So, after as many as 15 articles, not counting off-cycle ones, we have finally come close to the point that, in the author's opinion, is able to explain to us the vast majority of the ambiguities of the battle between the Varyag and the Koreyets on January 27, 1904. took place in less than a quarter of an hour, in the period 12.03-12.15 Russian time, or 12.40-12.50 Japanese time.
We left "Varyag" and "Koreets" at 12.38 (Japanese time, 35 minutes ahead of Russian timing in Chemulpo). By this time, "Varyag" fought for 18 minutes, of which the first 15 - only with "Asama", because the low speed of the cruiser and about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) prevented the firing of the remaining Japanese cruisers. The Varyag had already received some damage, but, of course, it still retained its combat effectiveness, and the gunboat did not suffer any damage at all. But the artillerymen of the Asama shot slowly, at 12.35 the Chiyoda opened fire, followed by other cruisers, and then the damage to the Varyag began to grow like an avalanche.
12.37 Fire on "Varyag" is resumed by "Naniva", starting zeroing with the left side.
12.39 The "Niitaka" enters the battle - according to the "Battle report" of its commander, the bow and side 152-mm cannons opened fire, the distance to the "Varyag" was "6,500 m (about 35 cables). And, at the same time, at the same time, Takachiho also starts shooting at the Varyag - 152-mm guns on the left side from a distance of 5 600 m (30 cables)
Here I would like to insert a few words about the accuracy of determining the distance by Japanese cruisers. As we said earlier, unlike the Varyag and Koreyets, which had to use Lyuzhol-Myakishev micrometers, all Japanese cruisers were equipped with Barra and Struda optical rangefinders, which, of course, gave them great advantages. In theory, because in practice it was still necessary to be able to use them. We can watch absolutely any battle scheme - even a very common one by V. Kataev, even a Japanese one from the official Meiji, or even A. V. Polutova, at least any other - everywhere at 12.39 "Takachiho" was further from the "Varyag" than "Niitaka". But at the same time "Takachikho" shoots at the "Varyag" from 5,600 m, and the closest "Niitaka" - 6,500 m. Niroda …
12.40 The Japanese record the third hit on the cruiser - presumably, it was a 152-mm projectile from the Naniva, which, according to the commander of the Japanese flagship, hit the middle of the Varyag hull. And it was at this very time, apparently, that the "Varyag" passed traverse about Phalmido (Yodolmi). Let's remember that the entry in the Varyag's logbook begins: "12.05 (12.40 Japanese)" Having passed the traverse of the island "Yo-dol-mi" … ". But before we continue this phrase, we will try to assess the damage to the "Varyag" by this time, especially since a mistake may have crept into their description in one of the previous articles.
As we said earlier, the first hit on the Varyag, recorded by the Japanese (and confirmed during the repair of the cruiser, after lifting it), was achieved by a 203-mm projectile in the stern of the ship. On "Asam" it was observed as "hitting the area of the aft bridge, where a strong fire immediately broke out," and we assumed that we were talking about a strong fire on the quarterdecks, described in the logbook, during which cartridges with smokeless gunpowder caught fire. But "Varyag" is still not a sailing frigate of the gray times, but an armored cruiser, and for ships of these times "on quarterdecks" meant "in the middle part of the ship's deck, to the stern mast" (many thanks to Alexander under the "nickname" "Seeker", who pointed out this error). Thus, the distance from the point of impact of a 203-mm projectile to the area of the fire is too great to assert that the fire occurred as a result of this hit, although, of course, anything happens.
However, the logbook "Varyag" contains a description of other damage - in addition to the already mentioned fire and hit in the right wing of the bridge, which caused the death of A. M. Niroda, during this period of time (before the traverse of the Phalmido-Yodolmi Island) there was also a hit in the mast: “Other shells almost demolished the main mainsail, the rangefinder station No. 2 was destroyed, guns No. 31 and 32 were knocked out," in the lockers of the living deck, soon extinguished ", and besides, there was also" 6 "gun No. 3 was" knocked out "and all the servants of the gun and feed were killed or wounded, at the same time the plutong commander Midshipman Gubonin was seriously wounded, who continued to command the plutong and refused to go for bandaging while did not fall."
So, it is quite possible that the first hit of a 203-mm projectile in the stern of the cruiser was not described in the logbook at all, or it caused the aforementioned fire in the living deck. As for the fire on the quarterdecks, it is quite possible that it was the result of hitting the main mars, which the Japanese did not record during the battle. This is normal, since the total number of hits on the ship is 11, or even 14 (all this is according to Japanese data), but the "Battle Reports" describe only six of them.
Later, during the rise of the Varyag, the Japanese found 12 holes in the upper deck of the cruiser, just in the mainmast area, including on the quarterdecks, and they could well have been left by a large-caliber projectile hitting the mainmars. Accordingly, it is possible that one of these fragments (red-hot metal) caused a fire on the quarterdecks, which was extinguished by the inspector Chernilovsky-Sokol. However, it is possible that the fire (and holes in the deck) was caused by the rupture of another shell, whose detonator detonated over the cruiser, say, on contact with the Varyag's spar. In general, the stern of the ship was showered with shrapnel, it is possible that some of them jammed six-inch guns # 8 and # 9, and also disabled one more 75-mm and two 47-mm guns. True, the Varyag logbook reports that the cause of the fire on the quarterdecks and the failure of the aforementioned guns was the hit of an enemy shell on the deck, but (taking into account the fact that smokeless powder could explode) it was easy to make a mistake here.
The hit into the main mars caused human losses (four sailors were killed), both 47-mm guns installed on it (Nos. 32 and 32), as well as the second rangefinder post, were out of order. It is precisely known that a shell hit in the right wing of the bridge caused the death of four more people. At the stern of the cruiser, 10 people were killed during the entire battle, but here, unfortunately, it is impossible to say exactly when this happened - but it is very likely that some of them fell during the events described above.
But the hit from the "Naniwa" is in some way a mystery. The Japanese saw it, but it is impossible to pinpoint it to specific damage - in principle, it could have been either a hit in the cruiser's third chimney, or a hole in the starboard bulwark (0.75 by 0.6 m)
The Varyag logbook does not contain a suitable description, but there is information about the damaged gun No. 3. The exact time of its damage is not indicated, theoretically, it may coincide with the hit of the Naniwa, but it does not coincide in place, and most likely it was caused by fragments of another projectile, perhaps not even a direct hit, but a rupture at the side. It should be noted that gun # 3 killed one more person.
Thus, at the moment of passing the traverse about. The Phalmido (Yodolmi) cruiser appears to have been hit by 4 shells, and it is possible that another shell exploded just above the deck in the stern. Apparently, at least 10-15 people died, and maybe more. Is it a lot or a little? Note that on the armored cruiser "Aurora" for the entire time of the Tsushima battle, only 10 people died, not counting those who died of wounds later. On "Oleg" (also for the whole battle) 12 people were killed.
The Varyag lost at least the same amount, or rather even more, in just 20 minutes.
But now, at approximately 12.38, the Varyag passes O. Pkhalmido (Yodolmi) traverse, now there is a relatively wide reach in front. Having entered it, the Russian ships can maneuver more or less freely, but how can you use this?
Unfortunately, it is not easy to indicate the location of the Japanese ships at this moment of the battle. As we said earlier, the combat maneuvering schemes for ships are very crude and contain many errors. Take, for example, the well-known scheme of V. Kataev.
Running a little ahead, we note that the Varyag's logbook clearly states that the rudder damage of the cruiser occurred at 12.05 pm Russian time (and 12.40 Japanese time) after passing the traverse about. Yodolmi, but V. Kataev recorded this moment for some reason not at 12.05, but ten minutes later, at 12.15 (12.50). Further V. Kataev tried to mark the location of the enemy ships at the same time - alas, his assumptions are completely refuted by the "Battle reports" of the Japanese commanders. So, for example, according to V. Kataev's scheme, "Asama" until 12.15 (12.50) could fight only with the left side, while its commander, Yashiro Rokuro, clearly indicates that starting from 12.00 (that is, from 12.35 Japanese) "Asama" fired from the starboard side. Yes, discrepancies in a minute or two, of course, are possible, but … more than a quarter of an hour ?! The Chiyoda, following the Asama, at 12.05 fired at the Russian ships with the starboard side, according to V. Kataev's scheme, this is impossible.
Let us now take a diagram from the official Japanese historiography "Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji (1904-1905) ". An analysis of Japanese combat reports suggests that at 12.38, when the Varyag passed the traverse of Pkhalmido Island (Yodolmi), the position of the Japanese ships was approximately as follows
And then we take the pilot of the water region of Chemulpo, which we have already given earlier, and cut out the area we need from it. Let us mark on it in blue the boundaries of the shoals, where the Varyag could not enter, and compare it with the previously given scheme. It should be noted that when comparing the Japanese scheme (as, by the way, and V. Kataev's scheme), it is necessary to unfold diagonally, since with the usual arrangement of the sheet, the direction to the north does not coincide on them. The position of the Varyag at 12.38 is shown by a solid black arrow, the approximate location of the Japanese ships and the direction of their movement are shown by red arrows.
Let's put ourselves in the place of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev. What did he see? The cruisers Sotokichi Uriu rushed to block the road to the Eastern Channel, and now it, of course, is reliably blocked. But on the other hand, the passage to the Western Channel has opened: two two Japanese cruisers are still heading south, and only the Asama and Chiyoda have turned back, apparently realizing that the Russians should not be allowed to pass. And if now turn to the right, that is, towards the Western Channel (in the diagram there is a black dotted arrow) …
Of course, the Japanese will never allow a breakthrough, but the fact is that now, in order to intercept the Varyag and the Korean, they will have to turn around and "run" to the north. At the same time, managing the maneuvering of three "two" cruisers in a relatively small stretch is a very difficult task. The slightest mistake - and the detachments will be aligned, preventing each other from firing. As a matter of fact, even now "Naniwa" and "Niitaka" are close to being on the line between "Varyag" and two "Takachiho" - "Akashi". Following to the west, "Varyag" and "Korean" will be able to fire at the enemy with full side salvos, but it is far from the fact that all Japanese cruisers will succeed. In addition, the Japanese have already "missed" a little, having gone farther south than they should have, so who knows, maybe at least one of their detachments will not immediately react to the movement of the Varyag to the right, to the west, continuing to move to the south?
In other words, the turn to the right did not promise any victory or breakthrough, the result of it, in any case, was a rapprochement with the Japanese - but rapprochement, so to speak, on its own terms. Do not run forward, under the enemy's side volleys, responding to him only with the fire of bow guns, but try to force him to do so.
Alternatives? They weren't there. The road to the left (east) is a path to nowhere, there are shallows and the Empress's Bay, from which there was no way out for the cruiser. The road in the direction of the Eastern Channel was a "heroic" head-on attack by six Japanese cruisers, despite the fact that, following this course, the Varyag could only use bow guns. That is, the same rapprochement as when moving to the Western Channel, but on the most unfavorable conditions for oneself.
Thus, turning to the right was the only reasonable choice, but on one condition - if the cruiser commander was still going to fight, and not imitate it. And here we just come to one of the cornerstones of the theory of "revisionists": in their opinion, V. F. By this time Rudnev had no intention of fighting at all - having decided that the cruiser had already “endured” enough enemy fire, he wanted “with a sense of accomplishment” to return to the raid in Chemulpo.
However, just one glance at the sailing direction completely refutes this hypothesis. The fact is that if Vsevolod Fedorovich was going to return to the roadstead, then it was categorically impossible for him to turn to the right.
As we remember, the cruiser was at a low speed - its own speed did not exceed 7-9 knots, still some (up to 9-11) "Varyag" gave a current. At the same time, on the right, the cruiser had Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi), but the current in that area was directed at an angle to the left side of the cruiser.
If we accept as a hypothesis that the Varyag was not going to turn around, but had to go west along the island, then we will see that the direction of the current practically coincides with the direction of its movement - that is, the cruiser received about 3 additional knots due to the current, which at the same time would have carried him a little more from Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi). But if he was going to turn around …
It must be said that a ship always loses speed with a somewhat sharp circulation - this is a natural physical process. In addition, when turning in Chemulpo, the very current that previously pushed the ship forward and added speed to it, now, on the contrary, would impede its movement towards the roadstead. In general, a turn to the right by 180 degrees at about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) would only lead to the fact that the cruiser practically lost speed, moving barely 1-2 knots, while a strong three-node current would carry it to the stones of the island. That is, a turn to the right, simply put, led by no means to an early return to the roadstead, but to the creation of a full-fledged emergency situation, from which it would have been quite difficult to get out. And this is not to mention the fact that the ship almost lost speed became an excellent target for the Japanese gunners.
True, there is another option - to the west of about. Yodolmi sailing seems to show the presence of a narrow passage, purely theoretically allowing to bypass the island from the north and return to the roadstead. But in fact, this is a completely unrealistic opportunity, because the passage is too narrow, and to meddle on it with a strong lateral current, and even almost losing speed, is a form of suicide. Moreover, everyone knew about the presence of pitfalls in Fr. Phalmido, and there was no guarantee that they would not be on this narrow strip. The accident of a Japanese ship (marked on the diagram) perfectly illustrates where such optimism could lead. And, as a matter of fact, "Varyag" did not attempt to bypass the island this way (shown in turquoise on the diagram).
Thus, if V. F. Rudnev was going to interrupt the battle and return to the raid, the cruiser Varyag, of course, turned, but not to the right, but to the left, just where the Koreets would turn a little later (marked with a green arrow on the diagram). Such a turn did not create any navigational problems, because in this case the current would have carried the cruiser away from the shoals that bound the fairway from the east, but to about. This would leave enough space for the yodolmi. And in general, if we are going to withdraw from the battle, then it would be more logical to turn away FROM the enemy (turn to the left), but not ON the enemy (turn to the right), right?
But the turn to the right practically deprived the Varyag of the possibility of a normal return to the Chemulpo raid. Turning in this direction, the cruiser could then follow only in the direction of the Western Channel (black arrow in the diagram) and to approach the Japanese cruisers, which, of course, would go to intercept it (and the Asama was already on its way). An attempt to turn around "over the right shoulder" so as to return to the fairway leading to the roadstead automatically led to an emergency situation, which V. F. Rudnev, naturally, should have avoided with all his might.
As a matter of fact, it is the turn of the Varyag to the right that the author of this article considers to be the main proof that the Varyag actually intended to fight, and not to imitate a battle.
But what happened next? We read the logbook "Varyag":
“12h 5m (Japanese time - 12.40, author's note) After traversing the island,“Yo-dol-mi”was cut to the cruiser by a pipe in which the steering gears passed, simultaneously with fragments of another shell that exploded at the foremast and those who flew into the armored cabin through the passage were: the cruiser commander was wounded in the head, the head-bugler and drummer standing near him on both sides were killed, the chief sergeant-major Snigirev, who was at the helm, was wounded, and the orderly of the commander, quartermaster Chibisov, was lightly wounded in the arm.
There is no doubt that at least two Japanese shells hit the Varyag just at this time. Recall that the Japanese recorded the hit of a 152-mm projectile from the Naniwa in the central part of the cruiser, but in addition, at 12.41 on the Asama, they observed a 203-mm projectile hit between the front bridge and the first chimney. Already after lifting the Varyag, a large hole 3, 96 m by 1, 21 m and ten small holes next to it were found in the deck near this bridge. At the same time, the Takachiho was observed hitting a 152-mm projectile near the gun in front of the nose bridge, and on the Asam - 3 or 4 hits by shells of the same caliber in the middle of the hull (this is doubtful, since no corresponding damage was found, but, on the other hand, it could have hit the mast).
And so … as we said in the last article, there is a suspicion (but not certainty!) That in fact the steering did not fail, and this fact is only a fantasy of V. F. Rudnev. Let's consider both versions: # 1 "Conspiracy", according to which the steering remained intact, and # 2 "Official" - that the steering column was still damaged.
"Conspiracy" - everything is very simple here. At about 12.38 Vsevolod Fedorovich decided to turn to the right to go to the Western Channel. On the "Varyag" they raised the signal "P" (turn to the right) and, turning the steering wheel to the appropriate position, began to turn. However, after the start of the turn, at about 12.40, the cruiser commander was wounded by shell fragments and the helmsman was seriously wounded. As a result, control of the cruiser was briefly lost, and the ship, instead of turning about 90 degrees, to pass along the island. Phalmido (Yodolmi), turns almost 180 degrees, that is, directly into the island.
The commander is coming to his senses, but what can he do here now? The situation is exactly as we described it earlier: "Varyag" goes to the island, having the smallest speed, and the current carries it to the stones. It is obvious that Vsevolod Fedorovich begins to take energetic measures to save the ship. What was done exactly, we, alas, are unlikely to know when.
The commanders of "Niitaka" and "Naniwa" in their "Battle Reports" noted that the "Varyag" took refuge behind about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) at 12.54-12.55. This does not contradict Russian sources, and taking into account the fact that the hit, which caused a temporary paralysis of the cruiser control, happened at 12.40-12.41, from the moment of hitting until leaving for about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) has passed less than 15 minutes. Most likely, during this time, the cruiser really had to reverse gear, and then, having moved away from the island at a sufficient distance, move forward again.
It is possible that when approaching the island, the Varyag touched the stones, but perhaps this did not actually happen. In fact, only one thing is reliably known - somewhere between 12.40 and 12.55 the cruiser received a fatal hole in the port side, at the waterline level, with an area of about 2 sq. m and its lower edge was 80 cm below the waterline. It cannot be ruled out that this particular hit was seen on the Naniwa as a hit by a 152-mm projectile in the middle part of the hull at 12.40, or several hits there, observed on the Asam at 12.41, but most likely that it happened later, when the cruiser at the lowest speed he tried to somehow maneuver at Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi).
Having studied the logbooks of "Varyag" and "Koreyets", as well as other documents, the author assumes the most likely such reconstruction:
12.38-1240 - somewhere in this interval "Varyag" begins to turn to the right, to the west;
12.40-12.41 - hitting a 203-mm projectile leads to the fact that the cruiser loses control of the ship;
12.42-12.44 - around this time V. F. Rudnev comes to his senses, control of the cruiser is restored, but Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi ") and Vsevolod Fedorovich orders" Full back ". Naturally, it is impossible to execute his command at once - the steam engines of a cruiser are not the engine of a modern car;
12.45 - Varyag gets another serious hit with a 203mm projectile in the stern, just behind the 152mm stern guns, and a massive fire starts. From the "Battle report" of the commander of the "Asama": "12.45 8-inch shell hit the deck behind the aft bridge. A severe fire broke out, the foremast top hung over to the starboard side. " At about the same time (plus or minus five minutes), the Varyag gets a hole in the side at the waterline level, and its stoker begins to fill with water;
12.45-12.50 The cruiser departs from the island for a sufficient distance in order to move forward. V. F. Rudnev decides to withdraw from the battle to assess the damage;
12.50-12.55 - "Varyag" starts moving forward and hides behind about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), which prevents firing at him for a while.
After that, the cruiser retreats to the anchorage (but we will return to this later).
It would seem, well, what is so reprehensible in all this? Yes, a tragic accident, with the loss of control, but the cruiser still managed to get out, and that received heavy damage, excluding a breakthrough - well, the ship was in battle, not for a walk. However … let's look at all this from a different angle. After all, someone could describe the actions of Russian sailors, for example, like this:
"The commander of the cruiser" Varyag "V. F. Rudnev led the forces entrusted to him to break through against the superior forces of the enemy. However, barely breaking the channel, as a result of an incorrectly executed maneuver, created an emergency situation due to the enemy, as a result of which the latter was able to cause damage to the cruiser, excluding the possibility of a further breakthrough."
And after all, in a sense, it was true, because the U-turn of the Varyag towards Fr. Phalmido really created an emergency, as a result of which the cruiser either touched the stones or not, but, most certainly, lost speed and was forced to reverse directly in front of the approaching enemy. And it was at this time that the "Varyag" received a hole in the side of two square meters, which caused the stoker to flood and roll 10 degrees to the port side. The ship, of course, could not continue the battle in this state.
Of course, Vsevolod Fedorovich was wounded, so it was quite forgiven for him to lose control over the situation for a short time - and it did not take much time to turn around in Pkhalmido Island. The helmsman was also wounded, and if not, it was not his business to change the course of the ship on his own. But, first of all, the wound of V. F. Rudneva was not serious, and secondly, in the conning tower of the cruiser there was actually a senior navigator officer of the Varyag E. M. Behrens - and so he should not have allowed the ship to turn on the rocks.
It is rather difficult to judge Evgeny Mikhailovich strictly. He had just been busy plotting a course along the Chemulpo fairway, which was very difficult in terms of navigation, and suddenly - a shell hit, the commander was injured, the sailors died, etc. Who knows what he was doing at that moment, perhaps he rushed to the aid of V. F. Rudnev, but what he had to do was to make sure that the cruiser did not turn on the stones, he did not. And Vsevolod Fedorovich, nevertheless, is "the first after God", and it was he who was responsible for everything that happens on the ship.
The author of this article does not at all claim that V. F. Rudnev did lie in the report regarding the damaged steering. But, arguing within the framework of the "conspiracy" theory, he had grounds for this, because the damage to the rudder as a result of an enemy shell hitting the ship obviously removed the responsibility for creating an emergency (the Varyag's turn towards Pkhalmido Island).
That's the whole "conspiracy" version: as for the "official" version, everything is the same in it … with the exception that the steering column of the "Varyag" was really damaged and that the turn to about. Phalmido could not be prevented by either the commander or the chief navigator of the cruiser.
Thus, we come to the following conclusions:
1. Having passed the traverse about. Pkhalmido (Yodolmi) and turning to the right, the Varyag was not able to turn around to go to the Chemulpo raid - given its low speed and current, an attempt to make such a turn automatically led to an emergency situation in which the cruiser almost completely lost speed and with a high probably sat on the rocks at Yodolmi. Obviously, Vsevolod Fedorovich could not help but understand this.
2. Turning to the right (without turning) brought "Varyag" and the next "Korean" on the course to the Western Channel and to approach the ships of the Japanese squadron.
3. If V. F. Rudnev would like to get out of the battle, he should have turned to the left - moving in this way, he could return to the fairway without creating an emergency.
4. Taking into account the above, it can be argued that the very fact of the Varyag's turn to the west (to the right) after leaving the Chemulpo fairway indicates the desire of V. F. Rudnev to conduct a decisive battle with the enemy squadron.
5. Also, taking into account the above, with the highest degree of probability, a reversal to about. Phalmido was not the result of a deliberate decision, but occurred either as a result of damage to the steering column, or as a result of a short-term loss of control of the ship due to the injury of its commander and failure to fulfill his duties by senior navigational officer E. M. Behrens (perhaps both are true at the same time).
6. As a result of the turn to about. Pkhalmido (Yodolmi) and the associated speed loss "Varyag" received critical damage.
7. Arguing within the framework of the "conspiracy" theory, which admits a deliberate lie, V. F. Rudnev in the reports he wrote, we come to the conclusion that if Vsevolod Fedorovich lied, then the meaning of his lie was not to hide his unwillingness to fight, but to “cover up” the unsuccessful turn of Fr. Pkhalmido and the associated critical damage to the Varyag.
Apparently, Vsevolod Fedorovich was simply unlucky (or, conversely, he was lucky, it’s how you look at it). With the highest degree of probability, if not for the Japanese shell that hit the cruiser at 12.41 and temporarily knocked out V. F. Rudnev (and possibly also damaged the steering column of the ship), then today we would read in sources about a cruiser and a gunboat that took their last battle on the reach behind the Chemulpo fairway and heroically died in an unequal battle on the way to the Western Canal. However, the short-term "failure" of V. F. Rudnev in combination with the erroneous actions of E. M. Behrens or damage to the steering column led to the fact that the cruiser almost sat down on the stones and was damaged, making the continuation of the breakthrough completely inappropriate.
In the discussions of this series of articles, much has been said about the "agreement" between V. F. Rudnev and officers of the cruiser and gunboat. They say that the logbooks were filled after the battle, so that the gentlemen could agree among themselves about what exactly to write there. In the next article we will try to estimate the likelihood of such a development of events based on the descriptions of the battle given in the logbooks of both Russian ships.
