The concept of a new class of armored vehicles - tank support combat vehicles (BMPT) - has been discussed since the early 90s, and have not yet come to a common denominator. In the late 90s, it is not clear from what considerations, two prototypes of the BMPT "Terminator" were developed and manufactured, which were presented as a qualitative leap in the development of armored vehicles. For almost twenty years they were regularly shown at various exhibitions, but they were not in demand in the Russian army. They did not find a customer abroad either.
After testing these machines in real combat conditions in 2017 in Syria, the controversy around the BMPT flared up with renewed vigor, the emphasis shifted, it turned out that there is a completely different field of application for such machines.
When developing the BMPT concept, everything was turned upside down. First, they developed and manufactured prototypes of the BMPT "Terminator", and then began to substantiate the need for such machines and substantiate the tactics of their use.
As a result, they came to the conclusion that this vehicle is necessary for fire support of tanks from close combat anti-tank weapons at a distance of hundreds of meters, the most tank-dangerous of them are ATGM and RPG, which are difficult to detect from a tank. Then, it is not clear by what logic, they added the fight against lightly armored vehicles, which tries to stay as far from the tanks as possible, since the hit of a shell from a tank gun or a rocket blows lightly armored vehicles to shreds. That is, tanks already have an effective means of dealing with lightly armored targets, and BMPTs are not really needed for this.
The article discusses what weapons are most appropriate to use on the BMPT. Of course, one can talk about the armament of this vehicle, but at the same time the main question remains overboard: why do we need an BMPT, what tasks it should solve and what is the tactics of its use.
If for a tank at close range the most tank-hazardous targets are RPG and ATGM calculations, then BMPT should have better instruments and means of detecting small-sized tank-hazardous targets than a tank, have effective weapons for their rapid destruction and more powerful protection against weapons than a tank close combat.
Which of this set is implemented on the BMPT? From the means of detecting targets, only a set of standard tank sights and observation devices, which did not bring anything new to the process of searching for and hitting targets in comparison with a tank.
To destroy targets, two small-caliber 30-mm cannons and a tank 7, 62-mm machine gun are used. The installation of guided missiles also looks far-fetched: they are not needed to defeat small-sized targets, this class of weapons is designed to destroy well-armored equipment at long distances and protected firing points and strong points. On some samples, automatic grenade launchers were used, then they were removed. ATGM and RPG crews to destroy tanks must see their target and aim a rocket at it, so they cannot be behind obstacles. The installation of a grenade launcher, designed to "throw" mines over obstacles, is really not needed to destroy such targets. To reduce the weight and booked volume, the tank gun was removed from the BMPT, which weakened its firepower.
That is, in terms of firepower, the BMPT is significantly lower than the tank. The only advantage is the use of two 30mm cannons. The tank is even better equipped with small arms, it has two machine guns. One of them is large-caliber and with a significantly higher elevation angle. In terms of guided weapons, the tank is many times superior to the BMPT, it does not have four missiles in the ammunition rack, and the entire ammunition load in the automatic loader can contain 22 guided missiles.
As a result, in terms of firepower, the BMPT is significantly inferior to the tank in artillery armament (there is no tank gun), in small arms, guided weapons and is superior only in small-caliber artillery weapons. In principle, work on the installation of 23-mm and 30-mm guns on the tank has already been carried out, and this task can be solved without any problems on the tank, for this it is not necessary to develop an BMPT.
The task of providing the BMPT with more powerful protection than the tank has also not been solved, since the hull of the T-72 tank was taken as the base of the BMPT. Its protection has been slightly increased, but there is nothing fundamentally new.
According to the complex of tasks facing the BMPT, it can be concluded that the task of finding and detecting BMPT targets is solved at the level of the tank and does not exceed it, in providing firepower, the BMPT is significantly inferior to the tank, the advantage is only in small-caliber artillery, and in protecting the BMPT at the level tank.
It should also be noted that the tactics of using BMPTs on the battlefield has not been worked out at all, based on their equipment and tasks to be solved. In what tactical link of the tank forces and in whose subordination they should be, in what combat formations should they be located (in front of tanks, as part of a tank unit or behind tanks)?..
All these problems, apparently, determined the thorny path of the advancement of this machine into the army. The use of BMPT for fire support of tanks in the form as it was created does little. If such a task is worth it, then it should be solved with a different approach to equipping and using armored vehicles.
The use of this machine in a real combat situation in Syria showed that this machine is needed, but for completely different tasks. It turned out that it is necessary as an infantry fire support vehicle in confrontation with the enemy, unable to massively use armored vehicles, and in urban areas. In such battles, the main targets are enemy infantry with small arms, MANPADS and RPG operators, light armored vehicles, artillery and rocket launchers and firing points at short range.
To solve such problems, the vehicle must be equipped with small-caliber and small-caliber artillery weapons to suppress infantry and lightly armored targets, light grenade launchers to engage targets behind obstacles, missile weapons for pinpoint suppression of artillery and rocket launchers and strong points.
Different types of weapons should be untied from each other vertically and horizontally and be able to fire simultaneously in different directions, since the vehicle can be unexpectedly attacked from any direction. Small arms must have elevation angles of at least 75 degrees (45 degrees is not enough) for firing on the upper floors of buildings, as was done when the Utes anti-aircraft machine gun was installed on the tank.
The machine needs "eyes" for reconnaissance of the terrain and identification of targets, and for this the most acceptable UAV, controlled by a separate crew member. The vehicle must have powerful comprehensive protection against the most likely weapons (RPG and ATGM), especially from an attack from above. To solve the tasks assigned to the vehicle, the crew must be at least four people.
From the point of view of the tactics of using an infantry fire support vehicle, it should be in the battle formations of the tactical echelon, company - battalion, under the command of commanders of this level.
The expediency of creating such a machine is obvious, the Syrian events only confirmed this. Such a machine is necessary for use in low-intensity local conflicts and police operations, which are now the majority.
Apparently, BMPT can also find its place in army structures. Before starting the development of such a machine, it is necessary, taking into account the experience gained in the creation of the Terminator BMPT and its tests in combat conditions in Syria, to determine the tasks it faces, the tactics of its use, the requirements for the weapons complex and the protection system, and only then make a decision on creation of such armored vehicles.
