Recently it became known what they think about the Russian carrier-based aircraft in the United States. In short, we are recommended to hand over our only TAVKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" for scrap and forever say goodbye to aircraft carrier ambitions, using the freed up funds for the construction of nuclear submarines of the "Ash" type or several small missile ships. Moreover, these recommendations do not sound from analytical journalists of any publication, which no one has heard of in the United States itself, but from highly respected professionals: the expert of the US Naval Institute Richard Moss and the commander of the US Navy Ryan West.
Well, the position is clear. But it is interesting for a change to see what America thinks about the prospects for the development of its own aircraft carrier forces. Moreover, in recent years there has been a certain revival in terms of the concept of aircraft construction.
A bit of history
For a long time in the American Navy, everything was more or less simple and understandable. The experience of World War II led the Americans to the idea of a supercarrier of the largest possible size, since it was such a ship that created the best conditions for the actions of its own air wing. This is how the Midway appeared, laid down on October 27, 1943 and having a standard displacement of 47219 tons.
The new aircraft carrier was only slightly smaller than the most modern American battleships of the Iowa class at that time and was one of the largest warships in the world. Of course, small aircraft carriers were also built in the United States, the purpose of which is well understood from their name: "escort". These ships were not intended for sea battles, but for escorting caravans of transport or landing ships, anti-submarine defense and solving other, of course, important, but secondary tasks from the point of view of conquering supremacy at sea.
Then, after the end of the war and the start of the serial production of atomic weapons, the idea arose that aircraft carriers as a means of war were completely outdated. American admirals categorically disagreed with this, and therefore the US aircraft carriers increased even more in size: firstly, in order to ensure the basing of jet aircraft, for its era has come, and secondly, to carry aircraft capable of using atomic weapons … As a result, the first post-war production aircraft carriers of the Forrestal type already had over 61 thousand tons of standard displacement, and it only grew in the future. And nuclear power has already arrived there. Of course, the use of the latter on ships and vessels has caused and to this day causes well-known controversy, but, by and large, for three classes of ships: aircraft carriers, submarines and icebreakers, their usefulness has never been seriously disputed. In addition, combat aircraft grew in size by leaps and bounds, and it is not surprising that the displacement of American aircraft carriers eventually exceeded 100,000 tons.
Nevertheless, the Americans were not at all embarrassed. In their post-war concepts, the Air Force always played the first violin, a special role, air supremacy was considered by them to be an absolutely necessary prerequisite for winning a war. It is not surprising that with such an approach, and even having a wealth of experience in the aircraft carrier war in the Pacific, the American admirals are absolutely sure that aviation is the priority in the armed struggle at sea. It is aviation, in their opinion, that should win air supremacy, destroy enemy ship groupings, play an important role in the anti-submarine defense of formations, strike along the coast, etc. and so on
Thus, the growth in the size and cost of aircraft carriers could not embarrass the command of the Navy - it is obvious that they considered it criminal to save on a key naval weapons system. And besides, may this banality be forgiven to the author, America is a rich country, and could afford a lot.
But then the inevitable happened. There is one very interesting economic law, commonly known as the "Pareto Rule", which says: "20% of the effort gives 80% of the result, and the remaining 80% of the effort only 20% of the result." In other words, upon reaching a certain level, it becomes more and more expensive to ensure an increase in the combat qualities of an aircraft carrier, and at some stage, to put it simply, the game ceases to be worth the candle. According to the personal opinion of the author of this article, the Americans either reached the ideal or extremely close to it in the project of aircraft carriers of the "Nimitz" type - very expensive, but at the same time extremely effective aircraft-carrying ships. But as time went on, this project gradually became obsolete morally, new technologies appeared, and the US Navy wanted to get an aircraft carrier of a new project. This is how the development of the Gerald-class ship was launched. R. Ford ".
In essence, this ship was viewed as an "improved Nimitz", and there were three main areas of improvement:
1. Transition from steam to electromagnetic catapults, the latter are much more comfortable, and better preserve both the health of the pilots and the resource of aircraft.
2. An increase in the average number of sorties per day from 140 to 160 while maintaining the same number of air group.
3. Reducing the size of the crew due to automation: it was assumed that this would reduce the operating costs of the ship.
Also, naturally, “Gerald. R. Ford”was supposed to receive the most modern technologies: such, for example, as new reactors that do not require recharging of the core for the entire service life of an aircraft carrier, the use of stealth technologies, etc. etc.
And how are you doing?
What did the Americans do as a result? It is too early to judge, because "Gerald R. Ford" turned out to be very "raw" and cannot cope with numerous "childhood illnesses" in any way, including in such important systems as electromagnetic catapults. Whether he copes with them, or whether the shortcomings become chronic, the future will show. But what is absolutely impossible to deny is that the aircraft carrier turned out to be expensive. Very expensive.
Of course, the US military budget is titanic; in 2018, Uncle Sam's military spending accounted for 36% of global military spending. But you need to understand that the costs of the Americans are also enormous - their military-industrial complex has long ceased to be distinguished by moderation of appetites. And therefore the price tag of the latest design nuclear aircraft carriers is capable of driving even the senators of the United States of America into anguish.
Initially, it was planned to keep within 10, 5 billion dollars, and - only for the lead ship, on which the United States traditionally "add up" the cost of its development, while the cost of the serial was supposed to be at the level of 8 billion dollars. in fact, the cost of creating "Gerald R. Ford" has exceeded $ 13 billion, and a number of systems still do not want to work as they should. Of course, in these conditions, someone must have proposed to build aircraft carriers "smaller in size, at a cheaper price", and this happened. For some time now, both the Congress and the US Department of Defense have been discussing the concept of LAC in one way or another, that is, Light Aircraft Carrier, which means "Light Aircraft Carrier" in Russian. As far as the author knows, by the word "light" the Americans mean aircraft carriers of less than 70,000 tons of standard displacement.
In 2017the infamous, terribly odious and now deceased American Senator John McCain gave a fever: he proposed to wind up programs for the construction of universal amphibious assault ships in the period until 2022 in favor of light aircraft carriers, which will have to complement the existing heavy ones. In addition to him, the Research Institute of the Center for Budgetary and Strategic Analysis spoke out for light aircraft carriers in its report "Restoring American Seapower", made in January 2017. 40-60 thousand tons with a conventional, non-nuclear power plant, whose air group will be about 40 aircraft and helicopters, that is, roughly half of the supercarrier's air wing.
Why does the US Navy need light aircraft carriers?
The logic of supporters of light aircraft carriers is as follows: there are a number of tasks for carriers of carrier-based aircraft, for which the capabilities of nuclear supercarriers are excessive. These tasks include:
1. Participation in low-intensity combat operations.
2. Direct protection of amphibious and attack ship groups.
3. Escort of convoys.
4. Power projection and flag display.
Accordingly, it is possible to solve them with light aircraft carriers, using heavy ones only where it is really needed.
I must say that what is happening in 2017 and now is not new in the history of the US Navy. At the turn of the 70s, the notorious Admiral E. Zamwalt, in whose honor the newest American destroyer was later named, also drew attention to the high cost of nuclear aircraft carriers and, accordingly, their relatively small number in the fleet, which did not allow to control the oceanic expanses. His proposals gave life to the concept of the Sea Control Ship (SCS), that is, a ship to control the sea. In the initial version, it was a small aircraft-carrying ship with a displacement of only 13,000 tons, a speed of 26 knots, a crew of 700 people and an air group of 17 aircraft, including 11 anti-submarine helicopters, 3 AWACS helicopters and 3 vertical and short take-off fighters and landing. It was assumed that, having abandoned one nuclear "super", it would be possible to build eight SCS with the saved money.
The SCS concept seemed interesting, so the Americans even converted one of their amphibious assault helicopter carriers ("Guam") into the carrier of "Harriers" and anti-submarine helicopters. Later, the idea evolved into a ship of about 30 thousand tons. with a speed of 30 knots and an air group of 26 aircraft including 4 VTOL fighters, but it seemed suboptimal in terms of cost-effectiveness. As a result, the concept gradually came to naught, although articles appeared in the American press for a long time on the topic that SCS with a displacement of up to 40 thousand tons, a non-nuclear power plant and with VTOL aircraft is the future of aircraft-carrying ships. However, there is a persistent feeling that this was done with one single purpose - to convince the USSR, which was then just engaged in the construction of a TAVKR of the "Kiev" type, that, they say, "you are going the right way, comrades!"
And in the American Navy, it all came down to the fact that the universal amphibious ships were able to carry VTOL aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters. Usually in Internet publications this fact is presented as an acknowledgment of the SCS concept, but the author of this article has great doubts about this. The fact is that such innovations increase the PLO of amphibious assault groups and enable the American marines to better use the VTOL aircraft at their disposal. That is, such steps only increase the capabilities of amphibious formations and do not claim any "control over the sea."
In other words, some real step towards the concept of light aircraft-carrying ships in the United States was made a very long time ago, and this was the end of it. However, in June 2017, the Congressional Budget Office amended the US $ 30 million in 2018 to develop an initial concept for a light aircraft carrier. In other words, Americans are getting down to business from idle chatter.
New concepts
What does the future hold for the American carrier fleet? Experts from the notorious RAND corporation tried to answer this question, compiling and publishing the Future Aircraft Carrier Options report, in which they considered possible directions for the development of carrier-based aircraft carriers in case of abandoning the serial construction of aircraft carriers of the Gerald R. Ford type.
The authors of the report, B. Martin and M. McMehon, presented 4 such options:
In the first case, we are talking about practically the same "Gerald R. Ford", but with a number of measures to reduce the cost of the ship with a minimum drop in the combat capability of the latter. In the report, this version of the aircraft carrier is referred to as CVN 8X, while the aircraft carrier of the Gerald R. Ford class is referred to as CVN 80.
The second project is the funniest and most unusual concept of a modern aircraft carrier that the author of this article has ever come across (the horrors of the Krylovsky KGNTs, that is, Project 23000 "Storm" and other catamarans are not to be offered - they make you shiver). It's all about the combined power plant of the latter. No, combined power plants have been known for a very long time and are used everywhere, but, at least, remember our frigates of Project 22350 - diesel is used there for the economic course, and a gas turbine for the full one. But gentlemen from RAND suggested combining gas turbines with a nuclear engine …
The essence of the proposal is as follows - "Gerald R. Ford" has two A1B reactors, which provide all the needs of the aircraft carrier, but, of course, are very expensive. So, the proposed concept with a displacement of 70,000 tons should get by with only one such reactor, and since its capacity for the needs of such a giant is still not enough, it is proposed to "finish off" it with gas turbines. The option of a complete transition to "fossil" fuel was considered by American specialists, but was rejected as deliberately erroneous, the United States does not want to follow the path of the British with their "Queen Elizabeth". It is very indicative that, it would seem, the most logical option is to create a new reactor for the needs of an aircraft-carrying ship with a displacement of 70 thousand tons. The Rands are not considering either. And this is probably logical, because in today's realities of the American military-industrial complex, such a development will become not even gold, but brilliant, and RAND's task, in fact, is to reduce the cost of US aircraft carrier programs, and not increase it. This concept was designated by B. Martin and M. McMahon as CVN LX.
The third concept is very simple. In fact, this is a light aircraft carrier with a displacement of 40,000 tons, carrying only VTOL aircraft, that is, today, the F-35B. Naturally, no nuclear reactor is envisaged. The concept is named CV LX.
And, finally, the fourth ship, which received the designation CV EX, is downright renaissance of E. Zamwalt's ideas, since we are talking about an "aircraft carrier" with a displacement of 20,000 tons or a little more. Of course, its air group is also limited to VTOL aircraft and helicopters.
B. Martin and M. McMehon assessed the possible performance characteristics of all four concepts, in the report they are combined into a table, and for people who do not speak English, the author will try to give the necessary explanations below.
The flight-deck maximum size of the CVN 8X concept remains the same as that of the Gerald R. Ford, while the 70,000th CVN LX is slightly smaller (by 3.8%). And the same applies to the size of the air group (Embarked aircraft): on the CVN 8X, it has 80 aircraft, as on the "Ford", and on the CVN LX it may be slightly smaller - 70-80. But the reduction in size led to a significant drop in the "fire performance" of the aircraft carrier. If Gerald R. Ford is expected to provide 160 sustained sorties per day (SGR sustained per day), and from its simplified analogue CVN 8X - 140-160, then from the 70,000 CVN LX - no more than 80 sorties per day. Strictly speaking, B. Martin and M. McMeahon stipulated that this is a conservative estimate, that is, the number of sorties may turn out to be higher, but in any case, the lag behind the super-aircraft carrier will be more than significant. In addition, according to American analysts, an aircraft carrier of 70,000 tons will be significantly inferior to an aircraft carrier of 100,000 tons in terms of aviation fuel reserves, ammunition and the level of constructive protection. The decrease in speed from 30+ to 28 knots is also noteworthy.
Naturally, the performance of the "forty-thousand-ton" CV LX is much more modest - the flight deck area will be slightly more than 35% of the Gerald R. Ford, the air group - 25-35 aircraft and maximum 50-55 sorties per day. CVN LX is also distinguished by the lowest speed - 22 knots.
But on the small CV EX, the authors of the report did not find an opportunity to place more than 10 aircraft on it with the ability to provide up to 15-20 flights per day. In this case, the speed of the ship will be 28 knots.
And what's the price?
As for the comparative cost of the concepts, here, alas, the author is let down by his poor knowledge of English. Apparently, under the term "Total recurring ship cost" B. Martin and M. McMahon mean something intermediate between the cost of building a serial ship and the cost of its life cycle. In any case, this "Total recurring ship cost" for ships of the Gerald R. Ford class in 2018 prices is defined in the report as $ 18,460 million.
As you can see, CVN 8X in its combat potential is practically not inferior to Gerald R. Ford, but alas, it is also practically not inferior to him in cost - it was determined by the authors of the report at $ 17,540 million and only $ 920 million. dollars (less than 5%) below the "Ford". The 70,000th CVN LX is a different matter - here the savings will amount to $ 4,895 million, or just over 26.5%. However, it should not be forgotten that it will be achieved due to a significant drop in the combat capability of the aircraft carrier, by about half in air sorties, as well as a significant reduction in combat stocks and the weakening of constructive protection.
But CV LX is a very attractive option from a financial point of view, because its "Total recurring ship cost" is only $ 4,200 million, or less than 23% of the cost of a nuclear supercarrier. But here B. Martin and M. McMehon remind that in order to compensate for the absence of one Gerald R. Ford, at least two CV LX-class ships will be required, and most importantly, the basing of AWACS and EW aircraft is impossible on them, without which modern air combat is completely unthinkable. Thus, ships of the CV LX type can be used only where they can be adequately supported by either supercarriers or land-based aircraft, that is, their combat potential is significantly limited.
As for CV EX, here the verdict of RAND specialists is unambiguous - maybe in some specific cases such ships will be useful, but they will not be able to replace, or at least act as a useful addition to supercarriers. But CVN LX and CV LX, with certain reservations, can be considered as a direction for further work on a light aircraft carrier.
And what does the US Navy command think about this?
It is, to put it mildly, not happy. The idea of sacrificing combat potential for the sake of price, for obvious reasons, does not attract admirals at all, but fears that in order to implement the program for building a light aircraft carrier it will be necessary to reduce the number of heavy aircraft, exist and are expressed.
As a matter of fact, taking into account the current state of the US military budget, it is possible to build light aircraft carriers only at the expense of nuclear "super", or at the expense of universal amphibious assault ships. Obviously, the first option is not to the liking of the sailors, and the second - to the Marine Corps, which has repeatedly raised the issue of the lack of landing craft for the expected scale of amphibious operations from them.
And finally
We can only wish the Americans every success in promoting the LAC program and building light aircraft carriers. Based on the experience of a number of American military programs, it is quite possible to expect that as a result of an attempt to reduce the cost of the aircraft carrier fleet, the US Navy will receive ships one and a half times less, two times worse and three times more expensive than the existing ones. The author, of course, exaggerates, but in every joke there is a grain of a joke, and everything else is true.
