So, in the last article we left "Novik" when it, having received damage from a Japanese shell and taking 120 tons of water, entered the inner roadstead of Port Arthur. Interestingly, the battle on January 27, 1904, killing one of the Novik sailors (the mortally wounded gunman of the 47-mm gun, Ilya Bobrov, died on the same day), had a positive effect on the fate of the other. The fact is that even before the battle, Novik's quartermaster Rodion Prokopets managed to "distinguish himself" - on November 10, 1903, being on leave and heavily drunk, he "cursed" the officer of the ground forces - Captain Blokhin, for which he received a saber on the head. Either the captain was drunk himself, or his hands were shaking from such impudence of a lower rank, but R. Prokopts's head did not fall in half, but got off with a scar twenty-two centimeters long, for which the captain went to court.
However, even R. Prokopets, despite the status of a victim, such an escapade had to come out sideways - they were going to judge him exactly on January 27, 1904, but, for quite understandable reasons, the process did not take place. The trial was postponed to February 9, and there N. O. von Essen, who asked for leniency to the defendant due to the fact that the latter "stood all the time at the helm and displayed a lot of military valor, and calmly and skillfully performed his duty under fierce fire." As a result, the case ended with the fact that R. Prokopets was sentenced to a year of a disciplinary battalion, but he was immediately pardoned: Vice-Admiral O. V. Stark, on the eve of handing over the post to the new squadron commander, S. O. Makarov confirmed this verdict, so for his "small boatswain's bend" R. Prokopets got off with a slight fright.
Nikolai Ottovich himself for the battle on January 27, 1904 was awarded a gold weapon with the inscription "For Bravery."
I must say that the combat damage did not put the cruiser out of action for a long time - on January 30, she was put into dry dock, and on February 8, 1904, she left there like a new one, ready for new battles and achievements. Nevertheless, during these 10 days a lot happened in Port Arthur, including the death of the cruiser Boyarin, and all this, perhaps, had a much greater impact on the activities of the squadron than is commonly believed.
The fact is that, oddly enough, the first days after the start of the war, the governor E. I. Alekseev demanded active action - on February 4, he convened a meeting, in which, in addition to himself, the chief of staff of the governor V. K. Vitgeft, squadron chief O. V. Stark, junior flagships, and other officers. It contained a note from Captain 1st Rank A. A. Eberhard, in which he proposed a squadron march to Chemulpo with the aim of demonstrating strength and interrupting the landing, if any, for which, among other things, it was necessary to inspect the skerries near the city.
Of course, A. A. Eberhard was well aware that in its current state - five battleships, of which "Peresvet" and "Pobeda" were an intermediate type between the battleship and the armored cruiser, and the small armored cruiser "Bayan" could not count on success in an open battle against the main forces of the Japanese fleet consisting of 6 battleships and 6 large armored cruisers. Nevertheless, he considered it possible to give battle to a part of the Japanese fleet, if the latter, under the influence of any factors (damage in the battle at Port Arthur on January 27, 1904, the distracting actions of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, etc.) split into such and the squadron encountered will be "in the teeth" of the weakened Pacific squadron.
Thus, in order to bring the squadron out to sea without the "Tsarevich" and "Retvizan", it was necessary to carry out long-range reconnaissance and find Japanese forces. A. A. Eberhard proposed to conduct "a thorough reconnaissance of both the western half of the Pechili Bay and part of the Liaodong Bay, and the eastern part of the sea in the direction of the cruising place of the enemy squadron -" Shantung Clifford ". If at the same time a relatively weak Japanese detachment is found, then it will be possible "to think about an offensive with the aim of a battle at a distance of 100-300 miles from our point - Port Arthur."
Interestingly, the members of the meeting fully agreed with the governor, with the need for such a raid of the main forces to Chemulpo in order to destroy individual ships and enemy detachments, as well as an attack on the communication routes of the ground forces that landed in Chemulpo. Nevertheless, the decision was not implemented, and the main problem was the lack of cruisers.
And indeed, apart from the "Rurik", "Thunderbolt", "Russia" and "Bogatyr" located in Vladivostok, the Pacific Ocean Squadron before the war had seven cruisers, including: one armored cruiser "Bayan", four armored deck 1 rank - "Askold", "Varyag", "Pallada" and "Diana", as well as two armored deck 2nd rank - "Boyarin" and "Novik". But by the time the meeting ended, the Varyag was already lying at the bottom of the Chemulpo raid, the Boyarin was killed by a mine blown up, and the Pallada and Novik were under repair, and vice-admiral O. V. Stark had only three cruisers left - "Bayan", "Askold" and "Diana".
At the same time, "Diana", in its actual qualities, was completely unsuitable for the role of a distant scout. With a real speed in the range of 17, 5-18 knots, this cruiser could not get away from a group of Japanese armored cruisers or a large armored cruiser - they were quite capable of catching up and destroying the Diana. This does not mean the complete uselessness of this cruiser, oddly enough, he could well serve as a reconnaissance squadron. The fact is that in those years, the effective firing range was significantly lower than the detection range. It was possible to see the enemy for 10 miles or more, but it would be difficult to successfully shoot at him from cruisers at distances greater than 4 miles. Thus, even with a speed superiority of 2-3 knots, it might take enemy cruisers 2-3 hours to get close to the Diana, which is leaving them at full speed, within effective fire range after detection. Accordingly, "Diana" could well conduct reconnaissance at a distance of 35-45 miles from the squadron and even more, always having the opportunity to retreat under the cover of "big guns", and the 8 * 152-mm guns of the cruiser, in principle, made it possible to count on success in a battle with a single small cruiser of the Japanese (such as "Tsushima", "Suma", etc.). But even this could be dangerous if the same detachment of "dogs" managed to get a wedge between the "Diana" and the main forces, and it was completely impossible to send the cruiser into long-range reconnaissance.
Moreover, if a competition for the most untrained crew was held on the squadron, then the "Diana" had excellent chances to take first place on it. Let us recall how Vl. Semenov in his famous "Payback":
“The cruiser, which started the campaign on January 17, had been in reserve for 11 months before! Even if, even when he left Kronstadt for the Far East (in the fall of 1902), the team was formed strictly according to the rules, then it should have included two conscriptions, that is, about 1/3 of people who have not seen the sea. In fact, these men, dressed in sailor shirts, turned out to be almost 50%, and the maritime practice of a good half of the rest was exhausted by the only trip from Arthur to Vladivostok and back … just … rustic. When performing some kind of work, although not general, but requiring a significant number of people, instead of a specific order or command - such and such a department there! - the non-commissioned officers asked the "fellow countrymen" to help, and even the senior boatswain, instead of the chief shout, invited the "guys" to pile on "the whole world" in order to quickly "brush it off - and the sabbath!.." ".
Thus, in order to scout the situation, O. V. Stark, there were only 2 cruisers, armed transports and destroyers left, and this, of course, was not enough - attempts to conduct reconnaissance by these forces, although they were undertaken, did not lead to anything sensible. But if at the disposal of the head of the Squadron were not only "Bayan" and "Askold", but also "Novik" with "Boyarin", then perhaps the squadron still went on its first military campaign. Of course, "Novik" went out of repair on February 8, and could be used in operations, but, as you know, on February 9, a new commander was appointed to the Squadron, S. O. Makarov.
As a matter of fact, things were like this - due to the fact that the Japanese were landing in Korea, the governor E. I. Alekseev urgently needed to visit Mukden. In order to strengthen the authority of O. V. Stark, the governor asked for the highest permission to endow O. V. Stark with the rights of the commander of the fleet, which this vice admiral did not have. However, E. I. Alekseev received the answer that a new commander was appointed to the squadron, S. O. Makarov. The governor, of course, took this into account, but did not abandon his plans for an expedition to Chemulpo, and in a secret order of O. V. Stark, reminding him of the need to take care of the battleships, demanded nevertheless to make this campaign. However, alas, the delay turned out that the Japanese again took the initiative into their own hands …
The governor left Port Arthur on February 8, simultaneously with the return of Novik to service, and O. V. Stark was preparing to carry out the Viceroy's orders. According to his orders, on February 11, all three available cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral M. P. Molas, accompanied by four destroyers, was to carry out a reconnaissance raid to the mouth of the Tsinampo River. But on the evening of February 10, the Japanese made the first attempt to block the exit to the outer roadstead in Port Arthur, which, however, was repulsed. On the morning of February 11, two destroyers - "Sentinel" and "Guarding" went on patrol - to search for enemy ships, and found four Japanese destroyers. Having attached to themselves the "Speedy", which turned out to be nearby, all three Russian destroyers tried to attack the Japanese formation - but they did not accept a decisive battle and retreated to the east, firing sluggish fire at a great distance. In the end, following the instructions transmitted from the Golden Mountain, the destroyers turned back. At 07.08 in the morning, the Novik went to sea for support, but could not catch up with the Japanese, so, having sent the Fast to Port Arthur, he led the rest of the Russian torpedo boats to Golubinaya Bay, where the Striking and Agile ". Leading, thus, a combined detachment of four destroyers, "Novik" led him to Port Arthur.
However, at the same time, the 3rd combat detachment under the command of Rear Admiral Deva approached Port Arthur as part of the high-speed armored cruisers Kasagi, Chitose, Takasago and Iosino (dogs), which went to intelligence, followed by the main forces of H. Togo. The cruisers identified the Russian detachment as "Novik" and 5 destroyers, and went to rapprochement with it.
The situation was saved by the foresight of the rear admiral, and perhaps the head of the squadron, since it is not clear who exactly gave the order, according to which at 08.00 am the Bayan left for the outer raid to cover the returning Novik and the destroyers, and 25 minutes later - “Askold . At about this time, the observers of the Golden Mountain discovered, in addition to the 3rd combat detachment Dev, also 6 battleships and 6 armored cruisers of H. Togo, accompanied by small ships, a total of 25 pennants were counted. Thus, the reconnaissance raid of cruisers to Tsinampo finally lost its meaning - the main forces of the Japanese were in line of sight from Port Arthur.
By 08.55, Rear Admiral Deva's dogs approached the Novik and destroyers and fired at the Russian ships. Official Russian historiography indicates that the Japanese approached at a distance of 40 cables, but, reading the reports of the destroyer commanders about this battle, one involuntarily feels a great doubt about this. So, for example, the commander of the "Guarding" reported that the Japanese volleys fell down "huge undershoots", and the "Novik", apparently, did not even try to respond. Obviously, all this is completely unusual for a distance of 4 miles and it can be assumed that in fact it was much larger. Apparently, the source of this error lies in the misinterpretation of the report of the Bayan commander, who reported: “At 0855 hours, the enemy ships, approaching a distance of 40 cables, opened fire on Novik and destroyers, and then on the cruiser Bayan "". However, this line has a double interpretation - it is not clear to whom exactly there were 40 cables, before Novik or before Bayan? In addition, one should take into account the not very good ability of our rangefinders to determine the distance, but, perhaps, the visibility is also to blame: the fact that the Japanese cruisers gave strong undershoots suggests that they mistakenly determined the distance to the enemy, and in fact the Russians were farther than Rear Admiral Dev's gunners had anticipated.
Be that as it may, “Bayan” and “Askold” rushed to the Novik and the destroyers to help, so the Japanese were forced to disperse the fire. On "Bayan" they raised a signal: "Novik" to enter the wake of "Askold" ", which was done. Now the "Novik" opened fire, and the Russian cruisers attacked the 3rd combat detachment of the Japanese, and the destroyers covered by them proceeded to the harbor. However, a decisive battle did not work out - already at 09.00 the "dogs" turned 16 points (that is, 180 degrees), and began to leave. This decision of Rear Admiral Dev is quite understandable: his task was to reconnaissance of the success of blocking the passage to the inner harbor of Port Arthur, and not at all a decisive battle with Russian cruisers. He completed this task, and now he should have returned with a report: in addition, retreating, the Japanese had little hope of pulling the Russian cruisers under the guns of their heavy ships. Despite the fact that the Japanese battleships and armored cruisers were far enough away, and, in principle, it was possible to try to pursue the Japanese cruising detachment for at least some time, the signal "Cruisers to return to internal raid" was raised on Golden Mountain. Naturally, this order was carried out and at 09.20 the fire ceased on both sides. In this battle, no one suffered any losses - there were no hits on the Japanese ships, but their shells, according to the Bayan commander, fell no closer than two cables from the Russian ships. However, this little skirmish was just a prelude to what happened the next day.
On the evening of February 11, eight Russian destroyers went to the outer roadstead. If their task was to attempt a night attack by the main forces of the enemy, discovered in the morning of the same day, then such a dashing deed should only be welcomed. However, the tasks of these destroyers were much more modest - they should have prevented the Japanese light forces from trying to commit another night sabotage, by analogy with the attempt to block the exit on the night of February 10-11. However, this was also important - we must not forget that the newest battleship Retvizan, which was blown up during the attack on January 27, 1904, was still aground and represented an excellent prize for the Japanese destroyers. The Japanese launched a night attack, which, however, was not crowned with success - but our destroyers did not succeed in their attempts to intercept their "colleagues" from the Land of the Rising Sun.
It was clear that the Japanese light forces (yes, the same "dogs") could show up at Port Arthur in the morning to conduct reconnaissance or in the hope of intercepting and destroying destroyers returning from patrol. To prevent this, at 06.45 am on February 12, all three combat-ready Russian cruisers entered the outer roadstead - and all this became the prologue for the most unusual naval battle of the Russian-Japanese war. The fact is that just at that time the main forces of Heihachiro Togo were approaching Port Arthur, and this time they were not going to stand aside …
Of the 8 Russian destroyers of the 1st detachment that went on the night patrol, only two returned by dawn. Then at 07.00, 4 more destroyers returned, reporting to Bayan that they had seen two smoke. Soon, several smokes were noticed on the cruisers in the southeast, at 08.15 it became clear that the main forces of the Japanese fleet were coming. Rear Admiral M. P. Molas, who was holding the flag on "Bayan", reported to Port Arthur that "the enemy, among 15 ships, is coming from the sea" and ordered the cruisers to form in order of battle: "Bayan", "Novik", "Askold", as was executed at 08.30.
Oddly enough, but O. V. Stark was not at all going to sit out in the inner harbor - at about the same time he ordered the battleships of the squadron to breed pairs in order to go out at 14.00 to the outer roadstead - this was a daytime full of water, before deep-seated ships could not leave the inner harbor. Then O. V. Stark ordered the cruisers to continue observing the enemy, remaining under the protection of coastal batteries, and canceled the exit of the "Diana", which, apparently, was still going to use before. At about the same time, observers from the forts noticed 2 Russian destroyers who did not have time to return to the port: "Impressive" and "Fearless" were returning from the direction of Liaoteshan.
Some sources indicate that Rear Admiral M. P. Molas asked the head of the Squadron for permission to return to the internal raid - whether or not it is difficult to say, but neither the report of the Bayan commander, nor the official historiography mentions this, so this might not have happened. But at 09.00 O. V. Stark repeated his order, indicating at the same time to have 9 knots of travel. Soon the Japanese fleet became clearly visible - in front there was an advice note "Chihaya", behind it - 6 battleships of the 1st combat detachment, then, with a large interval - an advice note "Tatsuta", and behind it 6 armored cruisers of Kamimura, and behind them all - 4 armored cruisers of Rear Admiral Virgo.
As a matter of fact, for the Japanese the situation was extremely successful - there were only three Russian cruisers under the batteries, which could be attacked by the main forces of the fleet and destroyed, while the battleships of the Squadron remained in the inner roadstead and, obviously, could not help anything. H. Togo seemed to be going to do this and went to a rapprochement, but, according to official Japanese historiography, he found a floating mine right on the course and suggested that the cruisers were luring him into a minefield, which in fact was not. As a result, he paraded past Port Arthur at a great distance (about 10 miles), keeping the course to the top of Liaoteshan, then at 09.35 he turned 180 degrees. and went back, while the advice notes left, and the 3rd combat detachment ("dogs") continued to move towards Liaoteshan, thereby cutting off the road home for the returning Russian destroyers.
Well, 12 armored ships of H. Togo were now returning to where they came from, and, again passing Port Arthur, only at 10.40 turned to the Russian cruisers. Around the same time, the Japanese admiral allowed his ships to open fire at any moment convenient for them. This happened according to Japanese data at 10.45, but the difference of five minutes is quite explainable by the inaccuracies of the logbooks, which in the Russian fleet, for example, were filled after the battle. Most likely, all the same, H. Togo gave this order simultaneously with the turnaround on the Russian cruisers - however, it is possible that he ordered during the turnaround, and the five-minute difference is associated with the loss of time for the signal rise.
Rear Admiral M. P. Molas immediately turned to the southeast - it turned out that he diverged from the Japanese squadron in counter-courses, while moving away from Port Arthur. Here I would like to note a mistake made by the respected A. Emelin - in his monograph dedicated to the cruiser "Novik", he indicates that the cruisers went to the entrance to the harbor, but this is not confirmed by either Russian or Japanese sources. The Japanese, having approached the Russian cruisers for 40 cables, turned again (where, alas, it is not clear from the descriptions of this battle, it is only indicated that 8 points, i.e.90 degrees) and no later than 10.58 opened fire on the cruisers - the closest to them at that time was the terminal "Askold". We write "not later" because at 10.58, as we know from Japanese historiography, Mikasa opened fire, but it is possible that other Japanese ships, guided by the order of H. Togo, began the battle earlier. Russian sources indicate that the battle was started by the "head Japanese battleship", but they opened fire a little earlier, at 10.55.
What happened next? An eyewitness to those distant events, Lieutenant A. P. We can read Stehr:
“Then, seeing that, continuing the battle with such a strong enemy, one could only destroy the ship without using it at all, the Novik commander gave full speed to the machines and rushed to the enemy fleet, intending to attack with mines. He was not allowed to carry out his plan, because, having noticed our maneuver, a signal was raised in Arthur: "Novik" to return to the harbor."
But was it really? Apparently - no, it was not at all like that. As we said earlier, at the beginning of the battle, the detachment of Rear Admiral M. P. Molasa was moving away from Port Arthur, and hence from the batteries of his fortress. Therefore, already at 11.00 O. V. Stark raised the signal "Stay close to the batteries", which was logical - in the emerging situation, only their fire gave the cruisers some hope of surviving. At this time, the cruiser M. P. Molas fought with the enemy on the port side, and in order to fulfill the command of the commander, they had to turn 16 points, that is, 180 degrees, but how? A turn to the left led to a rapprochement with the enemy, but if you turn to the right, then on the contrary, breaking the distance. And at that very moment, a mistake was made on the Bayan cruiser: wishing to give the order to turn "over the right shoulder", they raised a signal on it: "All of a sudden, turn to the left by 16 points."
As a result, it turned out that "Novik" and "Askold" turned left on the opposite course, "Bayan" turned to the right - from the side, and on the ships themselves it looked as if "Novik" and "Askold" went on the attack at the enemy. Probably, O. V. Stark, ordering to raise the signal: "The cruisers return to the harbor."
I must say that by this time the cruisers of Rear Admiral M. P. The Molas were not at all good - he fought with three ships against six battleships and six armored cruisers of the Japanese, and only high speed (and with the beginning of the battle a move of 20 knots was given) still saved his ships from heavy damage. But the distance to the main forces of H. Togo was already reduced to 32 cables, and therefore the rear admiral had no choice but to take emergency measures and enter the inner harbor of Port Arthur at a speed of 20 knots, which, of course, was unthinkable and which has never been done before. Warrant officer from "Askold" V. I. Medvedev described this episode as follows:
“It seemed that everyone had forgotten that there were port barges to enter the harbor. All had one desire, to fulfill the admiral's signal as soon as possible and more successfully … One by one, we entered the passage at full speed, and the shells continued to fall behind the stern. Our gunners fired until the stern cannon disappeared behind the Golden Mountain, which just at that moment was hit by a shell, sprinkling it with fragments and stones."
The Russian cruisers entered the harbor at about 11.15 am, so a firefight with the Japanese fleet at distances of 32-40 cables took 20 minutes or so. "Askold" used 257 rounds, and "Novik" - 103, including 97-120-mm and 6 - 47-mm, unfortunately, the consumption of "Bayan" shells remains unknown. It is also unclear how many shells the Japanese used up in that battle, but in any case, they fired not only on the cruiser, but also on the coastal batteries of Port Arthur. According to Japanese data, in this battle they did not suffer any damage, as for the Russian losses, the hit of the Japanese shell knocked off part of the barrel from the left waist 152-mm gun of the cruiser "Askold", and the shrapnel of this shell wounded the sailor, breaking his leg. On the cruiser itself, it was believed that they were hit by a 305-mm Japanese shell. In addition to the detachment of Rear Admiral M. P. Molas, one of the batteries of the Tiger Peninsula and the guns of the Electric Cliff took part in the battle: moreover, a lower rank was wounded on battery No. 15 of the latter. The Japanese ships, apparently, were not hit and no one was killed or injured either. Thus, it can be stated that the greatest losses in the battle, which took place on February 12, 1904, were suffered by … the Chinese, who after the battle were arrested 15 people on suspicion that they were giving signals to the Japanese fleet. This, however, is not the only anecdote from February 12 - according to the recollections of the above-mentioned warrant officer V. I. what will the commander of the Squadron decide … a signal was raised on it: "Free doctors should gather at Sevastopol at three o'clock in the afternoon."
Nevertheless, the Russian fleet suffered losses on February 12 - the destroyers "Impressive" and "Fearless" were returning to Port Arthur when the Japanese squadron appeared, while the "Fearless", having given full speed, broke into the harbor under fire, but the "Impressive" did not risked, preferring to take refuge in Pigeon Bay. There he was caught by four cruisers of Rear Admiral Dev. "Impressive" opened fire, but was quickly knocked out, after which the team, having opened the ship's kingstones, was evacuated to land.
I must say that, before the arrival of Stepan Osipovich Makarov in Port Arthur, the cruiser under the command of M. P. Molas left the inner harbor of Port Arthur twice more, but in both cases nothing interesting happened. So, on February 16, "Bayan", "Askold", "Novik" and "Diana" entered the sea, the goal, according to the order of the chief of the cruiser squadron, was: "to show the Russian flag in the waters of the Kantun fortified region, and, if possible, to illuminate the adjacent waters of the Pechili Bay, with the indispensable condition of avoiding a collision with the strongest enemy."
The trip went wrong from the very beginning - the cruisers were scheduled to leave at 06.30, but the port boats arrived only at 07.20 after two reminders. Note that this time the Rear Admiral also took Diana with him, but not because he decided to use this cruiser in reconnaissance - he was only destined for the role of a radio transmitter. Therefore, when the ships of M. P. Molas approached Fr. Encounter, then "Diana" remained there, and the rest of the cruisers, having adopted the formation of an equilateral triangle with a side length of 2 miles, and having the lead cruiser "Novik", went ahead. But alas, the indispensable "condition to avoid the strongest enemy" played a cruel joke with the cruisers - moving 25 miles from about. Encounter, signals from a combat flashlight were seen on the Novik. Without discerning who was in front of them, the detachment turned to Port Arthur where and arrived without incident, taking the Diana along the way and entering the inner roadstead at 15.30. All reconnaissance boiled down to the discovery of a Japanese destroyer and two junks, so that its only result was a statement of the absence of the main enemy forces 50 miles from Port Arthur.
The next release took place on February 22nd. Initially, it was planned to send "Novik" to Inchendza Bay in order to cover 4 Russian destroyers that had gone there for reconnaissance at night, and "Bayan" and "Askold" were supposed to go to the Dalny port and bring from there four steamers intended for flooding in the roadstead, with the purpose of hindering the actions of Japanese fire-ships. But, when all three cruisers had already headed out to sea, the "Diana" entered the outer roadstead, from which a new order was transmitted by radiotelegraph and signals: all cruisers immediately go to Inchendza, because the Japanese are landing there.
I must say that they decided to oppose the landing in earnest - General Fock set out from Kinjou, leading the regiment and the guns attached to it, and a battalion with four guns came out of Port Arthur to Inchendza. The main forces of the squadron were also going to withdraw - the battleships were ordered to separate the pairs and go out into the raid with full water.
At this time, the cruiser M. P. Molas approached Inchendza, and this time the rear admiral acted bravo, and much more decisively than when he left on 16 February. The Russians discovered the smoke of unknown ships, then M. P. Molas ordered "Novik" to reconnoitre the bay in which, according to information, the Japanese were landing, he himself led "Bayan" and "Askold" towards the enemy. Alas, the fighting fervor was gone this time in vain - it turned out to be the very 4 of our destroyers that Novik was supposed to meet and cover. By the way, they did not immediately identify the cruiser M. P. Molas and at first tried to retreat, but then they managed to count the number of Askold's pipes - since it was the only one among all other Russian and Japanese ships to have five pipes, it became clear that these were their own.
As for the Novik, he, as ordered, made a reconnaissance of the bay, but alas, he did not find anyone there - the information about the landing of the Japanese turned out to be false. Thus, the detachment of cruisers of Rear Admiral M. P. Molas had no choice but to return to Port Arthur along with the destroyers he met, which, by the way, caused this error - the head of the telegraph station in Inchendzy, who reported on the Japanese landing, actually saw the landing of people from Russian destroyers.
Thus, we see that the thesis "to take care and not to risk" still did not fully affect the cruisers of the Pacific squadron and "Novik" - nevertheless, before S. O. Makarov's arrival, they repeatedly went to sea and twice fought against the main forces of the Japanese fleet (January 27 and February 12).
