So, on January 29, 1903, the Varyag arrived in Chemulpo (Incheon). Less than a month is left before the battle, which took place on January 27 next year - what happened in those 29 days? Arriving at the place of duty, V. F. Rudnev quickly discovered and reported that the Japanese were preparing to occupy Korea. The materials of the historical commission noted:
"Cap. 1 p. Rudnev reported in Port Arthur that the Japanese had set up food warehouses in Chemulpo, at the Jong tong-no station and in Seoul. According to the reports of the cap. 1 p. Rudnev, the total amount of all Japanese provisions had already reached 1,000,000 poods, and 100 boxes of cartridges were delivered. The movement of people was continuous, in Korea there were already up to 15 thousand Japanese, who under the guise of Japanese and in a short time before the war settled throughout the country; the number of Japanese officers in Seoul reached 100, and although the Japanese garrisons in Korea officially remained the same, the actual number of garrisons was much larger. At the same time, the Japanese openly delivered scows, tugboats and steam boats to Chemulpo, which, as the commander of the kr. "Varyag" clearly indicated extensive preparations for amphibious operations … All these preparations indicated too clearly the inevitable occupation of Korea by the Japanese."
The same was conveyed by the Russian military agent in Japan, Colonel Samoilov, who on January 9, 1904, reported on the freight of numerous steamers, the mobilization of divisions, etc. Thus, the preparation of the occupation of Korea was not a secret either for the Viceroy or for higher authorities, but they continued to remain silent - as we said in the previous article, Russian diplomats decided not to consider the landing of Japanese troops in Korea as a declaration of war on Russia, about which Nikolai II and notified the Steward. It was decided to consider as dangerous only the landing of Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel, and everything to the south (including Chemulpo) was not read as such and did not require additional instructions for the stationers. We wrote about this in more detail in the previous article, but now we will just note once again that the refusal of armed opposition to the landing of the Japanese in Korea was accepted by much higher authorities than the commander of the Varyag, and the instructions he received completely forbade interfering with the Japanese.
But - back to the "Varyag". Without a doubt, the best way to avoid the loss of the cruiser and gunboat "Koreets" would be to recall them from Chemulpo, together with the Russian envoy to Korea A. I. Pavlov or without him, but this, unfortunately, was not done. Why so - alas, it is very difficult to answer this question, and one can only speculate. Without a doubt, if it was decided to believe that the Japanese landing in Korea would not lead to a war with Russia, then there was no reason for the recall of Russian stationers from Chemulpo - the Japanese were going to land, and let them. But the situation changed drastically when the Japanese broke off diplomatic relations: despite the fact that in St. Petersburg they believed that this was not yet a war, the risk to which the cruiser and gunboat were exposed clearly outweighed the benefits of our military presence in Korea.
As a matter of fact, the events developed as follows: at 4 pm on January 24, 1904, a note on the severance of relations was officially received in St. Petersburg. What was important - in this case, the classic phrase: "Diplomatic relations with the Russian government now have no value and the government of the Japanese Empire has decided to break off these diplomatic relations" was supplemented by a very open threat: "The government of the empire leaves it reserves the right to act at its own discretion, considering it the best way to achieve these goals. " This was already a real threat of war: but, alas, it was not taken into account.
The fact is that, for the reasons voiced earlier, Russia did not want a war in 1904 at all and, apparently, did not want to believe in its beginning. Therefore, in St. Petersburg, they preferred to listen to the Japanese envoy Kurino, who never tired of repeating that the severance of diplomatic relations is not yet a war, and it is still possible to arrange for the better. As a result, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and Nicholas II), in fact, allowed themselves to ignore reality, hoping for the mirages that the Japanese envoy drew for them and in which they really wanted to believe. Moreover, there was a fear that "our heroes in the Far East would not suddenly be carried away by some military incident" (words of Foreign Minister Lamsdorf). As a result, a gross mistake was made, which, perhaps, ultimately ruined the Varyag: the Governor was notified of the severance of relations with Japan by St. Petersburg the next day, January 25, but the second part of the Japanese note (about the "right to act as) was omitted in the message, and E. I. Alekseev did not find out anything about this.
Let's be frank - it's far from the fact that, having received the text of the Japanese note in full, E. I. Alekseev would have taken measures to recall "Varyag" and "Koreyets", and in addition, in order for these measures to be crowned with success, it was necessary to act with lightning speed: it is known that speed of action is one of the advantages of the Governor E. I. Alekseeva did not enter. Still, there was some chance, and it was missed.
It is also interesting how E. I. Alekseev disposed of the information he received: he notified the consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore about the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan, notified the Vladivostok squadron of cruisers and the Manchzhur gunboat, but did not report this to either the Port Arthur squadron or the envoy in Korea A. I. … Pavlov, nor, of course, the commander of the Varyag. One can only assume that E. I. Alekseev was given the task “in no case to provoke the Japanese” and, guided by the principle “no matter how something happens,” he preferred not to tell the Arthurian sailors anything. The author of this article, unfortunately, could not figure it out when the squadron chief O. V. Stark and the chief of the naval headquarters of the Governor V. K. Vitgeft. It is possible that they also received this information with a delay, so maybe N. O. Essen (expressed by him in his memoirs) that the inaction of the latter led to the untimely recall of the Russian stationers in Chemulpo and Shanghai (where the gunboat Majur was there) is not entirely justified. But in any case, the news was no longer about the severance of diplomatic relations, but about the beginning of the war, was sent to the Chief for the Varyag only on January 27, after a successful attack by Japanese destroyers that blew up the Retvizan, Tsarevich and Pallada, and on the same day when the Varyag entered its first and last battle. Of course, this was a belated warning.
And what was happening on the cruiser at that time? Already on January 24 (the day when St. Petersburg officially received notification of the severance of diplomatic relations), the commanders of the foreign stationary units "secretly" informed Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev about this regrettable event. The commander of the Varyag immediately requested instructions from Admiral Vitgeft: “rumors have reached the rupture of diplomatic relations; due to the frequent delay in dispatches by the Japanese, I ask you to inform us whether there has been an order for further actions,”and a request to the envoy A. I. Pavlova in Seoul: "I heard about the severance of diplomatic relations, please provide information." However, no answer was received from Port Arthur, and A. S. Pavlov replied:
“Rumors of a breakup are spreading here by private individuals. No reliable confirmation of this rumor has been received. It would be very desirable to see you and talk to you."
Apparently, upon receipt of V. F. Rudnev set off on the first train to Seoul (departed on the morning of January 25, 1904) and there, in the Korean capital, the last chance to take the Russian stationers out of Chemulpo was missed before the start of the war.
During the conversation, it quickly became clear that A. I. Pavlov, like V. F. Rudnev, for a week now he has not received any answers to his inquiries or any new orders. All this strengthened the opinion that the Japanese were intercepting and delaying the dispatches of the Varyag commander and the Russian envoy to Korea: but how was this situation supposed to be overcome? V. F. Rudnev proposed to take the envoy and consul and immediately leave Chemulpo, but A. I. Pavlov did not support such a decision, citing the lack of appropriate instructions from his leadership. The envoy proposed to send the gunboat "Koreets" to Port Arthur with a report - according to A. I. Pavlova, unlike the telegrams, the Japanese could not intercept it, which means that in Port Arthur they would be able to put two and two together and send orders, say, with a torpedo boat.
As a result, the Varyag commander, returning to the cruiser, on the same day on January 25, ordered the Koreets to be sent to Port Arthur - according to his order, the gunboat was to leave Chemulpo on the morning of January 26. On the night of January 25-26, the Japanese stationary "Chiyoda" left the raid (strictly speaking, it would be more correct to write "Chiyoda", but for the convenience of the reader, we will adhere to the names historically established and generally accepted in Russian-language literature). Unfortunately, for unclear reasons, the "Koreets" did not leave in the morning, as VF demanded. Rudnev, and stayed until 15.40 on January 26 and, while trying to get out, was intercepted by a Japanese squadron heading to Port Arthur.
We will not describe in detail the preparation and nuances of the landing operation that the Japanese were preparing. We only note that it was supposed to be produced in Chemulpo, but only if there were no Russian warships there, otherwise it was necessary to land not far from Chemulpo, in Asanman Bay. It was there that the general gathering of the Japanese ships participating in the operation was appointed, and it was there that the Chiyoda left the Chemulpo raid. But on January 26, 1904, when all the "characters" were assembled, the commander of the operation, Rear Admiral Sotokichi Uriu, realizing that the occupation of Seoul must be carried out as soon as possible, and having received information that the Russian stationers were behaving as usual and not taking no threatening actions, decided to land in Chemulpo, which, of course, as a landing site was far more convenient than Asanman Bay. Nevertheless, the Japanese, of course, had to reckon with the possibility of intervention by Russian ships - they should, if possible, be neutralized.
Sotokichi Uriu gathered the commanders of warships and captains of transport ships carrying troops, announced to them the plan of the operation and brought to their attention his order No. 28. This order is very important for understanding what happened in the future, so we will quote it in full. Although some points of the order, insignificant for our analysis, could be omitted, but in order to avoid any speculations on this topic, we will quote it without cuts:
“Secret.
February 8, 37 year Meiji ()
Board of the flagship "Naniwa" Asanman Bay.
1. Situation with the enemy as of 23:00 on January 25: in the Chemulpo bay, the Russian ships "Varyag" and "Koreets" are still at anchor;
2. The point of disembarkation of the expeditionary detachment was determined by the bay of Chemulpo, upon arrival in which the disembarkation of troops should immediately begin;
3. If Russian ships meet outside the anchorage in the Chemulpo bay, abeam Phalmido () or S from it, then they must be attacked and destroyed;
4. If Russian ships will not undertake hostile actions against us at the anchorage in the Chemulpo bay, then we will not attack them;
5. Simultaneously with the preparations for leaving the temporary anchorage in Asanman Bay, the forces of the Detachment are divided as follows:
- 1st tactical group: (1) "Naniwa", (2) "Takachiho", (3) "Chiyoda" with attached 9th detachment of destroyers;
- 2nd tactical group: (4) "Asama", (5) "Akashi", (6) "Niitaka" with the 14th destroyer detachment attached to it;
6. Actions for approaching the anchorage in the Chemulpo bay:
a) "Chiyoda", "Takachiho", "Asama", the 9th destroyer detachment, transport ships "Dairen-maru", "Otaru-maru", "Heidze-maru" come to anchorage in the Chemulpo bay;
b) The 9th destroyer detachment, passing the Phalmido island, goes forward and calmly, without arousing suspicion from the enemy, enters the anchorage. Two destroyers stand at a point inaccessible to enemy fire, and the other two, with a peaceful air, occupy such a position next to the Varyag and Koreyets, so that in an instant it would be possible to decide their fate - to live or die;
c) "Chiyoda" independently chooses a suitable place for itself and becomes anchored in it;
d) A detachment of transport ships, following in the wake of the Asama, after the failure of the Chiyoda and Takachiho, as soon as possible enter the anchorage and immediately begin to unload the troops. It is desirable that they be able to enter the port during the high tide of the evening tide.
e) "Naniwa", "Akashi", "Niitaka" follow in the wake of the detachment of transport ships, and then anchor to S from the island of Gerido in the line to NE. The 14th destroyer detachment, having finished receiving coal and water from the Kasuga-maru, is divided into two groups, each consisting of two destroyers. One group occupies a position to the S of Phalmido Island, and the other is located next to "Naniwa". If at night the enemy starts moving from anchorage into the open sea, then both groups must attack and destroy him;
f) Before sunset, Asama departs from a position near the Incheon anchorage and proceeds to the Naniwa anchorage and anchors there;
7. In the event that the enemy takes hostile actions against us, opens artillery fire or makes a torpedo attack, we must immediately attack and destroy him, acting in such a way as not to inflict damage on ships and ships of other powers at anchorage;
8. Ships at the Gerido island, by dawn the next day, move to a temporary anchorage in Asanman Bay;
9. Ships and destroyers anchored in the Gulf of Chemulpo, after making sure that the disembarkation is fully completed, move to a temporary anchorage in the Gulf of Asanman;
10. "Kasuga-maru" and "Kinshu-maru", having finished bunkering the destroyers of the 14th detachment with coal and water, anchor at the entrance to Masanpo Bay and do not open anchor lights at night, observing blackout;
11. Destroyers carrying out patrols in the Chemulpo Bay, discovering that the enemy ships began to move from anchorage to the open sea, immediately begin pursuit of them and, when they find themselves to S from the Phalmido island, they must attack and destroy them.;
12. During anchorage, be ready for immediate shooting from the anchor, for which prepare everything necessary for riveting the anchor-chains, keep the boilers under steam and set up an enhanced signal and observation watch."
Thus, the Japanese admiral's plan was very simple. He needed to land a landing in Chemulpo, but without shooting in the roadstead, to which foreign stationers would have been extremely disapproving. Accordingly, he was going to first enter the bay and take aim at the Russian ships, and only then lead the transports with the landing party to the raid. If the Russians open fire, great, they will be the first to violate neutrality (as we said earlier, no one considered the landing of troops on Korean territory as a violation of neutrality) and will be immediately destroyed by destroyers. If they try to get close to the transports, they will fall under the sight of not only destroyers, but also cruisers, and when they try to shoot, again, they will be immediately destroyed. If "Varyag" and "Koreets" try to leave Chemulpo without firing, the destroyers will accompany them and sink them with torpedoes as soon as they leave the raid, but even if the Russians manage to escape by some miracle, then pass the Japanese cruisers that blocked the exit they still won't succeed.
The most "funny" thing was that a torpedo attack by Russian ships with a probability of 99.9% would not be considered by foreign stationaries to be a violation of neutrality. Well, unexpectedly two Russian ships exploded, who knows for what reason? No, of course, there were no madmen among the commanders of foreign ships, unable to put two and two together and understand whose hands it was. But, as we said earlier, European and American ships in the Chemulpo raid were not defending Korean neutrality, but the interests of their countries and their citizens in Korea. Any actions of the Japanese that did not threaten these interests were indifferent to these inpatients. The war between Russia and Japan was a matter between Russia and Japan, in which neither the Italians, nor the French, nor the Americans had any interest. Therefore, the destruction of "Varyag" and "Koreyets", provided that no one else was hurt in this case, would only provoke a formal protest on their part, and even then - hardly, because the senior on the raid was considered the British "Talbot", and the interests of England in this war were entirely on the side of Japan. Rather, here one should have expected unofficial congratulations to the Japanese commander …
In fact, S. Uriu was going to build a wonderful trap, but man assumes, but God disposes, and at the very entrance to the roadstead his ships collided with the "Korean" that went to Port Arthur. What happened in the future is rather difficult to describe, because domestic and Japanese sources completely contradict each other, and even, often, themselves. Perhaps in the future we will make a detailed description of this collision in the form of a separate article, but for now we will limit ourselves to the most general overview - fortunately, a detailed clarification of all the nuances of the maneuvering of the Korean and the ships of the Japanese detachment is not necessary for our purposes.
Canonical for Russian-language sources is the description presented in the “Work of the Historical Commission for the Description of the Fleet's Actions in the War of 1904-1905. at the Naval General Staff ". According to him, the "Korean" weighed anchor at 15.40, and after a quarter of an hour, at 15.55, a Japanese squadron was seen on it, which was moving in two wake columns. One of them was formed by cruisers and transports, with the Chiyoda, Takachiho, and Asama as the lead, followed by three transports and the rest of the cruisers, and the second column consisted of destroyers. The "Korean" tried to get past them, but it turned out to be impossible, as the Japanese columns were heard to the sides, and the gunboat was forced to follow between them. At this time, "Asama" turned across the course of the "Koreyets", thereby blocking the exit to the sea. It became clear that the Japanese squadron was not going to release the Koreyets into the sea, and its commander G. P. Belyaev decided to return to the raid, where Japanese provocations would have been unlikely. But at the moment of the turn, the gunboat was attacked by torpedoes from destroyers, which, however, passed by, and one sank before reaching the side of the ship. G. P. Belyaev gave the order to open fire, and immediately canceled it, because the "Korean" was already entering the neutral raid of Chemulpo, nevertheless one of the gunners managed to fire two shots from a 37-mm gun. In general, everything is clear and logical, and the actions of the Japanese look, although completely illegal, but consistent and logical. But the Japanese reports give rise to serious doubts.
According to Japanese data, the ships of S. Uriu first operated according to the previously outlined plan. The Japanese moved in the following formation:
When the columns approached the traverse about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), then the leading Chiyoda and Takachiho separated from the main forces and, accompanied by the 9th destroyer detachment, increased their speed and moved forward - in accordance with the plan of the landing operation, they were to be the first to enter the Chemulpo raid, so to take aim at Russian stationers. And when Fr. Phalmido was covered by them for about three miles, unexpectedly on the Japanese ships they found the "Korean" coming towards them. Thus, a situation not stipulated by Order No. 28 arose.
If "Korean" had come out a little earlier and the meeting would have taken place for Fr. Phalmido, the Japanese would simply have destroyed the Russian ship, as provided for by the order. But the meeting took place between Fr. Phalmido and raid, the order did not regulate such a situation, and the intentions of the "Koreyets" were unclear. The Japanese feared that the gunboat would attack the transports, so the Chiyoda and Takachiho prepared for battle - the gunners took their places at the guns, but crouching behind the bulwarks so that their warlike preparations could not be seen if possible. When the leading cruisers approached the Koreyets, they saw that the Russian ship was not preparing for battle, on the contrary, a guard was built on its deck for greeting. Whether at that moment the "Korean" found itself between the cruisers and destroyers, it is impossible to say for certain - on the one hand, the distance between the Japanese cruisers and the destroyers did not exceed 1-1.5 cables, but on the other, the "Korean" parted with the "Chiyoda" and "Takachiho" at a distance of no more than 100 m, so that, in principle, he could wedge himself between the one and the other.
In any case, the "Korean" found itself between two detachments, one of which walked past him to the Chemulpo raid, and the second, led by "Asama", walked towards the Russian gunboat. There was some confusion on the Japanese transports, and then the armored cruiser left the formation, turning 180 degrees, and went on a course parallel to that of the Korean, in order to remain between the Russian gunboat and the caravan escorted by Asama. But then "Asama" again turned to the right - most likely, it was this maneuver that was adopted by G. P. Belyaev for trying to block his access to the sea. The funny thing is that the Asama commander did not think anything like that - according to his report, he turned to the right in order to dodge the torpedoes, which, in his opinion, the Koreets could fire at him.
Accordingly, G. P. Belyaev decided to return to the roadstead and turned back. We have already seen that the commanders of the Chiyoda and Takachiho, convinced that the gunboat had no aggressive intentions, moved further towards the raid in order to fulfill the task assigned to them, but the commander of the 9th Japanese destroyer detachment had a different opinion. He considered that the Koreets could carry out reconnaissance in the interests of the Varyag and that the Russians might be planning a strike. Therefore, having dispersed with the Koreyets, he rebuilt from the wake column to the front, and then took the Koreyets in pincers: the destroyers Aotaka and Hato took up a position on the left side of the Koreyets, while the Kari and Tsubame - from the right … or rather, should have taken. The fact is that, while performing the maneuver, Tsubame did not calculate, went beyond the fairway and jumped onto the stones, so that further the Korean was accompanied by only three destroyers, while the torpedo tubes on them were put on alert.
And when the "Korean" began its turn back to Chemulpo, it turned out that the Russian ship went in the direction of the Japanese destroyers caught between it and the edge of the fairway. On the destroyer Kari decided that this would create a dangerous situation, but on the other hand, it would make it possible to end the Korean while none of the foreign stationers could see it, and fired a torpedo shot, which the Korean had dodged. As the saying goes, "a bad example is contagious," so "Aotaka" and "Hato" immediately increased their speed and laid down on rapprochement with the "Korean", while "Hato" fired one torpedo, and "Aotaka" refused to attack for unclear reasons. It can be assumed that the distance is to blame - at the moment when the "Korean" entered the Chemulpo raid, the distance between it and the "Aotaka" was still about 800-900 m, which was far enough for a torpedo shot in those years.
In general, everything is as usual - the Russians have one picture of maneuvering, the Japanese have a completely different one, while the information on the consumption of ammunition also differs: the Russians believe that three torpedoes were fired at the Korean, the Japanese that two, while the Russians claim that the "Korean" fired two artillery shots, the Japanese note that the gunboat fired at all three destroyers who took part in the attack (which, you must agree, is extremely difficult to do with two shells).
Separately, I would like to draw your attention to the Tsubame accident - moving along the fairway, along which the Varyag and the Korean will go into battle the next day, pursuing a gunboat, which had at most 10-12 knots, the destroyer managed to find itself on the rocks and get damaged by losing one blade of the left propeller and damaging three blades of the right propeller, which is why its speed was now limited to 12 knots. True, the Japanese claim that they were chasing the Koreyets at as much as 26 knots, but this is extremely doubtful for Tsubame - it flew onto the rocks almost immediately after the turn, and hardly had time to pick up such a speed (if at all, at least one of the Japanese destroyers, which, again, is somewhat doubtful). In general, it is unlikely that a small skirmish between a Russian gunboat and Japanese destroyers can be called a battle, but, without a doubt, the pitfalls of the Chemulpo fairway proved to be the most effective in it.
In any case, as soon as the "Korean" returned to the Chemulpo raid, the Japanese abandoned the attack, and "assuming as peaceful a view as possible" took up the positions prescribed for them: "Aotaka" anchored 500 m from the "Varyag", "Kari" - at the same distance from the Koreyets, and Hato and Tsubame, who had independently removed from the stones, hid behind the British and French ships, but, in accordance with Order No. 28, were ready to attack at any moment.
Now let's look at this situation from the position of the Varyag cruiser commander. Here the "Korean" leaves the water area of the raid and goes along the fairway to the sea, and then miracles begin. First, two Japanese cruisers, Chiyoda and Takachiho, enter the raid. Behind them, the returning "Korean" unexpectedly appears - it is unclear whether they heard his shots on the "Varyag", but, of course, they could not know about the torpedo attack.
In any case, it turned out that on the "Varyag" they either saw that the "Koreets" was firing, or they did not see it, and either heard the shots, or they did not. In any of these cases, either on the Varyag they saw that the Korean was shooting, but the Japanese did not shoot, or they heard two shots (which, for example, could well have been warning shots), while it was not clear who was shooting. In other words, nothing that could be seen or heard on the cruiser Varyag required immediate military intervention. And then the Japanese cruisers and 4 destroyers entered the raid, which took up positions not far from the Russian ships, and only then, finally, V. F. Rudnev received information about the events that took place.
At the same time, again, it is not entirely clear when exactly this happened - R. M. Melnikov reports that the "Koreets", having returned to the roadstead, approached the "Varyag" from where he briefly conveyed the circumstances of his meeting with the Japanese squadron, and then the gunboat anchored. At the same time, the "Work of the Historical Commission" does not mention this - from its description it follows that the "Koreets", having entered the roadstead, anchored at 2.5 cables from the "Varyag", then G. P. Belov went to the cruiser with a report, and 15 minutes after anchoring the gunboat, the Japanese destroyers took up positions - two ships in 2 cables from the "Varyag" and "Koreyets". Obviously, in 15 minutes it was only possible to lower the boat and arrive at the Varyag, that is, the Russian ships were at gunpoint when G. P. Belov only reported to V. F. Rudnev about the circumstances of the battle.
In general, despite the difference in interpretations, both sources agree on one thing - by the time Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev was aware of the attack undertaken by the Japanese destroyers:
1. "Korean" was already out of danger;
2. The 9th destroyer detachment (and probably also the cruiser) was stationed in close proximity to the Varyag and Koreyets.
In this situation, for the Varyag cruiser, opening fire and engaging in battle made absolutely no sense. Of course, if the Koreets were attacked, and the Varyag saw this, the cruiser had to, disdaining any danger, go to the Koreets' rescue and engage in an arbitrarily unequal battle. But by the time the cruiser learned about the Japanese attack, everything was over, and there was no need to save the Korean. And after the fight, they don't wave their fists. As an old British proverb says, "A gentleman is not one who does not steal, but one who does not get caught": yes, the Japanese fired torpedoes at the Koreyets, but none of the foreign stationers saw this and could not confirm this, but means that there was only "word against word" - in diplomacy it is the same as nothing. Suffice it to recall almost a century-old confrontation between the official Russian and Japanese history - the Russians claimed that the first shots in the war were Japanese torpedoes, the Japanese - that two 37-mm shells fired by the Korean. And only recently, as the Japanese reports were published, it became obvious that the Japanese did shoot first, but who is interested in this today, except for a few history buffs? But if the "Varyag" opened fire on the Japanese ships entering the raid, in the eyes of "the entire civilized world" it would be the first to violate Korean neutrality - whatever one may say, but at that time the Japanese had not yet started the landing and did nothing objectionable on a neutral raid.
In addition, tactically, the Russian stationers were in a completely hopeless position - they stood in the roadstead under the sights of Japanese ships and could be sunk by destroyers at any moment. So, not only did the opening of fire on the Japanese directly violate all V. F. Rudnev's orders, violated Korean neutrality, spoiled relations with England, France, Italy and the United States, and did nothing in military terms, leading only to the rapid death of two Russian ships. Of course, there could be no question of any destruction of the landing party here - it was impossible purely technically.
Diplomatically speaking, the following happened. The honor of the Russian flag obliged the Varyag to defend any domestic ship or vessel that was attacked and to defend its crew (to fight with it) against any and arbitrarily superior enemy forces. But no notions of honor required the Varyag to engage the Japanese squadron after the incident with the Korean had been successfully resolved (the Russian sailors were not injured, and they were no longer in immediate danger). The attack by the Japanese destroyers, no doubt, could have become a belli incident, that is, a formal reason for declaring war, but, of course, such a decision should not have been made by the commander of the Russian cruiser, but by much higher authorities. In such situations, the duty of any representative of the armed forces is not to rush into the attack with a saber at the ready, but to inform his leadership about the circumstances that have arisen and then act according to their orders. We have already said that all the orders that V. F. Rudnev, just directly testified that Russia does not want war yet. At the same time, an "amateur" attack by the Japanese squadron would only lead to providing Japan with a wonderful reason to enter the war at a convenient time for her, to the immediate death of two Russian warships with virtually no possibility of harming the enemy and to diplomatic complications with European countries.
The concept of honor for a military man is extremely important, but it is equally important to understand the boundaries of the obligations it imposes. So, for example, it is known that during the Second World War, when the USSR was bleeding to death in the fight against Nazi Germany, the Japanese armed forces more than once or twice carried out various kinds of provocations, which could well become a pretext for declaring war. But the USSR absolutely did not need a war on two fronts, so our armed forces had to endure, although, one must think, the troops present at such provocations openly "itched their hands" to answer the samurai the way they deserved. Can our troops and navy be blamed for cowardice or lack of honor, on the grounds that they did not open fire in response to Japanese provocations? Did they deserve such reproaches? Obviously not, and in the same way Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev does not deserve reproach for the fact that on January 26, 1904, the ships under his command did not engage in a hopeless battle with the Japanese squadron.
