Studying the actions of Z. P. Rozhestvensky in the first half of the day of the Tsushima battle, the author came to the conclusion that the Russian commander had extremely good reasons for not rushing to deploy the squadron into combat formation. The fact is that, losing heavily to the Japanese in speed, Z. P. Rozhestvensky had no chance to outplay H. Togo in the classic maneuvering of wake columns. Form a Russian squadron in a column, ledge or in the front - with some correct actions of the Japanese admiral "crossing T" was almost inevitable.
Actions of the Russian admiral
Apparently, Z. P. Rozhestvensky saw the way out in not accepting the battle formation until the main enemy forces appeared, and only then to rebuild. In this case, the Russian commander had a good chance to avoid "crossing T", because H. Togo until the very last moment will not know the formation into which the Russian squadron will deploy. However, this decision had a downside. Taking into account the fact that the visibility on the morning of May 14 did not exceed 7 miles, Z. P. Rozhestvensky risked that he would not have time to complete the rebuilding by the time fire was opened.
Therefore, the Russian commander tried to play it safe. When at about 06.30 on the squadron was found tracking her "Izumi", he did nothing, rightly believing that the main forces were still far away. The squadron continued to march in formation, with its main forces marching in two parallel columns. But when the 3rd combat detachment appeared, Z. P. Rozhestvensky, expecting the imminent appearance of the battleships of H. Togo and the armored cruisers of H. Kamimura, orders the right column to increase the speed from 9 to 11 knots. Thus, the right column gradually overtook the left, reducing the time required to rebuild into the battle line - however, for the time being, this maneuver was poorly visible from the outside and did not give an idea of what exactly the Russians were up to.
But time passed, and the main forces of the Japanese were not. The right column moved forward strongly, and Z. P. Rozhestvensky could only rebuild into a wake. At this moment, there is a short skirmish with the Japanese cruisers, and contact was lost for some time. Taking advantage of the lack of observation, Z. P. Rozhestvensky is trying to reorganize from the wake column to the front line. This made sense, since the scouts probably had to report to H. Togo the formation of the Russian squadron, but then the Japanese commander was in for a small surprise.
But this surprise did not come as well - at the moment of the beginning of the execution of the maneuver, Japanese cruisers appeared. Then Z. P. Rozhestvensky orders the 2nd detachment to cancel the maneuver, and his 1st detachment, consisting of 4 squadron battleships of the Borodino class, returns the front to the wake. As a result, the Russian squadron again moves in two parallel columns, and the only difference is that if in the morning "Oslyabya" and the 2nd combat detachment went in the right column, to the wake of the 1st armored detachment, now he was in charge of the left column.
In other words, Z. P. Rozhestvensky again rebuilt his ships in a non-combat order, from which, however, he could quickly turn around both in the front line and in the wake column. What happened next?
And what did H. Togo do?
The Japanese admiral received a message about the Russian fleet at about 04.30. A little more than an hour and a half later, he weighed anchor, and at 06.07 he led his main forces to intercept. NS. Togo was going to start a general battle near Fr. Okinoshima, but how? An exhaustive answer to this question is given by the Japanese admiral himself, in his official report on the battle:
“… The reports received allowed me, being several tens of miles away, to have a clear idea of the enemy's position. Thus, even without seeing him, I already knew that the enemy fleet consisted of all the ships of the 2nd and 3rd squadrons; that they are accompanied by 7 transports; that the enemy ships are in the formation of two wake columns, that his main forces are in the head of the right column, and the transports are in the tail; that he is traveling at a speed of about 12 knots; that he continues to go to the East Strait, etc. Based on this information, I could draw up a decision - to meet the enemy with my main forces at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon near Okinoshima and attack the lead ships of the left column."
Why exactly the left one? Obviously, made up of the "battleship-cruiser" Oslyabi, the old battleships of the 2nd armored detachment and the "samotopes" of the 3rd, it was a very vulnerable target, unable to withstand the attack of the main forces of the Japanese. Both of these detachments made sense only as support forces for the main force of the Russian squadron - four squadron battleships of the "Borodino" class, but without them they could not successfully fight the Japanese battleships. On the other hand, if the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments were defeated, then the fate of the Borodino-class ships would be quickly resolved. By attacking the left column, the Japanese commander could quickly, and with minimal damage to himself, achieve a decisive success, and it would be strange if H. Togo neglected this chance.
And so the Japanese commander led the fleet towards the Russians. At 13.17 (according to Japanese data) - 13.20 (according to Russian data) the parties saw each other. "Mikasa" was found slightly to the right of the course of the right Russian column, while the Japanese battleships crossed the course of the Russian squadron at about 90 degrees. from right to left.
Obviously, H. Togo was preparing to put his plan into practice - in order to attack the left Russian column, he had to go over to the left side of the Russian squadron, which he did.
Russian squadron begins rebuilding
In response to this, Z. P. Rozhestvensky immediately ordered to increase the speed of his flagship to 11.5 knots, and ordered to raise the signal "1st detachment - keep 11 knots." "Suvorov", went across the course "Oslyabi". According to the testimony of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky of the Investigative Commission, the turn was started at 13.20, and finished at 13.49 - at that moment "Prince Suvorov" entered the course "Oslyabi" and, turning to the right, led the wake column of the main forces of the Russian squadron.
I must say that in various, and sometimes very serious sources, the above events are described in completely different ways. The time for the detection of the Japanese is indicated at 13.20, but sometimes at 13.25, and the time for the completion of the maneuver of the 1st armored detachment is from 13.40 to 13.49 minutes. Thus, according to the testimony of eyewitnesses, the execution time of the maneuver "jumps" from 15 to 29 minutes. There is a statement that the 1st combat detachment did not turn sequentially, but "all of a sudden" 8 points (90 degrees) to the left. At the same time, an eyewitness to the events, flag-captain K. K. Clapier-de-Colong, in his testimony to the Commission of Inquiry, argued that the battleships did not turn "all of a sudden," but sequentially, and not by 8, but by 4 rumba (45 degrees). Official Russian historiography, apparently, decided to somehow reconcile these conflicting points of view, agreeing with the flag officer that the turn was by 4 rumba, but declaring that it was not carried out sequentially, but "all suddenly." But that's not all: K. K. Clapier-de-Colong reported that the 1st armored detachment turned immediately after developing 11 knots, but the flagship mine officer Leontiev 1st reported that the right column, having developed 11 knots, first outstripped left, and only then began to turn.
A separate issue is the distance between the left and right Russian columns, and their relative position. Z. P. Rozhestvensky claimed that the distance between the columns was 8 cables, the same distance was indicated by the flagship navigator Filippovsky. Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov practically agreed with them, reporting 7 cables. There were other similar testimonies: for example, Lieutenant Maksimov from the coastal defense battleship "Ushakov" reported 6-8 cables. But the officers of the battleship Eagle had a different opinion and reported about 14-15 and even 20 cables, on the Sisoy Veliky they believed that the distance between the columns was 17 cables, and so on. The same problem with the position of the columns: a number of testimonies and official Russian history indicate that by the time the Japanese appeared on the horizon, Oslyabya was abeam of Suvorov, but there are "opinions" that the right column by this time turned out to be somewhat pushed forward.
Thus, it is very difficult to compose a consistent description of this maneuver, relying on the recollections of eyewitnesses and on historical works, since the latter contradict each other too much. But for reasons that will be described below, the author adheres to the version of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky.
So, at 13:20 the Russian squadron was moving in two columns, the distance between which was 8 cables or so, while the Oslyabya was on the traverse of the Suvorov, or slightly lagged behind. Seeing the Japanese, "Suvorov" immediately increased speed to 11, 5 knots. and bent to the left, but not by 4, and even less by 8 points, but quite insignificantly - the change in course was less than a point, about 9 degrees.
In order to build a single wake column with the 1st armored detachment at the head with the help of such a turn, it took almost half an hour, but this is Z. P. Rozhestvensky was quite happy. He needed to complete the rebuilding by the time the Japanese opened fire on the ships of the left column, and for this, just about so much was required. But the most important thing is that such a rebuild, performed relatively slowly, and with a slight turn to the left, would be very difficult to see from the Japanese flagship.
From the perspective of the Japanese flagship, it was almost impossible to "catch" a slight increase in speed and a slight turn of the "Prince Suvorov" and the battleships of the 1st detachment following him. Thus, the Russian squadron was gradually reorganizing into a battle formation, but for H. Togo, the situation looked as if the Russians continued to march in two columns and did nothing. In other words, it turned out that Z. P. Rozhestvensky, as it were, “invited” H. Togo to rush to the relatively vulnerable left column, showing him that in this case the battleships of the “Borodino” type would no longer have time to lead the Russian squadron. In fact, thanks to the increase in speed and the turn of the 1st armored detachment, this was not the case, because the Russians had time to complete the rebuilding.
And it turned out that if Kh. Togo continued his movement towards the Russian squadron in order to defeat 7 old ships led by the Oslyabey on the countercourses, he would soon find a wake column coming towards him, led by the best battleships of the 2nd Pacific squadron. This beginning of the battle became extremely beneficial for the Russian commander, especially since in the Russian Imperial Navy, shooting on the counter-courses was considered one of the most important artillery exercises.
Of course, all this was not at all a verdict for H. Togo. The Japanese commander, having superiority in speed and seeing that things were not going well for him, could well have retreated, breaking the distance. But in this case, a tactical victory at this stage would have remained for Z. P. Rozhestvensky: he did not allow the "crossing T" and even forced the Japanese to withdraw, what else can be asked of him? In addition, the Japanese, when retreating, fell for some time under the fire of Russian guns, being in a not very favorable position for themselves: there were chances not to drown, but at least damage their ships. And if Kh. Togo had delayed, or risked diverging on counter courses at a short distance … Even with the disgusting quality of Russian shells, and even if Kh. Kamimura would not expose his ships to dagger fire, the passage of four battleships and the Nissin from "Kasugoi" along the line of 12 Russian ships, 11 of which (except for "Admiral Nakhimov") carried heavy guns, could cause very heavy damage to the Japanese.
Apparently, the first version of the "trap for H. Togo" was put forward by the respected V. Chistyakov ("A quarter of an hour for Russian cannons"), and, in the author's opinion, he was largely right. It is possible, of course, that Z. P. Rozhestvensky was guided by somewhat different considerations than V. Chistyakov described it. But the fact is that the Russian commander was well aware of the benefits of delaying rebuilding from a marching order to a combat one, which follows from the words of Z. P. Rozhestvensky: the author quoted them in a previous article.
Coming out to the left side of the Russian squadron, the Japanese turned around and took a countercourse: it was all because they were going to attack the relatively weak left Russian column. Here, of course, a number of readers may have a fair comment - diverging on the counter course H. Togo would hardly have had time to completely crush the old Russian battleships with 305-mm guns, and they could well have "recouped" on the relatively weakly armored cruisers of H. Kamimura. But the fact is that the Japanese squadron did not form a single wake column, the 2nd combat detachment went separately and slightly to the right of the 1st. In addition, H. Kamimura had rather broad powers, he had to act according to the situation and was not obliged to follow the flagship. Thus, the armored cruisers of Kh. Kamimura could break the distance if they diverged with counter courses, which would minimize their risks, or even retreat altogether if it became very hot. However, it is unlikely that the Russian squadron could have known about all this.
For some time, the squadrons converged on counter courses, and then the Japanese turned almost 180 degrees - more precisely, 15, and possibly all 16 points, and laid down on a course almost parallel to the Russian squadron. This maneuver was later called the "Togo Loop".
Such a turn, undertaken in view of the enemy, in any respect cannot be considered a success of Japanese tactics, because during the execution of the maneuver only the deployed ships could fire, interfering with those that were just going to the turning point.
2 minutes after Mikasa entered circulation, that is, at 13.49, several events occurred simultaneously:
1. "Prince Suvorov" went to the head of the Russian squadron and turned to the right, falling on the course NO23, which was followed by the left column;
2. "Mikasa" completed the U-turn and went on a new course;
3. "Prince Suvorov" reduced the speed to 9 knots. and opened fire.
This was the end of the pre-battle maneuvering - the main forces of the Russian and Japanese squadrons entered the battle, and the author with a clear conscience could return to describing the history of the cruisers Zhemchug and Izumrud. However, in order to avoid understatement, we will briefly and concisely consider the consequences of the maneuvers of the opposing sides.
How much did the Japanese "substitute" themselves, performing the "Togo Loop"?
Unfortunately, the position of the turning point of the Japanese ships relative to the Russian squadron is not exactly known: eyewitnesses have a "spread" of opinions, considering that the bearing to it was from 8 to 45 degrees to the left. But, be that as it may, there is an absolutely reliable fact, confirmed by the Japanese themselves - in the first 15 minutes of the battle, while Mikasa received 19 hits, including 5 * 305-mm and 14 * 152-mm shells, and in others ships of the Japanese fleet hit at least 6 more shells. Why at least? The fact is that the Japanese, of course, based on the results of the battle, had the opportunity to record almost all hits on their ships, but they, of course, did not always manage to record the time of hits. Thus, we are only talking about hits, the time of which is known exactly, but it is quite possible that there were others.
All of the above testifies to the very accurate shooting of Russian ships, which would hardly have been possible if the Japanese had made their turn at very sharp heading angles. Thus, by indirect indications, it can be argued that the bearing from the Suvorov to the Japanese squadron was nevertheless closer to 45 degrees than to 8.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the mutual position of the Russian and Japanese ships at the time of the outbreak of the battle allowed the Russian artillerymen to achieve a large number of hits in the Japanese, that is, "Togo's Loop" was an extremely risky maneuver for them.
Why Z. P. Rozhestvensky concentrated the fire of the entire squadron on the Japanese flagship?
The question is very important: did the Russian admiral really not understand that 12 ships would interfere with targeting each other? Of course I did. That is why Zinovy Petrovich did not give the order to fire at Mikasa for the entire squadron.
According to the testimony of numerous eyewitnesses, on the "Prince Suvorov" signal "1" was raised - it indicated the serial number of the enemy ship, on which the fire was to be concentrated. Undoubtedly, it was about Mikasa. But the point is that, according to order No. 29 of January 10, this signal did not concern the squadron as a whole, but only the 1st armored detachment. Literally this place sounds like this:
“The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. If possible, the entire squadron's fire should be focused on this number."
Moreover, it is obvious from the context that a squadron is understood to mean exactly one of the armored squadrons, and not the entire squadron as a whole. So, for example, the order contains the following indication:
"… when approaching on a collision course and after the concentration of fire on the head one can indicate the number to which the action should be directed by all artillery of the first (lead) squadron of the squadron, while the second detachment will continue to operate on the originally chosen target."
Thus, Z. P. Rozhestvensky ordered only four Borodino-class battleships to fire at Mikasa, while the remaining 2 armored detachments were free to choose their targets on their own.
What advantages did the Japanese admiral receive upon completion of the Togo Loop?
They, oddly enough, were relatively small: the fact is that from the position in which the Japanese ships found themselves after the completion of the maneuver, it was almost impossible to expose the Russians to "crossing T". In other words, after the "Loop Togo" the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons, although they lost their position advantage (and the Japanese gained it), but at the same time occupied a position that excluded the possibility of setting them "crossing T".
The fact was that the Russian and Japanese squadrons were on courses very close to parallel ones, and the Japanese were ahead. But any of their attempts to turn to the right, in order to expose "crossing T", could be parried by the same turn to the right of the Russian squadron. In this case, the Japanese moved, as it were, along the outer circumference, and the Russians along the inner one, respectively, to maintain their current position, the Russians had to cover a shorter distance than the Japanese, and this neutralized the Japanese speed advantage.
Why Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not take advantage of the "maneuver along the inner circle"?
Who said he didn't use it? At 13.49 "Prince Suvorov" turned to NO23 and opened fire, and for 15 minutes kept the same course in order to give the Russian gunners to realize the advantage of the position. Then, at 14.05 Z. P. Rozhdestvensky turns 2 rumba to the left in order to be closer to the Japanese, but quickly realizes that this is not a very good idea, and then lie down 4 rumba to the right. Thus, the combat columns of the Russians and the Japanese were on parallel courses, and the chances of the Japanese to set the "crossing T" dropped to zero. They no longer even tried to do this, limiting themselves to the fact that their 1st combat detachment went ahead and to the left of the Russian flagship, which gave the Japanese a certain advantage.
Why Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not rush with his 5 relatively fast battleships to the pivot point of the Japanese ships in order to turn the battle into a dump?
This action did not make the slightest sense for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it could not have been executed on time, because taking into account the time to set and raise signals and increase the speed to 13-14 knots, the Russian ships obviously did not have time to get close to the enemy ships. Let's not forget that, according to Russian data, there were about 37-38 cables left to the turning point, that is, about 4 miles, and it would be possible to overcome them in 15 minutes only if the Russian battleships had a speed of about 16 nodes. Of course, they could not develop such a speed, and even if they could, they would not be able to do it quickly. In addition, we must not forget that, unlike the turns in succession, the turn "all of a sudden" required a flag signal, and it had to be dialed, raised, wait until the ships that received the order rebelled (that is, raise the same signals), and only then order to execute …
Secondly, it was much more profitable to follow the previous course than to rush headlong forward. The fact is that moving forward at a speed of at least 9 knots brought the Russian squadron closer to the Japanese pivot point, and opened them the best heading angle to this point. In other words, by the time when the end Japanese ships, the weakly protected cruisers of Kh. Kamimura, would have entered the turn, almost the entire squadron could have fired at them with their entire side from a distance that Z. P. Rozhestvensky assessed as not exceeding 35 cables for the terminal Russian ship. At the same time, a forward thrust meant that the most powerful Russian battleships could operate with only half of their large-caliber artillery (bow turrets) and prevented the ships of the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments from firing.
Thirdly, at the end of the maneuver, the "dump" still could not work out - Z. P. Rozhestvensky, the relatively slow-moving 1st combat detachment of the Japanese, did not have time in any case, and the cruisers of Kh. Kamimura had a greater speed and could break the distance very quickly. But after that, the Russian squadron would have been scattered into 2 detachments, and would have been easily defeated.
Why did the Japanese admiral even start his "noose"?
As mentioned earlier, the Japanese commander in his report said that, based on the intelligence data, he decided to attack the left column of the Russian squadron. Obviously, from this goal he switched from the right shell of the Russian squadron to the left one. H. Togo explained his subsequent actions as follows:
"The 1st combat detachment temporarily turned to SW in order to make the enemy think that we were going with him on a contrary course, but at 13.47 he immediately turned to Ost, pressing along a curved line on the enemy's head."
It must be said that the explanation of this maneuver given by H. Togo is completely unsatisfactory. There was no point in "making the enemy think of a countercourse." What could be achieved by this? Only that the Russians would try to reorganize into one wake column. But if H. Togo initially conceived such a maneuver, then he should have built his maneuver so as to deliver the "crossing T", or achieve another significant advantage. However, everything that the Japanese commander achieved as a result of the "Loop of Togo" - he found himself in almost parallel columns somewhat ahead of the Russian squadron - was quite achievable even without extreme turns at the muzzle of the heavy guns of the battleships Z. P. Rozhdestvensky.
In other words, it was possible to believe the Japanese admiral that his maneuvers were part of a pre-planned plan, if, as a result of their implementation, the Japanese received a clear, tangible advantage that could not be achieved in any other way. But none of this happened. Therefore, it is most likely that H. Togo, coming out to the left shell of the Russian squadron and turning it to a countercourse, was really going to fall on its left column, believing that the battleships of the "Borodino" type did not have time to lead the Russian formation. And when he saw that the Russians did manage to do it, he was forced to urgently think of something in a hurry. He probably did not dare to turn "everything all of a sudden", since in this case control of the battle passed to his junior flagship. There remained only a turn consistently, which H. Togo did, that is, this decision was forced for him.
Thus, it can be stated that the idea of Z. P. Rozhestvensky was a great success - for a long time maintaining the "two-column" formation and rebuilding so that it was unnoticeable from Japanese ships, he tactically outplayed the Japanese commander, saved his squadron from "Crossing T", provided his gunners with a 15-minute advantage in the outset of the battle and forced H. Togo to enter the battle is far from the best position possible.
All of the above would make it possible to consider the Russian commander a brilliant naval commander … if not for a number of mistakes that Zinovy Petrovich made in the implementation of his, in every respect, outstanding plan. But we will talk about this in the next article.
