So, at a meeting with the commander-in-chief V. A. Kanin, after a five-hour debate, on June 17, 1915, a decision was made in principle to raid Memel. Now it was necessary to prepare an operation plan and do it very quickly, because, according to intelligence, the imperial review in Kiel was to take place the next day, that is, June 18, after which the German warships would return to their posts. In order to have time to carry out the operation, the ships had to go to sea on the night of June 17-18, and it was necessary to prepare for the exit. All this together meant that the headquarters of the Imperial Baltic Fleet had literally a few hours to prepare the operation plan.
Oddly enough, during this so short time, a very original plan of a combat operation was born, which provided for the use of heterogeneous forces in a large area. The plan provided for the formation of three detachments of ships:
1) shock group;
2) covering forces;
3) a group of demonstration actions.
The strike group consisted of a special detachment, which included:
1) armored cruiser "Rurik";
2) armored cruisers "Oleg" and "Bogatyr";
3) destroyer Novik;
4) 6th destroyer division, including Kazanets, Ukraine, Voyskovoi, Terrible, Guarding, Zabaikalets, Turkmenets-Stavropolsky.
Without a doubt, everyone who reads this article perfectly remembers the performance characteristics of cruisers and Novik, as for the 6th division, it was made up of "post-Tsushima" destroyers of the "Ukraine" class, which had 730 tons of normal displacement, 25 knots of speed and armament, consisting of two 102-mm cannons, one 37-mm, four machine guns and two single-tube 450-mm torpedo tubes.
Rear-admiral Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev was assigned to lead the special task force, who in 1914 took command of the 1st cruiser brigade, and before that was the commander of the armored cruiser Rurik.
Covering forces included:
1) battleships "Slava" and "Tsesarevich";
2) armored cruisers Bayan and Admiral Makarov;
3) submarines "Cayman", "Dragon", "Crocodile", "Mackerel", "Okun" and E-9.
The first three boats were ships of the same type "Cayman", which had 409/480 tons of surface / submarine displacement, surface and electric gasoline engines for underwater navigation on which the boats developed, respectively, 9 and 5 knots. The boats were armed with one 47-mm and one 37-mm cannon, as well as four 450-mm torpedo tubes. These ships were the brainchild of the "gloomy American genius" engineer S. Lack, who envisioned many unique features in his project, such as wooden superstructures, a diving chamber and retractable wheels (!) For movement along the bottom, although in the end the latter were abandoned. Unfortunately, submarines of the "Cayman" type were also distinguished by an almost complete lack of combat capability, which made their use in the First World War extremely difficult. As for the "Mackerel" and "Perch", they were small (151/181 tons) and very outdated ships that had managed to take part in the Russian-Japanese war. In fact, of all six submarines that were part of the Covering Forces, only the magnificent British E-9, which had 672/820 tons, was of combat value.underwater / surface displacement, speed 16/10 knots, and torpedo armament, including 2 bow, 2 traverse and one stern 450-mm torpedo tubes.
The group of demonstrative actions included the 7th destroyer division, which included "Combat", "Enduring", "Stormy", "Attentive", "Mechanical engineer Zverev" and "Mechanical engineer Dmitriev". Normal displacement 450 tons, speed 27 knots, 2 75-mm guns, 6 machine guns and three single-tube 450-mm torpedo tubes. These ships would have looked good in the Port Arthur squadron, for which they were built, but they were late for the Russo-Japanese war. After her, only two out of ten destroyers built according to this project went to the Far East, and the remaining eight were included in the Baltic Fleet.
The general concept of the operation was as follows. The ships of the special purpose detachment (strike group) were to leave their bases and concentrate at 05.00 at the Vinkov bank. Then, moving through deep water between the coast and the eastern coast of the island of Gotland, they should have approached Memel in the early morning of June 19, made a shelling, planned in the form of a short fire raid, and then left for the Abo-Aland skerry position.
The surface ships of the covering forces remained at the Abo-Aland skerry position in full readiness to go to sea at the request of the commander of the special detachment. Covering submarines were to deploy in the area of Libau and Steinorth lighthouse and patrol there on 18 and 19 June. The meaning of this action, most likely, was that if there were any large German ships in Libau, they could advance by the shortest route along the coast to the Gulf of Finland in order to try to intercept a special purpose detachment at its throat. In this case, they would just have swooped down on the positions of the Russian submarines.
But the most interesting thing in the original version of the plan is the presence of a group of demonstration actions, which consisted of a battalion of old destroyers and was supposed to go to the Libava area by 10.00 on June 19. Thus, it was assumed that first there would be a fire raid on Memel, and almost immediately the Germans would see Russian ships at Libava. All this could mislead the enemy and make him assume that the shelling of Memel is just an attempt to distract attention, and the main operation will be carried out at Libava, and send reinforcements specifically to Libava, and not to intercept the forces retreating after the shelling of Memel.
Overall, the original plan had obvious positives with two negative ones. Firstly, the floated 1st brigade of cruisers (Bayan, Admiral Makarov, Bogatyr and Oleg) was split into semi-brigades between the two detachments, and this was not good. And secondly, the main danger for the Russian ships did not come from Libava, but from the area of the Vistula mouth, Danzig-Neufarwasser, where enemy large ships could be located, and where they actually ended up, so that the submarines should have been deployed there.
Despite the fact that the fleet headquarters had only a few hours to draw up the plan of the operation (after all, it was necessary to write orders, transmit them with the special commanders of the ships, and those need time to prepare for the exit, etc.), the quickly drawn up plan immediately began be subject to various innovations. First, common sense still prevailed, and "Bayan" with "Admiral Makarov" was removed from the covering forces and transferred to the special purpose detachment M. K. Bakhirev. Thus, in the upcoming operation, the amalgamated unit, which was the 1st brigade of cruisers, acted together. I must say that otherwise, the Gotland battle could not have taken place at all, but we will talk about this later.
Secondly, the shelling of Memel was postponed from the morning of June 19 to the evening of June 18, so that it would be possible to retreat into the night when the Germans had practically no chance of intercepting the special forces. Accordingly, there was no need for demonstration actions at Libava, which freed up the 7th destroyer division, but there was no point in sending them with a special purpose detachment, due to the extremely low combat qualities of these already outdated destroyers. Therefore, it was decided to use them to ensure the deployment of combat ships participating in the operation - they accompanied the cruisers of the 1st brigade and Rurik to the muster point at the Vinkov bank and, if necessary, accompany the covering forces in the person of the battleships Tsesarevich and Slava in if they go out to sea.
But the plan for the deployment of submarines had as many as three iterations - we have already indicated the first version above, but then, sensibly assessing the technical condition of the boats, it was decided to use two other submarines, "Akula" and "Lamprey", sending them to the northern and southern the extremities of Öland Island, and the British E-9 to Libau. But alas, "Shark" with "Lamprey" were also not ready for the campaign, so the final disposition of the submarines was determined as follows:
1) "Cayman", "Dragon", "Crocodile" deployed at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland;
2) "Mackerel" and "Perch" were sent to Luserort (he is marked on the map with a question mark, because the author of this article is not sure that he correctly determined his location);
3) British E-9 was sent to the mouth of the Vistula.
In other words, as sad as it may sound, Russian submarines patrolled where they could, and British ones where needed.
What else could be said about the Russian plan? Throughout the operation, the ships were instructed to maintain radio silence, using radio stations for transmission only if absolutely necessary. In a collision with enemy ships, on the contrary, it was required to "jam" their radio transmissions. And the order also contained very interesting instructions: if an enemy was discovered on the passage to Memel, and if at the same time "the detachment was in an advantageous position," the cruisers were ordered to engage in a decisive battle. Nevertheless, one should not forget about the main goal:
"If the object of the attack is negligible, or if in the course of the battle it turns out that the weakened enemy can be destroyed by part of our forces, then, leaving part of our ships for this purpose, the rest will invariably continue to carry out the planned operation."
In the end, the plan was drawn up and communicated to the direct executors. It's time to get down to business.
At one time, the German field marshal Helmut von Moltke uttered the catch phrase: "No plan survives a meeting with the enemy," although there is a suspicion that the same idea was expressed long before him by Sun Tzu. Alas, the Russian plan of the operation began to "pour in" long before the enemy appeared on the horizon.
June 17, 1915 "Slava", "Tsesarevich" and the 1st brigade of cruisers were in the Abo-Aland skerry position, "Rurik" - in Reval (Tallinn), and "Novik" and the 6th division of destroyers - in Moonsund. All of them, due to wartime, were in high readiness for the exit, they only needed to load a little bit of coal. On the cruisers of the 1st brigade, the loading was completed by 17.20 the same day and immediately moved to the Pipsher raid, where they were by 21.30. There they met with a part of the 7th destroyer battalion, and, accompanied by the "Combat", "Endurance" and "Stormy" cruisers, left the raid at 02.00 am on July 18 and moved to the rally point near the Vinkov bank. The other three destroyers of the 7th division were escorting the armored cruiser Rurik on its way to the Vinkov bank from Revel. The cruisers met without incident, after which the 7th division was released "to winter quarters."
But if the 1st brigade of cruisers and "Rurik" had no problems at the concentration stage, then the "Novik" and the 6th division of destroyers that left Moonsund got into a thick fog and were forced to anchor off the island of Worms, so to the Vinkov bank they came out more than three hours late. By this time, the cruisers of Rear Admiral M. K. Bakhirev had already left, but he ordered the destroyers to follow him to Daguerreau, where, due to the higher speed of the destroyers, the detachments would have to join. Alas, at 06.00 am on June 18 and M. K. Bakhirev found himself in a strip of fog and there was practically no chance that the destroyers would be able to join him. Then Mikhail Koronatovich, not wanting the relatively low-speed ships of the 6th division to wander further in the fog, canceled their participation in the operation and ordered them to return back. As for "Novik", according to the order of M. K. Bakhireva, had to give up attempts to find the cruiser of the 1st brigade and "Rurik", and go independently to Memel, guided by the general plan of the operation. But the commander of "Novik" M. A. Behrens did a simpler thing and asked by radio for the coordinates, course and speed of the cruisers of the special forces commander, and having received all this, he was able to join them.
So, the special purpose detachment "lost" the destroyer battalion, but the rest of the ships still managed to be brought together. Cruisers of the 1st brigade marched ahead in the wake column, followed by "Rurik", and the rear of the column was "Novik". However, the jokes of the fog were just beginning, because at about 18:00 on June 18, the Russian detachment landed in a strip of almost zero visibility. And now, after turning on the course, the ships of M. K. Bakhireva to Memel, "Rurik" and the next "Novik" were lost - despite the fact that the 1st brigade of cruisers turned on wakefires and threw special rattles into the water (guided by the sound of which it was possible to choose the correct course) to reunite with the "Novik" "And" Rurik "they did not succeed.
Here, a huge role was played by the fact that, unlike the ships of the 1st brigade, neither Rurik nor Novik were included in any brigade, division, or other division of the Baltic Fleet, but were included in it as separate units. To some extent, this was understandable, because both the Rurik and Novik were radically different in their characteristics from the rest of the ships of the Russian fleet of the same class. To include Novik in the coal destroyer division meant to severely curtail its capabilities, but there was also a downside to this. The fact is that on June 18 the cruisers of the 1st brigade also lost sight of each other, but, being floated, they were able to "find themselves" guided by the barely noticeable wake left by the ship in front. But the commanders of "Rurik" and "Novik", who did not have such experience, failed to connect with the 1st brigade.
The evening came on June 18, when the ships of the special purpose detachment, according to the order, were to fire at Memel. But M. K. Bakhirev, of course, could not do this - not only was he, do not understand where (the detachment was marching by reckoning from two o'clock in the morning) and there was nothing to be seen around, so he also lost almost half of his combat strength, “having lost "" Rurik "," Novik "and the 6th destroyer division on the way! But the main reason that prompted M. K. Bakhirev refused to fire, there was a terrible visibility, or rather, its complete absence.
However, at that moment, the Russian commander had not yet completely abandoned the idea of shelling Memel - he simply decided to postpone the raid until morning. At 19.00 on June 18, he turned 180 degrees and, instead of Memel, went to the Gotland Peninsula in order to determine the location of his detachment. As a result, the cruisers of the 1st brigade reached the southern tip of Gotland, where the fog was not as thick as to the east, and they were able to determine the Faludden lighthouse. Now M. K. Bakhirev, at least, knew the exact location of his cruisers. At 23.35 he turned around again and again went to Memel - but only in order to once again find himself in a strip of the strongest fog.
Meanwhile, the communications service of the Baltic Fleet continued to maintain its combat watch: this is how Captain 2nd Rank K. G. Love:
"Midnight. A new radio log page has started. Above, it clearly reads "Friday 19 June from midnight." The rest is empty, clean bluish lines of lines waiting to be written. There is nothing remarkable now. In the ears, there are insane long and short crackles, dashes, dots, evoking various emotions in the listeners on Kilconde. Tuning tone, transmission speed, sound strength - everything matters, everything is so familiar among the unfamiliar sounds of "strangers", that is, Swedish, radio stations. Since the enemy, the German are a kind of "friends".
Suddenly, all of a sudden, everyone bent over the table at once, as if on command. One began to write down the numbers on paper quickly, quickly, the other turned some round shiny black handles, the third moved some pointer up and down the scale.
- So, so, - Rengarten repeats in an undertone, - the darlings were in the rear. Thumbs up. We listened to your voice, and now we read what you write there. And, quickly going through the copied edition of the German code, our gallant radiotelegraph officer began to decipher Commodore Karf's radio report. Letters, syllables, phrases appeared on a sheet of paper.
- And now give me our code: we need to telegraph the chief of the first brigade of cruisers. It will interest him. Koronatovich will rub his hands."
The thing is that, simultaneously with the Russian light forces' raid on Memel, and in spite of the imperial review in Kiel, the Germans carried out “task VII” (under this designation it appeared in German documents), namely, laying a minefield in the area of the Bogscher lighthouse … For this on the evening of June 17, the minelayer Albatross left the mouth of the Vistula, accompanied by the armored cruiser Roon and five destroyers. On the morning of 18 June, Commodore Karf left Libau to join them in the light cruiser Augsburg, accompanied by the light cruiser Lubeck and a pair of destroyers. It must be said that the strongest fog prevented the Germans no less than the Russians, because these two detachments could not connect at the rendezvous point and went to the area of the operation (laying the minefield) separately. Interestingly, the cruiser M. K. Bakhireva and the German detachments dispersed at noon on June 18, about 10-12 miles apart, but, of course, they could not find the enemy.
So, the radio intelligence of the Russian fleet was able to find out about the imperial review in Kiel, as well as the fact that the bulk of Germany's warships in the Baltic had been recalled to Kiel for the period of the review. This was an unconditional success, which predetermined the conduct of the operation to shell Memel. Unfortunately, the communications service was unable to identify in advance the mining operation that the Kaiserlichmarine was carrying out just during the review in Kiel, and this should be regarded as a failure of our intelligence. However, then she managed to detect the negotiations of German ships at sea, promptly decipher them and thereby reveal the approximate composition of the German forces, as well as their location.
Interestingly, the Germans also discovered Russian negotiations, because, as we saw above, the special task force did not comply with the prescribed radio silence. But, not being able to decipher the Russian messages, Commodore Karf decided that his radio operators were hearing the talks of the Russian sentinels near the Gulf of Finland, which, of course, could not alert him. But Russian scouts literally "took the arm" of Rear Admiral M. K. Bakhirev and brought him straight to the enemy, which should be regarded as a brilliant success in the service of Nepenin and Rengarten.
As we said above, on the evening of June 18 at 23.35 the 1st brigade of cruisers again turned to Memel. And after a little over two hours, at 01.45 on June 19, two radiograms were received on the Admiral Makarov:
"06.19 Augsburg appointed a rendezvous for the likely light cruiser in square 377"
and
"9.45 place of the enemy cruiser, which was assigned a rendezvous, square 339".
Having received this information, Mikhail Koronatovich without regret abandoned attempts to go to Memel in a thick fog - he had an excellent "prize" in front of him, for the sake of which it was worth abandoning the main goal of the operation. However, M. K. Bakhirev did not immediately rush to intercept - until 03.00 am on June 19, he continued to search for "Rurik" and "Novik", and only making sure that he would not find the lost ships, turned his brigade of cruisers towards the Germans. Then another radiogram came from Rengarten:
"At 2.00" Augsburg "was in the fourth quarter of 357 squares, its course is 190 degrees, speed is 17 knots"
It was getting light. The thick fog that confused the Russian and German sailors on June 18 parted a little and the cruisers of the 1st brigade saw each other: "Bayan", "Oleg" and "Bogatyr" were three miles from "Admiral Makarov". Having restored the wake column, the ships of M. K. Bakhirev went to the course 303 at 06.15, and an hour later turned back to the course of 10 degrees, leading to the point where the "Augsburg" was supposed to be. Then Mikhail Koronatovich ordered to increase the speed to 19 knots and inform the brigade's cruisers with a semaphore:
“Prepare for battle. The enemy is expected right on the course."
The officers of "Admiral Makarov" were perplexed. “Nepenin and Rengarten inflicted on the Germans … You can trust our connection,” M. K. Bakhirev.
