Troubles. 1919 year. 100 years ago, on October 11-13, 1919, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive on the Southern Front. The Reds struck in the Oryol and Voronezh directions. In the decisive battle of the Civil War, a radical change took place in favor of the Reds. The Moscow campaign of Denikin's army against Moscow collapsed.
The offensive of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia on Moscow
Fulfilling Denikin's "Moscow directive" of July 3, 1919, all three armies of the AFSR (the Volunteer, Don and Caucasian armies) carried out an offensive with varying success. The Caucasian army of Wrangel fought on the distant approaches to Saratov, the Don army of Sidorin - in the central direction, the Volunteer Army of May-Mayevsky - in the Kursk direction.
At the same time, the white armies dispersed hundreds of miles. On the left flank, White discovered the weakness of the Reds in Little Russia. On the western flank, the Southern Front of the Reds was destroyed most of all, which was associated with the extremely unsatisfactory combat capability of the former rebel detachments in Little Russia, which joined the ranks of the Red Army. The Denikinites easily occupied huge spaces and did not have the opportunity to gain a foothold there, to organize a full-fledged defense. Maneuver warfare required unceasing movement. It was possible to cover the captured Yekaterinoslav region only by developing the offensive, pursuing and destroying the weak 12th and 14th Red armies. That is, it was necessary to capture the lower reaches of the Dnieper in order to cover the left flank of the Volunteer Army advancing on Kursk and Kiev. As a result, Denikin's plan was adjusted. Without canceling the task of the offensive in the Moscow direction, the commander-in-chief of the AFSR issued a new directive on July 30 (August 12). It provided for the transfer of part of the Volunteer Army and the 3rd separate corps to the west. General Bredov's Kiev group of troops is being formed to attack Kiev. Schilling's 3rd Army Corps received the task, with the assistance of the White Black Sea Fleet, to take Kherson and Nikolaev, then Odessa.
Thus, the white command decided to use the favorable situation in the western direction to occupy the regions of Novorossiya and Little Russia. The rapid offensive did not allow the Reds to come to their senses, put themselves in order, organize a tough defense and take advantage of their strength. Also, Denikin's army seized rich lands, received a food base, human reserves and huge military reserves left over from various armies (starting with the tsarist). The North Caucasus could not become a full-fledged base of the AFSR, it was already exhausted by previous mobilizations. As the war moved away from the region, fewer and fewer people wanted to leave their homes. In addition, the movement in the Kiev direction brought Denikin's army closer to Poland, which opposed Soviet Russia.
The advancing Armed Forces of the South of Russia were constantly strengthening. The victories strengthened the ranks of Denikin's army. The volunteer army at the beginning of May in the Donetsk basin numbered, after the capture of Kharkov on June 25, despite all the heavy losses incurred in battles and from diseases, the combat strength of the army was 26 thousand people. By the time of the capture of Poltava on July 31, the size of the army had increased to 40 thousand soldiers. The Don army, previously defeated and numbered up to 15 thousand people by the beginning of May, numbered 28 thousand by June 20, and 45 thousand soldiers by July 20. 3rd Army Corps with a force of only about 4 thousand.a man who at the beginning of June launched an offensive from the Ak-Manai positions, replenishing along the way, passed the whole Crimea, took Odessa on August 23-24. On the basis of the corps, a group of troops of the Novorossiysk region was formed under the command of General Schilling, numbering up to 16 thousand people. The total number of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia increased from May to October from about 65 thousand to 150 thousand people.
The capture of vast areas by the White Guards caused the rise of all anti-Soviet elements, which strengthened the ranks of the AFSR. Denikin's army was on a moral upswing, but it did not last long. The bulk of the people were indifferent to the whites, or hostile and were just waiting for the moment of the arrival of the Reds to speak openly. Denikin's army will soon face a large-scale rebel, peasant movement in the rear, which, like in the East of Russia (Kolchak's army), will become one of the leading reasons for the defeat of the white movement.
Mammoth Raid
The Soviet command restored the fighting efficiency of the Southern Front by emergency measures. In Little Russia, the former Ukrainian armies were reorganized on a regular basis and replaced a number of weak commanders. The commander-in-chief of the Red Army, Vatsetis, was replaced by Kamenev (former commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front), the commander-in-chief of the Southern Front, Gittis, was replaced by Yegorov. The most brutal measures (revolutionary tribunals, detachments, etc.) restored discipline in the units. All reserves went south. New mobilizations have been carried out, the armies have been replenished. Several divisions were removed and sent to the Southern Front from the Eastern and Western Fronts. New fortified areas are being created - Saratov, Astrakhan, Voronezh, Kursk and Kiev. The number of troops of the Southern Front reached over 180 thousand people and about 900 guns. As a result, the pace of the offensive of Denikin's army in July - the first half of August slowed down sharply and the advance was insignificant. Only the Caucasian army captured Kamyshin on July 26.
The Soviet command was preparing for a counteroffensive. Just as in the spring, they planned to defeat the White Army with two powerful converging strikes. On the left wing, the main blow was to be delivered by Shorin's Special Group (units of the 9th and 10th armies); Selivachev's group (parts of the 8th and 13th armies) struck at Kupyansk, at the junction of the Volunteer and Don armies. With the success of the first stage of the operation, Shorin's group was supposed to break through to Rostov-on-Don, cutting off the Don region from the North Caucasus. Auxiliary operations were to be carried out by the 11th Army from Astrakhan and the 14th Army in Little Russia.
Due to the protracted preparation, the plan became known to the command of the AFYUR. The White command decided to launch a preemptive strike with the cavalry corps. Initially, it was planned that the 4th Cossack Corps of Mamontov and the 2nd Don Corps of Konovalov would break through the front at the junction of the 8th and 9th Red Armies, then rush to Moscow, raising a large-scale uprising in the rear of the enemy. However, Konovalov's corps was tied up by battles at the front, only Mamontov's corps was sent to the raid. His tasks were narrowed down. The Cossacks had to walk along the rear of the Southern Front, take Kozlov, where the headquarters of the Red Front was. This was supposed to lead to disorganization of the enemy's command and control and communications, and to disrupt the offensive of the Southern Front. Then, due to the deteriorating situation and data on the arrival of large Red forces, the task was further limited. The corps was aimed at Voronezh, in the rear of the Selivachev group.
On the morning of August 10, 1919, Mamontov's corps (about 9 thousand bayonets and sabers, 12 guns, 12 armored trains and 3 armored vehicles) struck at the joint of the Soviet armies, northwest of Novokhopyorsk. The Cossacks easily broke through the front, the attempts of the Reds to stop the breakthrough were unsuccessful. The Cossacks went north. That is, Mamontov violated the order, since he had to go west. Torrential rains became an excuse, which washed away the roads. Another reason is that the Mamontovites did not want to get involved in a battle with a strong group of Selivachev. It was easier to go north, smash and plunder the rear, avoiding a collision with the enemy. On August 11, the Mamontovs intercepted the Gryazi-Borisoglebsk railway, 3 thousand Red Army soldiers, who were replenishing the front, were taken prisoner and dispersed to their homes. Then the Cossacks captured a field training camp, where they dispersed several thousand more mobilized peasants. They also captured several echelons with ammunition and equipment.
They tried to intercept Mamontov's corps, but without success. From the reserve of Shorin's group, units of the 56th rifle division were sent, but its vanguard in the upper reaches of the river. Tsny was scattered by the Cossacks. A cavalry brigade was put forward to cover the Tambov-Balashov railway, but it was also scattered by Mamontov's corps. Then the White Cossacks bypassed the fortified positions of the enemy south of Tambov and occupied the city on August 18. Many prisoners and mobilized peasants from Tambov were captured in the city. They were dismissed to their homes. More food and clothing warehouses were seized. During the raid, the Cossacks seized so many trophies and goods that they even distributed property and provisions to the local population. Of course, not out of considerations of humanism, unusual for the Cossacks, but because there was so much good that they themselves had nowhere to go. On August 22, the Cossacks were in Kozlov (Michurinsk). The headquarters of the Southern Front, which was located in Kozlov, fled.
In this situation, the Defense Council of the Soviet Republic introduced martial law in six provinces (including Voronezh and Tambov). Revolutionary committees were created in county towns and railway stations to mobilize all forces of funds for the defense of their territories. On August 25, Lashevich, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, was appointed commander of the Internal Front (by September 10, about 12 thousand bayonets and sabers, 67 guns and over 200 machine guns, plus aviation and armored trains). Also, the Internal Front included separate detachments of communists, internationalists, and special forces (about 11 thousand soldiers in total).
The Reds were unable to block and destroy the Mamontov corps. Taking advantage of the inconsistency of the enemy forces, the White Cossacks on August 25 began to move from Kozlov to the west and northwest. On their way, the Whites destroyed front-line and army warehouses, destroyed railway stations and bridges, dispersed several tens of thousands of peasants mobilized into the Red Army. A separate infantry brigade (later the Tula Infantry Division) was formed from volunteers. On August 27, a small detachment of the Mamontovites occupied Ranenburg. The Red Command decided that the main enemy forces were located there, and began to concentrate its main grouping in this area. Meanwhile, Mamontov turned his corps to Lebedyan, and on August 28 captured this city. Then the Cossacks, without any problems, occupied Yelets on August 31, Zadonsk on September 5, Kastornoye on September 6, Usman on September 7 and Voronezh on September 11.
Already on September 12, the Reds drove the Mamontovs out of Voronezh. The Red Command tried to encircle and destroy the enemy corps south of Voronezh. For this, the Cavalry Corps of Budyonny was removed from the front (he was leading an offensive in the Tsaritsyn direction) and the 37th Infantry Division. But the White Cossacks, instead of moving south, along the left bank of the Don to Liski, turned to the southwest. On September 17, Mamontov's corps crossed the Don in the Gremyachye area. On September 19, the Mamontovs united with the 3rd Kuban Corps of General Shkuro, who was pushed out of the Stary Oskol region to help in the breakthrough.
Thus, the 40-day raid of the 4th Don Corps greatly disorganized the rear of the Southern Front, diverted significant enemy forces (about 40 thousand bayonets and sabers) to fight the Cossack cavalry, which led to the weakening of the Red shock groups. However, the White did not succeed in completely disrupting the offensive of the Southern Front. This was caused by the inconsistency of the actions of the Mamontov corps with the main forces of the Don army. At the same time, the Cossacks were carried away by robberies, did not fulfill the main task - to shackle the main forces of the enemy in battle, the corps by the end of the raid strongly decomposed, overgrown with huge wagons with looted goods, and lost most of its combat capability. Cossacks from warriors turned into marauders. The trophies were huge. By the time they reached their own quarters, carts of up to 60 km long stretched behind Mamontov's corps. And after joining with their own, a significant part of the Cossacks with carts went to their native villages, take the booty and celebrate. At the front, only about 2 thousand sabers remained from the corps.
Disruption of the Soviet counteroffensive
Shorin's special group went on the offensive on August 14, 1919. Budenny's corps was advancing on the western flank. The operation was supported by the Volga military flotilla and a detachment of Kozhanov's marines. Initially, the offensive developed successfully. Bleed in continuous battles, Wrangel's troops were forced to retreat, to retreat to Tsaritsyn. The Reds recaptured Kamyshin on August 22 and reached Tsaritsyn in early September. The 11th Red Army also tried to attack from the south from the Astrakhan region on Tsaritsyn, but it was defeated and thrown back by the Whites. Part of the army was cut off from Astrakhan, blocked in the Black Yar area.
Meanwhile, the Soviet high command created a new front - Turkestan, headed by Frunze. It included the 1st, 4th and 11th armies. In early September, Frunze arrived in Astrakhan. The front commander brought in reinforcements and made a risky and brave decision. He loaded ammunition onto the steamers, took his headquarters and all the command of the army with him, and broke through to the Black Yar. The arrival of Frunze and the entire command restored the fighting spirit of the cut off units. Frunze launched an attack from the encirclement. At the same time they hit from Astrakhan. The blockade was broken. The 11th Army again went to Tsaritsyn. But already without Frunze, who returned to the Turkestan direction, where the situation also worsened.
As a result, a fierce battle broke out for Tsaritsyn. The Reds attacked the city from the north and south. On September 5, units of the 10th army began an assault on the city, but the forces of the 28th and 38th rifle divisions and the landing detachment of Kozhanov's sailors were not enough, they failed to capture the city on the move. The Red Army broke through the main defensive positions of the Whites, but Tsaritsyn again confirmed the glory of an impregnable fortress. Wrangel threw his last reserves into battle, the Kuban cavalry launched a counterattack. Stubborn battles continued for several days, then there was a lull. The Denikinites kept Tsaritsyn, but lost their strategic advantage in this direction. East of Tsaritsyn, the 11th Red Army joined up with the 10th, cutting off Denikin's army from the Ural army.
With its right flank, Shorin's group inflicted a number of blows on the Don army. The Don Cossacks were retreating again. Mobilization had to be carried out in the villages. The Reds pushed the White Cossacks back to the Khopr and Don line, but could not break through the front. It was not possible to cross the water line. The 2nd Don Corps of Konovalov threw the enemy back beyond Khoper. In September Shorin's group tried to attack again. Parts of the 9th Army reached the Don at a site of 150 km, captured a number of villages. The Cossacks retreated to the high, right bank and took up prepared positions. All attempts of the Red Army to force the arm were repelled. On this, the front stabilized. The offensive of Shorin's group was exhausted.
The 13th and 14th red armies were preparing for an offensive in the Kharkov direction. Their operations were scheduled for August 16, but the whites identified the enemy. Three days earlier, Kutepov's corps struck. The western army group preparing for the offensive was crushed and thrown back. Parts of the 13th army retreated to Kursk, the 14th - to Konotop. As a result, the Selivachev group launched an offensive without support from the western direction. Units of the 8th Red Army broke through the enemy's defenses and occupied the Kupyansk region. The Reds were 40 km from Kharkov, intercepted the Kharkov-Belgorod railway, even captured the headquarters train of the commander of the Volunteer Army, May-Mayevsky. However, the white command organized flank counterattacks with the aim of encircling and destroying the Soviet group. From under Yekaterinoslav, the 8th Cavalry Corps Shkuro was transferred here. On August 26, White launched a counterblow. The Reds began to withdraw on September 3 and reached Kursk by September 12. Selivachev managed to avoid encirclement, but the group suffered heavy losses.
Thus, the counter-offensive of the Red Army did not stop the enemy, although it slowed down his advance in the central direction, and improved the situation on the eastern flank. On the western flank, the situation was disastrous. The defeat of Selivachev's group opened the way for May-Mayevsky's army to new victories in Novorossia and Little Russia. Denikin's army again intercepted the strategic initiative and resumed the offensive in the Moscow direction.
