In the article "Pre-war structure of the Red Army armored forces" we stopped at the formation of pre-war tank corps, which before the start of the war were gigantic formations, the basis of which was 2 tank and motorized divisions, plus reinforcement and command units. The staffing of such a mechanized corps was 36,080 people, it included 1,031 tanks of almost all types that were in service with the Red Army (KV-1, T-34, BT-7, T-26, flamethrower and amphibious tanks).
Alas, the bulk of the most equipped and efficient mechanized corps, which we had at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, was lost during the Border Battle and the battles that followed. There were a lot of reasons for this, and we have already listed them in detail earlier:
1. The strategic initiative belonged to our enemy, while the USSR did not have plans to repel such an invasion. The fact is that the war plan of the USSR provided for disrupting the deployment of the German army by forces stationed in the border districts, but intelligence "slept through" and we had to repel the invasion of a fully mobilized and deployed enemy.
2. The superiority of the Germans in the number of personnel, the unsuccessful disposition of our troops.
3. Poor training of the headquarters and personnel of the Red Army, less combat experience in comparison with the Wehrmacht, weak communications, which made it extremely difficult to control troops.
4. And, finally, organizational and technical reasons - the suboptimal composition of mechanized corps, an insufficient number of vehicles and tractors in them, design flaws and "childhood diseases" of the newest T-34 and KV tanks, which were expressed, among other things, in the small resource of these combat machines.
All this together predetermined the defeat of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war and the defeat of its mechanized corps. What's next? It was quite obvious that such formations did not justify themselves, and the attempt to form new mechanized corps did not make sense. But what should have come to replace them? The Red Army already had experience in creating tank and mechanized divisions of various composition, but nevertheless, the choice was made in favor of tank brigades. The decree of the State Defense Committee No. GKO-570ss of 23 August 1941 read:
“When forming new tank units, establish two main types of organization of tank forces:
a) a separate tank battalion attached to a rifle division;
b) a tank brigade.
Tank divisions and mechanized corps will not be formed in the future."
At the same time, a little earlier, on August 12 of the same year, the State Defense Committee issued order No. 0063 "On the formation of separate tank brigades," according to which, in the period before January 1, 1942, as many as 120 such formations should have been formed. Let's take a closer look at what was going to replace mechanized corps and tank divisions.
The tank brigade had a new, previously unused staff: in fact, it was formed on the basis of two regiments, a tank and a motorized rifle, in addition, having anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions, four companies - reconnaissance, motor transport, management and repair, brigade management and a medical platoon. In other words, according to the original idea of the creators, the new tank brigade was a kind of "tank division in miniature", which, however, lacked field artillery. As for the total number of the brigade "sample of August 1941", then there is a small mystery, which the author, unfortunately, has not figured out.
The fact is that the number of personnel of a separate tank brigade was supposed to be 3,268 people. At the same time, in the decryptions of the number of the brigade by divisions known to the author, the number of the motorized regiment is only 709 people. This is too small for a regiment, and besides, adding up its strength with other units, we get the brigade strength equal to 1,997 people. The author is left to assume that the idea of equipping brigades with a full-fledged motorized regiment very quickly followed the path of all good intentions simply due to a lack of vehicles, as a result of which they had to limit themselves to a motorized battalion.
As for the tank regiment of the brigade, alas, it was also a kind of "mechanized corps in miniature", because it had 91 tanks of three different types in terms of staff. The regiment originally consisted of a battalion of light, medium and heavy tanks, and two battalions of light tanks, and included 7 KV, 20 T-34 and 64 T-40 or T-60, and the number of personnel reached 548 people. However, less than a month later, on September 13, 1941, the regiment was significantly reduced - now it consisted of only 67 tanks, including battalions: 7 KV, 22 T-34 and 32 T-40 or T-60.
Alas, even this turned out to be too much for our industry, and on December 9, 1941, another staff reduction awaited a separate tank brigade. The tank regiment disappeared - its place was taken by 2 battalions, each of which had 5 KVs, 7 T-34s and 10 T-60s, and from now on there were only 46 tanks in the brigade (there were additionally 2 control tanks). The staffing of the brigade was reduced to 1,471 people.
But this was not the limit. A separate tank brigade according to the state approved on February 15, 1942, had the same 46 tanks, and the number of T-34s in battalions increased from 7 to 10, and the T-60, on the contrary, decreased from 10 to 8, but the number of motorized battalion was reduced from 719 to 402 people. Thus, the staffing of the brigade again decreased, and amounted to 1,107 people. This number became the minimum for the tank forces of the Red Army, and in the future the number of tank brigades and larger formations only increased. True, there were tank brigades in the Red Army and a smaller number, but we are talking about specialized brigades intended for operations as part of cavalry corps. As a rule, they were assigned the same 46 tanks according to the staff, but heavy KVs were not included in its composition, as well as support units, including a motorized battalion, etc., since their functions were performed by the cavalry corps.
How justified was the decision to abandon tank and motorized divisions in favor of separate brigades? Reasoning from the point of view of the theory of tank warfare, this, of course, was a big step back in comparison with the pre-war formations. But in practice, apparently, this was the only correct decision in that situation.
As mentioned earlier, individual tank companies, battalions and regiments attached to rifle and cavalry divisions did not live up to the hopes placed on them during the Soviet-Finnish war. Therefore, it was decided to abandon them, and to bring the equipment and personnel into separate tank brigades, whose task would be to support the rifle and cavalry corps. At the same time, mechanized corps were formed to conduct mobile warfare.
This was not the worst distribution of duties, but after the decision was made in the winter of 1941 to increase the number of mechanized corps to 30, there were absolutely not enough tanks to form them. Separate tank brigades were quite predictably transferred to the new mechanized corps. But after such a "brigade cannibalization", rifle and cavalry units were left completely without tank support!
This was wrong, because both the infantry and the cavalry, of course, needed the support of armored vehicles, but where did they get it from? And as a result, in the very first days of the war, a significant part of the mechanized corps forces was "torn apart" to support the rifle divisions and died with them. That is, combat experience irrefutably testified that tank forces, in addition to large, "heavy" formations intended for mobile warfare, entering a breakthrough, operations on the operational rear of armies and enemy fronts, also needed smaller units / subunits to support infantry units.
Moreover, after the death of the main motorized forces in the Border Battle and further, the task of supporting again, and in a hurry, the infantry divisions being formed, came to the fore, at least to give them greater combat stability. This, of course, did not mean at all that the Red Army was abandoning deep operations to encircle the enemy. As a matter of fact, already during the battle of Moscow, the Soviet counteroffensive almost led to the encirclement of Army Group Center or its individual units. For example, there was a moment when the last communication of the German 4th Panzer and 9th Armies was the one and only railway Smolensk - Vyazma. The Red Army lacked just a little bit …
However, what was done turned out to be enough to bring the Wehrmacht to a crisis literally at all levels. Many military leaders demanded an immediate withdrawal of troops, since only this could still save the personnel of Army Group Center. Kurt phot Tippelskirch, a German general whose memoirs are considered the "golden fund" of historical literature on the Second World War, because of their amazing desire for impartiality, spoke of the idea as follows:
“From an operational point of view, this thought was undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless, Hitler opposed her with all the energy of his indomitable character. He could not accept it for fear of losing his prestige; he also feared - and not without reason - that such a large retreat would cause a decline in the morale of the army. Finally, there was no guarantee that it would be possible to stop the retreating troops in a timely manner.».
Translated into Russian, this means that neither the generals nor the Fuehrer himself were confident in their own troops, and they seriously feared that "an organized withdrawal to prepared positions" would result in a massive and uncontrolled flight. The situation was stabilized only by the resignation of the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, whose place was taken by Hitler, and the army unconditionally believed him. And, of course, the famous "stop order" "Not one step back!", Which the German army received about six months earlier than the Red Army, since a similar order (No. 227) was signed by I. V. Stalin only on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad.
Nevertheless, despite the conduct of such a large-scale operation, as a result of which the Wehrmacht suffered a most sensitive defeat for the first time in its history, the main leitmotif of the Red Army was still defensive battles, in which tank brigades were extremely in demand as a means of supporting rifle divisions. In addition, as we said earlier, the brigade organization of the tank forces was well known and mastered by the Red Army. But, in addition to all of the above, there were other arguments in favor of tank brigades.
The fact is that a tank division is, without a doubt, an extremely formidable force, the "top of the food pyramid" of the ground forces. But - only if it is correctly controlled, using tanks, motorized or self-propelled artillery, anti-tank equipment and motorized infantry in the right place and at the right time. And the organization of such control is very complicated - it is the competence of the division commander and his staff, and the level of communication, and the level of interaction between individual units. In other words, a Panzer Division is an extremely formidable instrument of war, but extremely difficult to control. So, in 1941, apparently, we still lacked the skill to use tank divisions, even if we had them - we lacked training, the level of commanders, communications, everything.
In this respect, the career of one of the best Soviet tank commanders, Mikhail Yefimovich Katukov, is very indicative.
The war found him commander of the 20th Panzer Division, which took part in the famous battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody. Without a doubt, M. E. Katukov did nothing to shame the honor shown to him, but, on the other hand, it cannot be said that the division under his leadership achieved any stunning success. Then, after Mikhail Efimovich withdrew the remnants of his unit from the encirclement, he received under his command the 4th tank brigade, which, as you know, brilliantly showed itself in the battle of Moscow and became the first brigade to deserve a guards rank.
In other words, at the beginning of the war, the division for M. E. Katukova, perhaps, was still too big, but the brigade was just right, it was there that he was able to perfectly prove himself and hone his skills. Then, in 1942, he was appointed commander of a tank corps and fought valiantly (although not always successfully). Well, later, having received such an excellent experience, he excellently commanded the 1st Tank Army, which distinguished itself in the battles near Kursk and at the Sandomierz bridgehead, and became under the leadership of M. E. Katukov is one of the symbols of victory over Hitler's fascism.
And finally, the last thing. As many history buffs, as well as professional historians, pay attention, the order to form 120 separate brigades of 91 tanks in each required almost 11,000 tanks. This was more than enough to form 29 tank divisions of the pre-war composition (375 tanks in the division), and since this was not done, then there were some weighty and principled objections to such divisions.
The author of this article fully agrees that there were such objections; some of the reasons in favor of the formation of brigades were given by him above. But we must not forget the most important thing - the presence of a sufficient number of tanks to form three dozen tank divisions does not at all give us the opportunity to form them. Tanks are just one of the necessary conditions for their formation, but they are far from the only one.
For a tank division, a lot of vehicles are needed to transport infantry and field artillery and anti-tank equipment, as well as this artillery itself and many support units. At the same time, a tank brigade, despite the formal presence of a motorized rifle battalion in it, is by and large still a purely tank formation, with a minimum amount of forces assigned to it. At the same time, it was planned that the tank brigade would not act independently, but in close cooperation with rifle or cavalry divisions, which had both infantry and field artillery, but where would the USSR get the same artillery to form 29 new tank divisions? Only the infantry, because the Red Army, of course, did not have free reserves. Thus, the attempt to create tank divisions in 1941 was possible only by weakening the rifle divisions, and there was nowhere to weaken them. On the contrary, they needed the reinforcement that tank brigades could give them, but tank divisions hardly.
Thus, we are touching on another important aspect - in 1941, the USSR, apparently, simply did not have the opportunity to equip tank divisions according to the staff they required, and the problem was not at all in tanks, but in cars, etc.
In view of the above, the return to tank brigades as the main unit of tank forces for the USSR in 1941 was uncontested, and had many benefits. Nevertheless, of course, tank brigades could not replace the larger tank formations in any way. For all its merits, the return to separate brigades had one, but a fundamental drawback. Tank forces made up of tank brigades could never have achieved the murderous effectiveness of the German Panzerwaffe. For the reason that, as an independent force, tank brigades could not compete with tank divisions due to the lack of field artillery and a sufficient number of motorized infantry in their composition. And it was not always possible to establish effective interaction between rifle or cavalry corps and tank brigades. Whatever one may say, but for the corps commander, his rifle corps always remained "dearer" to the tank brigade attached to him, and the "infantry" commanders lacked the ability to use it correctly. But there was always a temptation to "plug the holes" with the bodies of tankers - they are "in iron", and the corps commander is less responsible for their losses than for his own …
So it turned out that in those cases when it was possible to ensure normal interaction between rifle and cavalry units and a tank brigade, sometimes an absolutely phenomenal result was achieved. So, for example, the joint actions of the previously mentioned 4th tank brigade M. E. Katukov, the 316th rifle division (Panfilov's men) and the Dovator's cavalry group on November 16-20 in the Volokolamsk direction delayed the offensive of the 46th motorized and 5th German army corps, which in total consisted of 3 tank and 2 infantry divisions.
But in most cases, alas, this was not the case. We will simply quote part of the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 057 of January 22, 1942 "On the combat use of tank units and formations", revealing the essence of the problems:
“The experience of the war has shown that there are still a number of major shortcomings in the combat use of tank forces, as a result of which our units suffer heavy losses in tanks and personnel. Excessive, unjustifiable losses with a low combat effect in tank forces occur because:
1) Until now, the interaction of the infantry with tank formations and units is poorly organized in battle, the infantry commanders set tasks not specifically and hastily, the infantry in the offensive lags behind and does not consolidate the lines captured by tanks, in defense it does not cover the tanks standing in ambushes, and even when retreating does not warn the commanders of tank units about a change in the situation and leaves tanks to their fate.
2) The attack of tanks is not supported by our artillery fire, no tank escorting tools are used, as a result of which combat vehicles are killed by enemy anti-tank artillery fire.
3) Combined-arms commanders are extremely hasty in using tank formations - they throw them into battle right on the move, in parts, without taking time even for the production of elementary reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain.
4) Tank units are used by small subunits, and sometimes even one tank at a time, which leads to dispersal of forces, loss of communication between dedicated tanks and their brigade and the impossibility of material support for them in battle, and infantry commanders, solving narrow tasks of their unit, use these small groups tanks in frontal attacks, depriving them of maneuver, thereby increasing the loss of combat vehicles and personnel.
5) Combined-arms commanders do not take good care of the technical condition of the tank units subordinate to them - they make frequent transfers over long distances on their own, remove themselves from the issues of evacuating emergency materiel from the battlefield, set combat missions, regardless of the amount of time the tanks stay in battle without preventive repair, which in turn increases the already large losses in tanks."
As we can see from the above, the tank brigades categorically lacked their own infantry and artillery trained to interact with tanks. In other words, despite all the validity of the return to tank brigades, they were not, and indeed could not be, as perfect an instrument of mobile warfare as the German tank divisions were. Alas, we have to admit that for our temporary inability to form full-fledged formations for a tank war, the Red Army had to pay with high losses in tanks and tank crews.
At the same time, as we said earlier, in 1941-42. production was engaged in fine-tuning the T-34 to a normal technical and technological state, postponing some fundamental upgrades for later. The leadership of the Red Army perfectly understood the shortcomings of the T-34, including the difficulty of controlling the tank, and the lack of a commander's cupola, and the insufficient number of crew. But then the shaft was extremely important, because there were absolutely not enough tanks, and in no case it was impossible to reduce the production of thirty-fours with their still anti-cannon armor and a very serious 76, 2-mm cannon. From the above structures of tank brigades, it is clearly visible what a huge share was occupied by light tanks like the T-60, and it was they who, in the face of a shortage of T-34s, had to solve all the tasks of a tank war.
Of course, for all its shortcomings, the T-34 and in 1942 still had an advantage in protection and firepower over the bulk of the Wehrmacht tanks. And these qualities of the T-34 helped the Red Army to withstand that terrible period for us. But, of course, in their then technical condition and in the conditions of the forcedly non-optimal structure of the tank forces, our units and formations that fought on the T-34 could not equal the effectiveness of the German "Panzerwaffe". We couldn't yet.
