The second attempt to liberate Kharkov was made in May 1942. As a result of the Barvenkovo-Lozava operation, the Soviet command failed to liberate Kharkov in January 1942, but a Barvenkovsky ledge 90 km deep and 100 km wide was created south of Kharkov, on the western bank of the Seversky Donets River. The ledge wedged deeply into the German defenses, but at its base in the Izyum area there was a narrow throat, from the north the Germans hung from Balakleya and from the south from Slavyansk. With the beginning of the spring thaw in March, active hostilities on both sides were suspended and the opposing sides began to prepare for the spring-summer operations.
Plans of the Soviet and German command
The Soviet Supreme Command Headquarters proceeded from the fact that the Germans would advance on Moscow, and Hitler was preparing Operation Blau, which assumes an offensive in the south of the Soviet-German front with the aim of breaking through to the oil fields in the Caucasus.
The Soviet command at a meeting in the Kremlin at the end of March considered the proposals of the commander of the South-West direction Timoshenko and approved the campaign plan for the spring-summer of 1942. In order to secure Moscow from the German offensive from the south, it was decided to launch an offensive from the Barvenkov salient and liberate Kharkov, destroy the encircled German troops in this area, regroup the forces and attack Dnepropetrovsk and Sinelnikovo from the north-east. The Southwestern Front was supposed to liberate the city from Kharkov with the help of converging blows from the north and south.
The southern front under the command of Malinovsky was not supposed to advance, it was tasked with strengthening on the occupied lines and ensuring the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front in the Kharkov direction with its right wing. The Soviet command did not foresee the possibility of a German offensive on the Barvenkovo ledge.
North of Kharkov, three armies were attacking: the 38th, 28th and 21st. The main role was assigned to the 28th Army under the command of Ryabyshev. She, in cooperation with the 6th and 38th armies, was also supposed to surround and defeat the forces of the 51st German Army Corps in the Chuguev area southeast of Kharkov.
From the Barvenkovsky ledge south of Kharkov, the 6th, 9th and 57th armies and the army group of General Bobkin delivered a blow to cover Kharkov from the south-west and encircle the 6th German army together with the 28th army advancing from the north. The main role was assigned to the 6th Army and Bobkin's group, which were supposed to advance in the direction of Merefa - Kharkov, cut off German communications west of Kharkov and, having made a breakthrough to the west, take the city of Krasnograd.
According to the plan of the operation, Soviet troops with the forces of the 38th and 6th armies were to take the German troops into the "cauldron" in the Chuguev area, and the second "cauldron" with the forces of the 28th, 6th armies and the Bobkin military group in the Kharkov area. Bobkin's group struck westward in depth, securing the outer front of the encirclement and creating a bridgehead for the attack on the Dnieper.
The offensive from the Barvenkovo ledge was risky, since the Germans could easily organize a "cauldron" for the Soviet troops, cutting the "narrow throat" in the Izyum region, which subsequently happened.
At the beginning of the spring-summer campaign, the German command of Army Group South, in support of Operation Blau, set the task of eliminating the Barvenkovo ledge in the narrow throat with two converging strikes from Slavyansk and Balakleya (Operation Frederikus). From the Slavyansk region, units of the 1st Panzer Army of Kleist and the 17th Army of Hoth were supposed to advance. The troops for this operation began to concentrate in the winter, the German command pulled the 640,000-strong group here.
Thanks to aviation and intelligence, the Germans knew about Timoshenko's preparations for the offensive, and the Soviet command could not fix the concentration of German troops in this direction.
As a result, in March-April 1942, in the Kharkov region, there was a real race to prepare offensive operations directed against each other, and the question was who would start first and whether he would be able to outplay the enemy.
The beginning of the Soviet offensive
Soviet troops were the first to launch the offensive. On May 12, after a powerful artillery barrage, they launched an offensive from the north and south of Kharkov. For the Germans, who themselves were preparing to launch an offensive on May 18, this anticipatory strike was still unexpected.
On the northern flank, the 28th Army, advancing in the Volchansk region, broke through the German front to a depth of 65 km and by May 17 came close to Kharkov. An artillery cannonade was already heard in the city and everyone was waiting for a speedy release. On the southern flank, the strike group operating from the Barvenkovo ledge also broke through the front and, having gone 25-50 kilometers deeper, reached Merefa and Krasnograd, semi-encircling the latter, creating a threat to encircle Kharkov from the west.
On the northern flag, the troops of the 28th Army reached the suburbs of Kharkov, but the Germans transferred additional forces to this area from the southern flank and used forces that were preparing to strike at the base of the Barvenkovsky ledge. The German command, having superiority in manpower, increased resistance on the northern flank and the Soviet offensive stalled. Fierce battles began between Chuguev and Stary Saltov, from where Soviet troops tried to surround Chuguev. No one wanted to give in, for example, the village of Peschanoe changed hands many times over the course of several days, but the Soviet troops could not advance further.
The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Bock, came out with a proposal to transfer several divisions to him from the 1st Panzer Army, which was preparing to attack the base of the Barvenkovsky ledge, in order to stop the enemy's advance. But this put an end to Operation Fridericus, so he was refused and preparations began for a counteroffensive at the base of the Barvenkovsky ledge.
On the southern flank, the 6th army of Gorodnyansky behaved passively, the commander was in no hurry to introduce the 21st and 23rd tank corps into the breakthrough, and this allowed the Germans to transfer troops to the northern flank and stop the Soviet offensive. Most likely, if a more serious threat of encirclement of Kharkov from the west arose on the southern flank, the Germans would have to withdraw troops from near Slavyansk and transfer them to a threatening direction. But the Soviet command was in no hurry to launch the offensive, lost time and the Germans were able to concentrate troops to strike at the base of the ledge.
In addition, the troops of the Southern Front did not take active action, and the 57th and 9th armies subordinate to the Southern Front, occupying the southern side of the Barvenkovsky ledge, did not even prepare for an active defense. The battle formations of the troops were not echeloned, there was no terrain engineering equipment and the defense depth was only 3-4 km.
In the process of capturing Kharkov, the troops suffered heavy losses, since tanks and infantry often rushed to well-fortified enemy defenses without reconnaissance and suppression by artillery. By May 17, the troops were exhausted by continuous battles and were stopped by the enemy in many sectors of the front.
German counteroffensive
The German counteroffensive began on May 17, Kleist's 1st Panzer Army inflicted two dissecting blows to the rear of the advancing Soviet units, one from Andreevka to Barvenkovo and the second from Slavyansk to Dolgenkaya, with the subsequent exit of both groups to Izyum. The purpose of these strikes was to cut the defense of the 9th Army, encircle and destroy the grouping east of Barvenkovo with a further offensive on Izyum-Petrovskoye in the direction of Balakleya to join with units of the 6th Army on the Chuguevsky ledge and encircle the entire group of Soviet troops on the Barvenkovsky ledge. On the very first day of the offensive, Barvenkovo and Dolgenkaya were captured, in which the communications center of the 9th Army was destroyed, which led to the loss of control of the troops.
At this time, at the forefront of the offensive on the southern flank, the 21st and 23rd Panzer Corps were finally thrown into the breakthrough, which deepened into the German defenses and further broke away from the supply bases that were crushing Kleist's tanks.
By May 18, the situation had deteriorated sharply. Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky proposed to stop the offensive and withdraw the 6th, 9th, 57th armies and the group of General Bobkin from the Barvenkovsky ledge. Tymoshenko reported to Stalin that this danger was exaggerated and the troops continued their offensive. The Germans deployed their troops to the West, took Lozovaya and on May 22 surrounded the remnants of the 57th Army and the 21st and 23rd Panzer Corps that had wedged in. As a result, by May 23 the Germans had closed the encirclement and the entire group was in the "cauldron".
The results of the battles on the Barvenkovsky ledge
5 rifle divisions of the 57th army, 8 rifle divisions of the 6th army, 2 rifle divisions of the Bobkin army group, 6 cavalry divisions of the 2nd and 6th cavalry corps, 2 tank corps, 5 tank brigades and other artillery, engineering, auxiliary units and rear services. These troops were drained of blood, exhausted, subjected to constant air strikes and largely lost their combat power.
The order to retreat was given only on May 25, in the most difficult situation were the troops, which had penetrated deeply to the west into the Krasnograd region. Now the front line was almost 150 km behind them and they had to break through with battles to their own. Not everyone managed to break out of the encirclement; only the most persistent and ready to fight to the end reached the Seversky Donets.
To unblock the encircled Soviet grouping as part of the Southern Front, a consolidated tank corps was formed, which from May 25 began to make attempts to break through the outer ring of the encirclement. Inside the encirclement ring, two shock groups were formed to break through the inner ring. The first group was advancing from the Lozovenka area towards the consolidated tank corps at Chepel. Of the 22 thousand servicemen who went to the breakthrough, only 5 thousand people were able to break through on May 27. In total, by May 30, about 27 thousand people were able to enter the positions of the 38th Army and the consolidated tank corps. The Germans created a tight encirclement ring and, widely using aircraft and tanks, destroyed the remnants of the Soviet group. The bulk of the encircled were killed or taken prisoner, by the evening of May 29, the fighting on the right bank of the Seversky Donets stopped, only a few pockets of resistance remained.
As a result of the May 1942 operation, the second attempt to liberate Kharkov ended in the tragic "cauldron" of Barvenkovo. In the battles near Kharkov, the irrecoverable losses of the Soviet army amounted to about 300 thousand people, there were also serious losses in weapons - 5060 guns and mortars, 775 tanks and hundreds of aircraft. According to German data, 229 thousand people were captured.
The encirclement and subsequent destruction of large forces of Soviet troops in the Barvenkovsky ledge led to the fact that the defense in the zone of the Southwestern and Southern fronts was radically weakened. This made it easier for the German command to carry out the pre-planned operation "Blau" for a strategic offensive on the oil fields of the Caucasus and created the preconditions for reaching Stalingrad and the Volga.
