We have dates in Russia that the country does not celebrate. And he doesn't even remember. These are the dates of the tragic mistakes of the military and / or political leadership. Such blunders are especially costly in the fight against terrorists.
We believe that such failures should be especially kept in mind. And disassemble them in detail. It’s not just to find out, but who was actually responsible for the death of our guys, as well as the fact that the terrorists were then “helped” to leave from above? It is also important to remember such tragedies, first of all, so that such things never happen again.
And further. For the sake of the blessed memory of the guys who died heroically in that battle …
January 18, 2021 marks exactly 25 years of the tragedy near the village of Pervomayskoye. Perhaps, today, after a quarter of a century, it is already possible to speculate on the topic of who, at the top, would then benefit from “letting go” of the leaders of the terrorists? Could it be that the ardent liberals in power then helped Raduev to leave?
After rereading the eyewitness accounts once again, we tried to reconstruct the course of events on the eve of that fatal battle.
Lies of Yeltsin
So, on January 18, 1996, the twenty-hour evening Vesti conveyed the words of Boris N. Yeltsin:
“I tell all journalists: the operation in Pervomaiskoye is over. With minimal losses of both the hostages and ours.
Banditsif only someone hid underground, destroyed all.
82 hostages were released, 18 were missing.
That is, they could hide somewhere, run somewhere. We must still consider them alive, we must look. Now the search groups have been specially created, and remain there, and for two days they will be engaged only in this work."
It seems to be the speech of the first person in the state, but there is not a word of truth in it. Why and why did he lie then? What did those in power hide from the people in those fateful days?
Why was there no single command center and coordination of the actions of the units in the hostage rescue operation? Why were elite counter-terrorism units ordered to dig trenches instead of capture? Why was a possible assault on the militants canceled many times? And why did the terrorists know about every step of our soldiers? And for some reason ours did not even have the same radio frequency?
Let's remember how it all happened.
A Chinese proverb says:
"They feed the troops for a thousand days, but use one minute."
But when such a moment comes, a lot can depend on the soldier. If not all.
“On January 9, 1996 at 9.45 in accordance with the instructions of the Director of the FSB of Russia, General of the Army MI Barsukov. the personnel of directorate "A" was raised on alert to receive further instructions."
This fateful moment came for them exactly 25 years ago in January 1996. When our guys fought in the village of Pervomayskoye.
At the time, Russia was worn out by terrorist intimidation and atrocities. The people already dreamed of the end of the war and the defeat of the militants. But the elites were then so far from the people that they threw the guys into that battle with the thugs, completely leaving them without warm clothes and food.
Of course, the defeat was followed by exclamations:
"Who is to blame?"
"The intelligence of their terrorists?"
"Or the stupidity of our generals?"
"And, maybe, all the same, snickering politicians?"
Be that as it may, one should not think, of course, that only generals and colonels bear full responsibility for that unsuccessful operation.
Chubais knows
Undoubtedly, the politicians of that Russia also had a hand in the sad turn of events at that time.
How did they stigmatize and exterminate the army with their sweeping seven-mile reductions, conveyor conversion and sheer begging of the officers?
If we are not to blame those who deliberately destroyed the army and the special services (possibly on the orders of the West), then who?
Yeltsin's Kremlin? And his liberal, almost completely westernized team?
And let's, for the sake of interest, remember a couple of names from those who were then at the very top in that fatal January for our guys.
So, January 1996.
The first government of Viktor Chernomyrdin is in charge. Until January 16, 1996, his first deputy chairman was Anatoly Chubais (from January 25, Vladimir Kadannikov takes over this post). Deputy Chairpersons - Alexander Shokhin (until January 5) and Sergey Shakhrai. Until January 10 - Minister without portfolio Nikolai Travkin. Until January 5, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and since January 9 - Yevgeny Primakov. Defense Minister - Pavel Grachev. Minister of Emergency Situations - Sergei Shoigu. Interior Minister - Anatoly Kulikov.
Until January 15, the Presidential Administration is headed by Sergei Filatov, and from that date by Nikolai Egorov (who will be replaced by the unsinkable Anatoly Chubais in the same post by the summer of 1996).
The State Duma on January 17 was headed by Gennady Seleznev. Until this date, Ivan Rybkin was in this post throughout the first half of January.
In addition, let us also recall that 1996 was the year of the re-election of the president in Russia. In this connection, in Moscow in high offices there was a dominance of American consultants. As they say, they (Western curators) were swarming with the authorities everywhere.
As you can see, January 1996 was a month of constant reshuffling in the highest echelons of power. And everyone (of both those who leave and those who come), probably, really wanted to steer enough then. Who exactly of the then high-seated officials in Moscow put their 5 kopecks into the tragedy in Pervomayskoye, today we can only guess.
Perhaps the West itself was also interested in escalating the conflict?
After all, in essence, who, if not the West, benefits from terrorism by itself? Who, if not the Americans, is ready to train and nurture these very "puppets" -terrorists in order to keep entire peoples, countries and even continents in fear and numbness? After all, one can, in essence, now speak openly about a kind of cloning of terrorism as a phenomenon and phenomenon in separate "educational laboratories" of specific Western states. Is not it?
How else can they intimidate the rapidly impoverished civilian population? Viruses and terrorists - it's simple and fast. Well, that's by the way.
In other words, until we understand the main thing - who can / could benefit from it, we will not be able to find answers to all the above-mentioned questions either.
Thus, in order to understand what happened that day, not behind the scenes in Moscow, but in reality - there, in Pervomayskoye, let us turn to specific documents and testimonies.
How it was?
Here is a quote from the Group A special reporting folder:
“According to primary information, a group of 300 militants armed with small arms, firing at civilians, took hostage about 350 people in a hospital in Kizlyar, Republic of Dagestan. At the same time, the militants attacked the helipad of the city of Kizlyar, as a result of which 2 helicopters and a tanker were destroyed, and a residential building was also seized."
Each hour can be restored in chronological order.
Chkalovsky
"At 11:30, one hundred and twenty employees headed by Major General Gusev A. V., having with them weapons, special means and protective equipment, equipment necessary to perform the tasks of freeing the hostages, left for the Chkalovsky airfield."
Makhachkala
12:00. The personnel arrived at the airport and at 13:00 on two Tu-154 planes flew to Makhachkala on a special flight. At 15:30 and 17:00 the planes landed at the Makhachkala airport.
At 20:00 the personnel arrived in a vehicle at the FSB department of Makhachkala, where the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center of the FSB of Russia, Colonel-General V. N. brought the operational situation at the current moment."
Kizlyar
"At 01:20 on January 10, upon the arrival of two armored personnel carriers, the convoy began to move to Kizlyar, where it arrived at 5:30."
So, the Alpha fighters arrived in Kizlyar to free the hostages.
But by that hour, for some reason, the militants were “released” by decision of the leadership (republican or federal). In fact, our guys found there only the tail of a line of buses with terrorists leaving the city with hostages.
The fact is that the Dagestani official authorities (according to one version. And according to the other, the federal authorities) decided to release the terrorists from the city hospital and, moreover, ordered them not to obstruct them, but to guarantee them a quiet passage all the way to the border with Chechnya. Allegedly, for this the bandits intended to release the hostages at the border.
Around the time Alfa arrived in Kizlyar (exactly at 6:40), the terrorists with hostages had already started from the city in two KamAZ trucks provided to them and in a pair of ambulances, as well as in nine more buses. The abandoned hospital was mined by terrorists.
Who foiled the assault?
Of course, they were not released on all four sides. Escort was organized. In other words, a chase.
But the trouble was that the leadership of the hostage rescue operation was constantly changing plans.
At first, it was planned to block the convoy along the route of the bandits and free all the prisoners.
To be honest, this plan was quite risky. Indeed, among the captives there were several VIPs of Dagestan, including the deputies of the republic. Moreover, the terrorists had not one bus, but 9. Plus 2 KamAZ trucks and 2 ambulances. There are 13 vehicles in total.
It is hard to imagine what kind of howl would then rise in Western countries and throughout Europe if at least one of the hostages had died. And in this situation, it would have happened without fail. There weren't just two or three bandits. And they were not armed with sabers. They had grenade launchers, machine guns and machine guns.
Operation management is understandable. It was hot in the Caucasus then, the situation was tense, blood was pouring. Of course, the managers rushed about.
In other words, no one stopped Raduev or his pack of terrorists. The go-ahead for the blocking never came.
The bandits reached the border village of Pervomayskoye without hindrance. There they took more hostages. This time, the Novosibirsk riot police from the checkpoint were captured. The bandits took away their weapons. This is according to one version.
Another version looks like this.
It is believed that the Raduevites organized almost the seizure of Pervomaisky. But in fact, there was no assault. The fact is that a checkpoint of a special militia detachment (from Novosibirsk) was then located near the village. And the convoy with militants and hostages was accompanied not by anyone, but by a local resident. It was a colonel of the local militia who appeared on TV.
This very local then approached the commander of the riot police and invited them to peacefully lay down their arms. Which they did. It is known, however, that not all surrendered. Some part of the riot police then refused to surrender to the bandits, and withdrew with weapons. After that, the militants collected the policemen's weapons. And those who surrendered were added to the hostages. The terrorists themselves entered the village of Pervomayskoye. That, in fact, looked like, according to eyewitnesses, the whole procedure of the alleged capture of the village by militants.
Let us remind once again how the people of Raduev got to Pervomayskoye.
As follows from the report of the group "A" (service), at first it was planned to capture the militants in the direction of movement.
“In the course of further negotiations, the commander of the militants, Raduyev, put forward demands to provide an opportunity for the convoy to enter the territory of Chechnya, where he promised to release the hostages. In this regard, the command headquarters "A" developed a variant of carrying out an operation to free hostages along the route."
A special scenario for capturing bandits was even developed.
"The plan of the operation provided for blocking the convoy with armored vehicles, destroying terrorists with sniper fire and blowing up KamAZ vehicles loaded with weapons and ammunition, persuading terrorists to surrender their weapons and release the hostages."
For this, a group that arrived from Moscow worked out in detail the task:
“The personnel of the“A”department carried out a reconnaissance of the area and selected possible locations for the operation. The unit was assigned a combat mission and worked out a communication and interaction scheme, calculated forces and means."
As expected, the bandits changed their plans. Raduev will renounce his words. Instead of the promised release of hostages, the terrorists will capture new ones. The bandits decide to gain a foothold in the village of Pervomayskoye. For this, firing points are equipped.
Here we turn to the recollections of the officers.
One of them is the Hero of Russia, Colonel Vladimir Vladimirovich Nedobezhkin. At that time, he commanded a detachment of army special forces, which was in Khankala before these events.
The commander of the United Group of our troops, General Anatoly Kulikov, assigned Nedobezhkin's unit the task of storming buses with militants and hostages on the way to Chechnya. The paratroopers were supposed to land and block the site of the operation, and Nedobezhkin's group was to storm the buses, neutralize the militants and free the hostages.
The colonel recalls that on that day everything was ready for the capture. Army special forces were waiting for the bandits just across the bridge. Suddenly…
“Further events began to develop not according to our scenario. A column of militants with hostages passed through the village of Pervomayskoye. Behind the village there is a bridge over a ditch, and then the territory of Chechnya begins.
Suddenly, the crews of our two MI-24 helicopters launch a missile attack on this bridge.
The column (of the bandits) immediately turns around and returns to Pervomayskoye back."
So who gave the command to the helicopter pilots in front of the very nose of the column to destroy the bridge on the way to the place where our people were already waiting for Radulov?
It is clear that if the assault on the column was nevertheless carried out according to the plan / option of General Kulikov, then, firstly, our guys would not have to freeze for a week in the trenches in the vicinity of Pervomaiskoe. And secondly, there would definitely be annoying losses, both among the hostages and among the servicemen, much less.
There is information in the public domain that the commander of the 58th Army, General Troshev (who commanded that operation at the first stage), the military, who were then sitting in ambush behind the bridge that had just been blown up from the air, managed to ask the question:
“Who gave the command to the helicopter pilots right in front of the column to destroy the bridge on the way to the place where we were waiting for them?”
And then Troshev seemed to answer them:
"I didn't give."
So who exactly turned the course of events at Pervomaisky back then, in a literal sense, remains unknown to this day.
The terrorists are warm and the soldiers are in the cold
So, the column of terrorists turned around in front of the blown-up bridge (behind which the special forces were waiting for them). And she sat down in Pervomaisky.
It should be admitted that such a turnaround greatly strengthened the position of the terrorists. Having settled in the village, they changed the rules of the game. Those who were chasing them as part of a special operation to free the hostages were now forced by the bandits to engage with them.
All the previously outlined plans of the commanders and the tactical layouts of the special forces fighters were now inapplicable. The operation was retrained from that moment into a military (or a special KGB-military for the elimination of bandit groups). Until now, the military has no unity on this issue on its classification.
For example, the Ministry of Defense describes this episode in Pervomaiskiy as a special operation. Whereas the FSB interprets it as a combined arms. There is a discrepancy. Or inconsistency? But is it possible that these are just different-military approaches?
“Theoretically, the task of blocking and storming the village of Pervomayskoye could be carried out by any experienced battalion commander with the forces of one battalion - after all, this is an ordinary army operation. But everything went very differently. Various forces were involved in the operation - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the Ministry of Defense. However, the combat experience of all the participants in the operation was mainly spetsnaz, as well as paratroopers. The main units of the Ministry of Defense were from the 135th motorized rifle brigade from Budennovsk.
Given the number of forces involved in the operation, it was supposed to be commanded by General Anatoly Kvashnin, then the commander of the North Caucasian Military District. But FSB director Mikhail Barsukov and Interior Minister Viktor Erin were at the scene."
The experts who entered the discussion reasoned something like this. The presence of hostages, the issuance of ultimatums from terrorists, the execution of captured prisoners - gave all the grounds for starting the anti-terrorist operation.
The difficulty, however, was that there were many terrorists. Not a couple of three. And not even two or three dozen. And over three hundred thugs armed to the teeth.
The raiders who had entrenched themselves in Pervomaisk had sniper rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers and heavy machine guns.
In addition, these bandits dug not holes for themselves, but full-profile trenches. And they equipped a defensive fortified area. Moreover, they did it according to the canons of military art (forward and cut-off positions, communication passages, and even blocked slots, etc.). They say they dug all these fortifications with the hands of the hostages.
If you use the hint of a military specialist, then it all looked like a motorized rifle battalion (MRB) in defense.
Moreover, since this SMB did not bury itself in the ground at all in a desert field, but entrenched itself in a large rural settlement (about 1,500 inhabitants), then its attacking forces during the operation would have to storm the settlement. With far from bright prospects.
What specific prospects could there be?
Let's say right off the bat, quite depressing. And with all sorts of "ifs."
Any attack of such a fortified area in a settlement will result in failure and numerous casualties without preliminary artillery preparation and if the firing points of the bandits are not suppressed. Without a threefold (five or any multiple) superiority in manpower. And most importantly, it is in no way possible to lead unprepared soldiers and officers to such an assault.
People who dare to attack a settlement outside the aforementioned conditions will simply die. Here is the conclusion of the experts.
Which, in essence, was to be expected. There was almost no artillery preparation as such. Although they fired a pair of anti-tank guns for the sake of sharpness. In fact, they pressed a little psychologically. But the real destruction of the gang's firing positions, according to the recollections of the participants in the events, did not happen.
And it immediately became clear. As our first detachments moved to the attack, they were met by a hurricane of fire from the bandits. Several people from the Dagestani riot police immediately perished killed and wounded. And the assault group retreated.
From a tactical point of view, this indicated that the terrorists had not lost their firing points, and their front defensive edge had not been suppressed. That is, everyone who, in this situation, goes on the attack, will face inevitable death.
And here is what the documents tell about it. From the report of group "A" (service):
“On January 15, at 8:30 am, the personnel of the department took up their initial positions. After inflicting a fire strike by aviation and helicopters, combat groups in the divisions, setting up an advanced patrol, in cooperation with the Vityaz unit, entered into battle with Chechen militants and advanced into “square four” on the southeastern outskirts of the village of Pervomayskoye.
During the hostilities on January 15-18, the department employees identified and destroyed the firing points of the militants, provided fire cover for the Interior Ministry units, provided medical assistance, and evacuated the wounded from the battlefield."
There is so much unsaid behind the short reporting phrase: “the wounded were evacuated”. For example, these guys from group "A" took out and rescued fighters of the "Vityaz" detachment from the fire sack.
From the memoirs of Colonel Vladimir Nedobezhkin:
“On the third or fourth day, our people attempted an assault. The special forces of the internal troops "Vityaz", the special forces of the FSB "Alpha", "Vympel" tried to enter the village from the southeast and were caught there.
Then I talked to the guys from Vityaz. They said: “We went in, caught on, we are fighting in the village for every house. And "Alpha" could not follow us."
That is, Vityaz's back remained open. After all, "Alpha" with such a battle formation had an order to go behind and help "Vityaz", to concentrate, to storm houses together, and so on.
In a populated area, going forward with an open back is just suicide …
As a result, "Vityaz" was surrounded, and from this boiler it left on its own, with great losses."
This, by the way, is about the effectiveness and quality of the offensive fire preparation.
And here is what an eyewitness of that battle recalls about the accuracy of missile guidance:
“We saw the houses in which the militants were sitting, destroyed several machine gunners, snipers, and began directing artillery.
Our MI-24 helicopter appeared from behind. Launches rockets at the houses that we have indicated.
And suddenly two missiles come out, but they don't fly forward, but fall behind us and explode.
We - to the helicopter pilots: "What are you doing?"
And they: "Sorry guys, the missiles are substandard."
But it's funny to remember this just now. Then there was no laughing matter …"
Again, from the comments of experts: if this happened in the war, then the actions could be as follows.
First. For example, if the attack had choked, then they would again drag artillery and again iron the front edge of the enemy's defense.
Second. Better yet, call in aircraft and strike with bombs.
Or third. The advancing units would seek to bypass the epicenter of resistance and begin to advance.
But all these three options were impossible in those conditions. The authorities and the media then left the guys no other options, except for one.
The fact is that from the very first shots a screeching arose in the liberal press, turning into hysteria - hostages were being killed, the village was being destroyed.
And the journalists, and the West, and the authorities, it seems, wanted only one thing at that time - to tear our guys to pieces. Throw their bodies into the embrasures of the bandits. Destroy the best commandos. All at once. And "Alpha" and "Vympel" and "Vityaz".
Of course, the state is obliged to rescue the hostages. But instead of organization, planning, coordination, firepower and other means of military affairs, only one means was proposed from above - to put all our best fighters in this field at Pervomaysky at the same time? Not to mention that our best special forces guys were used in Pervomayskoye as infantry.
In spetsnaz schools they teach a three-pronged task:
"Do not die yourself, rescue as many hostages as possible, destroy the terrorists."
For this, the fighters of group "A" are trained to successfully storm the captured cars, liners and premises in which terrorists are hiding. But then, as they later tried to justify the failures at the top: they are supposedly not so strong in combined arms tactics, and especially in digging trenches …
By the way, our guys were very unlucky with the weather then. Every night there was frost, and during the day - frost. So my feet and all my equipment were wet all day long. They usually slept there on the ground, someone in the trenches. Then the sleeping bags were brought in, and the guys made capes out of them.
And who was in charge of all this action?
From the memoirs of an eyewitness:
“I don’t know who was in charge and how he was in charge. But I have never seen a more illiterate and disorderly operation in my life. And the worst thing, even ordinary soldiers understood this.
There was practically no leadership, and each division lived its own separate life. Everyone fought as best they could.
For example, the task was set for us by one, and the paratroopers to our right - by another. We are neighbors, we are a hundred meters from each other, and different people command us. It is good that we have more or less agreed with them.
We had communication with them both visually and by radio.
True, the radio communication was open, the militants must have listened to our talks."
It is here that I would like to explain why we began our story precisely with the Chinese wisdom that a soldier is fed for a thousand days to use one minute. The fact is that just under the May Day soldiers, in fact, there was nothing to eat. And they were freezing in the open air.
Employees of group "A" later said that Russian soldiers, numb in the cold, knocked on their buses in the evenings.
And at this time, by the way, the central TV channels bawled around the clock about Pervomayskoye. And they were reporting about the alleged complete blocking of militants. But this very blocking looked like sitting in winter trenches in a cold field. By the way, the militants were warming themselves at the residents of the village in warm huts.
Maybe someone needed such a breakthrough?
Now someone is asking:
"But how did Raduev escape from the blockade?"
Yes, it turned out that he escaped, breaking through in battle.
Eyewitnesses say that a continuous encirclement was not organized there then. And even more so, there was no external or any other ring.
And there were only rare defensive islands. One such bridgehead was held by thirty army special forces. This was exactly the same group of fighters who were suddenly attacked closely by the Raduev terrorists. It was these guys who put most of the bandits down.
Recall that the terrorists then had over three hundred mercenaries. And against them - 30 people from the 22nd brigade. The opponent has a tenfold advantage.
It is no wonder that almost all of our commandos were wounded. There were also those who died among them. But they are all real Heroes.
There are few of them left after that battle. Yes, and they left then, who where. Someone occasionally gives an interview and tells how it really was then.
And it looked, we must honestly admit, as an outright betrayal or setup. Judge for yourself:
“We were once again set up. The press then wrote - three encirclement rings, snipers. All this is nonsense. There were no rings. The guys from our 22nd Special Forces Brigade took the hit.
The density of the front was 46 people per one and a half kilometers. Imagine! According to all standards, the exceeding of the length for each soldier is three times. And the armament - only small arms, light, but two armored personnel carriers were attached.
These guys were put in the most difficult place. Most likely, the leadership knew that every one of them would have to die.
“Our site was the most likely to break through.
Why?
Because only here, in a single place, you can cross the Terek. I emphasize, in the only one.
There, an oil pipeline is stretched across the river, and above it there is a bridge.
And it was clear to the fool: there was nowhere else to go.
Everything turned out as if on purpose. It turns out that everyone knew that Raduev would go here? And by and large they did nothing. As if "from above" would let him pass? Or is it just an accident?
And what's strange? With this pipe came the order not to destroy. And the guys, it turns out, can you ruin as much as you like?
Well, about that ill-fated trumpet - a real gift for terrorists, different versions were circulated by both soldiers and officers. For example, here's the look of a fighter:
We suggested blowing up the pipe.
No, it's oil, big money. People are cheaper.
But they would blow it up - and the "spirits" have nowhere to go."
And here is the officer's testimony:
We stood at the place where there was the most convenient place for a breakthrough. First, close to the border with Chechnya. Secondly, it was here that a gas pipe passed through the river, above the water.
I suggested: "Let's blow up the pipe."
And to me: "And let's leave the whole republic without gas?"
I again: “So what is the task? Don't miss it? Then to fight like this."
And I’m talking about a republic without gas again.
At our own peril and risk, we put mines in front of the chimney. All of them subsequently worked when the militants climbed the pipe.
All these days of waiting, no one knew what would happen: an assault or a defense when they came out. And on January 17, a team arrives: tomorrow at dawn there will be a re-assault. We were preparing for the assault. But it turned out the opposite.
“By the way, two Chechen KamAZ trucks approached from the other side. We stood and waited. From our side - nothing, "turntables" did not work on them.
As such, the terrorists had no training. They began shelling, and their strike group went on the attack. Approaching the strong point about a hundred meters, the front bandits lay down and began to exert fire pressure. Meanwhile, a cover group pulled up, and everyone rushed forward in a crowd.
From a tactical point of view, they acted correctly. In another way, they could not. After the battle, we checked the documents of the dead. Afghans, Jordanians, Syrians. About fifty professional mercenaries."
And one more look at the tactics of bandits:
“And the breakthrough itself was built competently.
The militants had a distracting group to the side, a fire group with large-caliber weapons, grenade launchers, machine gunners. Their fire group did not let us raise their heads.
Basically, all the dead and wounded appeared precisely during this first strike.
The density of the fire was such that officer Igor Morozov shattered a finger on his hand. He, an experienced officer, passed Afghan and fired, sitting in a trench, sticking out only his hands with a machine gun. His finger was crippled here. But he remained in the ranks."
And here is how the commander recalls the very beginning of the battle with terrorists:
“Naturally, I didn’t put mines in front of me at night. At 2:30 am I ask the group of observers who were in front: "Quiet?"
The answer is: "Quiet."
And I gave them the command to retreat to position. I leave a third of the people to guard, and the rest I give the command to rest, because in the morning there is an assault.
A week has passed in such conditions: naturally, the people began to sway slightly while walking. But in the morning you have to run another seven hundred meters. And it's not easy to run, but under fire.
… And then almost immediately everything started …
Interestingly, there was no illumination at all that night. Therefore, we noticed the militants over forty meters.
There is frost in the air, you can hardly see anything through night binoculars.
At this time, the group that was returning followed our trenches. My signalmen, who were on duty in turn, launched a rocket and saw the militants. They start counting - ten, fifteen, twenty … a lot!..
I give a signal: everyone to fight!
A group of twelve people, which was walking from the observation post, was fully prepared and immediately hit the militants from the left flank.
Thus, they gave the rest of the opportunity to prepare."
The guys say that the terrorists were doping:
“As a rule, each one has two duffel bags, in one - ammunition and canned food, in the other - drugs, syringes and so on.
So they attacked in a state of narcotic dope. They say they are fearless suicide bombers.
The bandits were afraid."
And about how Raduev escaped:
“Yes, Raduev slipped away, but we killed many.
About 200 terrorists went into battle. We killed 84 people. Apart from the wounded and prisoners.
In the morning I looked at the tracks - no more than twenty people escaped. Raduev is with them.
The brigade also suffered losses: five were killed, six people were wounded. If two or three companies had been planted in our sector, the result would have been different.
Much was done stupidly. A small handful was put in defense, they did not begin to mine the approaches.
What did you expect?
Maybe someone needed such a breakthrough? »
Harsh, but true.
They break through to you
One thing is bad - the militants still broke through.
Then the guys participating in that battle with their comrades analyzed this battle again and again. And yet they came to the conclusion that a breakthrough could have been prevented. And just a little was needed - to strengthen ours with armor.
But it seems that they were not helping in that battle at all.
Judge for yourself.
Indeed, in every joke there is only a fraction of a joke. As a rule, after all, through a very good joke, it is precisely the very unspoken truth that peeps through.
Among those who participated in the siege of Pervomaisky, there is such a bike.
By the time the militants broke through on the night of January 17-18, 1996, the entire operation was commanded by Mikhail Barsukov, director of the FSB. So that night he was told:
"The militants are breaking through!"
And he was very drunk. And he commanded:
"Come to me!"
And they answer him with malice:
"Excuse me, comrade general, they are still breaking through to you" …
Note
Everlasting memory
In the battle near Pervomayskoye, the following died:
- Chief of Intelligence of the 58th Army, Colonel Alexander Stytsina, - the commander of the communications company, Captain Konstantin Kozlov, - medical captain Sergei Kosachev.
and officers of group "A"
- Major Andrey Kiselev
- and Viktor Vorontsov.
For the courage and courage shown during the rescue of the hostages, Andrei Kiselev and Viktor Vorontsov were awarded the Order of Courage (posthumously).
