Prologue
On September 1, 1969, the green flame of the Jamahiriya flared up over Tripoli - a group of young officers led by Muammar Gaddafi managed to overthrow King Idris and take power into their own hands. The new government of Libya announced its readiness to embark on the socialist path of development - for the leadership of the USSR this was a signal that a new potential ally and partner appeared in the Mediterranean region.
The only problem is that American and British military bases remained on the territory of the Libyan Arab Republic. An important oil-bearing region threatened to become the site of a bloody battle - the West began preparations for an operation to interfere in the country's internal affairs - as required by the previous Libyan-British defense treaty. It was required to transfer reinforcements from Crete to the British airbases Tobruk and Al-Adem and give the order to start an offensive operation.
The US Navy's Sixth Fleet, led by the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy, moved to the scene, and the situation was getting serious.
Sixth Fleet off the coast of Sicily, 1965
At that time, the 5th OPESK of the USSR Navy was located in the Mediterranean Sea, consisting of four cruisers: the anti-submarine cruise missile "Moskva", the missile cruise missile "Grozny", the artillery cruise missiles "Dzherzhinsky" and "M. Kutuzov ", three large anti-submarine ships and 10 outdated destroyers of projects 30 bis, 56 and 31 (the latter are radio intelligence ships). Under water, the squadron was covered by six diesel-electric submarines (missile carriers pr. 651) and a project 627A multipurpose submarine.
The Soviet ships immediately dispersed - the BOD and the destroyers formed a 150-mile defense zone between the coast of Libya and about. Crete. Now, in order to transfer forces by air, British transport planes would have to fly over the ships of the Soviet Navy. The threat to come under fire from naval air defense systems had a sobering effect - already on September 5, London announced that it would not interfere in the internal affairs of Libya.
An attempt to "project force" with the help of the Sixth Fleet suffered a crushing fiasco - on September 6, in the Tyrrhenian Sea, an aircraft carrier strike group was discovered by Tu-16R naval reconnaissance officers. A day later, the AUG was already moving in a dense ring of Soviet cruisers and submarines, holding the "pistol to the temple" of the Sixth Fleet. After wandering along the Libyan coast at the sight of the six-inch "Kutuzov" and "Dzerzhinsky", the US Navy squadron lay on the opposite course. On September 15, 1969, the ashamed Americans returned to the docks of the Naples naval base.
The Soviet Navy fulfilled its task in good faith.
Projectile versus rocket
Not so long ago, an interesting calculation appeared on one of the thematic sites of the Runet - what would be the real chances of the Soviet artillery cruiser 68-bis in the event of a military clash with an American squadron?
The simple answer - carrier-based aircraft will detect and sink the cruiser at a distance of 500 miles - is only valid for the Pacific theater of the 1941-1945 period. During the Cold War, the situation changed - the Soviet fleet practiced tracking the ships of the "potential enemy" in peacetime. In the event of an escalation of the conflict and the outbreak of war, the cruisers did not need to break through anywhere - they were initially at line-of-sight, ready to open fire on the decks of aircraft carriers and escort ships of the US Navy.
The prospect of fire contact with the cruiser of the project 68-bis (Sverdlov-class) could not but horrify the American sailors.
Soviet version. Checkmate in three moves
Six inches. 152 mm. - This is a funnel with a depth of two meters, where a machine-gun crew of two numbers could fit.
The guns of the Soviet cruiser hit day and night, in any conditions, in the thickest fog, storm and sandstorm. Minimum reaction time. In addition to optical rangefinders, there was guidance according to radar data - a fire control system based on the Zalp radar made it possible to automatically correct the shooting in response to bursts of falling shells. The maximum firing range is 30,000 meters. The OF-35 high-explosive fragmentation projectile left the barrel cut at a speed of 950 m / s - three speeds of sound! faster than any of the modern anti-ship missiles
In total, 12 such guns * were installed on board the cruiser pr. 68-bis in four armored rotating MK-5 turrets. The practical rate of fire of each gun is 4-7 rounds per minute.
Even if the ships of the "potential enemy" were outside the firing sectors of the stern guns, the destructive power of the main battery's bow group was more than enough to turn any US Navy ship into flaming ruins.
Only a blind man could miss the 300-meter hull of the John F. Kennedy. Three regular volleys for sighting - the fourth in the "bull's eye"!
In the case of the aircraft carrier, the situation took on an especially gloomy shade - it was enough to "put" just one shell to the deck crowded with aircraft, for a disaster to happen - the ship flared up like counterfeit Chinese fireworks. With a powerful explosion and ignition of tens of tons of fuel and ammunition suspended under the wings of aircraft.
This completes the work of the Soviet artillerymen - everything else will be done by the flames of the kerosene spilled everywhere - the fire will certainly penetrate the hangar and the lower decks through the holes pierced by the detonation of air bombs. The losses will be terrible. The question of further participation in hostilities will become irrelevant - the survivors will be concerned about a completely different problem: will it be possible to save the ship?
Fire on the deck of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier "Enterprise" (1969). The reason is the spontaneous launch of the 127 mm NURS.
A similar incident took place on board the Forrestal aircraft (1967) - a rocket fell off a pylon and hit the tank of an attack aircraft in front. The fuse prevented the explosion, but one spark was enough - a fierce fire destroyed half of the air group and killed 134 of the ship's personnel.
But Oriskani (1966) suffered the stupidest of all - the aircraft carrier almost died from a signal rocket that was accidentally launched in the hands of a sailor.
There is no reason to doubt that a 152mm shell that exploded on the deck of the John F. Kennedy aircraft carrier would have caused less damage. Six kilograms of the mighty brizant and thousands of red-hot shards would have guaranteed the ship out of action.
The artillery armament of the 68-bis cruisers was not limited to the main caliber - on each side of the ship there were three two-gun SM-5-1 installations with semi-automatic 100 mm guns - six barrels on each side, controlled by the Yakor artillery radar.
The universal artillery shells had a smaller mass and firing range (24 kilometers), but the rate of fire of each gun could reach 15-18 rds / min - it is not difficult to imagine what could have happened to the Kennedy if such a fiery barrage had fallen on it.
History is silent whether the cruisers had an escort in the form of a couple of destroyers - each "project 56" or the old "30-bis" could "congratulate" the enemy with a salvo of 130-mm naval guns.
The situation is paradoxical - rusty Soviet cruisers and outdated destroyers could "one click" deprive the US Navy squadron of its main force, and then engage in battle with escort cruisers and missile destroyers on very favorable terms.
There was no one to fear - the Americans in 1969 had neither anti-ship missiles, nor large-caliber guns, nor torpedo weapons on surface ships.
Universal "five-inch" (127 mm) could not cause enough damage to an armored monster in a short time.
Escort cruiser USS Leahy (DLG / CG-16) built in 1962. Was completely devoid of artillery weapons, with the exception of a pair of anti-aircraft guns
The reaction time of the US Navy aviation is incomparable with the 68-bis artillery pieces. The planes need to take off from the catapult, gain altitude, go to the combat course and only then attack the "target", which every minute spews out tons of red-hot steel from itself. No matter how it turns out that the aircraft will die before they can get off the deck of the ship. In addition, it is not yet a fact that even the most powerful weapon that the American pilots had at that time - free-fall bombs weighing 227 and 454 kg, could cause critical damage to the cruiser.
A certain threat is only a surprise attack from under the water - but, in any case, the reaction time of the American submarine will be excessively long. The cruisers will die a brave death, but by that time they will have killed all American "tin cans".
One jump - and you are in kings!
American version. Demons of the two elements
… Where are these Russians going with their backward Bolshevik technologies? They naively hope for the absence of anti-ship missiles, armor and large-caliber artillery in our country.
Ha! We have all this! In the wake of the aircraft carrier, the cruiser Little Rock, the flagship of the Sixth Fleet, was specially sent from Gaeta to reinforce the American grouping off the coast of Libya.
This rusty junk was launched in 1944, so it still has an armored belt, armored decks and even one main-caliber turret - the duel of Little Rock with the cruiser pr. 68-bis could have been an enchanting spectacle.
But we will not get our hands dirty in artillery combat - too vulgar to do in the Age of Rocket Weapons. We have prepared a special "surprise" for the Russians -
Submit two Talos missiles to the launcher!
USS Little Rock (CLG-4) is an old Cleveland-class cruiser that has undergone a deep modernization according to the Galveston project. In the late 1950s, both aft towers were dismantled from the cruiser - instead, a launcher and a protected cellar for 46 RIM-8 Talos anti-aircraft missiles were installed. Also, the bow of the ship has undergone a rearrangement. Thanks to high lattice masts, massive AN / SPS-43, AN / SPS-30 air target detection radars and AN / SPG-49 fire control radars, the cruiser acquired its bizarre, memorable silhouette - the ship seemed to have left the screen of a sci-fi movie 60 -s.
USS Little Rock (CL / CLG / CG-4), Mediterranean, 1974
Initially, the Yankees did not plan any surprises. The Galveston project involved the transformation of three obsolete cruisers into an air defense platform - the ship groups needed reliable air cover. The newest at that time naval air defense missile system "Talos" promised solid capabilities - the ability to defeat air targets at a distance of 180 km.
The unique characteristics of "Talos" were obtained at a high price - the complex turned out to be HUGE. A huge cellar for missile preparation, more like a factory floor, bulky radars, a whole hall with lamp computers, numerous auxiliary systems, power equipment, cooling and ventilation systems. But the main thing is the missiles themselves. Monstrous 11-meter "logs" weighing 3.5 tons (with booster-accelerator).
But even without the accelerator, the dimensions of the rocket were staggering: the mass was 1542 kg! - as a projectile of the battleship "Yamato" (of course, adjusted for the design, cross-sectional area and mechanical strength of the rocket). There was a special version of "Talos" in a nuclear version - such a missile was supposed to "clear" the coast before the landing in the Third World War.
But the main thing is that during operation it turned out that the Talos could be used not only against air targets - like any air defense system, it had a mode of firing at surface targets! The seeker of an anti-aircraft missile no matter what the signal is reflected from - from the wing of an aircraft or from the superstructure of an enemy ship, it is enough to turn off the proximity fuse - and the RIM-8 Talos turns into a powerful supersonic anti-ship missile with a warhead weighing 136 kg (later the idea will be developed - the Yankees will adopt a modification RIM-8H with guidance at the source of radar radiation. With such "tricks" the US Navy cruisers will fire at the positions of Vietnamese radars and air defense systems).
If we do not take into account the anti-radar modification of the RIM-8H, the Talos missile dual-use was not a full-fledged anti-ship system - the firing range is too short. Even the largest ships with high superstructures could be fired upon by air defense systems at a maximum range of a couple of tens of kilometers - the AN / SPG-49 radar cannot "look" beyond the horizon, and the Talos missile, left without a radar guiding beam, turns into a useless piece of metal …
Talos almost cut the target destroyer in half
Only a couple of tens of kilometers … But this is more than enough to strike at Soviet ships approaching the US Navy aircraft carrier group! There, off the coast of Libya, in the fall of 1969, Little Rock could easily hit the 68-bis cruiser with a Talos missile.
As shown by the computer simulation, a 1.5-ton blank, rushing from heaven at a speed of 2.5M, pierces, like foil, the 50-mm armored deck of the cruiser "Kutuzov" and the 15-mm steel lining underneath.
The core warhead will most likely collapse on impact with the armor, but it will be replaced by 300 liters of rocket fuel - a volumetric explosion will occur in the affected compartment, accompanied by a rapid spread of a cloud of fuel aerosol and debris at a speed of 2 km / s! The Talos hit is similar to hitting a cruiser with a heavy high-explosive incendiary bomb.
Meanwhile, Little Rock will reload its launcher and strike again in a minute. The Talos missile, in comparison with the artillery shell, is extremely accurate - it will surely hit the target from the very first shot. In such conditions, the Soviet squadron becomes doomed …
Epilogue. Few will survive that battle
In the heated discussion about the "living dead" and "ritual sacrifices" in the confrontation between the two largest fleets that have ever plowed the oceans, no final point was put.
Supporters of the "Reds" argue that the US Navy had only 8 cruisers with the Talos complex - too few to cover all US Navy squadrons around the globe. In addition, they appeared in the period 1960-64, i.e. 10-15 years later than the 68-bis cruisers - in fact, this is a technique from different eras, accidentally encountered by a misunderstanding on the battlefield. By the end of the 60s, the role of the main striking force of the Soviet Navy had already passed to missile cruisers and nuclear submarines.
Supporters of the "blue" reasonably note that as "Talos", albeit with a much lesser effect, another naval air defense system could be used, for example, the medium and short-range Terrier and Tartar complexes - the number of American ships equipped with these air defense systems was calculated many tens. However, air defense systems were not a novelty on Soviet cruisers and destroyers either …
Large anti-submarine ship - project 61
The Reds cite as an example the fact that the hull of the cruiser 68-bis consisted of 23 autonomous watertight compartments - even a few hits from the Talos and the resulting heavy destruction of the cockpits, superstructures and parts of the engine room does not at all guarantee that the cruiser will stop firing (loss of radars not scary - each tower has its own set of fire control devices). There are examples in history when Russian sailors fired until the ship was hidden under water.
The Blues argue that the pursuit of the American group was not easy - the American destroyers maneuvered dangerously and constantly cut the course of the Soviet ships, trying to push them away from the aircraft carrier. The Reds talk about the excellent handling and 32-knot speed of the 68-bis cruiser.
Was it a justified decision to send old artillery cruisers to intercept the AUG? The dispute can be endless …
The personal author's point of view is as follows: with a preventive (or at least simultaneous) receipt of a signal about the beginning of a war, artillery cruisers of the USSR Navy had a great chance to lay a volley across the flight deck of an aircraft carrier and, possibly, damage / destroy several smaller escort ships.
The rate of fire of the guns is too high, and the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier is too high.
And then, the cruiser will die a brave death …
We had no other way then. It was the 1960s, the Soviet Navy had just entered the World Ocean. It was still too weak and primitive in comparison with the mighty US Navy, which has a 10-fold budget and experience in conducting a real naval war in the vastness of the World Ocean.
And, nevertheless, our fleet behaved well! That year, off the coast of Libya, Soviet sailors were able to competently demonstrate their intentions and thus win a convincing bloodless victory.
As for the effectiveness of using artillery in modern naval combat, its advantage over rocket weapons becomes obvious only when providing fire support and shelling the coast.
