The Narew operation allowed the Russian army to retreat from Poland in an organized manner.
The Narev operation on July 10–20, 1915 is almost unknown to the domestic reader. But in the strategic aspect, this battle decided the fate of Warsaw. So what was it - victory or defeat?
After the end of the Third Battle of Prasnysh, Russian troops in northeastern Poland were able to withdraw and gain a foothold on the line of the Narew, the right tributary of the Vistula.
Strategically, the Narew operation was one of the links in the second stage of the enemy's "Summer Strategic Cannes" - on the northern flank of the Polish salient. In the event of the rapid advance of the German troops and the success of the enemy armies on the southern flank of the "Polish balcony", our grouping in central Poland was encircled. Moreover, a huge gap in the center of the Russian front could have the most unfavorable operational and strategic consequences and lead to the curtailment of the country's participation in the world war.
On both banks
Artillery General M. von Galwitz, realizing the tasks set by the front command, directed the main blow of his grouping to the positions of the Russian troops near the cities of Rozhany (Ruzhin) and Pultusk. Under the cover of this maneuver, the German troops were to force the Narew above and below Rojan, taking advantage of the wooded area in the river valley.
Our task was to firmly defend our positions in order to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the 2nd and part of the 4th armies from central Poland. The central group of the North-Western Front included the 12th, 1st, 2nd armies and the Osovets fortress. The first two bore the brunt of the Narew operation.
The primary period of the battle was characterized by fierce battles for bridgeheads. The left flank of the German 8th Army (1st and 11th Landwehr divisions) was shackled by actions at the Osovets fortress. Her heroic garrison pulled back the whole enemy corps.
The shock group of the 8th Army (10th Landwehr and 75th Reserve Divisions) led an offensive between Lomza and Ostrolenka. Considering the fact that the Russian troops (5th Army Corps and 9th Siberian Rifle Division) had a strong position on the right bank of the river in this direction, the Germans made a four-day artillery training. Hurricane enemy fire destroyed the Russian trenches and field fortifications, but despite this, enemy attacks invariably fought back.
There was a lull in the Ostrolenka-Rozhany battle area until July 12. But on the night of the 12th, the German troops crossed the Narew below Ostrolenka along the ford found by scouts - the summer of 1915 was so hot that the river became significantly shallow. The German infantry was entrenched on the left bank, a strong artillery group was placed on the right bank, which allowed the enemy to hold the bridgehead. But the Russian troops did not allow it to expand by counterattacking.
The Rozhany bridgehead of the Russian troops was attacked on the night of July 10. The surprise of the attack forced our units to withdraw to the second line of defense. German sources note the amazing tenacity of the Russian troops. Only the enemy's crossing below Rojan, which threatened them with tactical encirclement, forced them to withdraw to the left bank of the Narev.
On July 12, the Germans, taking advantage of the stretched position of the 21st Army Corps, with hurricane support from artillery of all calibers, attacked its right flank with significant forces. At the same time, the enemy launched an offensive in a northeastern direction along the Ozh River and struck the bridgehead at Pultusk. Units of the 30th and 40th Infantry Divisions heroically repelled the attacks of the many times superior enemy. From the morning of July 10, the Pultu bridgehead position repulsed the onslaught of the Germans for two days, but its defenders, suppressed by the enemy's fire and numerical superiority, began to slowly retreat to the left bank of the Narew. Fortified to the southeast of Pultusk, the Russian troops stopped the enemy.
In order to guarantee the evacuation of Warsaw and prepare the troops for the withdrawal from central Poland, the Russian formations on the Narew were required to hold out for several more days.
In the current situation, the German command turned all its attention to the direction of Rozhany - Ostrov. Here, at the junction of the 1st and 12th armies, a fierce battle went on for seven days. Both sides have concentrated almost all of their reserves in this area. These battles are an example of unsurpassed courage and unparalleled tenacity of the Russian troops. A number of units lost up to 2/3 of their personnel. The Germans, possessing superiority both in manpower and in equipment, fiercely stormed the Russian positions day and night, repeatedly broke through the front, but the Russian troops restored the situation with counterattacks.
The struggle in the operational direction of Rozhany - Ostrov was fought for every meter of territory, and in seven days of the battle the enemy was able to advance only 18 kilometers. The Germans actively used heavy artillery, airplanes and balloons.
In other areas of the Narew battle, fierce battles took place on both sides of the river. Nevertheless, even by the end of the operation, Russian troops retained bridgeheads on the right bank - on the Lomzhinsky fortified position on the Ostrov - Serotsk line.
From Warsaw without rout
For 11 days of extremely stubborn fighting, the Galvits group was able to capture only a few bridgeheads on the left bank of the Narew. The wooded and swampy nature of the terrain made it easier for the enemy to cross the river, but at the same time made it difficult to maneuver and did not allow large military masses to act. Instead of a ramming strike, the German offensive split into a series of isolated advancements of varying degrees of power, but the strength of each of them was insufficient for a decisive result. Of particular importance for the stability of the Russian troops was the fact that the flanks of the 1st and 12th armies rested on fortresses. The ability of the sides to operate with reserves and the command's understanding of their role in modern warfare had a great influence on the course and outcome of the operation.
Military historian GK Korolkov wrote: “This battle is one of the most instructive on the Russian front. Here you can see the influence of the fortresses Osovets and Novogeorgievsk, which covered the flanks of the 12th and 1st Russian armies, the struggle for fortified positions at Rozhany and Pultusk, the crossing over the Narev, the struggle at random and poorly trained rear positions and the interaction of different types of troops."
When on July 18 at Teisk the Germans broke through the front of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, the position was restored with a horse attack by the 1st Separate Cavalry Brigade (19th Dragoon Arkhangelsk and 16th Hussars Irkutsk Regiments). The Russian cavalry suffered heavy losses (the residents of Arkhangelsk lost two squadrons), but again solved the most important tactical task - eliminating the breakthrough.
Strategically, the battle on the Narew was deciding the fate of Warsaw. The enemy was unable to achieve the main goal - to break through to Sedlec, closing the ring of the alleged "Cannes" from the north.
The German command of the Eastern Front was forced to state: “The operation in the east, despite the Narev strike, did not lead to the destruction of the enemy. The Russians broke free of the ticks and achieved a frontal withdrawal in the direction they wanted. " Quartermaster General of the Eastern Front M. Hoffmann noted: “The 12th Army, having crossed the Narew, hoped to have time to cut off part of the Russians near Warsaw. This hope did not come true."
Russian troops left Poland in order to consolidate the front on new frontiers and continue the struggle.
