high losses.
Finally, the navies of NATO and European Union member states will have to follow the rules of battle, which are subject to close political scrutiny. The proportionality of the means used and the need to publicly justify each action can create more constraints on these navies than on actors who are not constrained to such things. In the increasingly chaotic and congested waters, new job descriptions will be required to help avoid collateral damage at sea and underwater. In addition, it is worth introducing requirements for personnel control over unmanned and autonomous systems, as well as for controlling interaction at the machine-to-machine level.
All of these trends will change the future requirements for naval weapons systems. Due to the future ubiquity of new types of sensors in the maritime domain, stealth, cybersecurity, camouflage and deception will become important. An increasing number of free-floating smart sensors and autonomous platforms will need to be integrated into the overall C4ISR maritime architecture, which in turn should be easily connected to similar systems in other waters. If new defenses and defenses are not implemented, A2 / AD will increase the risk to today's high value infrastructure, ships and vessels, which is likely to lead to the need to use the concept of "distributed capabilities" (when platform X has limited capabilities and makes a request to complete the task platform Y, which is capable of this). It could also reduce the current focus on multipurpose platforms towards highly specialized platforms capable of operating in smart swarms. Consequently, all elements of the future networked naval surface forces and submarine forces must be more flexible, easily integrable and ready to connect to each other even when located in different environments.
For autonomous systems, this is a kind of litmus paper - or the waters of the future will be too complex a threat, especially if adversaries use the interconnectedness of systems as a digital "Achilles' heel"; or it will become the main driver for the development of autonomous systems. In any case, it seems that the autonomous systems of the future will have to become much more flexible, respond faster and without prior approval to unforeseen situations, have improved self-defense capabilities and be able to withstand enemy unmanned systems. All this significantly increases the requirements for future autonomous vehicles.
Autonomous submersibles: motives, drivers and added value
The future of maritime conflicts, as described above, is likely to change the way we see the underwater environment, which is already seen today as a three-dimensional battlefield. Currently, the underwater areas are saturated in terms of the weapons systems used. Therefore, UUVs deployed in this challenging environment must provide added value beyond existing systems to create advantages that convince fleets and submarines of the necessity and usefulness of submarine autonomous systems. This determines the main operational and strategic motives for using BPA (see Table 2):
Operational motives
The overriding operational motive is to bridge existing capability gaps with unmanned systems, as discussed above in the case of the US Navy. Second, the operational motives also stem from principles that embody the core military paradigms of the Navy. The use of UUVs in accordance with such key principles as economy of strength, flexibility and surprise will multiply the strength of the IUD. [52] As discussed in the next section on military innovation, the use of UAVs will also require navies to rethink how they prepare and conduct missions with autonomous vehicles. The third group of motives is a consequence of the specifics of underwater operations. As the initial concepts of the US Navy show, sensors installed on UUVs that will interact with submarines can significantly increase existing capabilities, since it will be possible to track events in the submarine zone of interest, without the presence of the submarine itself. In addition, individual BPA sensors can get close to the target without endangering the motherboard. In the future concept of the underwater A2 / AD, proximity to the target should be considered as the main requirement for the UUV.
Table 2. Primary and secondary motives for the development of underwater autonomous systems in different countries
Strategic motives
First of all, the concept of risk is key. In this regard, BPA have both pros and cons, since they can both reduce risks and take them upon themselves. It is not yet clear whether state and non-state actors will interpret the use of autonomous vehicles as a danger, which could worsen geostrategic stability. Second, given the limited financial resources of most Western navies, cost cutting is another strategic motive. However, this is a double-edged sword. For example, China has a different attitude to costs: for it, low costs are considered a competitive advantage in relation to various players, including in terms of supply to export markets. [53] Third, increasing strength is the main strategic incentive for understaffed actors. Fourth, the military believes in the value of benchmarking and therefore wants to follow best-in-class examples. But, as will be shown below, this can also damage strategic freedom of action. Fifth, the flip side of benchmarking is a general concern about being lagged behind others, failing in technological advances. It could also provoke the navies of various countries to explore the advantages of autonomous underwater vehicles. Finally, developing countries are showing a growing interest in building strong national defense industries and entering international defense markets. [54] In this respect, autonomous vehicles operating in a variety of environments are very attractive, as barriers to entry into this segment tend to be lower than in other more complex segments.
In practice, the answers to all these motives are strongly intertwined with two key questions: "What does the navy want to do with the UUV?" and "how do they intend to carry out the respective tasks?" In view of the potentially disruptive nature of the UAV, the second question is more important, since this is where the naval forces need to come up with new conceptual approaches. Today, most Western fleets and military forces in general are focused on using autonomous systems in “dirty, routine and / or dangerous” missions. While this is reasonable in terms of risk mitigation, this approach deprives autonomy of its full potential as existing concepts and tactics remain largely unchallenged. To go beyond conventional thinking about underwater autonomy, different ways of using autonomous systems are needed: [55]
Autonomous systems, which can be deployed around the clock to patrol large areas of water, increase the range of the naval forces. The same applies to advanced deployed weapons systems that will be activated on demand in the future, such as DARPA's Upward Falling Payload program. [56] If autonomous systems could help deploy such weapons systems behind the enemy's A2 / AD wall, they could allow allied forces to exploit the surprise effect and thereby neutralize the enemy defenses.
Future navies are expected to be in line with other branches of the armed forces in terms of long-range sensors. Therefore, it becomes more important to take risks. Unmanned systems could help the Allied navies take greater risks by suppressing, deceiving and destroying enemy intelligence systems, thereby increasing their maneuvering capabilities.
If the naval forces are prepared for more risk, they will likely be reluctant to compromise their most expensive weapons systems. The naval forces need systems they are willing to lose. Therefore, cheap, single-purpose, autonomous systems that can be used in groups are likely to lead to the fact that mass will again become an important characteristic of future naval forces. [57] This could lead to ideas such as creating a "sensor screen" on large surface and underwater areas, which will help deter enemy submarines from entering strategic areas by installing noise jammers, improving underwater detection, and providing localization data for anti-submarine control struggle placed in other environments.
Swarms can also lead to a new division of labor. Sharing capacity within a swarm may mean that some elements are responsible for surveillance while others provide protection, while another group focuses on the primary task of the swarm. At the same time, the naval forces will move away from the traditional approach to the use of multipurpose platforms, which is becoming increasingly risky given the threat of A2 / AD.
Military innovation: what the literature talks about
The extent to which the use of unmanned and autonomous underwater vehicles is changing the nature of underwater warfare is of great importance for the future picture of maritime conflict. The mere fact that these devices are available does not yet constitute a military innovation. [58] Military innovation is the result of a complex interplay between operational needs and conceptual, cultural, organizational and technological change. This interaction is a concept of the military revolution (RMA), which describes various innovations, such as a new land war during the French and Industrial Revolutions (for example, telegraph communications, rail transport and artillery weapons), combined arms tactics and operations in World War I.; or Blitzkrieg in World War II. [59] Digital technology and network centricity, brought about by the emergence of new information and communication technologies, formed the basis of network warfare, which, in turn, paved the way for today's debate about the seamless integration of various branches of the armed forces in all relevant areas. [60]
In fig. 1 summarizes the factors discussed in the literature that help understand military innovation in the context of submarine autonomy - interactions between threats, safety culture and operational experience describe the “humanitarian” aspects of military innovation, while interactions between technologies, organizational complexities and resource requirements constitute “technical” Aspects. True military innovation requires both dimensions because conceptual, cultural, organizational and technological progress do not advance at the same pace. [61]
"Humanitarian" innovation
As Adamski points out, “the relationship between technology and military innovation … is social,” which means that “the weapons that are being developed and the type of military that envisions them are cultural products in the deepest sense.” [62] The American LDUUV concept, which mimics the roles and functions of an aircraft carrier, perfectly illustrates Adamskiy's point of view. In addition, social values are important determinants of the types of wars a state wages and the concepts and technologies it uses to do so. [63] Together, these elements constitute a military culture, which is defined as “the identities, norms and values that are accepted by a military organization and reflect how that organization sees the world and its role and functions in the world.” [64] The military organizational culture formed during peacetime, Murray argues, “determines how effectively [the military] will adapt to actual combat.” [65] In this respect, military organizations are mostly conservative, protecting the status quo from changes in how they are formed and what their missions are, and how funds are allocated. [66] All of these aspects may be required in order to take full advantage of the benefits of unmanned systems.
Reflections on the role of culture must also take into account threat perception and combat experience, but the impact of these two complementary dimensions on innovation is ambiguous. In general, the extent to which military changes are needed depends on: (i) the magnitude of the changes in the context; (ii) the impact of these changes on military missions and capabilities; and (iii) the readiness of the armed forces to cope with these changes and the resulting changes in missions and capabilities. Geostrategic changes can stimulate military innovation because they can induce countries to change their values if the stakes are high enough. [67] However, willingness to change is influenced by additional aspects such as the age of the organization, which is critical as older organizations resist change. [68] In addition, combat experience can increase cultural resistance, as the military is “more committed to the past than preparing for the future.” [69] This explains why military forces tend to use unmanned systems in the same way as manned platforms already in service, because the same military has developed tactics, methods and procedures for using them.
This raises the following question: can state (or non-state) actors obtain operational benefits from the use of unmanned and autonomous systems of strategic importance? Again, the literature speaks of the predominance of conservative forces. First, those who innovate first may enjoy advantages over their rivals, but, according to Horowitz, the relative benefits “are inversely proportional to the diffusion rate of innovation. [70] This suggests that latecomers can benefit from waiting, as the availability of additional information indicates the value of the risk associated with military innovation. As a result, this leads to the emergence of similar analogs, as competitors analyze the choice of their opponents and use similar weapons systems. [71] This suggests, first, that “dominant actors receive less relative benefits from new technologies.” [72] This, in turn, can affect their willingness to embrace new technologies. Second, developing countries are also risk averse. When it comes to adopting new, untested technologies, they are likely to emulate their rivals if “finding their innovations proves costly compared to imitation, there is little information available about the effectiveness of alternative innovations; and if the estimated risks of not being able to imitate another state outweigh the perceived benefits of using a new but risky technology.”[73]
"Technological" innovations
Technology is an important driver for military organizations. The main problem today is that key technologies no longer arise in the traditional military-industrial complex, but rather in commercial ecosystems. This raises the question of integrating commercially advanced technologies into the military sphere. In this regard, military innovation depends on three different aspects: (i) organizations, (ii) resources, and (iii) concepts. Organizations and resources are directly linked. Building on Horowitz's ideas, military innovation spreads less quickly if it requires intense organizational change and consumes more resources. [74] This has at least two implications for the use of unmanned and autonomous systems:
First, the introduction of unmanned and autonomous systems similar to those already in operation, for example using similar concepts of operations, will reduce barriers to adoption. However, this can be detrimental to innovation, as the military will continue to do the same, only by different means.
Second, unmanned and autonomous systems that disrupt the status quo are likely to bring about changes on the battlefield. This can lead to operational advantages, but it also risks not keeping up with the military's acceptance. [75]
The extent to which military organizations will embrace innovation depends on how they think about it. Their way of thinking, in turn, depends on several factors, such as the access of the relevant actors to sources of power in the political and military establishment, how these actors use their institutional weight to advance their own ideas for innovation, and the degree of cooperation or competition between various military departments. [76] In addition, career aspects are important. Effective military organizations reward people based on individual effectiveness and merit. Thus, it is important to what extent the soldier's ability to handle unmanned and autonomous systems is viewed as a special skill that needs to be rewarded as it sends positive signals to the troops. [77]
Finally, all of this suggests that for technology to have a lasting impact on military and naval innovation, it must be properly integrated into military concepts and regulations. Technology is relatively easy to acquire, but much more difficult to adapt accordingly. Decision-makers need to proceed with caution to balance urgent demands with long-term needs so that the military develops a balanced portfolio of capabilities, complemented by the benefits of autonomous and unmanned systems.
conclusions
Military innovation arising from the interaction between operational needs, concepts, cultural-institutional frameworks and technological progress is very resource-intensive. Autonomous systems can foster innovation in submarine warfare as they enable fleets to bridge capacity gaps, expand missions, and act more boldly. The extent to which UUVs will alter the pace and dynamics of submarine warfare and thus affect regional stability depends on the concepts that the naval forces use to operate these vehicles. So far, there is no progress, as conservative forces prevail.
None of the countries analyzed in this article have been able to develop innovation along three fronts - conceptual, cultural, and organizational change. Consequently, there are first-degree innovations today that have been achieved with underwater autonomy - they closely reflect existing concepts and existing platforms. Thus, UAVs initially replaced manned platforms, but traditional tactics, techniques and procedures remain largely unchanged. Innovation of the second degree would mean that the naval forces began to use UUVs in a way that would be different from the current use of submarine platforms, or that UUVs would be tasked with tasks that are not currently designed for manned platforms. This can lead to major innovations that will change existing tasks, platforms or technologies. However, this will require the naval forces to embark on radical conceptual and organizational changes that do not currently exist. Instead, the current tasks of the UUV are evolving in line with the literature on military innovation. Mine action has become a key challenge as the operational needs of the Navy are focused on reducing risk (eg, protecting mine clearance divers) and increasing efficiency (eg finding sea minefields). The result was Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), which in turn prompted suppliers to develop customized technologies.
If fleets want to innovate submarine operations using autonomous systems, they need to go further. Three aspects are of particular importance:
First, if Naval Forces want to expand the range of UUV applications, they need to develop new tasks that serve as role models. This requires them to replace today's technological advances with a much stronger emphasis on concepts that illustrate how to obtain operational benefits through subsea autonomy. This will require navies, industry and scientists to develop a more modular approach to understanding the combat system. This approach will define various modules ready for use in specific tasks. The approach also illustrates the conceptual, cultural, organizational and technological changes that are required to accomplish the respective tasks. An iterative approach [78] to development can also help overcome barriers to the adoption of OUVs, as this will help mitigate the impact of maritime threats.
Three major geopolitical players, namely the United States, Russia and China, are about to develop and deploy an UUV. This suggests that different role models may arise: each country tries to back up its ideas with concepts, interoperability requirements, and export of BPA. In the long term, this could lead to the collapse of the current mainly submarine combat regime in the United States if Russia and China develop UUVs that match their specific concepts of submarine warfare.
Secondly, a more complete understanding of the situation is needed, since underwater autonomy is not just about using an autonomous platform. Rather, it reinforces the need for a networked approach that connects all platforms and sensors operating in an underwater environment and for linking them with platforms operating in other environments. Multi-media autonomy as one of the key ideas for future warfare will reinforce the need for modular and scalable approaches based on open architecture and open standards rather than end-to-end solutions. To this end, navies and other types of forces should establish expert groups that will jointly consider the implications of using autonomous systems to address key issues such as concept development, research and development, procurement and operational deployment.
Finally, unlike autonomous air systems, UUVs must be delivered to areas of operations. As long as UUVs depend on submarines or surface platforms, platform-oriented thinking is likely to dominate other UUV concepts. A key question arises: Are UUVs adapting to submarines and ground platforms, or are these platforms adapting to deploy UUVs? [79] The naval forces and industry must team up to address this issue, as tomorrow's platforms will have to offer many more options for deployment. … This, in turn, will drive design beyond existing solutions such as torpedo tubes or submarine payload modules.
