The militias, faced with a clearly stronger rival, were forced from the very beginning to fight according to the principle "if you want to live, be able to spin." Ukrainian troops, on the contrary, tried to cover the entire territory of the LPNR quite straightforwardly with a kind of giant stranglehold, in the hope of cutting off the rebels from Russia. After the failure of the plan, it was decided, in the manner of a blitzkrieg, to inflict cleaving strikes in several directions, piling on all the available tanks and light armored vehicles. At the same time, of course, they did not forget about the massive use of artillery. This worked at first and endangered the integrity of the defense and territory of the LPR, but Ukrainian units eventually simply got bogged down in exhausting battles in the Southeast. Serviceable tanks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were methodically knocked out, because of which, for example, they were not enough for Ilovaisk, and "ideological" volunteer battalions on the legendary "Shushpanzer" were sent into battle.
At the same time, the self-defense of Donbass cannot be called absolutely ideal and devoid of shortcomings. First of all, this is a limited human resource: there are still too few armed people at the front, opposing the enemy army. In addition, the attacks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the civilian population, as well as refugees, who reduced the mobilization resource of the territory, made their contribution. A serious disadvantage of the militia, especially in the initial period of the war, was the lack of all types of weapons, including conventional small arms. There was a shortage of cartridges, as well as artillery ammunition. This became one of the reasons restraining the growth in the number of LDNR fighters. Increased raids by sabotage groups from Ukraine have sowed fear in the minds of some civilians in Donbass and increased the confusion in the settlements. After that, some simply refused to take up arms and stand up to defend their land, fearing retaliation even deep in the rear. By 2016, these contradictions were eliminated, and now only in one DPR the number of regular armed units exceeds 40 thousand fighters. Small arms and heavy armored vehicles, qualitatively and quantitatively in the near future, may be equal to the enemy's weapons. But everything looks rosy, if you do not look at Ukraine, in whose armed forces there are more than 160 thousand people and about 1 million more in reserve! Only tanks in varying degrees of combat readiness 2890 copies, 8217 armored combat vehicles, 1302 units of self-propelled guns of various calibers, 1669 copies of barrel artillery and about 620 MLRS. Even if no more than 30% of all this goes into battle (due to the lousy technical condition), at least such an armada will have to be reckoned with. And in the LDNR there is practically no stock of equipment with spare parts, even in faulty form. A more positive situation was with uniforms due to the fact that many were equipped with their own funds, as well as through the channels of the "military".
The problem of the 2014-2015 confrontation with Ukraine was the actual lack of a unified command, as well as the rivalry of field commanders for leadership. Bezler, Strelkov, Khodakovsky, Mozgovoy, Bednov, Kozitsyn and others at various times claimed leadership positions in the politics of Novorossiya. At the same time, this did not result in a large-scale fratricidal bloodshed, and in the face of an external threat, the field commanders (chieftains) managed to unite their efforts. There were even attempts to create a council of field commanders - this initiative was taken by Mozgovoy and Strelkov, but it was not possible to assemble it. Later, the strengthening of the vertical of power both in the DPR and in the LPR did not pass bloodlessly - the most recalcitrant were physically destroyed.
Now about the strong operational and tactical qualities of the Donbass militia. First of all, it is the outstanding flexibility, audacity and decisiveness of the command staff, as well as powerful charisma, attracting at least the minimum required number of fighters to the ranks of self-defense. Arseniy "Motorola" Pavlov and Mikhail "Givi" Tolstykh are undoubtedly such examples. In some situations, only their decisiveness and courage could turn the tide of hostilities in entire sectors of the front. But the rank and file of the militia was excellently prepared for hostilities, especially in comparison with the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ATO). The superiority of the self-defense forces was in the moral and psychological aspect, which was expressed in engaging in battle with a significantly outnumbered enemy. So, in the summer of 2014, near Lomovatka, one militia unit was able to keep a whole column of armored vehicles moving in the direction of Bryanka. In the militia there were (attention) six fighters who held back three armored personnel carriers, a tank and several "Urals" with a mass of ATO fighters. On August 13 of the same year, the infantry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as volunteer marauders, abundantly flavored with five T-64s, several self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, entered Miusinsk. The Motorola division met them with only 80 soldiers, one armored personnel carrier and three to five mortars. The final was the recaptured city center and the retreating anti-terrorist operation forces.
In these examples, the readiness of the militias for contact combat was manifested, which favorably distinguishes them from the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Undoubtedly, the "ideological" Ukrainian volunteers also willingly went into combat contact, but, in addition to the burning desire to kill, the corresponding skills, which the former Maidan immigrants were deprived of, are vital. And those who had the skills, that is, the rank and file of the Armed Forces, were only ready to walk on the scorched earth after the artillery barrage. In addition, some militias had considerable experience not only serving in the army, but also participating in military conflicts, for example, in Chechnya. They became a kind of mentors for the young replenishment, and in the hostilities with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, they largely copied the techniques and tactics of the Caucasian conflict.
Director of the Center for Current Politics Ivan Konovalov said in this regard: “I was in both Chechen campaigns, and today I see how experienced militias use their experience. This can be seen in uniforms, equipment, tactics. Some even cut their beards, as in that war. And most importantly, the militias have complete freedom of action here. The charter does not apply to them, they fight the way it suits them. This can explain the serious tactical successes, in particular, in the work of the DRG. Do not forget that the overwhelming majority of the militias are fighting for the territory, which they know very well, and in the conditions of a semi-guerrilla conflict, this is a serious advantage over the enemy. A typical militia is a mature man of 30-40 years old, and sometimes even 50 years old, which also leaves a certain imprint on the tactics of warfare. More experienced militia fighters are more successful than the 20-year-old youngsters from the next call of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in matters of survival and are much more stable in psychological terms.
Most had served in the army, many were contract soldiers, which makes them much more professional weapon users than their opponents on the other side of the front. This is precisely the reason for the victory of the militia specialists in the artillery duel with the "gunners" of Ukraine. The tactics of predominantly contraband warfare were much more effective than the thoughtless and ruthless shelling of settlements in Donbass by the ATO forces. In addition, the general level of technical competence of the population of the industrially developed Donbass played into the hands of the self-defense forces: the equipment, in particular, was restored much faster and re-entered the battle. Earlier Ukrainians militias brought home-made drones into battle with CCTV cameras installed. This became one of the reasons for the refusal of the self-defense forces from bloody assaults on the commanding heights. Now, even for reconnaissance in the interests of artillery, one Chinese or self-made drone is enough.
The temporary result of the Ukraine-LDNR confrontation was a relative calm, which cannot be interpreted otherwise than the victory of the self-defense forces of Donbass. With such a gigantic imbalance in the initial forces, the militia managed to bleed and wear out the enemy, who now has much less motive for the war.
