The shootout of the Rurik with a detachment of German ships ended the confrontation between the surface forces, but the battle at Gotland was not over yet. As we said earlier, the operation plan provided for the deployment of submarines in the area of those ports from which heavy German ships could go to intercept the special purpose detachment M. K. Bakhirev. Unfortunately, due to the technical imperfection of domestic submarines, only an English submarine under the command of M. Horton was deployed "in the right place".
His E-9 took up position at Neufarwasser. It should be noted here that long before the events described, Russian ships had placed enough minefields in this area, and this forced German sailors to leave and return to Neufarwasser strictly along the safe channel. So, M. Horton's position was greatly simplified by the fact that it was his boat that two months ago opened the position of this fairway. At the same time, the Germans, although they feared the appearance of submarines here, nevertheless believed that the density of minefields impeded their actions. In other words, while taking the necessary protective measures "just in case", the Germans still did not think that they could meet here with Russian or British submarines.
As a result … exactly what happened, in fact, should have happened. Rear Admiral Hopman was in Danzig with the armored cruisers Prince Heinrich and Prince Adalbert. Formally, these two ships provided long-range cover for the detachment of Commodore I. Karf, but in fact they did not even stand under steam, ready to leave. In general, judging by the description of G. Rollmann, von Hopmann was in no hurry to go anywhere.
The first radiogram "Augsburg", in which he reported on the successful completion of the assignment, of course, should not have prompted the rear admiral to feats. But at 08.12 a radio message was received (given in plain text from "Augsburg"):
“Armored cruisers and II squadron. The enemy is in square 003. Attack, go around and cut off!"
However, neither the text of the radiogram, nor the absence of the cipher prompted von Hopmann to take any action - observing the Olympic calmness, he remained in place. The German Rear Admiral gave the order to breed the pairs only after Roon reported at 08.48:
Place in square 117, heading WNW, speed 19 knots.
Further, according to G. Rollman: "thanks to the extremely friendly work of all personnel and the time of day favorable for anxiety", "Prince Adalbert" and "Prince Genirch" at 12.00, that is, more than three hours after receiving the order, left from the mouth of the Vistula. They were accompanied (again, it is impossible to refrain from quoting G. Rollmann):
"Only two destroyers, which were quickly prepared for the campaign."
That is, it turns out that there were more than two destroyers, but when it was urgently needed to go to sea, only two could accompany the cruisers. And this despite the fact that the von Hopmann armored cruisers were assembled for 3 hours! If we assume that G. Rollmann was still mistaken, and that the Rear Admiral ordered the ships to be withdrawn immediately upon receiving the radiogram from 08.12, then it turns out that he needed not even 3, but 4 hours! That's a cover, that's a cover.
Apparently realizing, finally, that such a slowness could be fatal for the ships of I. Karf, von Hopmann led his detachment along the fairway at 17 knots. However, as soon as the German ships rounded the Hel lighthouse, they ended up in a strip of fog, which, apparently, on June 19 stood over the entire Baltic Sea. Torpedo boats, marching ahead and searching for submarines, were drawn to the flagship. After about half an hour, it became clear, but von Hopmann considered it completely unnecessary to send destroyers forward - firstly, the ships were moving at a sufficiently large speed, which made it difficult to enter a torpedo attack, secondly, the next strip of approaching fog was visible, and thirdly, the cruiser and the destroyers were just among the Russian minefields, where no submarines should have been by definition.
Alas, everything happens for the first time - 6 miles from Richtsgeft, E-9 was eagerly awaiting them. Max Horton spotted the German force at a distance of four miles, von Hopmann's ships approaching. At 14.57 they were already in some two cables from the E-9, and the boat fired a two-torpedo salvo.
The commander of the "Prince Adalbert", Captain Zursee Michelsen, saw a bubble formed from the launch of torpedoes 350-400 meters from his ship, then a periscope and, finally, a trail of a torpedo. An order was immediately given to increase the speed, but no action could save the cruiser from the blow.
The first torpedo hit right under the Prince Adalbert's bridge and exploded, throwing up clouds of smoke and coal dust. On the cruiser, it was thought that the second torpedo hit the stern, because the ship was shaken again, but in fact this did not happen - the torpedo detonated from hitting the ground. However, one hit did the trick - water gushed through a two-meter hole, flooding the first stoker, the cellar of the bow tower of the main caliber, the central post and the compartment of the onboard torpedo tubes. I must say that the Germans were incredibly lucky, because the "Prince Adalbert" was literally on the verge of death - the energy of the explosion smashed the fighting compartment of one of the torpedoes, but it did not explode. If the warhead of the German torpedo had also detonated, it is quite possible that the cruiser was killed with most of its crew, but in any case it did not go without losses - the explosion killed two non-commissioned officers and eight sailors.
The British submarine was seen not only on the "Prince Adalbert", it was also spotted on the destroyer "S-138", which immediately rushed into the attack, trying to ram the E-9. However, M. Horton, fixing a hit to the "Prince Adalbert", immediately increased the speed and ordered to take water into the fast diving tank, as a result of which the boat avoided a collision and lay down on the ground at a depth of 12 meters.
Rear Admiral Hopman immediately sent the "Prince Heinrich" back to Danzig, he himself moved to the coast in order to be able to throw himself on it if the flooding became uncontrollable. This did not happen, but the armored cruiser still took 1,200 tons of water, its draft increased to 9 meters and could not return to Neyfarvasser. Then the rear admiral decided to go to Swinemunde. "Prince Adalbert" accompanied only the destroyer "S-139", because "S-138" remained at the attack site in order to continue the search for E-9. This was not enough, and von Hopmann included in his squad the floating base "Indianola", whose minesweepers were just working nearby.
On the "Prince Adalbert", fearing a repeated attack by the submarine, they tried to give the speed of 15 knots, but almost immediately had to reduce it to 12. However, even at this speed, the bulkheads were subjected to too much stress from the water entering the hull, so that soon the speed was reduced to 10 knots. In fact, it was even less, because the machines gave the number of revolutions corresponding to 10 knots, but a ship that took a lot of water and with an increased draft, while, of course, could not give 10 knots.
By evening, the forecastle sank under the water to the very top deck. Water continued to flow into the hull, and a roll arose. The Germans thought about counter-flooding to straighten it, but then the water found a "loophole" in the coal pits on the port side, and the roll straightened by itself. However, the situation was disastrous in all respects.
Under these conditions, the commander of the ship suggested von Hopmann to interrupt the cruise and anchor in order to carry out rescue operations not on the move, which was supposed to increase their efficiency. And so they did - at 20.30 "Prince Adalbert" dropped anchor near Stoopmulde, and its crew began work, which lasted all night. Interestingly, food for the damaged armored cruiser had to be delivered from the Indianola, because its own food supplies were in the water. Worse still, drinking water tanks were also mostly out of order, and boiler water supplies were greatly reduced.
By four o'clock in the morning on June 20, it became clear that it would not be possible to "pull" the bow of the ship out of the water. Then it was decided to lead the ship in Swinemunde stern forward, but at first this plan was not crowned with success. The draft of the bow reached 11.5 m, being in shallow water, the cruiser almost did not obey the steering wheel, and the left vehicle could not work at all. The situation improved only after the "Prince Adalbert" entered the "big water" - here he managed to go forward, developing a speed of about 6 knots. At this time, the armored cruiser was accompanied, in addition to the Indianola, by two more destroyers and three tugs. However, with the available draft, the ship could not pass in Swinemunde, at the same time the weather was very quiet and it was decided to lead the cruiser directly to Kiel.
By the evening, the draft was slightly reduced (to 11 meters), but water was still flowing into the hull - the ship had already received 2,000 tons, despite the fact that its buoyancy reserve was 2,500 tons. Nevertheless, the "Prince Adalbert" was able to return to Kiel on June 21 … Upon his arrival, Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich boarded and expressed his gratitude to the commander and crew for saving the old ship.
Without a doubt, in the struggle for the survivability of the "Prince Adalbert", its crew showed skill and professionalism worthy of the highest praise. Torpedoed, "Prince Adalbert" covered 295 miles, of which 240 miles in reverse. By this time, von Hopmann himself was no longer on the ship - he moved to a destroyer and returned to Neufarwasser.
And what were the British doing at that time? Max Horton "sat out" the search performed by "S-138", and remained in position. At about 16.00 on June 19, the E-9 saw the return of the ships of Commodore I. Kraff to the Gulf of Danzig: Augsburg, Roon and Lubeck were escorted by destroyers. The British submarine tried to attack, but this time M. Horton was not successful, and he could not approach the German ships closer than 1.5 miles, which was too long a distance for a torpedo attack. After that M. Horton quite rightly considered that his task was completed and took his boat home. E-9 arrived in Revel on June 21 without incident.
Interestingly, the British commander did not know who he was torpedoing. Max Horton was sure that he was attacking a battleship of the type "Braunschweig" or "Deutschland", and this delusion turned out to be very tenacious. Even D. Corbett in the 3rd volume of the official description of the world war at sea (first published in 1923) claims that the E-9 attacked and struck the battleship "Pommern". On the other hand, the Germans knew for sure that they had been attacked by the British - subsequently, a heating apparatus was found on the quarterdecks of the "Prince Adalbert", which hit the torpedo ship with details that make it possible to clearly identify its English "origin".
In general, it can be stated that the British submariners have achieved remarkable success. As a result of their attack, von Hopmann's squad was unable to take part in the battle at Gotland and also did not provide assistance to the Albatross. Although the "Prince Adalbert" did not sink, it was still heavily damaged, as a result of which it had to be repaired for over two months, greatly weakening the already small German forces constantly operating in the Baltic. Paying tribute to the professionalism of the British and their commander, Max Horton, the good work of the Russian staff officers should also be noted - after all, it was they who appointed the position of the only truly combat-ready boat at their disposal, exactly where it turned out to be needed.
However, as a result of the battle at Gotland, another clash of submarines took place. The fact is that at dawn on June 19 the Russian submarine "Akula" entered the sea.
At noon, the boat commander, senior lieutenant N. A. Gudim received an order to go to the Swedish coast of Gotland in order to prevent the Albatross from being floated if the Germans suddenly had such a desire. At 18.40 the boat was attacked by a German seaplane, which dropped 2 bombs on it, but the Akula did not receive any damage.
At five o'clock in the morning on June 20, the "Shark" approached and examined the "Albatross" from a distance of only 7 cables. It was then that it became clear that the “Nymph-class cruiser” was in fact a fast minelayer, and four Swedish destroyers were anchored next to it. ON. Gudim, by virtue of the orders he had received, continued his observation.
The Germans tried to help the Albatross and also sent their submarine to him, which they charged with preventing further destruction of the ship if the Russians made such an attempt. But the German boat "U-A" left later, on the morning of June 20. The next morning, she arrived at the scene and also inspected the Albatross, and then turned east to replenish the batteries. But there was a Russian "Shark" …
Russian submariners were the first to notice the enemy ("Shark" was on the surface), and N. A. Buzz immediately commanded the dive. A few minutes later, and on the German boat, they saw "an object, the size and shape of which was difficult to see against the sun." U-A immediately turned on the unidentified "item" and sank into readiness to attack. For some time, both submarines were submerged, ready for battle. But then on "U-A", apparently, they decided that the "object" they only imagined, and surfaced. ON. Gudim found "U-A" at 12 cables, immediately turned towards it and three minutes later launched a torpedo from a distance of 10 cables. At the same time, the "Shark" continued to approach and two minutes after the first shot fired a second torpedo. Alas, the first torpedo did not reach U-A (as you can understand, it simply sank along the road), and the boat dodged the second torpedo with an energetic maneuver. The Germans observed the tracks of both torpedoes. The boats parted and, although both remained in their positions (near the Albatross) until the evening of the next day, they no longer saw each other and did not engage in battle.
This ended the battle at Gotland. And we just have to summarize the conclusions that we drew throughout the entire cycle of articles, as well as give a description of the consequences to which it led. And that's why…
