In order to understand the capabilities of the air groups of the aircraft-carrying ships we are comparing, it is necessary to study the tactics of using carrier-based aircraft. Let us do this using the example of the Americans, especially since today they have the greatest experience in the use of carrier-based aircraft in comparison with the rest of the world's maritime powers.
The main "combat unit" of the US surface fleet can be considered an aircraft carrier strike group (AUG), more or less typical composition of which should be considered:
1. Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the "Nimitz" or "Gerald R. Ford" type - 1 unit;
2. Missile cruiser "Ticonderoga" - 1-2 units;
3. Destroyers of the "Arlie Burke" type - 4-5 units;
4. Multipurpose nuclear submarines such as "Los Angeles" or "Virginia" - 2-3 units;
5. Supply ship - 1 unit.
Despite the fact that the Ticonderogs are far from new ships (the last ship of this type, Port Royal, entered service on July 9, 1994, that is, almost 24 years ago), and the fleet is being replenished with the Arlie Burke destroyers of the latest sub-series, the Americans still prefer to include at least one missile cruiser in the AUG. This is due to the fact that, while designing their missile cruisers, the Americans envisaged their use as a command ship, providing the Ticonderogs with all the necessary equipment.
This does not mean that the Arleigh Burke cannot coordinate the actions of the ships of the warrant, say, when repelling a massive air attack, but the Ticonderoga is more convenient and copes with it better. But the US missile cruisers are becoming obsolete, and nothing is coming to replace them. The plans to create a new ship of this class remained plans, and if you remember how the epic of creating the newest destroyer Zamvolt ended, it may be for the US Navy and for the better. Therefore, it should be expected that after 10-15 years, when the Ticonderogs finally retire, the surface escort of the American aircraft carrier will carry 5-6 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
As for the air group, each US aircraft carrier has a military unit assigned to it, called a carrier-based wing. Currently, the typical composition of such a wing includes 68 - 72 aircraft and helicopters, including:
1. Four squadrons of fighter-attack aircraft "Hornet" F / A-18 and "Super-Hornet" F / A-18E / F - 48 units;
2. A squadron of electronic warfare aircraft "Hornet" E / A-18 Growler - 4-6 units;
3. A squadron of E2-S Hokai AWACS aircraft - 4-6 units;
4. Squadron of transport aircraft C-2 "Greyhound" - 2 units;
5. Two squadrons of MH-60S and MH-60R Sea Hawk multipurpose helicopters - 10 units.
Recently, the point of view has become widespread that the number of carrier-based aviation wings (90 aircraft) indicated in reference books is a fiction, and the above composition is the maximum, the basing and combat use of which can be provided by a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the "Nimitz" type … But this is not true, because this type of aircraft carriers in fact provided the operation of larger air groups. For example, during Desert Storm, 78 aircraft were based on Theodore Roosevelt, including 20 F-14 Tomcat, 19 F / A-18 Hornet, 18 A-6E Intruder, five EA-6B Prowler, four E-2C Hawkeye, eight S-3B Viking and four KA-6D, as well as six SH-3H helicopters. The existing limitations on the number of wings of carrier-based aircraft are not related to the capabilities of aircraft carriers, but to the capabilities of the budget allocated for the maintenance of the US Navy, and in addition, it is usually indicated that, in addition to the wing of the indicated number, a squadron of Hornets or combat helicopters of the Marine Corps can be additionally based on the aircraft carrier …
What changes can await us in the near future in the number and composition of the wings of carrier-based aircraft? Oddly enough, but there are few of them. Probably, in the relatively near future, two of the four squadrons of the Hornet F / A-18 and Super Hornet F / A-18E / F multi-role fighters will be replaced by the newest F-35C (sometime the Americans will bring them to mind), and we should also expect the replacement of the E-2S AWACS aircraft with a more modern version of the E-2D, which has similar functionality, but somewhat better capabilities. And that's probably all, since plans to create the latest carrier-based attack aircraft and anti-submarine aircraft have long been canceled, and rumors about the start of work on interceptors like the F-14 Tomcat are still just rumors - and according to them, the appearance of such an aircraft is not to be expected before the 2040s.
At the same time, the classical use of the AUG provides for the transition to the deployment area and the conduct of systematic hostilities there. In conditions of enemy superiority, the hit-and-run tactic can be used, when the AUG enters a given area, strikes, and retreats. In any case, the tasks of the carrier-based aviation wing are reduced to:
1. Implementation of the air defense of the formation during the transition to and from the deployment area, as well as in the area itself;
2. Striking enemy ship groups and ground targets;
3. Anti-submarine defense of the formation (AUG) and the areas assigned to it.
Let's figure out in order how it works.
Tactics of carrier-based aviation when solving air defense problems
The main "unit" providing air defense of the AUG is the combat air patrol (BVP), which, depending on the conditions in which the aircraft carrier and the ships escorting it, operate, may have a different composition. The minimum composition of the AUG is used during the covert movement of the AUG (to the area of hostilities, or when changing, or retreating from it) and consists of one electronic warfare aircraft and two fighters conducting air patrols no further than 100 km from the aircraft carrier. At the same time, the BVP (as, in fact, the AUG) are in radio silence and search for the enemy using their radio electronic means (RES), operating in a passive mode. Thus, obviously, the minimum radio signature of the connection is achieved. The BVP can also include the E-2S Hawkeye AWACS aircraft, but in this case its onboard equipment will also operate in a passive mode.
After detecting the enemy, the BVP is strengthened to the number of 1 AWACS aircraft, 1 electronic warfare aircraft and 4 fighters and moves to a distance of up to 350 km towards the threat, where it patrols and monitors enemy aircraft. Naturally, depending on the degree of threat, additional forces can be raised into the air. A feature of such combat operations is that carrier-based aircraft do not reveal themselves to the last by using the radar - the launch of fighters into the attack is carried out according to the data received by the RES in the passive mode. In essence, fighter radars only turn on at the start of an attack.
The AWACS aircraft in this case performs not so much a reconnaissance function (of course, its equipment, working in a passive mode, also collects information about the enemy), as the function of a "flying headquarters" and a data relay to the AUG air defense command post. If necessary, he can, of course, switch to active mode, turning on his "dish" for additional reconnaissance and clarification of targets before the attack itself, but only if the equipment operating in passive mode does not allow fighters to be launched into the attack. The fact is that there is no better way to warn the enemy about an attack, how to find yourself working with the most powerful radar station of an AWACS aircraft, and even seconds in an air battle can mean a lot. Therefore, the standard tactic for American fighters is a "quiet" launch into the attack, when their on-board radars are switched on already to issue target designations to air combat missiles. Further - everything is standard, fighters use long and medium-range air-to-air missiles (guided missiles), and then approach the enemy at a distance of short-range air-to-air missiles and engage in close combat.
So, we see a very important nuance. Illumination of the air situation and additional reconnaissance of the enemy is carried out by passive RES, while the radar of the AWACS aircraft should not switch to active mode at all - a situation in which such a need arises is considered force majeure. I must say that "on the Internet" the author of this article has repeatedly come across the following consideration - aircraft that have taken off, of course, can be used in radio silence mode, but takeoff and landing operations cannot be carried out in it, therefore, radio silence does not make sense - the airplane is lifted into the air during in any case, unmasks AUG.
But according to the author's information (alas, their reliability is not absolute), it works like this - US AUG can use its RES in three modes. The first of them is complete radio silence, when no transmissions are being carried out and the radars are not included in the active mode. The second - "to the fullest", when there are no restrictions on the use of RES, of course, in this mode AUG easily reveals itself. But there is also a third mode in which the RES AUG are used with low intensity: in this case, the AUG can be seen, but its identification is extremely difficult, since its activity on the air does not exceed that of an ordinary civilian large sea vessel. At the same time, in the specified mode, the AUG can carry out takeoff and landing operations of medium intensity, thus ensuring the constant presence of the AUG in the air does not unmask.
Having considered the organization of the AUG air defense at the transition, let us turn to the AUG air defense in the deployment area. It is carried out by one or two BVPs, each of which includes 1 AWACS aircraft, 1 electronic warfare aircraft and 2-4 fighters. The first BVP patrols at a distance of 200-300 km from the AUG in the direction of a potential threat, the second can be moved in the same direction to a distance of up to 500-600 km. At the same time, the "remote" BVP monitors the airspace similarly to the BVP, covering the AUG at the transition, with the only exception - the use of the radar of the AWACS aircraft for additional reconnaissance of targets for this BVP is a regular (and not force majeure) circumstance, but only for aiming fighters at enemy aircraft and no more than three turns of the antenna (that is, switching to active mode is very short-lived). Restrictions on the use of radar in the active mode for a near airborne vehicle can be set or canceled depending on the combat situation.
In general, the AUG air defense system is quite flexible. So, the aforementioned BVP can be supplemented by a third BVP, consisting of an electronic warfare aircraft and a pair of fighters in the immediate vicinity (up to 100 km) from the aircraft carrier. Or vice versa - an airborne vehicle of the same size as used at the AUG crossing can be raised, and according to its data, an advanced and near airborne vehicle with AWACS aircraft is deployed. If the hostilities are conducted against an obviously weaker enemy, then a "continuous coverage" can be used, when airspace control is carried out by AWACS aircraft, whose radar stations are constantly operating in an active mode - this was the case, for example, during Operation Desert Storm ".
And, of course, we must not forget that having from 2 to 10 fighters in the air, an aircraft carrier is always ready to support them with an emergency lift of a squadron on duty (or even squadrons).
What would I like to note about this? In "Internet battles" there are usually remarks of such a plan: "Well, the AUG is building an echeloned defense in one direction, but what about all the others?" But the fact is that the AUG does not wage war in a spherical vacuum, but solves the tasks set by the command in cooperation with other types of forces. For example, the operations of the AUG off the coast of Norway are largely supported by the operation of the land radars of Norway and England, as well as the E-3A Sentry AWACS aircraft. This does not mean, of course, that these forces are somehow tied to the provision of AUG, they are solving their tasks of controlling the airspace in the interests of the Air Force and the NATO ground forces. But as a result of their work, the number of directions that need to be controlled by carrier-based aircraft is sharply reduced. The same is true for the Far Eastern theater, where there is Japan with its radars, more than two dozen AWACS aircraft and other means of monitoring the air situation. Well, in the Mediterranean Sea, the AUG is generally located in a ring of friendly countries, so breaking through to it undetected is hardly a solvable task.
If we consider some kind of battle in the open ocean that is distracted from the existing military plans, then yes, indeed, layered air defense can be built in only one direction, but you need to understand that the tactics of AUG in an ocean battle is strictly offensive. This, when impacting along the coast, similar to the "Desert Storm" AUG, maneuvering in a given area, is a target for an attack, but in the ocean everything "works" not like that. The identification of enemy ship groups is carried out by satellite reconnaissance: although it does not provide the exact coordinates of the enemy's location (it takes a long time to decode satellite data, which makes the data about the enemy outdated by many hours up to a day and a half), it still gives an idea of the area where the enemy is located. The AUG is advancing to this area, and therefore it has the opportunity to deploy its patrols in the direction of a potential threat.
Tactics of carrier-based aircraft when destroying enemy surface forces
The first thing I would like to say is the distances at which carrier-based aircraft are capable of operating. In the US Navy, aircraft carrier clash is one of the classic forms of combat training, practiced regularly and carried out at distances of 700 - 1,100 km. However, with the appearance of the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier in the domestic fleet, the Americans on maneuvers practiced the destruction of the warrant headed by him at a distance of 1,600 - 1,700 km (with refueling in the air).
As we said earlier, the initial detection of the enemy's naval strike group (KUG) is assigned to satellites, after which, if possible, its position is clarified by land-based radio reconnaissance aircraft (we have already said that the AUG does not fight in a vacuum). Deck aviation carries out additional reconnaissance of the enemy and strikes at him, and this is how it is done.
Additional reconnaissance of the KUG can be carried out by an airborne projectile, advanced to the maximum range, or by a separate group of aircraft. After that, a detachment is formed from the composition of the carrier-based aviation wing, the number of which, depending on the complexity of the target, can exceed 40 aircraft. These aircraft are divided into several groups, the name and purpose of which we will list below.
Unfortunately, among some lovers of the history and modernity of the navies, there is still a very simplified perception of an air attack of a ship's order by the forces of naval deck aviation. It is assumed that attacking aircraft are nothing more than a means of delivering guided munitions (as a rule, we are talking about the Harpoon anti-ship missile system). That is, the aircraft is viewed only as a means of increasing the range of anti-ship missiles, and this is far from the case. An attack by carrier-based aircraft provides for a complex effect on enemy ships, much more dangerous and effective than a simple salvo of missiles in the same amount carried by attacking aircraft.
Strike groups - they include multipurpose fighters carrying a combat load in the form of attack aircraft. Usually, several such groups are formed, which will have to attack the enemy KUG from different directions, inflicting the main blow on it. In the opinion of the Americans, to attack an IBM, consisting of four ships, it is enough to include about 15 aircraft in the strike groups, but if the ACG has eight to nine ships, then 25-30 aircraft are needed.
Guidance and control group - represents two or three AWACS aircraft operating under the cover of a pair of fighters each. Their task is to approach the enemy order up to 200-250 km, control its movement, coordinate the actions of other groups and control the battle, as well as relay data to the command post of the aircraft carrier.
Additional exploration group - if for some reason there is a danger that the guidance and control group will not be able to reveal the position of the enemy order, one or two aircraft can be assigned to this group. Their task is to get close to the attacked ships to clarify the situation.
Fighter cover groups - their number, as well as the number of aircraft involved in them, is determined by the degree of the air threat and the number of strike groups. It is believed that one or two fighters are required to directly cover a group of three or four attack aircraft (that is, multipurpose aircraft performing a strike function, which for the sake of simplicity we will call attack aircraft, although in reality they are not).
Air cleaning group - consists of two or four fighters and, by and large, is one of the groups of fighter cover. But its difference is that it is not tied to the cover of attack aircraft or electronic warfare aircraft or AWACS, but is entirely intended to destroy enemy fighters.
Demonstration groups - each of them includes 2-4 aircraft, and their composition can be different and is selected based on a specific situation. Demonstration groups may include attack aircraft, fighters and electronic warfare aircraft. Their task, in essence, is to invoke fire on themselves with a demonstrative attack, forcing the enemy ships to leave the radio silence mode and turn the fire control radar into the active mode.
Air defense suppression groups - one such group includes four to five aircraft carrying a wide range of ammunition, both specialized for the destruction of RES ships (anti-radar missiles), and conventional, such as the Harpoon or Maverick anti-ship missiles.
Electronic warfare groups (EW) - each of them includes one or two specialized electronic warfare aircraft, to which fighters or attack aircraft carrying electronic warfare suspended containers can be added. Their task is to suppress and hinder the operation of the anti-aircraft weapons of the attacked order, as well as to cover the strike groups leaving the battle.
The tactics of using these groups is largely clear from their names. After the location of the enemy KUG is determined with sufficient accuracy, all of the above groups rise into the air and follow (usually by different routes) to the area where the enemy is supposed to be located. Up to the line at which it is possible to detect the ship's radar, the planes follow at medium and high altitudes (saving fuel).
Then the planes split up. The first is the guidance and control group, and (if available) the additional reconnaissance group, and the first, having discovered an enemy order, takes a position 200-250 km from it and begins to coordinate the strike. Groups of demonstration actions, suppression of air defense systems, electronic warfare and, finally, the shock ones first take positions outside the limits of the ship's radar, and then in the sequence indicated above (that is, first, the groups of demonstration actions, followed by the suppression of air defense, etc.) cross the specified line. At the same time, all groups, except for the shock ones, go at medium altitudes, and the shock ones descend to 60 m - in this form, they become invisible to the enemy's radars, since they “hide” from them behind the radio horizon. The airspace clearance team is used as appropriate.
The group of demonstrative actions strikes first. Approaching the order and using strike weapons, it forces the enemy ships to turn on their radars and start repelling an air attack. As soon as this happens, an air defense suppression group comes into play, using anti-radar and conventional ammunition. The bottom line is that with such a combined attack, it is impossible to simply turn off the fire control radar (in this case, targets will hit conventional anti-ship missiles, such as the Harpoon), and the operating radars are a tasty target for anti-radar missiles. All this, of course, seriously burdens both radar and air defense weapons of the attacked order.
At this time, the electronic warfare group identifies the parameters of the operating radars, and as soon as the strike groups reach the missile launch line, they interfere with the fire control radar, and the means of communication are suppressed if possible. As a result, the strike groups enter the battle at the moment when the air defense of the attacked ships is busy repelling the combined attack of the aircraft of the demonstration groups and the suppression of the air defense, and even in the most difficult jamming environment. Of course, in such conditions, the probability of destruction of ships of the warrant by anti-ship missiles of strike groups increases many times over.
In other words, if, say, a group of three modern warships is attacked by a dozen Harpoon anti-ship missiles launched at them from a distance close to the maximum flight range, then, of course, it will not be easy to resist them. But the means of radio-technical reconnaissance can reveal an approaching rocket "flock", interference will be put in order to confuse their homing heads. Combat information systems will be able to distribute targets, assigning missiles to each ship for fire destruction, and nothing will interfere with the exchange of data between ships, nor the operation of their fire control systems. The air defense systems will "work out" on them, and then, as the remaining missiles approach, which nevertheless managed to target the ships, rapid-fire autocannons will enter the battle. In this case, the anti-ship missile system will have to break through the echeloned air defense, all the power of which is concentrated on repelling a missile attack. But the missiles do not have too much "intelligence": target selection, the ability to attack it from different angles and anti-missile maneuver - these are all the capabilities of the latest modifications of the "Harpoon". RCC, of course, have some "skills", but they can only act according to a template, without taking into account the changing situation in battle. The variability of their actions is relatively small.
But if the same three ships were attacked by carrier-based aircraft, if the distribution of targets, the time and direction of attack are controlled by living people who build tactics depending on the many nuances of a particular battle, if during a missile strike the air defense of ships is partially disabled, partially occupied shelling of other targets, and the work of radar and radio transmitters is complicated by directional interference … Then we will understand that with such a load, the air defense capabilities to repel an anti-ship missile strike are significantly, if not multiples, of those described in our example above. And it is not excluded that even six anti-ship missiles fired on a warrant under such conditions will “achieve” a greater result than twice as many of them with a conventional missile salvo “from afar”.
American analysts conducted research aimed at calculating the required number of missiles to reliably defeat a particular sea target. The calculation principle was quite simple - there is a ship (or a group of ships) and certain capabilities of their air defense. The missiles fired should be enough to saturate the enemy air defense and allow enough anti-ship missiles to penetrate it, which would be enough to reliably defeat the target. According to the results of American calculations, up to a hundred anti-ship missiles could be required to completely disable or destroy the aircraft carrier, which is guarded by 8-9 ships. But the strike groups of the carrier-based aircraft wing do not need ammunition of this size, because due to better controllability, a larger range of combat assets and the massive use of electronic warfare means, they will need a significantly smaller number of missiles to saturate the air defense of the attacked compound.
By the way, all of the above should not be perceived as some kind of "attack" on domestic anti-ship missiles. For one simple reason - weapons of this type, developed in the USSR (and later in the Russian Federation), have noticeable advantages over the same "Harpoons", that is, to a certain extent we compensated for the advantages of manned aircraft due to the very high performance characteristics of our missiles.
Tactics of carrier-based aircraft when destroying ground targets
Its separate description does not make sense due to the cardinal differences between ground targets - it can be either a stationary object or an armored brigade on the offensive. But in general, it can be assumed that an attack on well-protected targets, covered by both ground-based air defense and land-based interceptors, will be carried out according to a scenario similar to that described in the section above.
Tactics of carrier-based aircraft in solving PLO tasks
In fact, the description of this tactic can serve as a topic for a separate article, so we will limit ourselves to the most cursory overview.
The Americans were quite serious about the threat posed by the Project 949A Antey SSGN, capable (at least theoretically) of launching a missile strike at the AUG from a distance of 550 km. However, the wings of the carrier-based aircraft did not have an anti-submarine aircraft capable of effectively operating at such a distance, so they had to resort to "outside" help.
In total, the AUG had three PLO-protection zones. The far zone (at a distance of 370-550 km from the order) was formed by basic patrol aircraft R-3C "Orion" - they worked on the AUG route, checking it for the presence of domestic nuclear submarines. The middle zone of the PLO (75-185 km from the order) was provided by the S-3A Viking anti-submarine aircraft, which were similar in functionality to the Orions, but at the same time had a smaller size and capabilities, as well as submarines that were part of the AUG. The close area of the PLO (up to 75 km) was formed by anti-submarine helicopters based on the aircraft carrier and ships of the order, as well as these ships themselves.
For a long time, the PLO AUG was considered a zonal-object, that is, capable not only of directly covering the AUG and the routes of its movement, but also blocking a certain area from breaking through it by enemy submarines. However, today the capabilities of the PLO AUG have significantly decreased - in 2009, the S-3A "Viking" aircraft were removed from service, and the ability to control the middle zone of the ASW, of course, has dramatically weakened. The improvement of the nuclear submarine (the appearance of the Virginia) could not fully compensate for the lack of anti-submarine aircraft. In fact, today the AUG is capable of providing a zone of continuous control of the underwater situation, preventing the use of torpedo weapons, and its nuclear submarines, being advanced in the direction of movement of the AUG or in a threatening direction, intercept torpedo submarines in a certain sector. But the wing of carrier-based aviation does not have the means of dealing with submarine missile carriers capable of attacking the AUG from a distance of 300 km or more.
However, here, again, there is a problem of target designation and timely transfer of it to the SSGN, since domestic submarines can use their weapons from such distances only if there is external target designation. If they are left to themselves, they will be forced to search for AUG using their sonar complex, that is, to enter the middle and near zones of the PLO AUG.
