This article will be devoted to the issue of the effectiveness of the firing of Russian ships at the ships of I. Karf's detachment - the light cruiser Augsburg, three destroyers, and, of course, the minelayer Albatross.
As you know, the shooting of Russian cruisers at the Albatross has become the object of criticism of numerous researchers. So, M. A. Petrov ("Two Fights") writes:
“Thus, thanks to the exceptional, in no way caused by the complexity of tactics and maneuvering techniques, completely unnecessary in this case" course angles, " distances, at which the target was sometimes poorly visible, it took almost an hour and a half to knock out a small, poorly protected cruiser, in fact, giving him the opportunity to take refuge in neutral waters."
The same point of view is shared by N. V. Novikov (notes to the Russian edition of the book by G. Rollman), and the authors of the monumental work "The Fleet in the First World War" and many others.
Well, let's try to figure it out. Unfortunately, there is no way to assess the firing accuracy of 152 mm guns, but we can, with certain reservations, calculate the percentage of hits of 203 mm guns. To do this, let us first determine the consumption of shells of Russian cruisers against the minelayer "Albatross". The best known is the amount of ammunition expended by the cruiser "Bayan". According to the memoirs of its commander, A. K. Weiss, after the fight with Roon:
“We still have shells after this battle: 6-inch 434, 8-inch 120, we used up 6-inch 366 and 8-inch 80. Here, apparently, only everyone understood why I did not allow aimlessly throwing out the shells.”
Unfortunately, these words of the Bayan commander may contain a mistake - the fact is that 366 expended 152-mm shells + 434 remaining shells give a total of 800 shells, 80 spent eight-inch shells + 120 remaining give, respectively, 200. It turns out as as if the cruiser had an ammunition load of 100 rounds per gun (2 203 mm cannons in the turrets and 8 152 mm in casemates), but in fact the ammunition load consisted of 110 rounds for both 8-inch and 6-inch guns.
Accordingly, we have three different probabilities. It is possible that the Bayan cruiser entered the operation with a shortage of shells (this is, in principle, possible, although unlikely) and actually used up 80 203-mm shells against the enemy, after which she had 120 left. It is possible that the cruiser commander indicated correctly consumption of shells, but was mistaken with the remnants, and then, after two firefights, in fact, at the disposal of the gunners A. K. Weiss remained 130 203 mm and 514 152 mm. In this case, the projectile consumption is also 80. And there is a possibility that in fact more projectiles were used up than indicated by A. K. Weiss., That is, the remnants are correct, but 90 shells were spent on the Albatross and Augsburg, not 80. In any case, we will not be mistaken in assuming that in the battle with the Augsburg and In a duel with Roon, Bayan used up 80-90 203-mm shells. As you know, according to Roon, Bayan fired 20 two-gun volleys, respectively, 40-50 shells remain for Augsburg and Albatross.
At the same time, Bayan fired at Augsburg from about 07.40-07.41 until 08.00 at least, and it is possible that he fired afterwards, that is, not less than 20 minutes, while at the same time at Albatross - only 10 minutes. Consequently, Bayan fired twice as long at Augsburg and probably used up more ammunition, but for the sake of "purity of the experiment" we will assume that Bayan fired the same number of shells at Augsburg and Albatross. If our assumption is correct, then "Bayan" fired no more than 20-25 shots at the "Albatross".
As for the "Admiral Makarov", it is indicated that by the time of the meeting with the "Roon" he had used up 61% of his ammunition load of 203-mm shells, which is confirmed by the memoirs of G. K. Column:
"The reason why the admiral did not engage the Roon was that there were too few large rounds left on the Makarov, for example, about 90 8-inch rounds and only half of the 6-inch stock."
The fact is that 61% of 220 gives 134-135 spent shells, respectively, the remainder should be 85-86 shells, just the same "about 90 shells" indicated by G. K. Count. The only thing that inspires some doubts is whether these 61% of the expenditure from the residues were calculated, according to the memoirs of G. K. Count? But in any case, it is generally accepted that the "Admiral" Makarov "used up more than half of the ammunition load and the figure of 135 rounds for a (roughly) hour and a half battle (combat rate of fire - 90 rounds per hour) looks reasonable - given that the" Bayan "in half an hour fired at Roon 40 shells (80 shells per hour) and even, perhaps, slightly overestimated.
So, assuming that on Augsburg, Admiral Makarov used up the same number of shells as Bayan (that is, 20-25 203-mm shells), we get that only 130 were fired at Albatross. 140 eight-inch rounds, including 20-25 from the Bayan and 110-115 from the Admiral Makarov.
Sources indicate that the Albatross received 6 203-mm shells, which gives us, in general, a very good hit rate - 4, 29-4, 61%. At the same time, in reality, these figures may be higher, because in our calculations we made all the assumptions that increase the consumption of projectiles for the Albatross. Therefore, the percentage of hits in the amount of 4, 29-4, 61% can be considered as the lowest possible value. Nevertheless, it, generally speaking, already puts an end to the version of poor shooting of Russian cruisers.
But here's what's interesting …
Where do we get the six eight-inch rounds on the Albatross? After the battle, the Germans sent their commission to the destroyed mine layer in order to assess the extent of its damage. This commission worked for a couple of days, and now it just counted 6 hits with eight-inch and 20 - six-inch hits on a German ship. It can be assumed that G. Rollmann was the first to cite them in the historical literature, the rest of the authors, subsequently, copied these data.
But as you know, according to the results of the survey, it was concluded that it was advisable to restore the Albatross. Naturally, the Swedes were engaged in this, because the ship was considered interned. And now, according to Swedish data, "Albatross" received not six hits by 203-mm shells, but twice as many, that is, twelve. It is possible that in fact there were fewer of them, that the Swedes were mistaken in something, yet they did not have much experience in determining damage, but on the other hand, they did not have much more time to figure out the hits to the Albatross. The fact is that the true number of eight-inch shells hit by the Albatross is between six and twelve.
Accordingly, the firing accuracy of Russian cruisers at the Albatross minelayer is in the range of 4, 29% and up to 9, 23%, and this, generally speaking, is not that "inept" but a very good result. Especially considering the conditions under which the Russian artillerymen achieved these hits.
Probably, the previous articles turned out to be too detailed and difficult to understand, so here is a short "timeline" of that battle:
07.30 Opponents noticed smoke, I. Karf immediately turned to the west, towards neutral Swedish waters;
07.35 The Russian flagship identified the enemy as a light cruiser Albatross, an Undine-class cruiser and three destroyers. "Admiral Makarov" turned back, leading the enemy to the course angle of 40 degrees. and went across to him;
07.37-07.38 (tentatively) "Admiral Makarov" opened fire on "Augsburg";
07.40-07.41 (tentatively) "Bayan" opened fire on "Augsburg";
07.45 Bogatyr and Oleg opened fire on Albatross;
07.50 (tentatively) Three German destroyers begin a torpedo attack;
07.55 (tentatively) Commodore I. Karf, seeing that he is sufficiently detached from the Russian cruisers, lies across their course in order to break past them to the southwest;
07.57-07.59 - On the destroyers they see that their flagship is retreating, and they "turn off" the attack - they put a smokescreen that hides the Albatross and Augsburg and begin to retreat after the Augsburg. From that moment on, shooting at the Albatross ceases, at Augsburg, it is resumed sporadically, during the period when the cruiser becomes visible;
08.00 Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev orders the 2nd semi-brigade of cruisers ("Bogatyr" and "Oleg") to act independently. As a result, the armored cruisers of the Russian detachment ("Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan") begin to bypass the "smoky cloud" delivered by the destroyers from the south, and the armored cruisers from the east;
08.08-08.09 (tentatively) "Admiral Makarov" bypasses the smoke screen, sees the "Albatross" and opens fire on it;
08.10 "Bogatyr" and "Oleg", bypassing the smoke screen, renewed fire on the "Albatross";
08.20 Several events occur at once. The Russians get their first hit on the Albatross. At this time, "Augsburg" seemed to resume firing at the "Admiral Makarov", but either it was not noticed on the Russian ships at all, or they did not consider it necessary to mention it. "Bayan" opens fire on "Albatross" - until that time its cannons were silent, since three Russian cruisers were already shooting at one German ship, and "Augsburg", it seems, was no longer visible from "Bayan";
08.30 Russian sailors observe severe destruction on the Albatross - damage to superstructures, downed foremast, fire. Bayan stops firing;
08.33 Augsburg ceases fire;
08.35 Contact with "Augsburg" and destroyers is completely lost. "Admiral Makarov" turns to the north, bringing the "Albatross" to the port side, while M. K. Bakhirev orders Bayan to “cut off the enemy from the south”;
08.45 A fire-engulfed Albatross describes two complete circulations at the very border of Swedish waters. According to the Russian sailors, the Albatross lowered the flag, according to the categorical assertion of the Germans, the Albatross did not lower the flag. According to another version of Russian eyewitnesses, the Albatross lowered the flag later, after it had thrown itself onto the rocks;
09.07 - The shelling of the Albatross is stopped. It should be noted that at 09.07, “Oleg” stopped firing at the Albatross, but the time when the “Admiral Makarov” and “Bogatyr” stopped firing is, unfortunately, unknown. The only thing that can be said for sure is that it happened between 08.30 (when the Bayan ceased fire) and 09.07;
09.12 "Albatross" threw itself on the rocks.
At the beginning of the battle, the armored Russian cruisers did not fire at the Albatross at all, only the Bogatyr and Oleg fired at the German minelayer. Having started firing at 07.45, they ceased fire at about 0800, because the German destroyers had set up a smoke screen, thus, the firing was carried out even for less than 15 minutes.
Of course, if we recall the fire of the Russian squadron in Tsushima, which from a slightly shorter distance (37-40 kbt) during the first 15 minutes of the battle with the forces of five head battleships and, perhaps, "Navarina" "threw" 5 twelve-inch and 14 six-inch rounds into "Mikasu", and even 6 hits in other ships (and in total, it turns out, 24 hits) and compare the results with the shooting of "Oleg" and "Bogatyr", it turns out somehow awkward. But you need to understand that in the battle near Gotland, Russian ships fired at the limit of visibility, the captain of the 2nd rank Svinin (flagship artilleryman of the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet) described them as follows:
“The shooting conditions were extremely difficult … often the fall (of our own projectiles - author's note) was not visible at all”.
In addition, the shooting of the Russian ships seemed to the Germans accurate enough to immediately begin to maneuver, going in a zigzag, in order to constantly knock down the aiming of the Russian artillerymen. Of course, the Japanese did nothing of the kind. It is possible that the supply of oil to the Augsburg nozzles helped in some way: as we know, in the battle of the Falklands, the mixed heating of the boilers of the British battle cruisers (when oil was sprayed on the burning coal) led to the formation of thick smoke, interfering with shooting, so that subsequently the commanders preferred to use pure coal heating. Accordingly, it cannot be ruled out that the smoke of the Augsburg further worsened the already disgusting visibility for some time.
Visibility is a very important factor that must be taken into account when comparing shooting accuracy in a given battle. Let's remember the Battle of Jutland - Hipper's battlecruisers showed excellent results at distances of 65-80 kbt. at the beginning of the battle. But then, closer to the first clash of the line fleets, "Luttsov" and "Derflinger" for some time could not oppose anything to the 3rd squadron of British battle cruisers, which shot them from a distance of 40-50 cables. Well, the German artillerymen suddenly lost their qualifications? Not at all - they simply did not see the enemy. Looking ahead, we note that a little later, the German armored cruiser Roon fought with the cruiser Bayan in approximately the same conditions as the Russian cruisers with the Augsburg and Albatross. In this episode of the battle near Gotland "Bayan" was located in the north-west of the "Roon", that is, where the German ships were relative to the cruisers M. K. Bakhirev. At the same time, "Bayan" also kept at the limit of visibility and went in a zigzag, in order to knock down the tip of the German artillerymen. And now, being in similar conditions, in half an hour of the battle "Roon" achieved a single hit. One can, of course, assume that the Roon's gunners were inept, but, generally speaking, the Germans always trained their gunners well, so it would be much more logical to assume that the poor visibility and maneuvers of the Russian cruiser were to blame for its poor shooting. Against this background, the fact that the Russian ships did not hit the Albatross and Augsburg during the first 15 minutes of the battle (and even less) can no longer be surprising.
Then, at 08.00, the setting of the smokescreen, the Albatross disappeared from view, and the shooting at it stopped, and at the Augsburg, according to the available data, was carried out sporadically, that is, only when the German cruiser appeared from behind the smoke. And only at 08.10 am the cruisers resume fire on the Albatross … but how?
The battle began at a distance of about 44 kbt, and then the distance decreased slightly, because M. K. Bakhirev led his ships across the path of the Germans. But from 08.00 to 08.10 the distance between the Albatross and the Bogatyr with the Oleg increased again, because after the installation of the smoke screen, the Albatross fled to the west, and the 1st semi-brigade of Russian cruisers was forced to turn north, bypassing the smoke … Thus, at 08.10 the Albatross was again at the limit of visibility from the Russian armored cruisers, and only the Admiral Makarov could observe and correct the fire of its artillery at the Albatross more or less well.
And the results were not long in coming - after 10 minutes the first hit follows, and then within 25 minutes the German ship is beaten - it is not known how many shells hit it in this period, but the damage was extremely great (both Russian and German sources admit this) - the ship loses its mast, burns, enters uncontrollable circulation … That is, in 35 minutes of battle, the Russian cruisers achieved a noticeably better result than Roon did. Unfortunately, we do not know when the Admiral Makarov and Bogatyr ceased fire in order to draw conclusions about the time of the fire impact on the Albatross, but it is likely that they ceased fire somewhere between 08.45 and 09.00, that is when the Albatross entered Swedish territorial waters. In principle, these cruisers could stop firing at 08.45, when they saw that the flag was lowered on the Albatross - no doubt, we will never know whether the flag was lowered on the German cruiser or not, but what is important here is not what happened on in fact, but what seemed to the Russian sailors.
Therefore, speaking of the "one and a half hour" shooting of the Albatross, it would be nice to note that the decisive damage to the ship was inflicted within 35 minutes (from 08.10 to 08.45) by three Russian cruisers (Bayan joined them for only 10 minutes) …
What was the fighting distance? It is most likely that at the moment when the Admiral Makarov transferred fire to the Albatross, the distance between them was about 40 cables, perhaps a little more, and even more to the Bogatyr and Oleg, and this with a visibility of 5 miles. It should be noted, however, that it improved “on the way” to Gotland. At the same time, the Russian cruisers did not approach the Albatross closer than 3 miles: this follows from the report of the captain of the 2nd rank, Prince M. B. Cherkasov, who, in response to a request from the Chief of the Naval General Staff A. I. Rusina:
"The cruisers did not approach the Albatross closer than three miles during the entire battle, for fear of mine shots."
On our own, we add that to reduce the distance to 30 kbt. Russian cruisers could only by the end of the battle, because, generally speaking, the Albatross was practically not inferior to them in speed. And by this time, further rapprochement no longer made much sense - the Augsburg was well observed and was badly damaged.
In this episode of the battle, Russian cruisers fired on German destroyers. But it should be understood that this shelling was carried out from 75-mm guns, moreover, when larger calibers were fired at Augsburg. In other words, the fire control system at that moment "worked" on the German light cruiser, and the anti-mine artillery shot "by eye" - of course, the effectiveness of such fire could not be high.
If the Albatross was hit by 12 or so eight-inch rounds, then why was the small (full displacement of 2,506 tons) German minelayer not blown to shreds? Alas, for the umpteenth time, Russian shells are to blame for this. The fact is that the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese war used lightweight shells weighing 87, 8 kg and post-war cruisers of the Admiral Makarov type, built in the image and likeness of the Port Arthur Bayan, also had outdated 203-mm / 45 guns, and feeders designed for lightweight projectiles. And while the dodreadnought battleships of the types "Andrew the First-Called" and "John Chrysostom", as well as the armored cruiser "Rurik", were armed with very powerful 203-mm / 50 guns, firing 112, 2 kg high-explosive shells carrying 14, 1 kg of trinitrotoluene, "Bayans" had to be content with 87, 8 kg of shells with 9, 3 kg of explosives. If we recall that, for example, British six-inch high-explosive shells carried 6 kg of explosives, then the conclusion suggests itself - 203-mm shells of "Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan" in their combat power occupied an intermediate position between six-inch and "normal" eight-inch shells. Hence, in fact, the "intermediate" result of their fire impact on the "Albatross".
Why did the author of this article "minute by minute" analyze the maneuvering of the ships of I. Karf and M. K. Bakhirev before the resumption of fire on the Albatross (approximately 08.10), but did not write anything about their further movement? The fact is that in the period 08.10 - 08.45 there were no tactical refinements - the Albatross was running at full speed towards Gotland, and the Russian cruisers were catching up with it at full speed. But the maneuvering of ships in the last phase of the battle (from about 08.45) is completely beyond reconstruction. According to the German scheme, ed. G. Rollmann, the Russian cruisers (and all four) brazenly invaded after the Augsburg into the Swedish territorial waters and finished it off there. According to the Russian maneuvering scheme, they simply cut off all exits from the Swedish tervod (Bayan - from the south, "Admiral Makarov" - from the east, and "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" - from the north) to Augsburg and shot him without disturbing sovereignty of Sweden - unless the shells flew.
Who is right? Without a doubt, the Germans would have benefited from the idea that the Russians invaded Swedish territorial waters, even if this actually did not happen. And vice versa - it made sense for the Russians to deny in every possible way from the violation of Swedish sovereignty, if there actually was a place to be. This is not a question of honesty of reports, it is a question of politics, and in it, as you know, all means are good. Nevertheless, the Russian version of events seems to be more reliable, and here's why. If the Russian ships really entered the terrorists, it would not have been difficult for them to get close to the Albatross that had thrown itself on the rocks and to examine it in all its details. But in this case, the subsequent dispatch of a submarine to the German minesag "for clarification" made no sense - however, the submarine was sent, and - according to the wishes of M. K. Bakhirev. In his report, the Russian commander indicates:
“After making sure that the Albatross was badly hit and washed ashore, I reported with a telegram:“After the battle, having received damage, the enemy cruiser threw itself ashore on the skeletal side of Fr. Gotland, behind the Estergarn lighthouse. I consider it useful to send the submarine to the site of the accident."
And why, in fact, the Russians were not to violate the sovereignty of Sweden, not to break into its territorial waters and completely destroy the Albatross? The fact that M. K. Bakhirev did not do this, many researchers blame him. Usually, they refer to the Germans, who respected the territorial law of other countries only when it was beneficial to them. A. G. Patients:
“Talk about some kind of neutrality is nothing more than a fig leaf. Neutrality is respected when it is beneficial. Remember the history of the destruction of "Dresden". The Germans spat on Chilean neutrality until the British squadron arrived. Here Ludeke has already become a champion of the purity of international laws. But Luce was absolutely right, who said: "My business is to destroy the enemy, and let the diplomats understand the intricacies of the laws." Bakhirev did not dare to say so, again demonstrating the cowardice and lack of will of the top commanding staff of the Russian fleet."
But it should be understood that this issue is much deeper than it might seem at first glance, and in no way can be considered exclusively within the framework of "decisiveness" or "lack of will". Let us cite a fragment of the monograph by D. Yu. Kozlov, dedicated to the Memel operation, dating back to the beginning of the First World War:
“The higher command never tired of reminding the Baltic command that its main task was to prevent the breakthrough of superior German naval forces into the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland … … and demanded to protect the fleet from the slightest risk and keep it for a decisive battle at the central mine and artillery position. However, such close attention of the rate was initiated by the commander of the Baltic Fleet von Essen himself, who in the first days of the war, on his own initiative, almost provoked a war with neutral Sweden. The Supreme Commander, who managed to stop Nikolai Ottovich's escapade literally at the last moment, considered the admiral's actions "a defiant act and an undeserved insult to the Swedes, who are loyal to Russia."
Unfortunately, the author of this article did not figure out what kind of "escapade" Nikolai Ottovich meant, but the fact is that after such an "afront" the sailors could well have received an order in an official or unofficial order: "Sweden is not neutral in any way violate!". And if they received such an instruction, then, of course, they were obliged to carry it out. At the same time, German or English sailors could have completely different orders, or no orders at all, which untied their hands. In other words, today we do not have complete information about this issue, we do not know what instructions M. K. Bakhirev and, accordingly, we cannot make judgments on this score.
The only thing we can say for sure is that the "Gotland incident" did not entail serious political consequences - Russian diplomats worked well and the Swedish Crown was completely satisfied with the Russian explanations. A. K. Weiss:
“… And even then we were so carried away by shooting that we did not notice that the Albatross entered the area of Swedish waters, and several of our shells almost hit the island of Gotland. Subsequently, a whole correspondence with the Swedish government came out of this, a diplomatic break almost occurred. But, in the end, everything was somehow settled: they dragged fog and all sorts of accidents inevitable at sea. In a word, it turned out that almost Sweden itself was to blame for all this, since their island of Gotland at the moment not only stood out of place, but in addition climbed into our shots."
So, completing the description of the first episode of the battle at Gotland, we come to the conclusion that there is absolutely nothing to reproach the Russian commander with. To say that M. K. Bakhirev "did not decisively approach the German ships, but" started a difficult maneuvering ", it is impossible, because his ships all the time went either across the course of the enemy minelayer, or caught up with him on a parallel course (with the exception of bypassing the smoke by the 2nd half-brigade of cruisers). That is, M. K. Bakhirev did everything to get close to the enemy as quickly as possible, and this was prevented by the fact that the Germans outnumbered his ships in speed and even the Albatross, developing up to 20 knots, was practically not inferior in this to the Russian cruisers. Formally, of course, the Bogatyr-class cruisers could go 23 knots, but in practice, Oleg did not develop that much. The Russian artillerymen demonstrated excellent possession of the materiel, giving a good percentage of hits “on the mountain”. M. K. Bakhirev made few decisions in this episode of the battle, but none of them can be considered erroneous. The fact that he did not order to focus fire on the attacking enemy destroyers, but continued to pursue the Augsburg, concentrating the fire of the 203-mm and 152-mm guns on it, should be considered not only true, but also a bold act of the commander. The chances of destroying the Augsburg from M. K. There was practically no Bakhirev, unless by an accidental and very successful hit to knock him down: the Russian commander tried to realize this opportunity - it was not his fault that a miracle did not happen.
In general, it can be stated that neither the 1st brigade of cruisers, nor its admiral deserved any reproach for their actions. However, now the Russian ships were waiting for a meeting with the armored cruiser Roon.
