Warsaw, September 17, 1939: note in the morning, flight in the evening

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Warsaw, September 17, 1939: note in the morning, flight in the evening
Warsaw, September 17, 1939: note in the morning, flight in the evening

Video: Warsaw, September 17, 1939: note in the morning, flight in the evening

Video: Warsaw, September 17, 1939: note in the morning, flight in the evening
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80 years ago, on September 17, 1939, the Red Army's Liberation Campaign began in Poland, culminating in the annexation of the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine to the USSR. On the eve of this date, the discussion about the causes and consequences of the Soviet invasion revived.

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As for the rest, beautiful Warsaw, everything is fine, everything is fine

The famous Polish historian Lukasz Adamski contributed to the discussion, having given a lengthy interview on this topic to the Russian Air Force Service the day before. In order to trace the technology of manipulation used by experts on Russia, let us quote literally Adamsky's point of view on the origins and significance of the Soviet-Polish conflict.

“LA:“At three o'clock in the morning on September 17, the Polish ambassador in Moscow was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. There they read to him the text of a note from the Soviet government stating that the Polish state had ceased to exist, the government had disappeared in an unknown direction. And in this regard, the Red Army is forced to stand up for the representatives of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples who lived in Poland. This was the version of the USSR.

And the Polish history textbooks emphasize that in fact, at the time when the Soviet note was handed to the ambassador, half of Poland had not yet been occupied by the Nazis. Kept the defense and the capital - Warsaw. The Polish government and the command of the army were in the country.

The textbooks emphasize that the Polish ambassador in Moscow refused to accept the USSR note precisely because the events in it were presented incorrectly. It was the invasion by the USSR and the threat of falling into Soviet captivity that then forced the president and the government of Poland to flee the country. Late in the evening of September 17, they crossed the Polish-Romanian border."

And now we give the text of the note of the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

“The Polish-German war revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish state. Within ten days of military operations, Poland lost all of its industrial areas and cultural centers. Warsaw as the capital of Poland no longer exists. The Polish government has disintegrated and shows no signs of life. This means that the Polish state and its government have virtually ceased to exist. Thus, the agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland were terminated."

Warsaw, September 17, 1939: note in the morning, flight in the evening
Warsaw, September 17, 1939: note in the morning, flight in the evening

It is obvious that Pan Adamskiy expounds this most important document, to put it mildly, incorrectly. The Soviet side did not claim that the Polish government had disappeared in an unknown direction, but stated that it did not control the situation in the country, and the fact (on which Adamsky emphasizes) that the members of the Polish government and the army command were physically in the country did not. refutes this thesis.

Even if Warsaw had not fallen under the onslaught of the Wehrmacht by this time, the Soviet side in its note quite reasonably noted that the capital of the state had ceased to fulfill its function, since there was no longer either the president, or the government, or the supreme commander in chief. According to the NKID, the Polish state actually ceased to exist. It is possible, of course, to dispute such a conclusion; at the same time, it must be admitted that at that moment Moscow had every reason for such an assessment of the situation.

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Adamsky insists that it was the invasion of the Red Army that forced the Polish leadership to leave the country. In support of his conclusion, the historian builds a simple temporary reconstruction: at three in the morning on September 17, the Polish ambassador to Moscow was summoned to the people's commissariat, and "late in the evening" of the same day, Polish politicians crossed the Romanian border. Almost according to the fitter Mechnikov: in the morning - a note, in the evening - flight.

That is, until three o'clock in the morning on September 17, the Poles were doing fine: in the third week of the war, politicians and military leaders had not yet fled, the Germans had not yet taken Warsaw, the Wehrmacht captured only half of the country, however, it occupied Krakow, Brest and completely surrounded Lviv … A little more, and Hitler will have to surrender.

Everything as usual. Who is to blame and what to do?

But then the insidious Soviets intervened, and mighty Poland, prepared to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy, crumbled like a house of cards. Meanwhile, on September 9, the Polish government began negotiations with France on asylum, and on September 16, negotiations began with the Romanians on the transit of Polish leaders to France.

By that time, the country's gold reserves had already been transferred to Romania and the evacuation of military units began. It turns out that it was not at all the Liberation campaign of the Red Army that became fatal for the fate of the Polish state.

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It is curious that Lukasz Adamsky is the deputy director of a certain Center for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Accord, but at the same time he is prohibited from entering the Russian Federation. Similar paradoxes permeate his judgments, which are unlikely to promote dialogue and harmony between peoples.

The Polish historian tries to look impartial, but then he seems to catch himself up and makes adjustments that nullify these attempts. So, Adamsky admits the fact of Poland's participation in the partition of Czechoslovakia and even calls it a dirty act, but immediately notes that this "happened not with Hitler, but in parallel with the actions of Germany." A joke, and nothing more.

Adamsky seems to recognize the leading role of the USSR in the defeat of Nazi Germany, but immediately clarifies that "the Western allies tried to save the blood of their soldiers, but the USSR did not save, and this brought the end of the war closer." What does it mean? If the civilized Anglo-Saxons did not "save blood", then they would certainly have made a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazism, but this was not needed, because the Russians did not spare human lives under the conditions of the "inhuman totalitarian regime".

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Such is the blatant injustice that must be reckoned with. “In Warsaw, they tried to keep an equal distance from both Hitlerite Germany and the USSR,” Adamsky asserts.

The key word here is "tried." We tried, but it turned out badly. Like the Polish historian himself, who tries to portray conscientiousness and objectivity, but every now and then strays into journalistic bias and inappropriate moralizing.

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