Germany and Austria, in an effort to "squeeze" Poland from the Russians, quite quickly went to a serious liberalization of the occupation regime. But this could hardly have pushed the Poles themselves to fight for complete independence, as before, claiming only autonomy. In an effort to play on the mistakes that Russians made one after another in pre-war Poland, the German occupation authorities opened a Polish university in Warsaw in February 1916, which they did not hesitate to report in the press. Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov had no choice but to answer in the State Duma. In his speech of 22/9 February 1916, he stated:
“From the very beginning of the war, Russia clearly inscribed on its banner the unification of dismembered Poland. This goal, foreseen from the height of the throne, announced by the Supreme Commander, close to the heart of the entire Russian society and sympathetically met by our allies - this goal remains unchanged for us now.
What is Germany's attitude to the realization of this cherished dream of the entire Polish people? As soon as she and Austria-Hungary managed to enter the Kingdom of Poland, they immediately hastened to divide this, hitherto united, part of the Polish lands among themselves, and in order to somewhat smooth out the impression of this new encroachment on the main object of all Polish aspirations, they considered it appropriate to satisfy some of the side desires of the Polish population. Among such events is the opening of the aforementioned university, but we must not forget that in the scope of the proclaimed here, from this very rostrum, at the highest command, the head of the Polish autonomy government naturally includes the Polish national school of all degrees, not excluding the highest; Therefore, one can hardly expect that because of the lentil soup offered to them by the Germans, the Polish people will abandon their best covenants, turn a blind eye to the new enslavement that is being prepared by Germany, and forget their brothers in Poznan, where, under the rule of the Gakatists, for the sake of German colonization, everything is stubbornly eradicated. Polish (1).
As soon as Sazonov's speech appeared in the Union press, Izvolsky hastened to inform St. Petersburg about the completely correct reaction of French newspapers to the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Duma, but he could not help but note that a number of radical publications still succumbed to the influence of the most active part of the Polish emigrants. They considered the promise of "autonomy" insufficient, already demanding the "independence" of Poland. The Russian envoy, giving tribute to the efforts of the French Foreign Ministry to "constrain" the discussion of this issue, admitted that in recent weeks "propaganda in favor of the idea of" independent Poland "not only has not weakened, but has noticeably intensified" (2).
The ambassador reported that censorship bans on this matter are easily circumvented, among other things, with the use of Swiss newspapers, and warned that Russia by the time of the end of the war could face "a strong movement of French public opinion that could cause very serious misunderstandings between us and our ally." … The ambassador recalled the background of the issue, and the recognition of it at the beginning of the war on the French side as a purely internal issue - Russian, which, according to Izvolsky, was due to the enthusiasm among the Poles for the appeal of the Supreme Commander.
However, then the situation changed dramatically - Germany and Austria-Hungary, as an experienced diplomat was forced to admit, not only occupied Poland, but also occupied an obviously more advantageous position in the Polish issue, forcing the Russians to go beyond simple autonomy. In addition, the very real prospect of military conscription on the territory of the former Kingdom of Poland itself gave the Polish question an international character.
“Gradually assimilating … the simple formula of 'independent Poland', the French … obviously do not stop at whether such independence is possible in practice and whether it will primarily benefit Germany. It is very likely that if it is promptly and thoroughly explained to them that "independent Poland" in the shortest possible time can become economically and militarily an instrument in German hands, this will significantly change their view of this matter. But this requires a systematic and skillful impact on the French press, with the expense of significant funds … If at the beginning of the war … almost a solid population of all three parts of Poland loudly expressed their sympathy for Russia and pinned their trust on the success of Russian weapons, now, under the influence of past events and experienced disappointments, these feelings have largely changed. Germany not only gives the population of Russian Poland some of the most valuable advantages for them in the field of language and public education, but promises them the restoration of an independent Polish state”(3).
Then Izvolsky informed the Foreign Ministry about conversations with representatives of the Realist Party, who, recognizing that it was still necessary to preserve the dynastic, economic and military ties between Poland and Russia, were striving not only for the national unity of their homeland, but for "national independence." Referring to R. Dmowski's note, the ambassador in Paris noted that realists have no doubt that the time has come to influence Russia through its allies, although they even imagine a "separate" Polish state with a monarch from the Russian reigning house, connected with Russia by a customs an alliance, but with a separate army, which in the event of war comes at the disposal of the Russian commander-in-chief.
The diplomat warned the Foreign Ministry that Parisian government circles "are beginning to be very worried about the news of Germany's intentions to declare Poland's independence in order to recruit recruits in occupied Polish areas." Izvolsky expressed his conviction that Russian diplomacy should “take care in advance so that local public opinion does not go down the wrong path; otherwise, at a decisive moment, we can easily find ourselves in a real, so important issue, in a dangerous disagreement with our main ally”(4).
Nevertheless, even those completely loyal to the Polish issue, Izvolsky and Sazonov, continue to withdraw from interaction with the same allies in any form. The reaction of Russian diplomacy to the proposal of the French to conduct in response to the German preparations a kind of demonstration of the unity of the allies in an effort to resolve the problem of Polish autonomy is indicative. Even the tonality in which Izvolsky reported this to Petersburg is noteworthy:
“For some time now, the French government has been very concerned about Germany’s efforts through various measures and promises to win Poles over to its side in order to prepare recruits in the occupied Polish regions. in fact, undoubtedly on behalf of Briand, he asked me how, in my opinion, the imperial government would react to the idea of a collective demonstration of the allies in confirmation of the unification and autonomy we had promised to the Poles. I expressed to Cambon in the most resolute manner that such an idea was absolutely unacceptable to us, for Russian public opinion would never agree to transfer the Polish question to international soil. I added that, while giving France complete freedom to decide at her own discretion the question of Alsace and Lorraine, we, for our part, have the right to expect that we too will be given the same freedom in the Polish question. To Cambon's remark that it is possible to find a declaration formula in which Alsace and Lorraine would be mentioned along with Poland, I replied that, in my deep conviction, we could not agree to such a formulation of the question (5).
However, the ambassador himself hastened to reassure the Foreign Ministry, bringing the French Prime Minister's telegram from Cambon to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Maurice Paleologue, where Aristide Briand immediately ruled out any mention of a collective demonstration of the allies:
"You informed me of the intentions of the tsar and the Russian government regarding Poland. The French government knows and appreciates the liberal intentions of the Russian emperor and the declarations made on his behalf at the very beginning of the war. Polish public opinion and restore the recruitment of its troops, we have no doubt that the Russian government will be able to take action on its part and make declarations that can allay the fears of the Polish people and keep them loyal to Russia. the ally will act with the wisdom and liberalism required by the position "(6).
After some time, the pressure of the occupation regime on Polish lands was nevertheless somewhat weakened, and not without reason. Lengthy secret Austro-German negotiations on the Polish question began, which Russian diplomats quickly became aware of. The first messages of this kind came, as might be expected, from Switzerland, where numerous Polish emigrants, for all the diversity of their political views, did not stop active contacts both with each other and with representatives of both warring groups. Let us cite an excerpt from the by no means the first, but extremely revealing telegram No. 7 from the envoy in Bern Bakherakht (apparently - V. R.) to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Neratov on January 18/5, 1916:
“Erasmus Pilz is one of the outstanding contributors to the Polish correspondence established in Lausanne, the direction of which is neutral and rather favorable to us. Pilz said he was in Paris and was received by some French politicians. The main purpose of Pilz's trip was to inform French circles about Polish sentiments and inform them of a fact that, in his opinion, should inevitably happen soon, namely, the declaration by the Germans of the Kingdom of Poland as autonomous under the rule of Austria-Hungary. The purpose of this, according to Pilz, is to recruit the 800,000 Poles capable of carrying weapons there, under the banner, into the army against us. Pilz considers the implementation of this project possible; At the same time, he told me that he personally is an unconditional supporter of Russia and thinks that without us no one can and should not solve the Polish question, and therefore he looks with fear at this new test that lies ahead for his fatherland, and finds it necessary to prevent it. It is difficult here, of course, to check how right Pilz is in the assumption that the Germans will succeed in this project, but that they are courting our Poles according to the news they receive here is undoubtedly”(7).
Less than two weeks later, Bakherakht telegraphed (January 31 / February 13, 1916) to Sazonov that he was visited by much more authoritative Polish representatives - Roman Dmowski and Prince Konstantin Broel-Platter. After a series of meetings with German and Austrian Poles, they only confirmed Pilz's rightness - for the sake of a new military set, the Central Powers are ready to grant the Kingdom broad autonomy or "semi-independence". Moreover, "generally alienate the Poles from us."
Referring to Dmovsky's confessions, Izvolsky wrote:
“The mass of the Polish population has a completely negative attitude towards Germany's flirting, but there is a danger that the German project may succeed. Hunger, partly caused by German measures, can force the population to accept all German plans, provided that the material situation is promised (improved). Dmowski came to the conclusion that it is difficult for Polish leaders, convinced that the salvation of Poland is possible only with the help of Russia, to fight against those Polish elements who work in favor of the German plan, since from Russia, after the occupation of Poland by the Germans, nothing appears so far. to give hope to the Poles that we do not give up the idea of uniting ethnographic Poland. Dmowski thinks that it would be in the interests of the Quadruple Accord to use for direct military purposes the feelings that most Poles have for Russia and its allies. But only Russia can give the Poles an opportunity to fight against German assassination attempts, and for this, according to Dmowski, he and his associates think that Russia should declare to the world that it is fighting not only against the Germans, as its enemies, but as enemies of all Slavs. (eight).
The above-mentioned reporter Svatkovsky very timely informed the Russian Foreign Ministry that a survey was conducted in the Kingdom of Poland, which showed that the entire population of both parts of the Kingdom was resolutely on the side of Russia. Based on the poll, the Austrian and German governments have refused military recruitment. But, as it turned out later, not forever.
Polish public figures, returning from Europe "very inspired", expanded their campaigning work - the French ambassador to St. Petersburg, Maurice Paleologue, fell into their sphere of action.
A diplomat who, under other conditions, could well have become a key figure in resolving the Polish problem, Palaeologus already on April 12, 1916, invited Polish emissaries to breakfast. There was no need to convince the French that the French were loyal to Poland's autonomy - Palaeologus only assured them that Nicholas II "was still liberal towards Poland." Vladislav Velepolsky, in response to these assurances of Palaeologus, remarked:
The aforementioned Prince Konstantin Broel-Platter, at the same time, believed that “Sazonov should take the solution of the Polish question into his own hands and make it international. The French ambassador strongly rebelled against this idea. According to him, “a proposal to make the Polish question international would cause an explosion of indignation in Russian nationalist circles and would nullify the sympathies we won in other strata of Russian society. Sazonov would also sharply oppose this. And Sturmer's gang would raise a cry against the Western democratic power, using the alliance with Russia to interfere in its internal affairs."
Maurice Paleologue reminded the Polish representatives of how the French government treats Poland, but made them understand that "its assistance will be the more effective the less noticeable it is, the less official it will be." At the same time, the Ambassador recalled that “even when viewed as private opinions, their repeated statements (not one of them, not even Sturmer, dared to object to the emperor’s intentions in relation to Poland) create something like a moral obligation that enables the French government in the final decision to speak with exceptional authority”(9).
The fact that we are talking about the prospect of recreating the "Kingdom of Poland" was made by deliberate regular leaks to the press, and on both sides of the front. But immediately after the occupation of Tsarstvo, that is, long before the beginning of 1916, and in fact even before the war, the Russian press, and without outside help, very closely followed the "Polish theme" - in German and Austrian newspapers. It is just that after the Austro-German invasion, those publications were added to them that during the war years continued to be published in the occupied Polish territories. Thus, on October 21 (November 3), Russkiye Vedomosti, with reference to the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten (dated November 1), reported that the chancellor's trip to the main apartment was directly related to the final solution of the Polish question.
On October 23, it was already reported about the lengthy meetings of the Polish colo in Vienna on October 17 and 18, as well as the fact that General Bezeler received the Polish delegation led by Prince Radziwill. Then the same delegation visited Berlin and Vienna.
At the same time, it became known that on October 17, the rector of the University of Warsaw Brudzinsky, the mayor (apparently the burgomaster) Khmelevsky, the representative of the Jewish community Lichtstein, and also a former member of the Russian State Duma Lemnitsky were present at the reception at the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Burian. They were not consulted, but actually confronted with the fact of the already adopted decision on the proclamation of the "Kingdom".
In the meantime, the Russian autocracy stubbornly viewed the "Polish question" as a purely internal one and was in no hurry to implement what the Grand Duke's "Proclamation" had proclaimed. This can be seen at least from the quoted words of General Brusilov, as well as from numerous other sources. However, it was the "Appeal" that served as the starting point for further bureaucratic creativity aimed at whitewashing the very clumsy efforts of the tsarist bureaucracy to resolve the Polish problem. But throughout the entire war, albeit a small, but always decisive part of that very bureaucracy nullifies everything, even timid attempts to implement the noble ideas of the "Appeal".
In the end, around the time of the formation of the "Kingdom", it became clear even to the invariably loyal Endeks that the tsarist government not only did not begin to implement the promised self-government, but also did not take any measures to destroy the long-standing legal restrictions of the Polish people. The great powers still did not consider the Polish nationalists to be equal partners.
And yet, was there a chance to use the "Appeal", for the ideas of which many Russian soldiers and officers shed their blood sincerely, for a real reconciliation between the Poles and the Russians? There was, but those who could implement it clearly did not want this.
Notes (edit)
1. International relations in the era of imperialism. Documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments 1878-1917 M.1938 (MOEI), series III, volume X, p. 398.
2. MOEI, series III, volume X, pp. 398-401.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. MOEI, series III, volume X, pp. 411-412.
6. Ibid, pp. 412-413.
7. MOEI, series III, volume X, p. 23.
8. MOEI, series III, volume X, pp. 198-199.
9. M. Paleologue, Tsarist Russia on the Eve of the Revolution. Moscow, 1991, page 291.
