In this article, we will consider some of the features of the organization of domestic tank forces in the pre-war period. Initially, this material was conceived as a continuation of the cycle "Why the T-34 lost to the PzKpfw III, but won over the Tigers and Panthers", which would illustrate the changes in views on the organization, role and place of the Red Army armored forces in the pre-war and war years, against the background which the T-34 evolved. But the article turned out to be too voluminous, while not going beyond the pre-war years and not even reaching the "thirty-four", and therefore the author decided to offer it to respected readers as a separate material.
It must be said that the armored troops, which were called mechanized troops until 1929, and armored and mechanized troops from December 1942, had a very complex and, moreover, constantly changing structure before the war. But briefly, its description could be reduced to the following. Two directions are clearly visible in the structure of the armored forces:
1. Creation of units and subunits for direct interaction with rifle and cavalry divisions;
2. Creation of large mechanized formations capable of independently solving problems in operational cooperation with large combined-arms formations, such as the army or the front.
So, as part of the solution of the first task, a large number of separate tank companies, battalions, mechanized squadrons, armored divisions and regiments were formed, which, as a rule, were part of the regular composition of rifle and cavalry divisions or brigades. These formations might not be on the staff of divisions, but exist separately, as a means of strengthening them, given for the period of a particular operation. As for the second task, for its solution, starting from 1930, mechanized brigades were formed, and from 1932 - mechanized corps.
The backbone of the mechanized corps consisted of two mechanized brigades, each of which had 4 tank battalions, a self-propelled artillery division, a rifle-machine-gun and sapper battalions, a reconnaissance and chemical company. In total, the brigade had 220 tanks, 56 armored vehicles, 27 guns. In addition to the mechanized brigades of the specified composition, the mechanized corps included a rifle and machine gun brigade and many support units: a reconnaissance battalion, a chemical battalion, a communications battalion, a sapper battalion, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, a regulation company and a technical base. It is also interesting that the mechanized brigades, which are part of the mechanized corps, had their own staffs, different from the individual mechanized brigades.
However, the teachings of 1932-34. showed that such mechanized corps turned out to be overly cumbersome and difficult to manage, which is why in 1935 their staffs were reformed.
Their basis was still two mechanized brigades, but now of a new composition. The fact is that by that time the need to unify them in composition with separate mechanized brigades had already been realized, but, oddly enough, it was not possible to do this at that moment. The number of tanks in these formations decreased, while the T-26 tanks were excluded from the corps mechanized brigades and now they were equipped exclusively with BT. Nevertheless, as can be understood from the descriptions, the corps mechanized brigade still remained unequal to a separate compound of the same type.
As for the rest of the units and subunits, the mechanized corps retained the rifle and machine gun brigade, but most of the support units were withdrawn from their composition - only the communications battalion and the reconnaissance tank battalion remained. The number of tanks in the mechanized corps in the state is now 463 units (earlier there were more, but the author is not clear how much). In total, the mechanized corps consisted of 384 BTs, as well as 52 flamethrower tanks and 63 T-37 tanks.
In general, the mechanized corps remained an unbalanced formation, which, in addition to many tanks, had armored vehicles, motorcycles, but practically had no guns (only 20 units) and motorized infantry in its composition. There were 1,444 cars on such a mechanized corps. In total, since 1932, 4 such mechanized corps were formed.
In 1937, the next round of modernizations took place. Firstly, all mechanized brigades of the Red Army began to gradually be renamed into tank brigades (the process dragged on until 1939), and were now divided into light and heavy tank brigades. Their staff and the number of military equipment have changed. The number of tanks increased from 157 to 265 combat and 36 training tanks in brigades equipped with T-26, or 278 combat and 49 training tanks for BT brigades. Now the tank brigade was supposed to include 4 tank battalions (54 tanks and 6 self-propelled guns in each), as well as one reconnaissance and motorized rifle battalion, not counting support units. Only now it was possible to unify the composition of the corps and individual tank brigades, now the number of tanks in one mechanized corps was 560 combat and 98 training.
But then something strange began.
It would seem that the Red Army is gradually getting on the right path: on the one hand, having begun to form large independent tank formations, and on the other, gradually realizing that they should not be purely tank formations, but also have their own mobile artillery and motorized infantry. And suddenly, having taken a step forward, the leadership of the army takes two steps back:
1. Created in July 1939, the commission for the revision of the organizational and staff structure of the troops, although it proposes to retain the tank brigades and mechanized corps, but advocates for the exclusion of motorized rifle and rifle-machine-gun brigades and battalions from their composition.
2. In October 1939, a plan for the reorganization of the Red Army was sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, according to which the mechanized corps was proposed to be disbanded, and again the need to withdraw from the staff of tank brigades of motorized rifle and rifle-machine gun units was emphasized.
It can be assumed that the reason for the rejection of motorized infantry is associated, first of all, with the small number of available vehicles. As we have already said, the state of the same mechanized corps was given almost 1, 5 thousand cars, and this is a lot. Recall that the German tank division of the 1941 model, with 16,932 personnel, that is, surpassing the Soviet mechanized corps mod. In 1935, in terms of the number of soldiers and officers, it was one and a half times, it had 2,147 cars on the staff. But in fact, cars were the eternal Achilles' heel in the Red Army, there were never enough of them, and it can be assumed that in brigades and mechanized corps their actual number was much lower than the standard one.
Most likely, there was a situation when the available vehicle fleet was simply not enough even to service the existing tanks, and there was nothing to transport the motorized infantry, as a result of which, in fact, the mechanized corps and brigades were only partially motorized formations. That is, the same brigade could select a mobile group from its composition, but was not completely mobile. Hence the desire of the members of the commission to "rid" it of the infantry in order to ensure mobility at least of the tank battalions in its composition.
As for the disbandment of the mechanized corps, there are no mysteries here, perhaps not. By the time the final decision was made on them, and this happened on November 21, 1939, the 20th mechanized corps (more precisely, already a tank corps) managed to fight on Khalkhin Gol, and the 15th and 25th took part in the "Liberation campaign" to Western Belarus and Ukraine. Thus, the Red Army was able to test the real combat capability and mobility of its higher tank formations and, alas, the results were disappointing. It turned out that with the existing level of communication and combat training, as well as the real capabilities of the headquarters of the tank corps, the management of three brigades at the same time is very difficult, and the structure is too cumbersome. It may seem strange, but in terms of the rate of advancement, the 25th Panzer Corps in Belarus and Ukraine managed to lose not only to cavalry, but even to infantry formations. At the same time, individual tank brigades showed significantly better results.
Very often the author of this article had to come across in Internet discussions with such a point of view that in 1939 there was a downsizing of armored forces in the USSR, and that mechanized corps were abandoned in favor of tank brigades. But this, of course, is wrong, because until the very end of the 30s of the last century, it was the individual mechanized (later - tank) brigades that made up the backbone of the Red Army tank forces.
So, for example, in 1938-39. the Red Army included at least 28 tank brigades (this is how many mechanized brigades received new numbers when the name was changed), but only 8 of them were included in the mechanized corps. Thus, in addition to 4 mechanized corps in the Red Army, there were at least 20 tank brigades, but most of them were 21. According to other sources, the number of separate tank brigades reached 28 by the end of 1937, which, however, was several doubtful, but by May 1940 there were already 39 of them.
In other words, despite the presence of mechanized corps and not taking into account the mass of tanks in rifle and cavalry divisions, the main type of connection of the Red Army armored forces was a tank brigade, and in this regard, the decision to disband the tank corps did not change anything. In addition, it should be borne in mind that according to the decision adopted in November 1939, instead of four tank corps to be disbanded, the Red Army was to receive 15 motorized divisions.
The number of the new unit was supposed to be 9,000 people. (originally planned for a thousand more, but when they started to form, there were already 9 thousand people) in peacetime. This was not too different from the states of the mechanized corps, in which, according to the state of 1935, 8,965 people were supposed to be in peacetime. personnel. However, if the mechanized corps had a brigade structure, then the mechanized division consisted of 4 regiments, including a tank, an artillery and two rifle regiments. Thus, with an approximately equal number of personnel, the number of tanks in a motorized division in comparison with a mechanized corps was reduced from 560 to 257 units, but the number of motorized infantry and artillery increased significantly.
In other words, the motorized division of 1939 turned out to be very close to such a perfect instrument of tank warfare, which was the German tank division of the 1941 model. Yes, of course, the German TD had even more personnel - almost 17 thousand people. against 12 thousand people the Soviet MD according to the state of war, and there were even fewer tanks in it - from 147 to 229. But, nevertheless, the new Soviet formation, apparently, was much closer to the ideal combination of tanks, artillery and motorized infantry than any similar tank connection of any country in the world in 1939
But how then did it happen that in the future, instead of improving such a successful type of tank formation, the Red Army moved along the path of forming giant mechanized corps, which had 3 divisions and more than 1000 tanks?
Apparently, the following happened.
First. It must be said that the motorized divisions, depending on the point of view, were either a little late to be born, or, on the contrary, were much ahead of their time. The fact is that their advantage was their versatility, that is, they had enough tanks, artillery and motorized infantry for independent and effective combat operations. But alas, the general level of training of the personnel of the Red Army in 1939it simply did not allow for the full benefit that the structure of a motorized division could give in theory. The Finnish war "excellent" showed that the Soviet infantry of that time was poorly trained and did not know how to operate either in conjunction with tanks or in conjunction with artillery, and the latter did not differ in a high level of interaction with each other. Such a completely intolerable situation was caused by gaping gaps in combat training, and in addition, the Red Army experienced a severe shortage of personnel in terms of competent officers at all levels and junior commanders. Here, by the way, it is not the mythical Stalinist repressions that should be blamed, but the fact that for a long time the size of the armed forces of the Country of Soviets did not exceed 500,000 people, and even of those a significant number were territorial troops. Only in the late 1930s, efforts were made to expand the army, but there was no personnel reserve for this. In other words, to bring four regiments into one division is one thing, but to ensure that they become a combat-ready tool capable of 100% unleashing their potential is completely different. At that time, the Red Army did not have either commanders or headquarters capable of effectively leading such a division, and there was a large shortage of commanders of its individual units and subunits, not to mention the rank and file of the Red Army.
Second. The formation of motorized divisions turned out to be strongly "blurred" by the Soviet-Finnish "winter war" of 1939-1940, since their creation had already begun in December 1939, that is, in the course of hostilities. Thus, the motorized divisions could not, they simply did not have time to properly show themselves in battle - they were simply not ready.
And finally, the third - the Soviet-Finnish war revealed large gaps in the organization of the tank forces of the USSR, which required immediate elimination, but could not be solved by simply building up motorized divisions of the above state.
As mentioned above, in the 30s of the last century, it was considered extremely necessary to saturate rifle and cavalry divisions with tanks, which were attached to tank formations from a tank company or battalion and up to a regiment. This, again, turned out to be theoretically absolutely correct, but at the same time - a premature decision.
Without a doubt, the presence of a trained and efficient tank battalion as part of an infantry division significantly increased its capabilities both in defense and in the offensive. But for this, in addition to the approved staff of the division and the supply of a certain number of tanks with crews to it, it was necessary:
1. From somewhere to take the commanders of divisions and officers of divisional headquarters, who are well acquainted with the capabilities and needs of the tank battalion entrusted to their command, and the tanks themselves. That is, it was not enough to give the infantry divisional commander a certain amount of armored vehicles, it was also necessary to teach him how to use this armored vehicle.
2. Create conditions for the operation of tanks - that is, at least equip the basing sites, create repair services, arrange the timely supply of spare parts, etc.
3. Create conditions for normal combat training of tanks in infantry and cavalry divisions.
So, as a matter of fact, none of the above-mentioned points were fulfilled by us. The Red Army had a chronic shortage of at least some knowledgeable commanders of rifle divisions. Many of those who held these positions according to their qualifications could not effectively command even a purely infantry formation, and then there were tanks … what kind of tanks, when a significant part of the officers at the radio station looked askance? Of course, this does not mean that there were absolutely no division commanders in the Red Army capable of effectively leading divisions with the tanks attached to them, it was just that there were still too few of them.
At the same time, even tankers who came to serve in divisions (battalion commanders and below) often themselves had gaps in education, and did not know how to properly organize the maintenance of complex equipment, did not have experience in building interaction with the infantry and artillery, did not know how to establish combat training … And if they could, then, often, faced with the fact that for this corny there was not enough materiel - spare parts for maintenance, etc.
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And all this together led to the fact that there were tank units in the infantry formations, but there was almost no sense in this, the division commanders did not know how to use tanks in battle, the materiel transferred to the rifle divisions was simply not used, so as not to develop a resource, or quickly went out of order if someone nevertheless tried to conduct serious preparation. And therefore, the conclusion drawn by the results of the "winter war" by the armored subcommittee (April 20, 1940) is not at all surprising:
“Based on the use in combat conditions of the previously existing and newly created formations: separate tank battalions of the SD, MSD of individual tank companies in the regiments, tank regiments of the SD, the commission considers these organized units to be completely non-vital. Such organizational forms only lead to a complete dispersion of combat vehicles, their incorrect use (up to the protection of headquarters and rear services), the impossibility of their timely restoration, and sometimes the impossibility of their use."
It was a very unpleasant fiasco. In fact, it was said that a significant part of all the tanks supplied to the Red Army cannot be used for their intended purpose, and if everything is left as it is, this will lead to their wear and tear without a noticeable increase in the combat effectiveness of rifle and cavalry units. What did the subcommittee suggest?
“All separate tank battalions of rifle and motorized rifle divisions, separate light tank regiments and divisions, with the exception of the 1st and 2nd OKA and personnel cavalry divisions, - to disband and create tank brigades … … To categorically prohibit any formations of tank units, except for tank brigades … If there is a need for tanks, send them only in whole brigades."
Did this mean that the analysis of combat operations showed that the brigade was optimal for tank forces? No. As we know, nothing of the kind happened. On the contrary, it turned out that tank brigades, being purely tank formations, cannot effectively operate without the support of infantry and artillery (we will not recall the Air Force). For example, on December 17-19, 1939, the 20th heavy tank brigade, armed with T-28, unsuccessfully tried to break through the Finnish fortified area Summa-Hotinen. The problem was that, although the 20th TBR was supposed to be supported by the 50th Rifle Corps, in fact he could not do this - it all came down to the occasional and weak support of the advancing tanks by the infantry.
In other words, if the rifle divisions did not know how to use tank companies and battalions in their composition, then where did they get the ability to interact with the tank brigade attached to the operation? At the same time, the tankers had neither artillery nor motorized infantry, in order to conduct full-fledged hostilities, they had to rely only on tanks, which, naturally, led to their large losses and periodic disruptions of combat missions.
It can be assumed that the members of the subcommittee saw and understood all this perfectly, so they did not at all want to abandon the motorized divisions arr. 1939 Their recommendations read:
“Maintain the existing organization of motorized divisions. To form 3-4 such divisions according to the peacetime state, check them in exercises and combat operations in various directions, and then make the appropriate clarification for new formations."
In other words, it turned out like this. In 1940, the tank brigade was the most combat-ready unit of the Red Army armored forces. Companies, battalions, regiments transferred to infantry and cavalry units demonstrated low efficiency, the larger mechanized corps were too clumsy and poorly controlled, and the motorized divisions had not yet had time to prove themselves. At the same time, the tank brigade, although it was definitely not the ideal of a tank formation, nevertheless represented a formation that was already mastered, understandable for the army, which they learned to control, maintain in peacetime, train and use in battle.
Hence - a natural and absolutely sensible proposal of the commission: to withdraw all (more precisely, almost all) tanks from rifle divisions and combine them into brigades. And, at the same time, in practice, continue the search for a more optimal combination of armored forces, which was precisely the motorized division. And only later, when the structure, staff and management issues of such a division have been worked out, it will be possible to gradually reorganize the armored forces into new formations. In general, the Red Army did not have any other reasonable options, because further leaving tanks in separate companies / battalions in rifle divisions meant only aimlessly spending funds on their maintenance, but to form a mass of motorized divisions that could "master "The tanks withdrawn in this way was impossible. And the same T-26 was not suitable for motorized divisions. In addition, of course, no one interfered with the further use of the newly formed brigades in order to directly support the rifle corps.
Nevertheless, the development of domestic tank forces took a different path - on May 27, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense, together with the chief of the general staff, sent a memorandum to the Politburo and SNK with a proposal to form tank divisions, consisting of two tank regiments, as well as artillery and motorized rifle regiments, and anti-aircraft artillery battalion, and again return to mechanized or tank corps. It is difficult to say what caused this decision: on the one hand, the idea of creating formations with more than 1,000 tanks, according to the memoirs of Marshal M. V. Zakharov, voiced by none other than I. V. Stalin. But, according to all the same recollections, this was done at the end of May, when the NKO and the Chief of General Staff were in full swing working on the idea of forming tank divisions and corps, so it is unlikely that Joseph Vissarionovich was the initiator of this process.
Most likely, the leadership of the Red Army was impressed by the Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht and the striking power of its tank divisions and corps. At the same time, in one German tank division, as of 1939, there were 324 tanks (downsizing began in 1940 and beyond), respectively, two such divisions, combined into a corps, already gave a total of almost 700 tanks. So it was in reality, but what information the Red Army leadership had in May 1940 is difficult to say - unfortunately, domestic intelligence greatly exaggerated the capabilities of the German tank industry. But in any case, the German tank corps, even in its actual size, seemed to be a much more powerful and dangerous formation than separate tank brigades or motorized divisions. It is possible that this is precisely what led to the desire of our commanders to receive an equivalent "tank fist".
Nevertheless, the NKO memo of May 27, 1940 was rejected: the structure of the tank forces needed to be finalized in order to keep within the staffing of the Red Army at the level of 3,410 thousand people, which was approved by the government. The proposals were redone, and the new staffs of the mechanized corps were approved on July 6, 1940 by the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1193-464ss. The same decree established the staffing for the tank division, and for the motorized division, the staff was adopted, approved by the decree of the NCO No. 215cc adopted on May 22, 1940.
In total, the mechanized corps was supposed to include 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions and, besides them, a motorcycle regiment, one air squadron, a road battalion and a corps communications battalion. In addition, by the same decree, one air brigade was assigned to each MK, consisting of two short-range bomber and one fighter regiments. The latter, however, was not carried out.
In this form, MK and existed until the very Great Patriotic War, changes in the structure were minimal. So, for example, according to decree No. 1193-464ss, the tank division was supposed to have 386 tanks, but then its staff was slightly changed, and in fact their number increased to 413, but later it was reduced to 375 units.
In total, in 1940, it was decided to create 8 mechanized corps. For this purpose, a new structure of armored forces was introduced, which involved the creation of 18 tank, 8 motorized divisions, as well as 25 tank brigades, not counting the units attached to other units. At the same time, 16 tank and 8 motorized divisions were intended to form 8 mechanized corps, 2 tank divisions became separate, and tank brigades were considered as a means of strengthening rifle corps. This plan was even overfulfilled: at the end of 1940, the Red Army had: 9 mechanized corps, 2 separate tank divisions, 3 motorized rifle divisions, 40 T-26 tank brigades, 5 BT tank brigades, 20 motorized brigades, 3 motorized armored brigades, 15 tank regiments cavalry divisions, 5 armored divisions of mountain cavalry divisions, as well as other, smaller units with tanks.
I must say that until that time, the formation of mechanized corps looked reasonable and logical. Firstly, they were created on the basis of existing units, so they immediately turned out to be "full-blooded", that is, saturated with both equipment and personnel. And, in addition, in the composition of the armored forces, numerous brigades also remained, whose task was to provide direct support to the rifle corps. But then the leadership of the Red Army, alas, changed the sense of proportion and, starting in the spring of 1941, it began to form another 21 MK in order to bring their total number to 30. But they had to be created practically from scratch, and as a result they were given almost any remaining technique. And including, of course, the one that had separate tank brigades.
As a result of such approaches, the following happened: firstly, the rifle divisions were deprived of tank support, and among the newly formed formations such strange formations appeared, such as, for example, the 40th Panzer Division, whose tank fleet consisted of 19 T-26 and 139 T -37.
In other words, the development of the Red Army armored forces in the 1930s was characterized by a polar shift in priorities. If in the early 30s the main priority was the saturation of rifle and cavalry units with tank units, then closer to the beginning of the war the infantry was practically deprived of such support, and the giant mechanized corps began to play the main role. Mechanized (hereinafter - tank) brigades at the beginning of the 30s were the main type of tank formation designed for independent solution of tasks in operational cooperation with other types of troops, that is, in fact, they were the main instrument of tank warfare. But in 1940, tank brigades turned into a means of supporting rifle corps instead of tank battalions withdrawn from rifle divisions, and then completely disappeared from the tank forces. At the same time, the reason for this disappearance was by no means a denial of the usefulness of a tank brigade, but the priority of the pre-war formation of a huge number of mechanized corps. The service and combat use of tank brigades were well developed, but at the same time, it was well understood by many in the leadership of the Red Army that a tank brigade was not the optimal formation for modern tank warfare. That is why the search for other formations, larger than a tank brigade, but at the same time combining tanks, and motorized artillery, and infantry, continued throughout the 30s. Thus, the mechanized corps of the 1932-35 model were created, which were abandoned in favor of motorized divisions, and then the mechanized corps was again restored, but at a completely different organizational level.
