Agony of the Third Reich. 75 years ago, on March 15, 1945, the Upper Silesian offensive began. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I. S. Konev eliminated the threat of a German flank counterattack and completed the liberation of the Silesian industrial region, which significantly undermined the military-economic potential of the Reich.
The threat of a German counteroffensive in the direction of Breslau
As a result of the Lower Silesian operation in February 1945, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (1st UV), defeating the formations of the 4th tank and 17th German armies, reached the level with the troops of the 1st Of the Belorussian Front, which at the end of January 1945 reached the Oder River. As a result, the armies of Zhukov and Konev occupied an advantageous line for an attack on Berlin. Also, the troops of the southern wing of the 1st UV were looming from the north over the Upper Silesian group of the Wehrmacht. Thus, Konev's armies were able to develop an offensive in the direction of Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and the central part of Czechoslovakia.
However, during the Lower Silesian operation, the southern wing of the front significantly (up to 200 km) lagged behind the main grouping. There was a threat of a flank enemy counterattack from the Oppeln-Ratibor area to Breslau with the aim of unblocking the capital of Silesia and returning an important industrial area under its control.
Operation plan
On February 28, 1945, the Front Military Council presented to the Headquarters a plan for an offensive operation of the troops of the left flank of the 1st UV in Upper Silesia. On March 1, the operation plan was approved. At the same time, an offensive operation of the 4th Ukrainian Front was planned with the aim of crushing the Moravian-Ostrava enemy grouping and capturing the industrial region of Moravska-Ostrava. The blow of the 4th UV was supposed to facilitate the offensive of Konev's troops. The Germans were deprived of the opportunity to maneuver their forces.
Soviet troops were to defeat the enemy forces in the area southwest of Oppeln, reach the Strehlen - Opava line. We formed two shock groups: the northern one, advancing in the direction of opposition, and the southern one, in the ratibor direction. The northern grouping consisted of Gusev's 21st Army, Lelyushenko's 4th Tank Army (soon transformed into the 4th Guards Tank Army), the 34th Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army and the 4th Guards Tank Corps. The southern grouping included: Korovnikov's 59th Army, Kurochkin's 60th Army, 7th Guards Mechanized Corps and 31st Tank Corps. The offensive of the southern wing of the 1st UV was supported by Krasovsky's 2nd Air Army.
The northern grouping of the front struck in the general direction at Neisse, Neustadt (Neustadt), where it was supposed to join up with the troops of the southern grouping. As a result, the Soviet troops had to encircle and destroy the enemy forces in the Opplensky ledge. The 34th Guards Corps of the 5th Guards Army and the 4th Guards Tank Corps were to develop an offensive to the west. The southern grouping with part of its forces (59th Army, 7th Guards Mechanized Corps) attacked in the direction of Neustadt, where on the third day of the operation it was planned to join forces with the forces of the northern grouping. Other troops of the southern grouping (60th Army, 31st Panzer Corps) were to take Ratibor and Opava.
The Soviet command decided to strike at the junction of the 17th Army and the Heinrici army group. Most of the forces and assets were concentrated in the strike groupings: up to 57% of the infantry, 60% of artillery, 90% of tanks and self-propelled artillery installations. As a result, there was, on average, one rifle division, about 200 guns and mortars, and 43 tanks per 1 km of the front of the breakthrough sector. Thus, the command of the 1st UV was going to use almost all forces and means in the first most powerful blow. This was due to the relatively shallow defense system of the Nazis. Therefore, all the mobile formations of shock groupings operated in the combat formations of rifle divisions. After breaking through the enemy's defenses, armored formations were to rapidly advance into the rear of the enemy.
Forces of the parties
The strike groups on the left flank of the 1st UV included 31 rifle divisions (only 3-5 thousand people remained in the division, there was a shortage of ammunition), over 5600 guns and mortars, about 1 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns. The air army consisted of over 1,700 aircraft.
Our troops were opposed by the formations of the German 17th Army and the Heinrici Army Group (from March 22, 1st Panzer Army), concentrated southwest of Oppeln. In total, up to 15 divisions, over 1,400 guns and mortars, about 100 tanks and self-propelled guns. Also in this direction were the operational reserves of the Heinrici army group and the Center army group - 5 divisions and 60 separate battalions. From the air, the German troops were supported by the 4th Air Fleet.
Breakthrough enemy defenses
On March 14, 1945, Soviet troops completed preparations for the operation. The moment for the beginning of the liberation of Upper Silesia was favorable. The attention of the German command and all reserves were linked by battles in East Prussia and Eastern Pomerania, in Hungary (Balaton operation) and the offensive of the 4th Ukrainian Front in the Moravian-Ostrava direction.
On March 15, the forward battalions of the 21st and 5th Guards Army began their advance in the northern sector, occupying the enemy's forward positions. After 40 minutes of artillery preparation, the main forces of the 21st and 4th tank armies went on the offensive. Overcoming stubborn resistance and repelling counterattacks by the enemy's tactical reserves, by the end of the day, our troops broke through two German positions in an 8-kilometer sector and advanced 8 kilometers in depth. After 80 minutes of artillery preparation, units of the 59th and 60th armies went on the offensive. They overcame the enemy's main line of defense in a 12-kilometer sector and advanced 6-8 kilometers in depth.
The slow advance of our troops was due to a number of reasons. During the artillery preparation, it was not possible to suppress most of the enemy firing positions. The Nazis paid great attention to anti-tank defense, prepared reserve firing positions. Soviet mechanized formations suffered heavy losses. So, Kuznetsov's 31st Panzer Corps lost up to a third of its combat vehicles in the day of the battle. In addition, the Soviet aviation was unable to operate in the morning due to bad weather. Aviation was inactive during the period of artillery preparation and further attacks by infantry and tanks. Only after 12 o'clock in the afternoon bombers and attack aircraft began to strike at German positions, strong points, headquarters, communications centers and communications. As a result, on the first day of the operation, it was planned to conduct about 3 thousand sorties, but only 1283 were carried out.
The spring thaw also affected. She slowed down the movement of heavy weapons. The Germans could not create a continuous, deeply echeloned defense, the battles mainly went for roads and settlements, which the Nazis turned into strong points. The Nazis, retreating under the pressure of our troops, did not try to break away and fiercely fought for every position, height, settlement and street, tactically advantageous.
In order not to give the enemy time to rest and organize defense in new positions, the Soviet command gave instructions to continue the offensive at night. To conduct combat operations at night, each rifle division allocated one battalion, which was assigned to the second echelon for rest during the day.
In the following days, the offensive developed more successfully. On March 17, the troops of the northern group overcame the entire tactical defense zone of the enemy and developed an offensive on Neustadt, covering the German group from the north-west. The German command did not manage to withdraw the troops from the "cauldron" in time. A large role in this success was played by the Soviet aviation, which inflicted strong blows on communications in the opposition direction and prevented the withdrawal of German troops from the ledge. The southern group also broke into the Nazi defense and from the 18th led the pursuit of the remnants of the defeated enemy units.
Defeat of the opposition group
On March 18, 1945, the troops of the front's two shock groups united in the Neustadt area. In the area south-west of Oppeln, more than 5 enemy divisions got into the "cauldron". Units of the 21st, 4th Guards Tank and 59th Armies, having completed the encirclement of the Opplnian grouping, part of their forces developed an offensive to the west and created an outer encirclement ring. This made it possible to immediately begin to eliminate the encircled enemy divisions. Already on March 19-20, the blocked German troops were destroyed. The speed of liquidation of the encircled Nazi troops was due to the fact that the enemy was not allowed to organize resistance, create a perimeter defense. Immediately after the completion of the encirclement of the enemy, our troops simultaneously attacked from several directions. As a result, the forces of the 21st and 59th armies quickly dismembered the encircled grouping into separate, isolated groups and destroyed them.
At the same time, part of the forces of the 21st and 59th armies and most of the 4th Guards Tank Army on the outer ring of the encirclement repelled enemy attacks from the outside. The Nazis tried to unblock the encircled divisions from the area southwest of Neisse. Here the German command threw into battle the elite division "Hermann Goering", then other formations, including the 20th Panzer Division. German counterattacks were repelled. After the liquidation of the encircled opposition grouping, Konev's armies continued their offensive with the aim of reaching the foothills of the Sudetenland. On March 24, units of the 21st and 4th Guards Tank Armies took Neisse. Overcoming enemy resistance, our troops reached the Strehlen - Neisse - Dolen line by the beginning of April 1945. At this point, the Soviet troops stopped and began preparations for the Berlin operation.
At the same stage of the operation, the troops of the 4th Guards Tank Army were transferred from the northern sector to the southern one in order to accelerate the defeat of the enemy in the ratibor direction. Here the Germans tried to counterattack, deployed two tank divisions (8th and 17th) to this sector. On March 24, the 38th Army of the 4th UF on Moravska Ostrava resumed the offensive, which improved the situation in the Ratibor direction, as a threat was created to encircle the German troops in the Rybnik and Ratibor areas. On March 27, units of Kurochkin's 60th army occupied Rybnik and soon reached Ratibor. For several days, the troops of the 60th Army unsuccessfully stormed this city, which the Germans turned into a strong defense center. Then the front command concentrated on this sector the 17th and 25th artillery breakthrough divisions, most of the army's artillery. Aviation was also involved in the assault on Ratibor. Massive artillery fire and bomb strikes broke the enemy's defenses. On March 31, our troops took Ratibor.
Results of the operation
Thus, the troops of the 1st UV captured the southwestern part of Upper Silesia, completing the liberation of the Silesian industrial region. Our troops eliminated the threat of a flank enemy counterstrike in the direction of Breslau in order to liberate the Breslau garrison. The capture of the city of Neisse deprived the Germans of the opportunity to use the rokad railway connecting Army Group Center with Army Group South. Konev's armies reached the foothills of the Sudetenland and were able to develop an offensive against Dresden and Prague. The opposition grouping of the enemy (more than 5 divisions) was destroyed, the Nazis were thrown back to the Sudetenland. The Germans lost about 60 thousand people, including over 18 thousand people taken prisoners.
The Hitlerite command was unable to use the troops in the Silesian direction to strengthen their groupings on the northern flank (in Eastern Pomerania) and in Hungary. During the Battle of Silesia, Army Group Center suffered a heavy defeat. The Germans had to weaken their central direction in order to prevent a catastrophe in this sector of the front. Also, the Third Reich received a strong economic blow. With the loss of Upper Silesia, the Reich, according to Reich Minister of Armaments Speer, lost up to a quarter of its military production.
