“On January 9, 1996 at 9.45 in accordance with the instructions of the Director of the FSB of Russia, General of the Army MI Barsukov. the personnel of directorate "A" was raised on alert to receive further instructions."
The ancient and wise Sun Tzu advised: "Feed a soldier a thousand days to use one hour at the right time and in the right place."
This hour has come in Kizlyar and Pervomaisky. The country is tired of the threats and bloody deeds of the Chechen terrorists. Everyone hoped to win. Completely forgetting to feed and train the soldier.
Then they shouted: who is to blame? Mediocre generals or gifted terrorists? Completely convince ourselves that generals and colonels are to blame for all our military troubles.
Who spat on and destroyed the army with lack of money, thoughtless reductions, insane conversion? Who shouted from the parliamentary tribunes that the "black dog" of the KGB cannot be washed and therefore he must be killed?
It turns out that they are not to blame, who, under the guise of a holy war against totalitarianism, was destroying the army and special services. But then who? Until we answer this question, the bloody fingers of the Basayevs will continue to hold us by the throat. We will not see victories in the fight against terror. We will not be able to protect our citizens on our land. After all, the pledge of these victories is in the wise advice of Sun Tzu: feed the soldier for a thousand days …
… And now let's return to Pervomayskoye.
From the service report of group "A"
“According to primary information, a group of 300 militants armed with small arms, firing at civilians, took hostage about 350 people in a hospital in Kizlyar, Republic of Dagestan. At the same time, the militants attacked the helipad of the town of Kizlyar, as a result of which 2 helicopters and a tanker were destroyed, and a residential building was also seized.
At 11.30, one hundred and twenty employees headed by Major General A. V. Gusev, having with them weapons, special means and protective equipment, equipment necessary to perform the tasks of freeing the hostages, left for the Chkalovsky airfield.
12.00. The personnel arrived at the airport and at 13.00 on two Tu-154 planes flew to Makhachkala on a special flight. At 15.30 and 17.00 the planes landed at the Makhachkala airport.
At 20.00 the personnel arrived in a vehicle at the FSB department of Makhachkala, where the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center of the FSB of Russia, Colonel-General V. N. brought the operational situation at the current moment.
At 01.20 on January 10, upon the arrival of two armored personnel carriers, the convoy began to move to Kizlyar, where it arrived at 5.30”.
What did the Alpha fighters see in Kizlyar? Essentially, they saw the tail of a convoy of terrorists and hostages leaving the city. By this time, the leadership of Dagestan had decided to release the Chechen bandits from the city hospital and provide them with unhindered passage to the Chechen border. The terrorists promised to release the hostages at the border.
At 6.40 a column of terrorists in 9 buses, 2 KamAZ trucks and 2 ambulances began to move. The Kizlyar hospital remained mined.
The pursuit began. Initially, it was planned to carry out an operation on the route: block the convoy and free the hostages. Although, I must confess, there was a considerable risk in this option. Some high-ranking officials, deputies of Dagestan, and a column of 9 buses were taken hostage. Imagine the death of at least one of the hostages. And it would be inevitable, since there are not one or two terrorists, and they are armed not with rifles, but with machine guns, machine guns, grenade launchers.
Now "superimpose" these events on that military, bloody, tense situation in the Caucasus - and you will understand what doubts tormented the leaders of the operation.
In a word, Raduev and his terrorists were not stopped or blocked on the route. He safely reached Pervomayskoye, disarmed the checkpoint of the Novosibirsk riot police, who resignedly raised their hands, replenished the number of hostages and added to his arsenal.
From the service report of group "A"
“In the course of further negotiations, the commander of the militants, Raduyev, put forward demands to provide an opportunity for the convoy to enter the territory of Chechnya, where he promised to release the hostages. In this regard, the command headquarters "A" developed a variant of carrying out an operation to free hostages along the route.
The plan of the operation provided for blocking the convoy with armored vehicles, destroying terrorists with sniper fire and blowing up KamAZ vehicles loaded with weapons and ammunition, persuading terrorists to surrender their weapons and release the hostages.
The personnel of the "A" department carried out a reconnaissance of the area and selected possible locations for the operation. The unit was assigned a combat mission and worked out a communication and interaction scheme, calculated forces and means."
However, the efforts of the commanders and soldiers of the special forces were in vain. Raduev refused the demands put forward, remained in Pervomayskoye and began to equip firing positions. I must say that this was a strong move by the bandits. Now the operation from a special one - to free hostages and destroy terrorists - turned into a military one. Or, rather, in a special, Chekist-military. By the way, experts still have no consensus on this matter.
The Ministry of Defense considers the operation in Pervomayskoye to be special, and the Federal Security Service considers it a combined-arms operation. Who's right, who's wrong?
Since hostages were taken prisoner, the terrorists put forward demands and shot some of the captured, all the components for conducting an anti-terror operation are available.
But there are not one or two terrorists, or even a dozen or two, but more than three hundred bayonets. They are armed with mortars, grenade launchers, large-caliber machine guns, machine guns, sniper rifles. They dug full-profile trenches, created a fortified defense area in accordance with all the rules of military science with forward and cut-off positions, with communication trenches and even blocked slots. Ask any person who has the slightest understanding of military affairs: what is it? This is nothing more than a motorized rifle battalion on the defensive. And since the battalion dug in not in an open field, but in a fairly large village, for the attackers it is also an assault on a settlement. With all the ensuing consequences.
What are the consequences? They can be very deplorable if you do not perform a few "ifs."
If you do not conduct artillery preparation and suppress the enemy's firepower, if you do not create at least a threefold (during the Great Patriotic War, both five and tenfold) superiority of forces, if not to throw unprepared soldiers and officers into the assault, if … is enough, I think. In this case, people who go on an attack will simply die, and the attack will drown.
Which is exactly what happened. By and large, there was no artillery preparation. The shelling from several anti-tank guns, perhaps, looked more like psychological pressure than the actual destruction of firing points.
Wow pressure … They fired from cannons, destroyed the village. Yes, they fired and destroyed. Everyone saw it on TV screens. But the firing did little harm to the militants buried in the ground. When, after the shelling, the first units moved to the assault, the terrorists met them with hurricane fire. Dagestan OMON immediately lost several people killed and wounded and retreated. According to the laws of tactics, this meant only one thing - the front line of the enemy's defense was not suppressed, the bandits retained their firepower, and anyone who tried to rush forward would face death.
From the service report of group "A"
“On January 15, at 8.30 am, the personnel of the department took up their initial positions. After inflicting a fire strike by aviation and helicopters, combat groups in the divisions, setting up a forward patrol, in cooperation with the Vityaz unit, entered into battle with Chechen militants and advanced into “square four” on the southeastern outskirts of the village of Pervomayskoye.
During the hostilities on January 15-18, the department employees identified and destroyed the firing points of the militants, provided fire cover for the Interior Ministry units, provided medical assistance, and evacuated the wounded from the battlefield."
There is a lot behind these scant lines of the report. For example, the withdrawal from the fire of the soldiers of the "Vityaz" detachment, who were, in fact, in a fire sack. They were helped by the staff of the "A" group.
In the war, when the attack was choking, they pulled up the artillery and again began to "work" the leading edge. Whenever possible, aviation was called in and bombed. Or there was another option: the advancing troops bypassed the center of resistance and moved forward.
The "feds" did not have such an option, as, incidentally, there was no other option. They could not resume the artillery preparation, since from the very first artillery volleys a howl arose: the hostages were being killed.
It turns out that there was only one thing left: to destroy our special forces - "Alpha", "Vympel", "Vityaz", throwing them under the dagger fire of the bandits.
I often think about a terrible dilemma: yes, the state must, must save the lives of the hostages. But what is the price of this salvation?
Recently, we often look at the problem through the eyes of a captured unarmed person. The bitter, humiliating role of a suicide bomber, moreover, innocent. But how humiliated and crushed is the professional, powerless in his main business - the release of prisoners and the punishment of bandits! What could a fighter of "Alpha" in Pervomaiskiy? Even the most experienced, top-notch fighter? Rise to full height in the attack and die heroically? But this is, to say the least, nonsense. Although this is enough in the war.
Not to perish yourself, to save as many hostages as possible, to destroy terrorists - this is the threefold task of special units.
Fighters of group "A" successfully know how to storm captured buses, airplanes, houses in which terrorists have settled, but they are not taught to walk in chains and are not strong in combined arms tactics. This is not their business. But then whose? Motorized riflemen, artillerymen, tankmen …
“We've arrived,” my opponents will say. “Eighteen-year-old, untrained, untrained boys were thrown into the fire, and excellent shooters, athletes, experienced fighters, who had been in more than one alteration, will remain on the sidelines.”
This is where the main question arises, with which I began my reflections and which underlies all of our recent defeats: why is a soldier of the Russian Armed Forces unfired, untrained, poorly equipped, or even hungry?
All this, by the way, was present in Pervomaiskoe. And the drivers who made their first march on the BMP, and the cold for many days, and the lack of basic living conditions.
I was told by the employees of group "A" how the frozen Russian soldiers asked them to take their buses for the night. The "Alfovtsy" would be glad to let them in, but they themselves slept sitting, counting, on each other's lap.
And our television kept on doing everything: cordon, ring, blocking. Forgetting that there are people behind every word. How many days and nights without sleep or rest can you "block" militants sitting in a trench or in a winter field? Considering that the militants were warming themselves at this time in the houses of Pervomaysky.
Now many are surprised to ask the question: how did Raduev escape? Yes, and slipped away, breaking through with the battles. Because by and large there was no ring there. And not just the external and internal, but even the usual environment. Well, maybe the "islets" of defense, one of which was defended by three dozen army special forces. A handful of fighters, which the Raduevskaya gang contacted. They killed the bulk of the terrorists, letting them in very close. However, remember how many people Raduev had - more than three hundred. So the advantage is almost tenfold. These Russian special forces guys are undoubtedly heroes. Almost all of them are wounded, and there are also victims.
How it was, very few people know. There are not many of them left after that battle - the special forces of the 22nd brigade. Some have left for the reserve, some have left for other cities, military districts. After those events, I barely managed to find several heroes. Here is how one of them tells about that terrible battle:
“We were once again set up. The press then wrote - three encirclement rings, snipers. All this is nonsense. There were no rings. The guys from our 22nd Special Forces Brigade took the hit.
The density of the front was 46 people per one and a half kilometers. Imagine! According to all standards, the exceeding of the length for each soldier is three times. And the armament - only small arms, light, but two armored personnel carriers were attached.
Our site was the most likely for a breakout. Why? Because only here, in a single place, you can cross the Terek. I emphasize, in the only one. There, an oil pipeline is stretched across the river, and above it there is a bridge. And it was clear to the fool: there was nowhere else to go.
We suggested blowing up the pipe. No, it's oil, big money. People are cheaper. But they would blow up - and the "spirits" have nowhere to go.
By the way, two Chechen KamAZ trucks approached from that side. We stood and waited. From our side - nothing, "turntables" did not work on them.
As such, the terrorists had no training. They began shelling, and their strike group went on the attack. Approaching the strong point about a hundred meters, the front bandits lay down and began to exert fire pressure. Meanwhile, a cover group pulled up, and everyone rushed forward in a crowd.
From a tactical point of view, they acted correctly. In another way, they could not. After the battle, we checked the documents of the dead. Afghans, Jordanians, Syrians. About fifty professional mercenaries.
Each, as a rule, has two duffel bags, in one - ammunition and canned food, in the other - drugs, syringes and so on. So they attacked in a state of narcotic dope. They say they are fearless suicide bombers. The bandits were afraid.
Yes, Raduev slipped away, but we killed many. About 200 terrorists went into battle. We killed 84 people. Apart from the wounded and prisoners. In the morning I looked at the tracks - no more than twenty people escaped. Raduev is with them.
The brigade also suffered losses: five were killed, six people were wounded. If two or three companies had been planted in our sector, the result would have been different. Much was done stupidly. A small handful was put in defense, they did not begin to mine the approaches. What did you expect? Maybe someone needed such a breakthrough?"
These are the bitter confessions.
In that battle, the chief of intelligence of the 58th Army, Colonel Alexander Stytsina, the commander of the communications company, Captain Konstantin Kozlov, and the medic, Captain Sergei Kosachev, were killed.
Lost in Pervomayskoye and group "A" two of its officers - Major Andrei Kiselev and Viktor Vorontsov.
Vorontsov was from the border guards, he served in a separate control unit in Sheremetevo-2. First he got into Vympel, and in 1994 he moved to Group A. Distinguished himself in the release of hostages in the city of Budennovsk, for which he was awarded the Suvorov medal.
Andrey Kiselev is a graduate of the Ryazan Airborne School. He served in a special-purpose company of the airborne forces communications regiment, was an instructor in airborne training. In 1993 he was admitted to subdivision "A".
Both officers took part in complex operational activities and combat operations. For their courage and courage in rescuing the hostages, Andrei Kiselev and Viktor Vorontsov were awarded the Order of Courage (posthumously).
