Goals and objectives set for the Georgian army
The main goal is to "establish constitutional order" in South Ossetia, in order to return the rebellious autonomy to Georgia, and then "restore constitutional order" in Abkhazia.
The military task is to defeat the army of "separatists", at the same time neutralizing the peacekeeping forces of the Russian Federation, and subsequently blocking the Roki pass. Check the NATO and US concept of mountain warfare.
The political task is to expel the Ossetian population, which does not wish to be part of Georgia. Start negotiations on Georgia's entry into NATO. Start resettlement of Georgian refugees to South Ossetia.
Geopolitical objectives - to reduce the influence of the Russian Federation on the states of the South Caucasus. Provide Israeli and US aviation with jump airfields in case of hostilities against Iran. To speed up the construction and laying of the next pipeline.
The technical task is to conduct a mass test of the modernized weapons systems in real conditions. Test in practice the "fire management centers" created with the help of Israeli military specialists.
Operation "Clear Field"
This operation was developed by Georgia together with the employees of Military Professional Resources Incorporates (MPRI) and was directed against South Ossetia. It was the MPRI company, having concluded a contract with Saakashvili, that for many years was engaged in the development of military operations and combat training of the personnel of the Georgian troops. The company's consultants were retired generals of the American army and a number of high-ranking "military retirees". These people to this day occupy the 4th floor of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, where the entrance to the Georgian military is closed.
The Georgian army, with a total strength of about 20 thousand people, was trained by American instructors; the cost of its creation amounted to $ 2 billion. The army tried, whenever possible, to abandon the old technology of the Warsaw Pact countries and was preparing to conduct "local" wars, primarily with separatist enclaves within the borders of Georgia, as well as for use in peacekeeping operations outside its borders. Having available data from radar, air and space reconnaissance, the command of the Georgian armed forces had extensive information about the structure and combat capabilities of the armed forces of South Ossetia and Russia. The tactics of the Georgian army were aimed at conducting a blitzkrieg. The preparation was based on the lessons of Israel's Middle East conflicts, the experience of the Iraqi and Afghan wars. The tactics of using infantry brigades implied the creation and operation of separate assault groups and the actions of special sniper and sabotage groups from among the servicemen of the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Gia Gulua" and "Omega". The structure of the assault groups included two motorized rifle companies, a platoon of tanks and a sapper squad.
The plan of the military operation against the rebellious enclave was based on the strategy of delivering two converging strikes in the direction of Tskhinvali. The main blow was delivered from the southern direction from the Gori region by the main group of forces, the main force of 4 mbr. meant a deep half-embrace of Tskhinval from the east, cutting through the defense of South Ossetia and an exit to the area of the settlement of Tamarasheni. Another blow was delivered from the Karelian direction with the help of 3 mbr and meant a semi-coverage of Tskhinval from the west and an internal coverage of Tskhinval from all sides along the outer border of the encirclement. The encircled Tskhinvali grouping was planned to be pinned down by MLRS and aviation strikes. Artillery strikes were supposed to weaken the enemy as much as possible, disorganize him and force him to surrender the cities.
The first echelon of the advancing troops consisted of 3 and 4 Georgian motorized infantry brigades, 1 mbr remained in the second echelon, support for the advancing troops was provided by: a separate artillery brigade, an MLRS division, a separate tank battalion and an electronic warfare center of the Georgian Air Force. During the operation, it was planned to use sniper and sabotage groups of 10-12 people as efficiently as possible. The task of these "wandering rangers" was to mine roads behind enemy lines, disorganize and demoralize the defending troops, direct their aviation and artillery to detected targets, and when the Russian army moved into the conflict zone, they had to switch to sabotage at its communication centers and communications …
The main stake of the Georgian army was to achieve maximum fire in a short period of time. At the first stage, a large role was assigned to the massive use of rocket and artillery fire, corrected with the help of drones and aviation strikes. According to plans, in 72 hours the Georgian army was supposed to capture Tskhinval, Java and the Roki tunnel, in 3-4 days the troops were supposed to capture about 75% of the territory of South Ossetia and transfer their efforts to the Abkhaz direction, where the actions of the ground forces would be supported by sea and airborne assault forces …
The Georgian side actively used military cunning: deliberately withdrawing troops from the previously occupied quarters of Tskhinval, followed by shelling and bombing when they were occupied by enemy troops.
The main focus of Georgia was on the conduct of hostilities at night. It was at night that the Georgian army gained an advantage over the Russian troops. The Georgian T-72 SIM-1 tanks, which were modernized in Israel, received thermal imagers, a friend-or-foe identification system, GPS and armor build-up.
Thanks to radio intelligence, radar and direction finding, Georgia monitored the signals of cell phones and launched fire strikes at them. Excellent topographic maps and high-resolution images from space of the territory of South Ossetia and Tskhinvali were found from Georgian artillery gunners. In preparing for war, Georgia tried to take into account the strengths of the Russian army: absolute superiority in heavy weapons, in the air, at sea, and its own weaknesses: the lack of active means to fight enemy aircraft in most of its territory and the general weakness of air defense. At the same time, the army had trained and well-equipped combat units that were armed with weapons of Turkish, German and Israeli production. Yet Georgia did not believe that Russia would respond to its offensive in South Ossetia, and was completely unprepared for a counterattack.
To achieve the effect of strategic and tactical surprise, the President of Georgia at 8 pm on August 7 announced on television a ceasefire and no use of weapons by Georgian troops in the conflict zone, already knowing that the first massive missile-air strike would take place at 23:30.
Weaknesses of the Georgian Army
The disadvantage is the lack of a unified leadership. Each brigade was led by two deputy defense ministers and a deputy minister of the Interior Ministry. The army turned out to be unprepared for the "bunker" war - the capture of well-fortified positions in the southern part of Tskhinvali. The Grad multiple launch rocket systems possessed by Georgia are designed to work across areas and are not suitable for delivering pinpoint strikes. Most of the T-72 SIM-1 tanks were in the second echelon, since the command took care of the most modernized tanks.
The attempt to switch to digital technologies in management did not justify itself. The inadequate training of specialists from the "fire organization centers" created with the help of the Israeli military made itself felt. These centers were supposed to be responsible for coordinating the actions of artillery and aviation with assault groups of infantry and tanks. In real combat conditions, the interaction of these centers with the troops turned out to be weak, especially in the effectiveness of hitting targets.
During the battles, MLRS and artillery fired at Tskhinvali for almost 14 hours, as a result the city was seriously damaged, 70% of buildings were damaged. But the tank units could not take advantage of the result of this continuous fire effect. The battles for the city in some ways repeated the lessons that the Russian army learned from the storming of Grozny: in the conditions of urban development, the use of tanks is ineffective and is associated with tangible losses from the fire of well-trained groups of grenade launchers.
Since August 10, the Georgian army has fought only through "self-organization". Artillery support was provided to the troops only if the commander personally knew the mobile phone of one of the artillery officers. The work of the rear services failed, many units withdrew from the battle, having expended ammunition. Due to poor interaction, Georgian troops were unable to avoid incidents of "friendly fire". The air defense, in the conditions of the superiority of Russian aviation, used tactics similar to the tactics of the air defense of Yugoslavia - temporary focal activation of air defense systems, the organization of ambushes with the use of mobile complexes "Buk" on the routes of alleged flights of Russian aviation.
The main disadvantages include the lack of unprepared defensive lines and positions. The Georgian leadership did not believe in the possibility of a counterattack from Russia, let alone bombing its territory. Soldiers in companies and battalions were not taught the skills of fighting in defense, actions during encirclement and withdrawal. The retreat of the Georgian troops turned into a disorderly flight.
