Let the Dombrowski mazurka burst louder!
In the summer of 1916, the brilliant victories of the Southwestern Front of General Brusilov put Austria-Hungary on the edge of the abyss. The Germans had to abandon attempts to snatch victory at Verdun and urgently save an ally. But in the end, the Russians did not manage to do so much that the possibility of "returning" Poland under the Romanov scepter turned from hypothetical to real. The armies of the Southwestern Front continued to shed blood, but the Western Front simply stood up, and in the Northwestern Front, it was limited to timid skirmishes and reconnaissance.
And this despite the fact that most of the reserves and weapons were received by these fronts, and not by Brusilov's troops. For the Polish question, the time was again not the most suitable time - all the more so since its awakening, in the opinion of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, could "provoke" the Germans and Austrians (1). Most likely, even when the prospect of a protracted war seemed absolutely unrealistic, the success of mobilization, and then the loss of a significant part of the Polish lands, led to the fact that the most influential representatives of the tsarist bureaucracy simply "bored" the Polish question. And I got bored very quickly.
Already in October-November 1914, the Minister of Justice, who headed the State Council I. G. Shcheglovitov, joined by the Deputy Minister of Education Baron M. A. Taube and the Minister of Internal Affairs N. A. Maklakov, declared "the resolution of the Polish question … untimely and subject to discussion only after the end of the war "(2). And although this was the opinion of the minority of the Council of Ministers, it was to him that Emperor Nicholas listened.
Again let us quote one of those who at that time in Russia had "almost" the decisive word. "None of the arguments … convinces me that the time has come," - this was written in May 1916 to Nicholas II by the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers BV Sturmer. Contemporaries testify that the emperor answered his prime minister in almost Polish: "Yes, the time has not yet come." And so on, in the same spirit, until February 1917. But at the same time, in a conversation with the French ambassador Maurice Palaeologus, the tsar continues to draw beautiful projects for the transformation of Europe, in which "Poznan and, perhaps, part of Silesia will be necessary for the reconstruction of Poland."
It must be admitted that the highest circles of Russia still sought to forestall possible steps by Berlin and Vienna to re-create Poland. With a pro-German orientation, of course. But most of the representatives of the Russian political elite still had very little understanding of the direction of the Polish policy of the Central Powers. Meanwhile, both the Hohenzollerns, and especially the Habsburgs, were intimidated by a single independent, independent and potentially strong Poland no less than the Romanovs.
It took the German occupation command a whole year and a half to publish a timid act on the formation of some sort of competent authority. But this Provisional State Council, in which, for the sake of impressiveness, the portfolio of the minister, or rather the head of the military commission, was given to Yu. Pilsudski, was formed only after the proclamation of the "Kingdom" without a king. However, in Poland itself, only by the winter of 1916-1917 did political groupings finally acquire real outlines capable of participating in this body of power.
But before the war, the population of the Duchy of Poznan could not dream of a general governorship (this will repeat itself in history - a quarter of a century later). The German-Polish project, in the event of a successful outcome of the war for the Central Powers, could turn out that it was Poznan, and not Krakow and not Warsaw, that would become the basis for the creation of a Polish state, which would become part of … the German Empire. Well, of course - the idea is quite in the spirit of the global concept of "Mitteleurope" creation.
Now no one doubts that Wilhelm and Franz Joseph (more precisely, his entourage, since he was already seriously ill) came out with the "Appeal" with the sole purpose of arranging new military sets. But, as already noted, this step was preceded by difficult negotiations. The bargaining between Berlin and Vienna dragged on for over a year, and only the poor health of Emperor Franz Joseph made the politicians of the Central Powers become more accommodating. But if little has changed in Germany's position, then, surrounded by the dying crown-bearer, who had been sitting on the throne for almost seven decades, they soberly judged that it might not be in time to divide the Polish pie at all. In the end, no one wanted to give in, but, in order to avoid unpredictable complications, they did not wait for the young Charles to ascend the Habsburg throne - they had to "create" something half-hearted, more precisely "bastard" - you cannot say better than Ulyanov-Lenin (3) …
It was possible to put the Poles under arms only by promising them something more concrete than two general governorships and abstract freedoms … after the war. The persuasive skill demonstrated by the pro-German-minded Polish magnates is simply amazing. In conversations with the courtiers of Schönbrunn and Sanssouci, with representatives of the German generals, they argued that 800 thousand Polish volunteers would appear at mobilization points as soon as the re-establishment of the Polish kingdom was announced.
And the Prussians believed. But the most amazing thing is that such a pragmatist as the German Quartermaster General Erich von Ludendorff believed - if not 800, and not even 500, like the Russians, but 360 thousand volunteers - a prize that is quite worthy of making an appeal, most likely, not binding to anything specific. Noteworthy is the very characteristic German accuracy and pedantry in the forecast prepared for Ludendorff by the officers of the operations department of the German High Command.
But after all, both Ludendorff and the Polish nobility, who had repeated conversations with him, had a good idea that it was impossible to talk about hundreds of thousands of Polish bayonets without Pilsudski's legions. It is no coincidence that this ex-bomber and ex-Marxist was immediately invited to Lublin, to the Governor-General Kuk, and even to Warsaw, to the other Governor-General Bezeller, Piłsudski appeared himself, practically without an invitation.
The brigadier quickly realized that he would not be the commander-in-chief of the Polish army - Bezeler himself hoped to take this post. Despite this, Pan Józef agreed "to cooperate in building the Polish army, without specifying specific conditions" (4). Pilsudski did not express his dissatisfaction with the fact that the military department in the Council did not even receive the status of a Department and endured the need to work in conjunction with almost all former enemies. He has not yet said a hard "no" to the Germans, but he managed to do almost nothing to ensure that the legionnaires and volunteers stood under the German or Austrian banners.
Now is the time to get acquainted with the text of the appeal, which some historians are still ready to consider as a real act of granting independence to Poland.
The Appeal of the Two Emperors
Proclamation of the German Governor-General in Warsaw Bezeler, announcing to the population the appeal of the two emperors for the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland on November 4, 1916.
Inhabitants of the Warsaw General Governorship! His Great German Emperor and his Great Emperor of Austria and the Apostle. The King of Hungary, firmly convinced of the final victory of their weapons and guided by the desire to lead the Polish regions, wrested by their brave troops at the cost of heavy sacrifices from Russian rule, towards a happy future, agreed to form from these regions an independent state with a hereditary monarchy and a constitutional system. A more precise definition of the boundaries of the Kingdom of Poland will be done in the future. The new kingdom, in its connection with both allied powers, will find the guarantees it needs for the free development of its forces. His own army will continue to live the glorious traditions of the Polish troops of the past and the memory of the brave Polish comrades-in-arms in the great modern war. Its organization, training and command will be established by mutual agreement.
The allied monarchs strongly hope that the wishes of the state and national development of the Kingdom of Poland will henceforth be fulfilled with due regard for the general political relations in Europe and the well-being of their own lands and peoples.
The great powers, which are the western neighbors of the Kingdom of Poland, will be happy to see how a free, happy and joyful state of its own national life arises and flourishes on their eastern border (5).
The proclamation was published in Warsaw on November 5, 1916. On the same day, November 5, a solemn proclamation was also made public in Lublin, signed by Cook, Governor-General of the Austro-Hungarian part of occupied Poland.
Immediately after the appeal of the two emperors, on behalf of Franz Joseph, quite unexpectedly, a special rescript is read out, where it is not a question of a new Poland, but, above all, of the independent administration of Galicia.
Rescript of Emperor Franz Joseph to the Minister-President Dr. von Kerber on the formation of the Kingdom of Poland and the independent administration of Galicia.
"In accordance with the agreements reached between me and his great German emperor, an independent state with a hereditary monarchy and constitutional order will be formed from the Polish regions, wrested by our brave troops from Russian rule. about the numerous proofs of loyalty and loyalty that I received during my reign from the Galician land, as well as about the large and heavy sacrifices that this land, subjected to a swift enemy onslaught, suffered during this war in the interests of the victorious defense of the eastern borders of the empire … Therefore it is my will that at the moment when the new state arises, hand in hand with this development, also grant the Galician land the right to independently organize the affairs of their land up to those limits that are consistent with its belonging to the state whole and with the prosperity of this latter, and thus give us the guarantee of Galicia's national and economic development … "(6)
The rescript was dated by the same November 4, 1916, but it saw the light a day later, official Vienna was just a little late in striving, just in case, to stake out "its" Polish province for itself. So that neither the new Kingdom, nor even more so - the Prussians got it. The then philosophy of the Austrian bureaucracy was later clearly reflected in his memoirs by Ottokar Czernin, Foreign Minister of the two-pronged monarchy: “We cheated ourselves already during the occupation of Poland, and the Germans turned most of the Polish territory in their favor. that with each new success they are entitled to the lion's share "(7).
However, the rescript brought some clarity to the question of where and how the Kingdom will be created. There was no doubt that independent Poland was restored only on the Russian part of the Polish lands - there was no question of even including Krakow in it, not to mention Poznan or, the top of the "Polish ambition" - Danzig-Gdansk. At the same time, the Austrians were immediately convinced that Germany adheres to "the point of view that it has the main rights to Poland, and that the easiest way out of the current situation would be to cleanse the areas we occupied" (8). In response, the Austrian command and Viennese diplomacy, as they say, fought to death, and the Germans were able to enter Lublin instead of the Hungarians and Czechs only much later - when the Austrian army began to decay completely.
Austria did not dare to unequivocally declare claims to "all of Poland", and Hungary was against the transformation of dualism into trialism, especially with the participation of "unreliable Poles". The Hungarian prime minister would prefer a German-Polish solution to the issue with certain compensation - in Bosnia and Herzegovina or even in Romania. The last Hungarian aristocracy was ready to be “swallowed up” as punishment for “betrayal” (in Romania, by the way, Hohenzollern was on the throne), and without any compensation to the Austrian part of the empire.
Germany took everything much easier - we will not give up an inch of our land, and the Poles can count on increments in the east. Moreover, they are greatly offended by the Russians, and then by the Austrians in the "Kholmsk question". Let us remind that before the war Russia legally cut the Kingdom of Poland in the eastern part of Grodno and Volyn provinces, Polish, turning them into the "Russian" Kholm, and the Austrians did not think after the occupation to "return" Kholm to the Poles. By the way, and later - at the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, no one wanted to return the Kholmshchina to the Poles - neither the Germans, nor the Austrians, nor the red delegates headed by Trotsky, and even more so, representatives of the Ukrainian Central Rada.
Against the background of such contradictions, the rest of the measures to restore Polish "statehood" were postponed until later - one might think that they were following the example of the Russian bureaucracy. And even what was not implemented, but only proclaimed, the occupation authorities did somehow in a hurry, without taking into account Polish national traditions. There was not even a talk about convening a Diet, later some not entirely clear Regency Council was put together with a stake on Austrian and German representatives. At the same time, it included outspoken conservatives from those who, before the war, unequivocally declared their commitment to Russia - Prince Zdzislav Lubomirsky, Count Jozef Ostrovsky and Archbishop Alexander Kakovsky of Warsaw. It seems that only the real threat that the revolution would spread from Russia to Poland as well, forced them to agree to such open cooperation with the "occupiers".
Everything else is about the same. But the Poles, of course, were not averse to deriving at least some benefit from the "liberation", instead of the dubious prospect of supplying cannon fodder to the Austro-Germans. That is why their military forces worked weakly, which, in the end, led to the famous arrest of Yu. Pilsudski, which the occupation authorities delicately called internment.
Notes (edit)
1. Russian-Polish relations during the First World War, ML., 1926, pp. 19-23.
2. Ibid.
3. V. I. Lenin, Complete. collection cit., v. 30, p. 282.
4. V. Suleja, Józef Pilsudski, M. 2010, p. 195.
5. Yu. Klyuchnikov and A. Sabanin, International politics of modern times in treaties, notes and declarations, M. 1926, part II, pp. 51-52.
6. Ibid, p. 52.
7. Chernin count Ottokar von, During the World War, St. Petersburg. 2005, p. 226.
8. Ibid.
