The embrace of the Emperor Napoleon turned out to be too harsh for both Alexander I and for Russia as a whole. No matter what historians say, they continue to assure the public that all the wars with France our country and people had to wage in the interests of England. But, at least in the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russians were not defending English interests, but above all their own freedom. Even if it was the freedom not to accept French social innovations, no matter how progressive they may seem.
Of course, it is hardly worth arguing with MI Kutuzov, who is still in the Tarutino camp, in a rather heated dispute about the role of the allies, as if on purpose publicly declared to one of the generals: “We will never agree with you, my dear boy, do you think only about the benefits of England, but for me, if this island goes to the bottom of the sea today, I will not ooh. The field marshal could well count on the fact that the British military representative at the Russian headquarters, General Wilson, would become aware of this conversation, and he would not hesitate to report everything to London.
And to make this happen for sure, Kutuzov near Maloyaroslavets decided to open up with the English general himself, whom he actually considered a personal enemy. The field marshal admitted to Wilson that he sees the task not in destroying the enemy, but only in driving him out of Russian borders and in refraining from further hostilities.
“I am not at all convinced whether the complete destruction of the Emperor Napoleon and his army would be a great boon for the universe. His inheritance will go not to Russia or some other of the mainland powers, but to the power that now dominates the seas, and then its dominance will be unbearable."
It seems that Kutuzov was slightly ahead of N. M. Karamzin, who later wrote:
“I will never forget my sorrowful forebodings, when I, suffering in a serious illness, heard about the campaign of our army … special benefits for themselves."
They later tried to develop Karamzin's idea that it was not even worth getting into a European squabble in semi-official opuses about the war of 1812 and the wars with Napoleon. But do not forget that this was written after the Crimean War, at the height of the confrontation with both France and England.
But for the then Russian emperor, England, by definition, had not yet become the main geopolitical rival. After all, Alexander, not without reason, considered himself a real heir and follower of his grandmother, thought in somewhat different categories of a European concert, in which the refrain "rule Britain" was by no means always present. So "rule the seas", and on European land, as under Catherine the Great, no cannon should fire without the knowledge of Russia.
A reluctant ally
After Tilsit and Erfurt, it so happened that France had to be reconciled so far, but Alexander did not immediately make it clear to Napoleon how he was mistaken in his attitude. This will happen later - in 1812, when the French emperor believed that his Russian enemy, just like after Austerlitz and Friedland, would not withstand his pressure. But Alexander held out.
However, before that, Russia still had to seriously play as an "ally". Vienna, where at some point they decided that it was finally possible to take revenge on Napoleon who was stuck in Spain, introduced its army to Bavaria. Napoleon was quick to "drop everything" in Spain and get serious about business in central Europe. And he immediately demanded support from a new ally.
Perhaps Russia in 1809 had an alternative - to break with France and support the Austrian Emperor Franz in his adventure. But at that moment she was very much bogged down in two wars at once - with Turkey and Sweden. From the point of view of our own interests, it was much more important to complete them victoriously than to poke our nose into Europe again.
After consulting with the members of the Secret Committee, Alexander decided that for now it is possible to simply, as they say, "serve the number." In this, the emperor was immediately supported by Admiral Shishkov, who understood that Russia would not have enough strength for a new battle with the French. However, Alexander nevertheless sent troops to Poland, which caused real delight among his Polish friend Adam Czartoryski, who was frankly inspired by the fact that Russian regiments and soldiers of the newly-minted Duchy of Warsaw would be able to act in one formation against the Austrians.
They, in general, did act, although General Golitsyn was just "serving out the number." After the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand defeated the Poles at Raszyn and occupied Warsaw, the main actions took place around Sandomierz. The Poles recaptured Warsaw, even took Lublin and Lvov, but they had to leave Sandomierz.
The Russians never came to their aid and even helped to restore Austrian administration in some places on the ground. The future Napoleonic Marshal Jozef Poniatowski, who headed the Polish army, simply handed over to Golitsyn the entire right bank of the Vistula, but at the walls of Krakow, which the Austrians left, trying to get closer to the main army, the company was practically over.
Poniatowski, after not receiving support from the Russians, in principle, was also ready not to escalate. Moreover, Napoleon and Archduke Charles beat each other at Regensburg, and then at Aspern, but so far without result. As a result, everything, as you know, ended in a bloody battle at Wagram, which Napoleon won with great difficulty. And some passivity of Poniatowski, it seems, was not least due to the fact that the army of Archduke Ferdinand was actually led by Prince Schwarzenberg - his old friend.
Having concluded the Schönbrunn Peace with Austria, Napoleon deprived her of access to the Adriatic, turning present-day Slovenia and Croatia into the Illyrian provinces of his empire. He thanked Alexander for his "participation" in the war with the Tarnopolsk District, while the Duchy of Warsaw was replenished with Western Galicia, inhabited mainly by Rusyns, who always considered themselves simply Russians.
Anyone who continues to argue that Alexander actually forced Napoleon into direct confrontation is simply underestimating the ambitions of the French emperor. In addition, such a view does not take into account the direct interests of the then French elite, both military-political and economic. And these interests simply demanded a strike to the east. Where no one was going to reckon with these interests.
It was Napoleon who, starting from the second half of 1810, was preparing for war with the intractable northern colossus. And the point is not only and so much in the notorious Continental system. Russia and without the support of England, without being pushed in the back from London, nourished by millions of pounds, could not and did not want to sink into the position of a junior partner of the great French empire.
In the thunderstorm of 1812
It only seems that after Tilsit, Erfurt and the strange war of 1809, Russia could calmly accumulate economic and cultural forces, improve the army, and begin to weaken internal contradictions, having carried out long-overdue reforms.“The Thunderstorm of 12 Years” and therefore led to the people's, Patriotic War, because the people, following their sovereign and the elite that had not yet completely separated from him, felt that it could be a question of something like a new yoke or, rather, a Polish-Swedish invasion in the years of turmoil.
It was not just that the people took on their shoulders the burden of fighting the invaders, it was not just that they joined the militia and shed blood in battles and campaigns. The Russian tsar himself was not so much eager to intervene in European affairs as he strove through a great victory to finally gain a foothold on the throne, which not so long ago fell to him so unexpectedly and strangely.
Of course, the British made great efforts to draw Russia into the next coalition. But both the British monarchy and the British politicians of the first row did not even deign to condescend to personal meetings with Alexander I. And he could not like this in any way. No matter how much someone wanted to put the Russian emperor in the role of some sort of not quite, say, an independent strategist, he, already starting with Tilsit and Erfurt, undoubtedly acted without any regard for anyone else.
Even the same Secret Committee is for Alexander Pavlovich, it seems, nothing more than an office, where you can add polish and legitimacy to any of your own decisions. The fact that he would still have to fight against Napoleon, Alexander, most likely, realized just after complicity in the war against the Habsburg empire - a potential ally. And, probably, he would very much like to fight again with the French on enemy territory.
It did not work, although mainly because it was very necessary to get rid of both the Turks and the Swedes. The latter, in the end, despite the loss of Finland by them, Alexander managed to completely pull into the next anti-Napoleonic coalition. And this is in the presence of Bernadotte, already declared heir to the Swedish throne. Incidentally, a French marshal and a relative of Napoleon himself. As you know, the Gascon Bernadotte and the brother of the emperor Joseph were married to the sisters of Clary - the daughters of a merchant from Marseilles.
By 1812, Alexander had long ago humbled his military ardor, preferring quiet victories in diplomacy. But he managed to generate in his French opponent a lot of doubts about friendship and loyalty. And Napoleon already saw in him only an enemy, and at that time both more dangerous and more accessible than England. The invasion was inevitable.
By the time Napoleon had already pulled his 600 thousand in the Great Army to the Russian border, the Russians had managed to collect no more than 220 thousand beyond the Neman. There was a long way to go for an increase. Admiral Chichagov was pulling up his army from the Danube, replacing Kutuzov, who defeated the Turkish army at Ruschuk in time, and in the north one could expect reinforcements for Wittgenstein's 1st corps.
Alexander, who, while still under Austerlitz, soberly appreciated his own military leadership talents, leaves Barclay da Tolly as commander-in-chief. He does not accept the battle in the Drissa camp, tries to advance near Smolensk, and constantly deftly evades the attacks of Napoleon. Already in Smolensk, Napoleon expects peace proposals from the Russians, but Alexander, to his surprise, is firm. How firm he will be after leaving Moscow, when both his mother and Tsarevich Konstantin, and almost all of his closest advisers asked him to make peace.
A number of researchers are not averse to reproaching Alexandra for this firmness, and for the fact that he tried not to remember the disasters of that war. "To what extent the sovereign does not like to remember the Patriotic War!" - Baron Toll notes in his notes. “Today is the anniversary of Borodin,” he reminded the emperor on August 26, 1815; Alexander turned away from him with displeasure.
Perhaps a lot here is due to the fact that in 1812 Alexander did not have to shine at the head of the allied forces, as it was later in the Foreign campaign. And he was never in the army, leaving it to Kutuzov, whom he did not love, but either by instinct or instinct he realized that now only he can replace the unpopular Barclay. While the war was on the territory of Russia, the emperor preferred to be away from the army, mainly in St. Petersburg.
At the same time, it cannot be said that someone forced him to entrust the command to people more experienced in military affairs. And only when the enemy was finally defeated, and the Russian army approached the borders, the emperor decided to appear in the main apartment, in Vilna. Here Alexander, with all his behavior, made even Kutuzov feel that his time had come. However, before that, the autocrat had to go for something completely different - to turn to the people for help.
As soon as the French crossed the Niemen, Alexander went to Moscow. And although the arrival of the Orthodox sovereign in the capital city turned into a real triumph, what he experienced there most likely reminded Alexander of humiliation. He actually had to ask for something from his loyal subjects. But only the people, having joined the militia, or gone to the partisans, could give, and as a result, gave their sovereign that very reinforcement, which was so lacking at the time of the Napoleonic invasion.
Subsequently, in rescripts and in official propaganda, Alexander I more than once thanked his subjects, but with the expulsion of the French, he immediately tried to emphasize the role of Divine Providence. The victory over Napoleon was simply declared a miracle, and the main slogan even on the medals was "Not for us, not for us, but for Your name!"
The mystic king quite unequivocally hastened to separate himself from the people, the emperor, as the anointed of God. The power of the sovereign of all Russia is from God, and nothing more! Russia, as the bearer of the only true Orthodox faith, now had to go to liberate Europe from the atheist foe.
