In these August days, the newly minted President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski, the government and the Seimas congratulate their compatriots on the 90th anniversary of the victory of the army of Józef Pilsudski over the troops of the Red Army at Warsaw.
Since there are not so many solemn dates in the Polish asset - more and more anniversaries of partitions, executions and other national catastrophes, this anniversary is celebrated with special pomp. A particular solemnity to the moment is betrayed by its openly Russophobic character - of course, because the victory was won over the "psheklentny Muscovites"! Tellingly, the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Warsaw (as well as Krakow, Gdansk, Poznanie and other cities) from the German invaders, for which hundreds of thousands of the same "Muscovites" were laid down, that passed in the same year, was not noticed at all in Poland.
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Despite the commitments taken according to the Peace of Riga not to support armed anti-government activities in the adjacent territories, the Poles in 1921-1924. helped the detachments of the supporters of Savinkov, Petliura, and Bulak-Balakhovich to conduct military operations against Soviet power. For its part, the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army until 1925 supported partisan activities in Western Belarus by the detachments of Orlovsky, Vaupshasov and others.
But with the notorious "miracle on the Vistula" of 1920, the Poles not only rush around like a famous character with a written sack, but in every possible way also emphasize its "world-historical significance."
“The battle was of great importance for Poland, since it preserved the independence of our country. If Poland lost, then all the misfortunes that later fell on Soviet Ukraine, Belarus - the Red Terror, the Cheka, collectivization, Holodomor would have fallen on it. The Polish army then erected an insurmountable barrier to the expansion of communism. If then communism had passed through Poland, then it would have had great chances to spread to the whole of Europe,”says Polish historian, Professor Tomasz Nalench, quoted by Radio Liberty.
An even more apocalyptic picture Pan Nalench paints in the article "If the Soviets won …" ("Tygodnik Powszechny", Poland). Anyone who wants to laugh can read the entire article on the Voice of Russia. In a nutshell, let's say - according to Nalecz, if not for Polish valor, hordes of bloody Bolsheviks would have reached the English Channel and the Strait of Gibraltar in 1920. So the goose saved Rome, that is, Poland - the European democratic civilization.
It is worth remembering that, despite all the "misfortunes" that "Moscow Bolshevism" brings, according to Nałęcz, he himself lived most of his life in the communist-ruled Polish People's Republic. Moreover, despite the "Red Terror, Cheka, collectivization, Holodomor", he lived not in the underground or in a concentration camp, but as a successful party member, university teacher with a professorship, and a regular author of the Soviet publishing house "Political Literature".
I also had a chance to read the book “Daria and Tomasz Nalench. Jozef Pilsudski. Legends and facts. - M., 1990 . There Pan (or, at that time, “Comrade”) Nalecz and his lady Daria very reasonably expose the current national hero Pilsudski in adventurism, betrayal of the cause of Marxism, clinical Russophobia and dictatorial aspirations.
The Polish sufferings about the fate of Ukraine and Belarus are even more touching. The regime that the Poles established on the territories of these lands that had seceded across the Peace of Riga (1921), even the Russophobic “Rukhovtsy” and “Beenefovtsy” characterized as “ethnocide”.
In fact, if you think about the victory over the “Reds” in August 1920, why not remember that the war itself began with the Polish invasion of Ukraine and Belarus.
Even now the Poles do not hesitate to admit that as soon as in 1918 the restoration of Poland's independence was proclaimed, they immediately demanded "the historical borders of 1772". Simply put - the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, as well as the Baltic and Black "Mozha" were supposed to become the eastern border of Poland.
Such Polish appetites shocked even the Supreme Council of the Entente patronizing it, and Lord Curzon (as KM. RU has already repeatedly told) to moderate his appetites and confine himself to the ethnographic boundaries of a purely Polish population. Hence the famous "Curzon Line" appeared, along which today, for the most part, the border of Poland with Ukraine and Belarus passes.
It is curious, however, that although, as is obvious to everyone, Lord Curzon was neither a member of the Politburo, nor the Council of People's Commissars, for this line in Poland they were offended precisely at Moscow. However, the Ukrainian nationalists, oddly enough, are also offended at her - they say, it was necessary to chop off more "historical Ukrainian lands" from Poland. But, again, the claims are not addressed - complain about the British lord.
Unlike modern Polish (and Ukrainian) "patriots", who are mostly capable of only malicious yapping, the aforementioned Józef Pilsudski, let's give him his due, turned out to be a much more determined guy. He decisively did not give a damn about the Supreme Council of the Entente and the lord with his line, and he himself decided to correct the line of state borders. In accordance with their own understanding of their fairness.
Back in 1919, his troops occupied almost all of Belarus, defeated the Western Ukrainian Republic in Galicia, and even entered Latvia and Lithuania. In Russia, there was a confrontation between the "reds" and "whites", and both could react to Polish actions only with notes of protest - which no one in Warsaw read, because neither the "red" nor the "white" government of Russia Poland recognized.
However, Pilsudski believed that the victory of the "Reds" was preferable for Poland - and in fact helped them defeat the army of General Denikin. The latter, as Pilsudski understood perfectly, did not recognize Polish territorial conquests. And the Bolsheviks - after all, "the proletarians have no borders", may well agree to this. Indeed, at the beginning of 1920, the Bolsheviks offered Poland peace, in fact giving them Belarus. But this did not seem enough to Pilsudski, and in May 1920 his troops took Kiev with a swift onslaught.
Here the Bolsheviks took it more seriously - although they were still fighting fierce battles with Wrangel, their large forces were diverted to Siberia and Turkestan, and an anti-Bolshevik insurrectionary movement was going all over Russia. The country was in complete economic collapse. And the imperfection of the system of "war communism" was recognized even by its founder, Lev Davydovich Trotsky. Nevertheless, having transferred troops from Siberia and the North Caucasus, tested in battles with the armies of Kolchak and Denikin, the red command was able to somewhat strengthen the rather weak troops of the Southwestern and Western fronts.
It must be said that, unlike the units thrown from the south and east, the troops of the Western Front of the Bolsheviks were below any criticism. They consisted mainly of the former so-called "veil troops", that is, those who simply had nowhere to go after the collapse of the old army, or who wanted to find there at least food and clothing. Unlike the troops of the Southern and Eastern Fronts, they almost did not participate in hostilities. The arrival of such units as the 1st Cavalry Army, the 3rd Cavalry Corps of Guy, the 27th Omsk Red Banner Division, and a number of others, changed the situation on the Polish front. For example, only in the troops of the Western Front (the command of which was entrusted to Mikhail Tukhachevsky) and in June 1920 alone more than 58 thousand reinforcements were received. During the period of preparation for a decisive offensive in Belarus, 8 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and a squadron arrived at the front. The troops of the South-Western Front of Alexander Yegorov were also significantly replenished. As a result, in the course of fierce battles in June-July 1920, Polish troops were defeated in Belarus and Ukraine, and the Red armies launched a counteroffensive.
It was then that both the Revolutionary Military Council (headed by Trotsky) and the command of the fronts put forward these loud slogans “Forward, to Warsaw! Forward to Berlin! Long live the world revolution!”, Which they love to remember to this day. Although, of course, it was complete adventurism - what a campaign to Berlin, if the Red Army could not cope with Wrangel's Crimea alone for almost a year.
Much has been written about the numerous mistakes of the Red Command, both Tukhachevsky, and Commander-in-Chief Sergei Kamenev, and about the actions of Yegorov, commander of the South-Western Front (to whom it is usually customary to attach Stalin, who was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council there), about the uncoordinated actions of them. The adventurousness of Tukhachevsky's actions, who stretched communications, scattered the troops and lost control of them, was recognized even by his apologists. And what is such "innovation" of Tukhachevsky worth, as a complete rejection of reserves: everything that is, must be immediately thrown into battle, he believed. for all the adventurism of their political leadership).
Taking into account all these factors, the “miracle on the Vistula” turned out to be quite natural. When the Poles launched a counteroffensive in the Wieprz area on August 16, they were almost five times superior to the opposing group of Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack. And although in general the number of troops on both sides was approximately equal, most of the red units managed to advance so deeply on the right flank of the offensive that, after a breakthrough in the center, by August 17-18, they were completely surrounded, separated by hundreds of miles from their rear … With huge losses by August 25, the remnants of the 15th, 3rd and 16th Soviet armies broke through into the regions of Bialystok and east of Brest-Litovsk. And the 4th army with the 3rd cavalry corps and two divisions of the 15th army could not break through, and were forced to leave for internment in East Prussia.
Actually, after this battle, the result of the war was practically predetermined. And although, on the one hand, there were still statements about a new rush to the world revolution, and on the other, about the borders from “can” to “can”, at the top both in Moscow and in Warsaw they understood that this was already a utopia. In October 1920, in Riga, the parties quickly agreed on an armistice, defining the boundaries of the front line that was approximately formed by that time. In March 1921, these boundaries were approved by the Peace of Riga.
The Poles, at the same time, "threw" the Ukrainian separatists of Petliura (who was recognized by them as the legitimate government of Ukraine), agreeing with the Soviet side not to allow them to negotiate. However, the Bolsheviks showed reciprocal courtesy when, referring to the decision of the Supreme Council of the Entente on autonomy for Eastern Galicia, representatives of the defeated West Ukrainian People's Republic tried to break through to negotiations in Riga. The Poles refused to let them even on the doorstep, in which the Soviet representatives were completely in solidarity with them.
