In this article we will try to understand the role of strike missile weapons on a domestic heavy aircraft carrier, as well as the capabilities that the presence of the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier in the battle against the American "standard" aircraft carrier group provides for the combination of heterogeneous forces.
As you know, the aircraft carrier "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" "at birth" was armed with a dozen anti-ship missiles "Granit". The current state of this missile system on the only aircraft-carrying ship of the Russian Navy is not reliably known; most likely, it is inoperable and, in this case, it is unlikely that it will ever be repaired. Therefore, our today's discussions about him are probably even more theoretical than usual.
The first thing I would like to note is that, all other things being equal (this is a very important reservation), a missile strike on a ship formation always loses in efficiency to a properly organized air strike. Thanks to the reconnaissance provided by AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft, the attackers have the opportunity to reveal the composition and formation, course and speed of the enemy order and control their changes in real time. And this, in turn, allows you to choose the optimal tactics for the attacking squadrons and the sequence of their introduction into battle. Anti-ship missiles (even taking into account the availability of equipment for mutual data exchange, algorithms for the distribution of targets, etc.) are significantly inferior in their capabilities to manned aircraft in organizing an attack. This is the first thing.
Second. An air attack is organized in such a way as to first identify (make it work) and then suppress (complicate the work) of the air defense of the ship's order - and only then deliver a decisive blow, destroying and incapacitating enemy ships. For this, a demonstration group is used, attacking the order and forcing the ships of the latter to turn on the fire control radar, and then the anti-air defense suppression group enters into battle with the support of the electronic warfare group. And only after the air defense of the formation is partially destroyed, and partially connected by combat, the main blow is delivered. At the same time, missile attack cannot work this way. In essence, cruise missiles are forced to deliver the main blow through completely unsuppressed air defense, which, of course, greatly simplifies the task of the defenders and reduces the effectiveness of the attack.
All this suggests that (the figures are relative) the use of 10 anti-radar missiles and 20 anti-radar missiles "Harpoon" during an air raid will inflict much more serious losses on the enemy warrant than could inflict a salvo of 30 "Harpoons" fired on a warrant at the maximum range from, say, several US destroyers.
Nevertheless, in the USSR, the stake was placed not on carrier-based aircraft, but on heavy missiles, that is, the missile strike was still chosen as the main form of defeat of the enemy. Accordingly, Russian military thought sought to compensate for the "innate" shortcomings of Soviet anti-ship missiles, giving them capabilities that were not available for similar-purpose ammunition that was in service with US carrier-based aircraft.
The stake was made, first of all, on speed, which left the enemy air defense minimum time for a reaction. As you know, modern manned carrier-based aircraft has a subsonic cruising flight speed, that is, its approach time with the order is rather long. Of course, attack aircraft can do this covertly, "hiding" from the ship's radars behind the radio horizon, but the problem is that the AWACS aircraft cannot be hidden in this way - it still has to "demonstrate" itself and from that moment the commander of the attacked order will know that he has problems, and prepare for them. But the AWACS aircraft must also determine the parameters of the order, the planes must reach the lines of the attack, which they usually try to carry out from different sides … All this, of course, requires a certain amount of time. In addition, the ammunition used by carrier-based aircraft (anti-ship missiles, guided aerial bombs) has a subsonic speed (although anti-radar missiles fly at supersonic speed).
At the same time, domestic anti-ship missiles like Granit have a supersonic cruising speed, and even a very supersonic one, reaching Mach 2.5 at an altitude of 14,000 - 17,000 m. than 2, 5 minutes, the flight time before going to low altitudes (about 500 km) will take less than 12 minutes. At the same time, the domestic anti-ship missile system is not such an "obvious" target. "Granite" has a diameter of only 85 cm and a wingspan of 2, 6 m. If we recall the S-75 missile defense system, then it had a diameter of at least 50 cm and a plane span of 2, 57 m, then in order to bring the RCS of this missile to 0, 75 sq.m., which was necessary when converting it into target missiles, it was necessary to put corner reflectors on it. True, the Granit anti-ship missile system was unfavorably different from the S-75 missile defense system by its nose air intake (the missile defense system had a radio-transparent fairing there), so their direct comparison is most likely incorrect. But let's not forget that the much more massive MiG-21, which had the same nasal air intake as our anti-ship missile system, but in whose “diameter” the pilot's figure was placed, and which had a wingspan of 7, 15 m, had a not so impressive RCS in 3 sq.m.
Based on the above, it would be quite realistic to assume that the EPR of "Granite" is at the level of 1 sq.m., although, of course, this is just the author's guess.
But in any case, even detecting our anti-ship missile in flight would not be so easy. But it must also be hit … The most long-range means of destruction of the atmospheric air threat of American ships - SM-2 Extended Range and SM-6 ERAM - have a range of up to 240 km. The detection range of the AGSN anti-ship missile system "Granit" is up to 80 km, thus, the area of fire destruction of the anti-ship missile system "Granit" is unlikely to exceed 160-170 km, and this time the missile is able to overcome in less than 4 minutes. Is it a lot, or a little? If you look at the passport performance characteristics of American air defense systems, then there seems to be a lot. But if you remember the incident with the frigate "Stark"? The latter, at 21.05, discovered that the Iranian combat aircraft, which had previously entered the course of approaching the frigate and increased its speed, now also “turned on” its onboard radar, which obviously indicated a readiness for an attack. And it would be okay to "oversleep" on the frigate - but the information about the operation of the radar was transmitted by none other than the ship operator of the AN / SQL-32 electronic reconnaissance station. Nevertheless, at 21.10.05 and at 21.10.30 the ship was successively hit by two Exocet anti-ship missiles. The traps were not shot, no interference was set, the Vulcan-Falanx on board was not used - that is, warned in advance of a possible attack, the ship, nevertheless, could not realize anything from its arsenal in 5 minutes.
It is also necessary to take into account this aspect - usually, in an amateur simulation of an attack by "Granites" of an American ship order, by default, it is assumed that the radars of ships are operating in an active mode. At the same time, this may not be the case - of course, radio-technical intelligence is actively developing today, and we see that the same Americans prefer to use passive RTR means, observing the radio silence mode. Accordingly, it may happen that the AUG will be attacked at the moment when the radars of the escort ships are not working in an active mode: in this case, it is no longer important at what distance the AN / SPY-1 radar of any modification can be detected at active mode, but the distance at which a missile salvo can be "opened" by means of electronic reconnaissance. And it's not a fact that RTR will do better, or at least as well as radars.
Having found an enemy order and distributed targets, the Granit anti-ship missiles go down, beyond the radio horizon, and become unobservable for shipborne radar systems, and because of it, they “surface” at a distance hardly more than 25-30 km, which the missile covers in 50 -60 seconds and it is extremely difficult to intercept it in this flight segment. There are doubts that Vulcan-Falanx is generally capable of doing this, since its effective range is less than one and a half kilometers (the flight time of Granit is 2 seconds), and even in the case of direct hits into the rocket by 20-mm projectiles, there is a great chance of that. that it will simply fall into the ship by inertia. And destroying the "Granite" in flight is unlikely to succeed, since its warhead has armor protection.
Thus, the speed of domestic anti-ship missiles significantly reduces the reaction time that remains for the attacked enemy, and the possibility of selecting and distributing targets, data exchange between anti-ship missiles, proprietary electronic warfare systems, and armor protection of warheads are designed to reduce the gap in the capabilities of missiles and manned aircraft (to completely overcome it, alas, impossible).
On the whole, the Granite anti-ship missiles are an extremely formidable means of fighting at sea, but they, of course, are not an invincible wunderwaffe. In the high-altitude segment of the trajectory, these anti-ship missiles can be shot down by carrier-based fighters, although this is very difficult, since the time it takes to intercept is extremely limited. Missiles can still be shot down by air defense systems of ships when they enter their zone of action and before going to low altitudes, during an attack at low altitude, anti-ship missiles "Granit" can also be destroyed by ESSM missiles specially oriented to defeat such targets. But, probably, the most important weapon against anti-ship missiles is not fire weapons, but electronic warfare stations capable of "blind" their homing heads, as well as false targets.
In the USSR, it was believed that a salvo of 20 missiles would be enough to oversaturate the air defense of the AUG and disable an aircraft carrier, but what this value is in reality is impossible to say. Most likely, a dozen anti-ship missiles carried by Kuznetsov are still not enough to successfully attack an enemy warrant, but if the domestic AMG has a missile cruiser (16 Vulcan anti-ship missiles or 20 Granit anti-ship missiles), these two ships are capable of striking 28 -32 heavy rockets. It is highly doubtful that the air defense AUG (even composed of the newest modifications of "Arlie Berkov") would be able to repel such a blow.
Thus, the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" really has a good "joker", which, however, can be realized only in tandem with a missile cruiser, but another problem arises here, more precisely even two - the relatively short range of the anti-ship missile system and target designation issues.
Target designation is a factor that very seriously limits the combat power of modern missile cruisers in the Russian Navy. The problem is that the ship itself does not have equipment capable of delivering the control center to the maximum flight range of heavy anti-ship missiles and is forced to rely only on external sources. But today we do not have a developed network of spy satellites capable of providing control centers in real time, data from over-the-horizon radars need to be clarified, and other means, like A-50U AWACS aircraft, have limited range reach, and are not included in the composition at all. fleet. Thus, both the project 1164 Atlant RRC and the Peter the Great TARKR, possessing super-powerful missile weapons, in most cases are unable to use it at the maximum range. As a result, an extremely unpleasant situation developed - having extremely limited over-the-horizon target designation capabilities (only deck helicopters), the domestic RRC or TARKR turned out to be very vulnerable even for a single enemy frigate, which was quite capable of approaching our cruiser at a distance of launching Harpoons or Exocets. It is clear that the domestic anti-ship missiles are much more powerful, and the air defense is much stronger, but … let's say that a domestic ship group consisting of an RRC (or TARKR) and several BODs or a patrol can theoretically be defeated by even a small detachment of missile frigates and corvettes of a third world country - of course, in the event that the latter will act skillfully and aggressively.
Another matter is the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov". His presence in the naval strike group is just capable of "closing" the missed target designation link. Our satellite constellation is quite enough to detect enemy ships, even if information about them arrives with a certain delay. In other words, Kuznetsov's aircraft are quite capable of searching for an enemy detachment in the area of its location, "prompted" by satellite reconnaissance data, and issuing control commands for anti-ship missiles. In the same way, the MiG-29KR are able to reconnoitre a target identified by the domestic ZGRLS - with the same sad consequences for it (the target, not the ZGRLS, of course).
Frankly speaking, such additional reconnaissance is very difficult, if not possible at all, if our enemy is the formation, which is headed by the supercarrier. There is probably no easier target for an air patrol that has electronic warfare and AWACS aircraft at its disposal than enemy multipurpose fighters searching for the enemy and using radar. But in all cases, when we are confronted by an enemy who has no aircraft carriers at all, the task of destroying its surface forces will not present much difficulty for the domestic AMG.
And even if the enemy has an aircraft carrier … the question will be which one. Take, for example, the British "Queen Elizabeth" - due to the absence of AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft and the relatively short range of carrier-based F-35В, its ability to control the sea space further than 300-400 km from the order is relatively small. There are chances that his AWACS helicopters will timely detect the MiG-29KR, conducting reconnaissance, but far from absolute. That is, the domestic AMG has excellent chances, having discovered the area of maneuvering of the British AUG according to satellite reconnaissance or ZGRLS, reconnoitre its position with carrier-based aircraft, approach it within the range of using the same Granit anti-ship missiles and strike a blow from which the British warrant is unlikely to recover … The British AUG has few chances to resist such tactics - after all, they need not only to identify the location of the domestic AMG, but also to organize an effective air raid that could stop our ships, and this takes much more time than a missile strike. Lacking electronic warfare and AWACS aircraft, the British air group does not have the situational awareness that their American or French counterparts can count on, while the number of British and Russian aircraft carriers is equal to 24 aircraft. But the British will have to send some of their machines in the shock version, that is, if the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov manages to raise most of their aircraft to repel an air raid (which is more than possible in such conditions), then the British fighters will have to be brave … to improve their capabilities in air combat, the British will have to reduce the number of attack aircraft, but this is also a bad decision, since it minimizes the chances of causing serious damage to the ships of the domestic AMG. Given the fact that, due to the limited range of the F-35B, the distance at which British decks can organize a massive air raid is not much greater than the range of the Granit anti-ship missile, the chances of the success of the British AUG in the battle against the AMG of the Northern Fleet are becoming more than dubious. …
As a matter of fact, we are now dealing with a very important aspect of the use of aircraft carriers and their carrier-based aircraft. The fact is that so far we have compared the capabilities of aircraft carriers and aircraft carriers "head-on": who is faster able to lift his air group into the air, whose fighters are better, and so on. But the aircraft carrier (TAKR) is not a spherical horse in a vacuum, but one of the many "screws" in the mechanism of the state's naval forces. So it turns out that if we compare the strike capabilities of the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" and the aircraft carrier "Queen Elizabeth", then the latter have much higher, given that:
1. With the highest degree of probability, "Kuznetsov" today cannot use the "Granit" anti-ship missile system;
2. British F-35Bs significantly outperform the MiG-29KR as attack aircraft;
In addition, Queen Elizabeth's situational awareness of the state of the airspace in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft carrier (200-300 km exactly) is higher due to the presence of 4-5 AWACS helicopters in the air group - that is, the British ship has more chances to receive information about the air attack than the domestic aircraft carrier.
If we try to predict the consequences of the confrontation between the domestic naval strike group led by the Peter the Great TARKR against the British AUG, then the result will be just as negative for our fleet. Deck aircraft gives the British the opportunity to timely identify the location of our KUG and destroy it in one or more airstrikes. At the same time, the chances of our KUG to get close to the British AUG at a distance that will allow us to reconnoitre its position and issue a control center for missiles by ship means are much lower. Simply because the KUG does not have the means of additional reconnaissance of targets at a distance of 550 km - that is, the firing range of the Granit anti-ship missiles.
But everything changes if our KUG turns into AMG by adding the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier to it. Yes, our KUG without TAKR is weaker than the British AUG, and our TAKR is weaker in its strike capabilities than the British aircraft carrier, but, being united in the AMG, they turn out to be stronger than the British AUG. And this suggests that comparing the capabilities of aircraft carriers is only half the battle; it is also necessary to compare the capabilities that the inclusion of these aircraft carriers in their fleets gives. That is, in order to understand the usefulness of aircraft carriers of a particular project, for example, British and Russian, it is necessary to compare not only the capabilities of the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov and the aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth, but also the capabilities of the KVMF, headed by the British Queen and the Northern Fleet., led by aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov".
As we said earlier, most likely the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" really does not have the ability to use the anti-ship missile system "Granit", but the fact that its aircraft will be able to carry out additional reconnaissance and issuance of control commands for missile cruisers as part of an aircraft carrier multipurpose group is significant (one might even say - multiples) improves overall connectivity.
All of the above is also true for the comparison of "Kuznetsov" with a French aircraft carrier. As we said earlier, it also surpasses the TAKR in striking capabilities and is generally a more dangerous opponent than the Queen Elizabeth. Thanks to the presence of AWACS aircraft, Charles de Gaulle has the ability to coordinate much better the attack on the order of the domestic AMG and air combat with the aircraft protecting it than is available to the British aircraft carrier.
Nevertheless, in the event of a hypothetical confrontation with the Russian AMG, the French aircraft carrier group will have very serious problems. As you know, the Russian Navy relied on heavy anti-ship missiles, while the French fleet was built according to the classic American theory of war at sea, according to which the strike function of ship formations is assigned to carrier-based aircraft. Accordingly, the tasks of the Kuznetsov air group will be additional reconnaissance of the enemy and the air defense of its own formation, while the Charles de Gaulle air group, in addition to these tasks, will also have to form and send into battle a strike air group, covering the latter with the necessary number of fighters.
Taking into account the fact that at least 6 multipurpose fighters and an AWACS aircraft should be left at the very minimum to ensure the air defense of the French compound, the total detachment of forces that Charles de Gaulle will be able to send to attack the domestic AMG is unlikely to be able to exceed 24 multipurpose fighters (rather there will be even less of them) with 1-2 AWACS aircraft. At the same time, a couple of fighters should be left with AWACS, at least a dozen more should be used to clear the airspace and cover strike aircraft. For obvious reasons, it will be rather difficult to form a demonstration group, an air defense suppression group and several strike groups capable of launching an attack from several directions from the remaining 10 aircraft. It is far from the fact that a dozen "Raphales", which will need to engage in battle at medium altitudes (and thus, when approaching our AMG, will be attacked by its long-range missiles), will be able to ensure the safety of strike vehicles. In an air battle, our warrant has a "flying headquarters" of aircraft - AWACS will be leveled by the "floating headquarters" (may the sailors forgive me for such sacrilege), whose action is provided by the most powerful ship radio stations - it is possible to hide attacking attack aircraft at ultra-low altitudes from the latter, but fighters in the battle on ultra-low ones cannot go and the radar stations of the ships will be visible. And to counter the "low-flying" threat, you can raise the Ka-31 into the air, which in this case, being literally above the decks of the AMG ships, will be quite useful.
This aspect is also interesting. The AWACS aircraft, no doubt, provides excellent opportunities for controlling the air and surface situation, but at the same time it is itself a "vulnerable link". Moving at medium or high altitude, it is very well, from afar, visible to the ship's radar, and the work of its radar will report the approach of the E-2S long before he himself "sees" the ships of the order. Of course, the E-2C Hawkeye can conduct reconnaissance in a passive mode, it has such equipment. But it can be assumed that since today the means of radio-technical reconnaissance have stepped so far forward that our ships have such devices no worse than those carried by the Hokai, which means that we have every chance to “explain” the upcoming air raid in advance. And having only 10-15 minutes in reserve, "Kuznetsov" will be able to lift 10-14 aircraft into the air, which, in addition to two pairs on duty in the air, will allow 14-18 aircraft to be put into battle. Will a dozen Raphales cope with so many MiG-29KRs, especially if the battle takes place within the range of the missile cruiser's air defense system as part of the domestic AMG? Will they be able to cover their attack aircraft? Frankly, it is very doubtful, but the increase in the number of "Rafale", involved in covering over the specified limit, critically weakens the strike group, which cannot be done.
At the same time, the air defense AUG of France is not well designed to repel an attack from supersonic cruise missiles. The difficulty lies in the fact that the most long-range French missiles Aster 30 have half the flight range than their American "counterparts" (120 km), respectively, the area of fire damage flying at high altitude "Granite" is very small (within 40 km). But the French missiles have demonstrated their ability to shoot down low-flying supersonic targets - in 2012, a supersonic target was shot down, going at an altitude of only 5 meters above sea level, so that they have some chances to intercept the Granit anti-ship missile system in a low-altitude area, but in general they have a chance of a successful repulse of a 16-20 missile salvo can hardly be called large.
That is, we, again, see that, for example, the oncoming battle of the KUG led by the same "Peter the Great" against the French AUG with great probability will provide us with another Tsushima. The presence of numerous carrier-based aircraft, coupled with AWACS aircraft, allows the French to control the movements of our KUG and, at a convenient time for the French, to organize a raid with up to two dozen strike aircraft, it is almost impossible to repel such an attack with naval air defense systems. But the French also have a good opportunity to bring several frigates with long-range modifications of the Exocet anti-ship missile system and supplement them with the attack of carrier-based aircraft. The risk of detection of surface ships of France in the conditions of air supremacy of Charles de Gaulle aircraft by deck helicopters of our KUG tends to zero, but there is absolutely no chance of detection of a French aircraft carrier by naval means.
At the same time, if the same KUG is headed by Kuznetsov, then the AMG and AUG counterfight becomes an extremely difficult and risky business for the French - yes, they can still win, but they can also lose, and then everything will depend on the experience of the naval commanders, the training of the crews and Lady Luck, of course. The AUG, headed by Charles de Gaulle, may still have an advantage over the AMG with Kuznetsov, but it is already relatively small and does not guarantee victory. And even if victory is nevertheless achieved, it will only be at the cost of very heavy losses of the Charles de Gaulle air group.
Consider now the confrontation between AMG and Kuznetsov and the US AUG against Gerald R. Ford. I must say that the capabilities of the American supercarrier are extremely great: it is quite capable of sending an air group of 40-45 vehicles into battle, while continuing to provide its own air defense with at least one air patrol in the air (AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft and 4 fighters), as well as some the number of ready-to-fly fighters on deck, ready for immediate take-off.
An attack by a Russian naval group, which does not have a TAKR in its composition, but, presumably, is able to get some kind of cover for ground aviation (at sea it will be good if there are one or two two fighters), can be carried out by the following composition:
In this case, the calculation was made as follows - due to the fact that the domestic KUG is a compound with a very powerful and layered air defense, the forces allocated to its suppression are calculated according to the "upper limit": for example, if it is indicated that the additional reconnaissance group may include 1-2 aircraft, then 2 is taken, if the group of demonstrative actions includes 3-4 aircraft, then 4 is taken, etc. - that is, everything in order to ensure the best possible opening and suppression of our radar and anti-aircraft ship complexes. The air clearing group includes only 4 fighters - in combination with four fighters covering the AWACS aircraft, this is quite enough to "deal" with 2-4 domestic fighters operating at the maximum range. The number of strike groups is calculated according to the residual principle and it turns out that they can include up to 15-20 multipurpose fighters loaded with "attack aircraft" (in order not to write so many letters further, in the future we will call them simply air combat - fighters) with a total squadron of 40 and 45 vehicles, respectively.
Obviously, a group of 4-5 ships' composition with air defense, on which 15 planes of additional reconnaissance, demonstrative actions, suppression of air defense and electronic warfare were "trampled", is unlikely to be able to survive the strike of 15-20 attack aircraft, even if it is headed by such a strong ship as " Peter the Great". However, if TAKR is "added" to this KUG, then the situation begins to change rapidly, and not for the better for the Americans.
The fact is that having fixed the approach of enemy AWACS aircraft (as we said above, it is rather difficult to hide them) and taking into account modern RTR means on our warships, the TAKR is quite capable of ensuring that up to 14-18 MiG-29KR are in the air on the beginning of the American attack, and with luck, even more. What does this mean for Americans? First, there are great difficulties in organizing the attack itself. In this case, the American air group cannot throw additional reconnaissance, demonstration, air defense and electronic warfare suppression groups into battle - such an attack by attack aircraft on 14-18 fighters will not end well for the carrier-based aviation of the same Gerald R. Ford. But even throwing a group of clearing the air on the same fighters plus the unsuppressed air defense of the formation means suffering heavy losses in aircraft, and it is not a fact that the air will be "cleared". Accordingly, it is necessary to act simultaneously - to attack Russian aircraft with fighters, and by "demonstrators", air defense suppressors, etc. - ships.
But such use obviously overloads the capabilities of the electronic warfare group - it will not be able to influence our fighters and ship radars with equal success, if only due to a sharp increase in the number of sources that need to be suppressed. Here it is already necessary to choose priorities - first of all to jam planes or ships, but no choice will be optimal.
Of course, 4 fighters for clearing the air are no longer enough here - apart from the direct cover of AWACS aircraft, it is necessary to allocate at least 16 fighters to this group in order to more or less reliably link Russian aircraft in combat and not let them pass to strike groups. But this means that in the group of 40-45-aircraft composition for the strike groups there are only 3-8 aircraft left!
That is, the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" by the mere fact of its presence reduces the number of strike groups of an American aircraft carrier by 60-80%. It is interesting that the result of our calculations very well intersects with the data of the respected V. P. Zablotsky, who wrote that the opportunity to meet the carrier-based aircraft of the American supercarrier with 18 fighters in the air, which the domestic aircraft carrier is capable of, will lead to a weakening of the missile strike on our ships by 70%.
Of course, wars are not won by defense, and the presence of a TAKR as part of a domestic formation of surface ships still does not guarantee its invulnerability from American carrier-based aircraft. Nevertheless, the aircraft carrier significantly increases the combat stability of the compound to which it is attached, and can become a decisive argument in a number of combat situations.
So, for example, it is well known that the combat services of the Northern Fleet often took place in the Mediterranean Sea - it was there that the 6th US Fleet was located, which, in the event of a global war, was supposed to neutralize the 5th OPESK (in fact, at the cost of its death). For a strike on the aircraft carriers of the 6th Fleet, the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" looks absolutely irreplaceable, and not only thanks to its aircraft, but also to its missiles. The Mediterranean Sea is a relatively small water area, and, being in the middle of it, the aircraft carrier is capable of shooting through the water area from the European coast to the African one. In other words, even despite the fact that in the oncoming battle, the domestic ship group with the aircraft carrier did not have a chance against the AUS (that is, two AUG), but our ships could destroy them from the tracking position, and the aircraft carrier significantly increased their chances of doing so.
Another situation is an attack by an enemy AUG by heterogeneous forces. The presence of the TAKR significantly complicates the use of patrol aircraft at a great distance from the AUG, which means it reduces the chances of detecting domestic submarines, despite the fact that the TAKR can destroy enemy aircraft while being at the limit of the combat radius of the supercarrier's carrier-based aircraft, or even beyond it. In the event that a decision is made to attack the AUG with aviation forces (for example, the Tu-22M3), its capabilities will be largely limited by the combat radius of ground cover fighters (which is significantly inferior to long-range aircraft), but the presence of a TAKR solves this problem.
Thus, despite the fact that the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" literally loses to the American supercarriers in all respects, this does not make it a useless or unnecessary weapon system. A fleet that has aircraft-carrying ships of this type has much greater capabilities than a fleet that does not have its own "sea airfield". Even as imperfect as TAKR…. Let's call it all the same correctly: TAVKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov".
