In modern sources, the counterattack of five mechanized corps of the Red Army in the first week of the war in the Dubno - Lutsk - Brody area is often called the largest tank battle of the Second World War, surpassing the tank battle at Prokhorovka.
In fact, this is not entirely true, near Prokhorovka also on July 12, 1943, there was no oncoming tank battle, as General Rotmistrov later imagined. The Fifth Guards Tank Army launched a counterattack on the well-prepared anti-tank defenses of the enemy and, sandwiched between the embankment of the railway and the floodplain of the river, suffered enormous losses from enemy artillery and tanks. Only at the final stage of the battle, several dozen tanks from both sides participated in oncoming tank battles.
The German command, having fixed in the Dubno - Lutsk - Brody area, the advance of large Soviet tank formations to the Kleist tank wedge, used the tactics not of an oncoming tank battle, but the organization of a solid anti-tank defense, as it was later in the Prokhorov battle.
Plans of the Soviet command
Near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody, from June 24 to July 1, the Soviet mechanized corps inflicted several scattered counterattacks on Kleist's German tank divisions, did not achieve their goal of defeating and destroying the enemy and suffered huge losses mainly from enemy aircraft and artillery. At the same time, there were very few oncoming tank battles; in fact, it was a "shooting" of the Soviet tank formations thrown into the attack.
In contrast to the actions of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, which organized on the Western Front at the same time tank pincers on the flanks of the Soviet grouping in the Bialystok area, which surrounded and destroyed five Soviet mechanized corps, the tank wedge of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group (11td, 13td, 14 td, 16 td), defeating the Soviet troops of the Southwestern Front on the border on June 22 and wedging deep to the east in the Radekhov area, he rapidly advanced to Rovno in an attempt to break through to Kiev.
The General Staff, in its directive on June 22, ordered the Southwestern Front to strike at the enemy grouping that had broken through from the north and from the south in the direction of Lublin, to encircle and destroy the enemy.
On the evening of June 22, a representative of the Headquarters Zhukov arrives on the Southwestern Front, the front headquarters considered it impossible to carry out such an operation and proposed to withdraw troops to the old border and then counterattack. This proposal was rejected and a decision was made to launch a counterattack by three mechanized corps (4th, 8th, 15th) from Radekhov and Rava-Russkaya to Krasnostav and from Vladimir-Volynsky 22mk to Krasnostav not to encircle, but to defeat the enemy during oncoming battle.
The unexpected seizure of Radekhov in the morning of June 23 by the German 11th division and the breakthrough to Berestechko forced the Soviet command to reconsider the previous decision and launch a counterattack not on Krasnostav, but on the wedged-in Kleist grouping in the Brody-Lutsk-Dubno region from the south by forces of 8mk, 15mk and 8td, and from the north by forces 9mk, 19mk, 22mk.
In the area of the counterattack, only 15mk was deployed, the rest of the mechanized corps had to make long marches from 110 km to 495 km to the place of concentration.
Aspect ratio
Sources give different figures for the number of tanks in mechanized corps as of June 22, up to 3,607 tanks. This is most fully and in detail reflected in Drig's book "Mehcorps of the Red Army in battle", on the basis of which 3324 Soviet tanks participated in this battle. Although these figures are also relative, for example, according to the corps corps 8mk Ryabyshev, there were 932 tanks in the corps on the eve of the war. The number of tanks by type and formations as of June 22 is shown in the table.
On the German side, in five tank divisions (SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte" joined in the battle) there were 728 tanks, of which 54 commanders (without weapons), 219 light Pz. I and Pz. II and 455 medium tanks Pz. III, Pz. IV and Czechoslovakian Pz-38.
Soviet tankers had 2,608 light, amphibious and chemical (flamethrower) and 706 medium and heavy tanks. That is, in terms of the number of tanks, the Soviet side had an advantage of 4, 5 times.
In terms of quality, Soviet tanks were not inferior to the German ones, and even surpassed them. The German light tank Pz. I had 13mm armor and two machine guns as armament, Pz. II armor 20-35mm and armament 20mm cannon, Pz. III armor 30mm and armament 37mm cannon, Pz. IV 50mm armor and a short-barreled 75mm cannon. …
Soviet T-26 tanks had 15mm armor and 37 (45) mm cannon armament, BT series tanks 13-20mm armoring and 45mm cannon armament, 45mm armoring T-34 and 76, 2mm cannon armament, 75mm KV-1 armoring and 76 cannon armament, 2mm. In terms of their characteristics, the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks were significantly superior to all German tanks.
Counterstrike on the southern flank
By order of the front headquarters, 15mk, 8mk and 8td were supposed to launch a counterstrike on the southern flank in the direction of Berestechko Dubno on 25 June, but it did not take place due to the unpreparedness of the troops still on the march. Troops from June 26 were brought into battle as they arrived at their initial positions and suffered heavy losses.
The formations that took part in the counterstrike were deployed in different places. Radekhov had only 15mk, stationed in Brody and Kremenets, attached to the 15th mechanized corps 8td was part of the 4mk and deployed in Lvov, and the 8mk was stationed in Drohobych (65 km south-west of Lvov).
By the end of the day on June 22, units of 15mk took up defensive positions at Rodekhov and on June 23-24 tried to take this settlement. On June 24, corps units even broke into Radekhov, but the Germans pulled up artillery, including 88mm Flak anti-aircraft guns, and 15MK, suffering heavy losses in equipment and people, began to retreat.
Reassigned to the 15th mechanized corps, 8td, according to the border cover plan, on June 21 moved to the border in the Dubrovitsy area. By order of Zhukov, on the morning of June 24, she should move to the Busk area, but the commander of the 6th army Muzychenko uses the division in a counterattack near the border town of Magerov, where she lost 19 tanks. Only after that will the division be redeployed to the Zhovkva area to replenish ammunition and by the end of the day on June 26 it comes to the concentration area near Busk, having completed a march of more than 200 km during this time and having lost a significant number of equipment due to malfunctions. On the morning of June 27, she immediately entered the battle from the march.
According to the plan to cover the border, on June 22, 8mk moved to the Yavorov area to launch a counterattack on Krasnostav, on the morning of June 24, he received an order to move east to the Brody area to deliver a counterstrike together with 15mk. The corps, having completed the 495 km march and having lost up to 50% of the equipment due to malfunctions and lack of fuel, did not arrive in full force in the Brody area only at the end of the day on June 25, and on that day it was supposed to deliver a counterattack. Due to the unsatisfactory condition of the corps, the counterattack on Berestechko was postponed to the morning of June 26. Without collecting all parts of the 8mk, he struck a counterattack, met stubborn resistance from the Germans, hiding behind the impassable floodplain of the Slonówka River. The corps' advance was negligible, as it was constantly raided by German aircraft, which destroyed a large number of tanks, vehicles and fuel tanks.
Until the approach of 8mk and 8td, superior enemy forces in the Radekhov and Berestechko area held back 15mk, receiving constantly changing orders from the front headquarters. On June 24, the mechanized corps received an order to concentrate south-west of Brody to deliver, together with 8 microns, a strike in the direction of Berestechko-Dubno. Corps units began to carry out the order, but on June 25 they received an order to return to the old lines and prepare an attack in the direction of Radekhov-Sokal.
On the evening of June 26, the task was set to advance on Berestechko and Dubno together with the 8th Division on the morning of June 27, the corps began to execute the order. However, the front headquarters, fearing a change in the direction of the attack of the German troops, decided to withdraw the mechanized corps from the battle and concentrate them behind the rifle corps. To this end, on June 27, at 2.30, an order was given to the 8mk and 15mk to withdraw from the battle and transfer the positions of 37sk, the corps began to execute the order. Moscow did not approve this order, and at 6 am a new order followed to continue the offensive on Berestechko Dubno. The corps columns were deployed 180 degrees with the task of capturing Dubno.
During June 27, part of the 8mk troops under the command of commissar Popel attacked the enemy in the Verba area and in the evening approached Dubno, reaching the rear of the enemy's 11th division. The main forces of the corps were unable to build on the success of Popel's group and she was surrounded. Fighting heavy fighting in the encirclement during June 28-29, Popel's group suffered heavy losses in men and equipment, and at night on June 29, separate groups without equipment escaped from the encirclement, concentrating southeast of Brody. In the evening of June 29, the front headquarters gave the order to withdraw the remnants of 8mk, 15mk and 8td from Brody Dubno and withdraw them to the front reserve.
Counterstrike on the northern flank
All corps taking part in the counterattack from the northern flank were outside the area of concentration of troops. In the Novograd-Volynsk region (100 km east of Rovno), 9mk were deployed, in the Berdichev region (280 km southeast of Dubno) 19mk, and 22mk in the Rovno region (70 km east of Lutsk) and Vladimir-Volynsk (75 km west of Lutsk).
The actions of 22 MK were aimed at covering the Kovel region, 41td stationed in Vladimir-Volynsk, advanced on June 22 to the Kovel region and took part in border battles, unblocking the garrisons of some pillboxes of the border UR and on June 23 broke into Ustiluga, but retreated under the blows of superior enemy forces in the area of Turopina and did not take part in the counterattack.
Corps headquarters, 19td and 215md were stationed in Rivne.
The front headquarters ordered 22MK to concentrate in the Voynitsa area and on June 24 to strike at Voynitsa and Vladimir-Volynsky and destroy the enemy. Having completed the 110 km march 19td only at 13 o'clock on June 24 came to Voinitsa from the east, having lost 72% of the equipment on the march. The division starts a counterattack on Voinitsa on the move, suffers heavy losses from enemy artillery, loses most of its tanks, and by the morning of June 25 withdraws to the Oderoda line and consolidates there.
Moved out from Rovno to strike from the north on Vladimir-Volynsk 215md, marching 120 km through Rozhitsa, Kovel, Turiysk, only by the evening of June 24 left 8 km north of Vladimir-Volynsk and took the line for the attack. The Germans, having discovered the approaching units of 215md, attacked them with the support of aviation and artillery on the morning of June 25 and threw them back to the north. On this counterstrike 22mk ended in vain.
After the battles at Voynitsa, units of the 22mk corps covered the Rozhitse - Lutsk - Ostrozhets front sector, holding back the enemy rushing to Rovno. The 226th rifle division stationed in Dubno was sent to defend Lutsk, but the Germans, using their advantage in mobility, rushed into Lutsk along the central road on June 25, knocking out a small garrison and did not allow the 226th rifle division into the city.
German tank divisions continued their offensive and on June 28 captured the railway bridge and a bridgehead in the Rozhitsa area. In these battles, the 19td of the 22nd mechanized corps lost almost all of its tanks (16 T-26 tanks remained) and all unit commanders. By order of the front headquarters, 22mk on July 1 went over to the offensive against Dubno and the next day advanced up to 30 km, reaching the Mlynov line, but unexpectedly underwent a counterattack in the rear of the German tank corps of the Leibstandarte division and retreated to the starting line. This 22MK counterattack had limited success and only held back the German advance.
By order of the front headquarters, the 9mk and 19mk were to be redeployed to the Lutsk region and on June 25, a counterstrike by the 9mk from the northeast and the 19mk from the east, together with 36sk, to Mlynov and Dubno, were to be taken and these points were captured. Having completed a 280 km march from Berdichev, 19mk only by the evening of June 25, it concentrated east of Mlynov, and 9mk, having completed a 160 km march from Novograd-Volynsk with a delay, reached the borders of the Ikva River only at night on June 26.
On the morning of June 26, units of the 19mk attacked Mlynov and Dubno on the left flank of the 1st tank group of Kleist, and on the morning of June 27th, they also struck the 9mk. Fierce battles lasted for two days, 19MK tankers broke into the outskirts of Dubno, but were knocked out by the enemy. The Germans began to bypass the tank divisions from the flanks, the corps suffered heavy losses and, under threat of encirclement, by the evening of June 27, began to retreat beyond the Goryn River. Despite the unsuccessful counterstrike of 9mk, he seriously eased the position of 19mk and did not allow it to be surrounded.
The front command demanded to continue the corps offensive, but they did not have the strength to do so. Still, the 9mk went on the offensive on July 1 and advanced 10-12 km, but due to the superior enemy forces, it could not develop the offensive further and on July 2, the corps received an order to retreat.
After an unsuccessful counteroffensive by 19MK, by the evening of June 29, it fought deterrent battles on the approaches to Rovno, the German 11th Division broke through to Ostrog and created a threat to encircle the corps. The corps commander ordered the evening of June 28 to leave Rovno and gain a foothold on the Goryn River. In view of the threat of a breakthrough by the Germans to Zhitomir, the commander of the 16th Army Lukin on June 25 organized a mobile group of 109md, which did not manage to leave for the Western Front, and sent it to Ostrog.
Part of the 5mk 109md redeployed from Siberia to the Kiev military district and on June 18 disembarked in Berdichev. Having completed a 180 km march in the second half of June 26, she took up positions on the outskirts of Ostrog, which the Germans had already taken. On the morning of June 27, without artillery preparation, the artillery was still on the march, began a counterattack on Ostrog and individual units broke into the city center, where fierce battles began. In the second half of the day, the Germans entered the main forces of the 11th division and pushed 109md out of the city across the river Viliya, part of the troops were surrounded. Counterattacks on Ostrog continued unsuccessfully until July 2, the encircled units in Ostrog could not get out and they fell in battle, at the end of the day a retreat from Ostrog began.
In connection with a failed counteroffensive and heavy losses, the front headquarters on July 2 gave the order to stop the counterattacks and withdraw the troops.
Consequences of the counterattack
The counterattack organized by the Soviet command did not achieve the set goal of defeating the enemy; it was only detained for a week in this triangle and thwarted the plan for a breakthrough to Kiev. With this result, the mechanized corps lost 2,648 tanks, after the battle, a negligible number of tanks remained in the corps (8mk - 43, 9mk - 35, 15mk - 66, 19mk - 66, 22mk - 340). The losses of Kleist's tank group were 85 irrecoverable tanks and 200 tanks to be restored. The defeat of almost all mechanized corps in border battles and the loss of almost all tanks led in a few months to their reorganization into tank brigades.
The reasons for the defeat were not in the small number of tanks and their poor characteristics, but in their inept use and inability to competently organize hostilities. The reasons were mainly organizational. The Soviet command, organizing a counterattack, knew very well that only one 15mk was concentrated in the place of its application, and the rest of the mechanized corps needed time to complete the march, in which there would be inevitable losses of equipment, which sometimes actually amounted to 72% of the total available personnel. The mechanized corps arrived in the area of concentration with a delay and not in a full composition, nevertheless, they immediately rushed into battle without reconnaissance of the terrain and the state of the enemy.
It was not possible to organize a powerful counterattack, the actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks for a week in different directions with the dispersal of forces and means and the lack of coordination of actions. On the southern flank, the counterstrike was dealt 15mk - June 24, 8mk - 26 and 27 June, 8td - 27 June. On the northern fang 22mk - June 24 and 25, 19mk - June 26, 9mk and 109md - June 27.
The defeat was also facilitated by the extremely inept organization of tank counterattacks from the front headquarters to the commanders of the subunits, and this in the absence of radio communications at almost all levels of command from the corps to linear vehicles. Tank formations and subunits often acted at random, without realizing the real combat situation. Tankers entered the battle in most cases without proper support from artillery and infantry, or in its complete absence. In addition, only German aviation dominated the air, destroying tanks and means of support, the mechanized corps practically did not receive their aviation support.
Also of no small importance was the inexperience and unpreparedness of Soviet tankers, who did not know how to operate equipment and conduct hostilities. The scanty amount of armor-piercing shells in the tanks or their complete absence is striking, while the command knew that the mechcorns were being thrown against the armada of German tanks.
A serious role in the defeat of Soviet tankers was played by the competent use of anti-tank artillery by the Germans, especially the 88-mm Flak anti-aircraft guns, which shoot all Soviet tanks at long distances.
The losses of tanks were not from oncoming battles with German tanks, but mainly from anti-tank artillery, fire of defending tanks, aviation and technical malfunctions on the march and during the battle. The battlefield was left behind the enemy, so all damaged Soviet tanks went into irrecoverable losses.
The competent organization by the German command of repelling the counterattacks of the Soviet mechanized corps and the inept actions of the Soviet command allowed the enemy to win a convincing victory even with fewer tanks. The Soviet mechanized corps tried to break through the prepared anti-tank defense, the German command moved away from oncoming tank battles, Soviet tanks were destroyed by aviation and artillery, and only then the German tank formations finished off the mechanized corps that had lost their combat effectiveness.
In terms of the number of tanks participating on both sides in the battles near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody, it surpasses all other operations of that war, but it is hardly reasonable to call it a tank battle, tanks practically did not fight against tanks, the German command achieved success in other ways.
