So, in previous articles we examined the actions of Rear Admiral M. K. Bakhirev and the 1st brigade of cruisers in a battle with the detachment of I. Karf and "Roon". And what were the rest of the Russian ships doing at that time?
On the evening of June 18, when the detachment, being in a strip of heavy fog, tried to reach Memel, the Novik went into the wake behind the Rurik and at 23.00 lost sight of the cruiser in front. According to G. K. Count, “Rurik” was to blame for this:
“It was extremely difficult for“Novik”to hold on to“Rurik”, since he did not reckon with him at all and, changing courses and courses, did not even warn about it; so we all the time risked to come off. On the bridge, everyone was in a tense state and made incredible efforts to notice the change in the course of their matelote in time”.
Within an hour, the commander of the destroyer M. A. Behrens tried to locate the ships of the special purpose squad, but he did not succeed. Then he decided to return, and at 09.30 on June 19, anchored at Tserel. At 10.10 on Novik we received a radiogram, which was given by M. K. Bakhirev for "Rurik" indicating the course of the 1st brigade of cruisers (during the exchange of fire with "Roon") and "Novik" went to meet, but then, at about 12.00, received an order to return and turned to Kuivast. This was the end of Novik's participation in the operation.
As for "Rurik", it turned out more interesting with him. He was "lost" even earlier than "Novik" and could not find the cruiser of the 1st brigade, but he did not go "to winter quarters", remaining in the area of operation. This was, without a doubt, the right decision.
As we said earlier, M. K. Bakhirev, having lost "Rurik" and "Novik" in the fog, searched for them for some time, and then turned to Gotland in order to at least determine his place (for a long time the detachment walked along reckoning). Most likely "Rurik" did not do this, as a result of which by the beginning of the battle with "Augsbug" and "Albatross" it was southeast of the 1st brigade of cruisers. At 08.48, i.e. about 13 minutes after Admiral Makarov fired the first shot at Augsburg, Rurik received a radiogram from M. K. Bakhireva: "Engage in battle with the enemy, square 400".
The commander of "Rurik" A. M. Pyshnov immediately ordered to increase the speed to 20 knots, and led the cruiser to the area indicated to him, where he arrived at 09.45, but, of course, he did not find anyone in the "400 square", and the first episode of the battle had already ended by that time. Yet A. M. Pyshnov was able to draw correct conclusions about the location of the main forces of the special purpose detachment, assuming that "the brigade is driving the enemy to the north" and went after the ships of M. K. Bakhirev.
At 10.10 Rurik receives a new radiogram indicating the course of the 1st cruiser brigade (40 degrees). It did not contain any instructions for “Rurik”, therefore A. M. Pyshnov suggested that the enemy was to the east of the cruisers M. K. Bakhirev (which was absolutely correct - "Roon" was catching up with the Russian cruisers from the southeast) and set off on a course of 20 degrees in order to find himself between the enemy ships and the coast of Courland, that is, take the enemy in two fires, cutting off his retreat. Then, at 10.20 am, a radiogram-order follows: "Engage in battle with the cruiser Roon in square 408." A. M. Pyshnov, having ordered to send a radiogram to "Admiral Makarov" ("I am coming to you"), ordered to turn 8 points to the left and led the "Rurik" directly to the center of square 408.
As we said earlier, at about 10.22-10.25 (the time in Russian and German sources differs) Roon left the battle with Admiral Makarov, turning south. But already at 10.30, the Lubeck, following along with the Roon, saw smoke in the east and turned "to find out." It was at this very moment that Roon and Augsburg finally discovered each other. The fact is that Commodore I. Karf, having heard the shooting at 10.00, went north, and now he met with the detachment of "Roona" that had withdrawn from the battle. Both "Roon" and "Augsburg" turned to "Rurik", while the destroyers went with the "Augsburg", lining up at the side of the light cruiser, opposite to the enemy.
At the same time, literally a few minutes after its turn, Lubeck examined a single silhouette, but it was still impossible to understand what kind of ship was in front of it. "Lubeck" gave an identification signal with a searchlight - "Rurik" answered him (of course - incorrectly). And here "Lubeck" should have retreated, but he, misled by the thin masts of the ship, believed that he saw "Novik" in front of him, and the German light cruiser could easily cope with it, so "Lubeck" continued to go forward. And only at 10.45 on the German cruiser, finally, they sorted out who they were dealing with, and lay down on the return course.
As for Rurik, the situation looked like this from him. At about 10.28, smoke was found on the cruiser to the right of its course, and after a short time, three silhouettes were seen approaching the ship, one of which showed something with a searchlight. Apparently, A. M. Pyshnov immediately ordered an answer with gibberish. At 10.35 a combat alert was sounded on the Rurik, at 10.44 the ship's control was transferred to the conning tower, and at 10.45 Rurik fired a sighting salvo at Lubeck from the bow 254-mm turret, which was soon joined by the bow 203-mm turrets. and a few minutes later the 120-mm cannons came into play. The distance at the moment of opening fire, according to domestic data, was 66 cables, on Lubeck it was believed that the distance at the time of opening fire was 60, 2-65, 6 cables. The German cruiser immediately zigzagged, knocking down the sight of the Rurik's gunners and opened intense fire from its cannons. The gunners of the Lubeck demonstrated excellent training - one of the first volleys fell right under the nose of the Rurik, flooding with water and temporarily incapacitating its open rangefinders, and almost immediately a 105-mm projectile hit the forecastle deck, pierced it and exploded into laundry. In fact, "Lubeck" was able to aim literally some minutes after the opening of fire, because the first hit "Rurik" received even before he transferred fire to the "Roon".
At the same time, the Rurik's volleys were not accurate, giving some undershoots, and there weren't many of them - for example, the nasal 254-mm turret managed to fire two volleys, after which at 10.50 it was possible to identify the second silhouette of three - it turned out to be the Roon … A. M. Pyshnov immediately ordered a turn, leading the enemy to a course angle of 60 degrees, in order to fight with the whole side, and concentrated fire on the Roon. The German armored cruiser responded. At this time, "Augsburg" and "Roon" were still moving towards a rapprochement with "Rurik", and this continued until 11.00 the distance between them was reduced from 82 to 76 kbt. By this time, Lubeck had retreated far enough from the Russian cruiser, so that a searchlight (obviously from Augsburg, although the sources do not contain direct indications of this) were sent to it an order to leave for Estergarn, so Lubeck went to the coast of Gotland and further, along it, to the base. Further rapprochement with the powerful Russian ship was clearly not in the interests of the Germans, so Augsburg and Roon took a course parallel to Rurik. From 11.00 to about 11.17 the exchange of fire continued without any maneuvers, but then Roon and Augsburg turned sharply away from Rurik and went south. Due to the great distances, this maneuver was not immediately noticed on the Rurik, but as soon as it became clear that the Germans were retreating, A. M. Pyshnov immediately ordered to turn directly on the enemy and at 11.20 "Rurik" followed "Roon".
However, it was at this moment in the conning tower received a report from the cruiser's senior officer about the submarine's periscope spotted. In accordance with the current instructions, A. M. Pyshnov immediately ordered a turn to the left in order to turn towards the submarine astern. From the board of "Rurik" they even observed the trail of a torpedo that passed behind the cruiser - in fact, the Germans did not have any submarine in that area. However, as a result of the turn, the courses of the Russian and German ships diverged under 90 degrees: "Rurik" went practically to the east, while "Roon" and "Augsburg" with torpedo boats - to the south. The Germans claim that the fire had stopped even before the Rurik's turn, while according to their data, at the time of the ceasefire, 87.5 cables separated Rurik from Roona.
And then came, perhaps, the most interesting moment of this episode. A. M. Petrov in his book "Two Fights" writes:
“While dodging Ost from the attack of the boat, the cruiser lost sight of the enemy, and then lay down on the N to proceed to the Gulf of Finland”.
That is, it turns out that the cruiser, turning away from the submarine, subsequently did not make any maneuver to get closer to the enemy and left the battlefield not salty. Without a doubt, such an act characterizes the commander of the "Rurik" far from the best. But if we open the work of S. E. Vinogradov and A. D. Fedechkin “Rurik is the flagship of the Baltic Fleet”, then we read a different description of this episode:
“Dodging a possible attack,“Rurik”temporarily ceased fire, which was immediately taken advantage of by the enemy, hiding in a veil of fog. The unsuccessful pursuit of him continued until almost noon, when the order of Rear Admiral MK Bakhirev was received on the radio to return to the base and join the detachment, after which Rurik turned to the north.
In other words, it turns out that A. M. Pyshnov, having made an evasion maneuver, then turned around and rushed in pursuit, and left the battle later, having received a direct order from M. K. Bakhirev. Who is right after all?
To do this, let's try to determine when "Rurik" turned north. V. Yu. Gribovsky writes about it this way:
“Dodging,“Rurik”turned sharply to the left and stopped firing. The alarm turned out to be false, but allowed the enemy to withdraw from the battle. At 10 hours 40 minutes on the hazy horizon, only clouds of smoke from the German cruisers were visible. The Rurik commander turned north."
Other researchers, such as D. Yu. Kozlov. And here is how the German historian G. Rollmann describes this episode:
"Rurik, it seemed, turned, then followed for a while outside the range of fire, and at 10.45, finally, completely disappeared from sight."
In other words, in the opinion of the Germans, there was still a chase, since the Rurik was following, but the Russian cruiser did not get close to the range of fire and eventually turned away and left the battle.
Let's make a simple calculation. We know that 20 minutes elapsed after the Rurik turned away from the non-existent submarine (11.20) and before it turned north (11.40). At the moment of turning the ships went south (Germans) and east (Russians) at an angle of almost 90 degrees. It is also known that "Rurik", having entered the battle at 20 knots, did not slow down during the chase. The Germans developed no less speed, as after a rapprochement of 76 kbt. they managed to break the distance up to 87.5 kbt.
So, let's imagine a giant triangle in which the Russian and German cruisers move along its legs, and the distance between them is the hypotenuse. If we assume that from 11.20 to 11.40 "Rurik" did not catch up with the German squadron, but left it to the east, then both legs during this time "lengthened" by 6 miles each (this is how much the ships of 20 knots will pass in 20 minutes) … And this means that the distance between "Rurik" and "Roon" by 11.40 should have been no less than 171 cables. Of course, visibility had improved a lot by 11.40, but not so much. And taking into account the fact that the Germans lost sight of the Rurik at 11.45, the distance between the opponents at the moment of loss of visibility should have been absolutely incredible 204 cables!
These are, of course, impossible figures, and therefore we state that after performing a maneuver of evading submarines, A. M. Pyshnov turned his ship back on its previous course and went to catch up with Roon and its detachment. Why didn't you catch up? Quite difficult to say. Theoretically, the "Rurik" should have had such an opportunity, because the ship had to develop its 21-knot speed from ¾ boilers, respectively, when all the boilers were put into operation, the cruiser speed should have been even higher. But on the other hand, this is a theory, and the real maximum speed of "Rurik" in 1915, unfortunately, is unknown to the author. At the same time, the Roon was the slowest ship of the German detachment, but it also showed 21, 143 knots during tests. That is, we absolutely cannot rule out that the speed of Roon and Rurik in 1915 turned out to be comparable. Perhaps the "Rurik" was a little faster, but it broke the distance strongly, performing a maneuver of evasion from the submarine. When the German ships went south, and the Rurik - to the east, the distance between them increased by about 4.7 cables per minute. That is, even if we assume that "Rurik" went east for only 3-4 minutes, and then turned to the opposite course, then the distance between the enemies should have been 101-106 cables. That is, even if the "Rurik" had a slight superiority in speed, it took time (and significant!) To get close to the Germans at a distance sufficient to resume the battle. Let us recall that the Rurik ceased fire on the Roon immediately after it turned away from the submarine. Yes, "Rurik", of course, went on a diverging course, but this could not prevent him from continuing to shoot at "Roon"! However, he stopped, which means that the distance was too great for aimed fire. Let us recall that at 11.50 on "Rurik" they were able to identify "Roon" only when he was at 82 kbt. from the Russian cruiser.
Therefore, assuming that the maximum visibility for actual artillery fire at that moment was about 90 cables, and upon completion of the submarine evasion maneuver, the distance between Roon and Rurik was 101-106 kbt., We come to the conclusion that even if the "Rurik" had surpassed the German detachment in speed by a whole knot, then even then it would take from an hour to an hour and a half just to resume the battle! But it is far from the fact that "Rurik" possessed such superiority.
It is not entirely clear what kind of radiogram M. K. Bakhirev at Rurik. Some sources claim that it was a direct order from A. M. Pyshnov to leave the battle and join the 1st brigade, but the text of the radiogram itself is not given. Other sources mention the radiogram "Fear the enemy approach from the south", which was given by "Admiral Makarov" as soon as he heard the sounds of battle. As a matter of fact, the presence of this radiotelegram does not refute or confirm the existence of an order to withdraw from the battle. But even if there was no direct order - what can we reproach the commander of "Rurik" A. M. Pyshnova?
As soon as he discovered the enemy (moreover, outnumbering him) and even before he could determine the composition of the opposing detachment A. M. Pyshnov, nevertheless, is moving towards rapprochement. As soon as the main enemy - "Roon" - was determined, "Rurik" leads him to a course angle of 60 in order to be able to fight with the whole side, while the Germans themselves were going to meet him. When "Lubeck" was far enough away from "Rurik", the Germans took a parallel course, and A. M. Pyshnov did not interfere with this, but as soon as he noticed that the Germans were trying to get out of the battle, he immediately turned and went straight for them. Having found the periscope, he performed an evasive maneuver, and then continued in pursuit of the retreating enemy. None of these actions of the commander of the Russian ship deserves the slightest reproach - he fought, and in a very aggressive manner.
However, soon after the resumption of the persecution, it became clear that:
1. It will not be possible to resume the artillery battle in the shortest possible time;
2. German ships flee south;
3. M. K. Bakhirev at the very beginning of the battle warned that one should beware of the approach of enemy forces from the south.
So by 11.40 “Rurik” had been walking for about an hour exactly where (according to MK Bakhirev) the enemy forces could have approached. Further pursuit of "Roon" in such conditions simply made no sense - we said that in order to resume the battle, and provided that "Rurik" was faster by one node of "Roon" (which is far from a fact) A. M. It took Pyshnov an hour or an hour and a half just to resume the battle, but in order to get close to a distance that would cause decisive damage to Roon, in this case it took not an hour, but hours. Given the threat of the appearance of enemy forces, such a pursuit completely lost its meaning, and "Rurik" turned north.
I must say that M. K. Bakhirev, did the same. When shots were heard on the "Admiral Makarov" and they realized that "Rurik" had entered the battle, Mikhail Koronatovich deployed his brigade and led it south. However, soon his cruisers lay on the opposite course. Why?
On the one hand, having no advantage in speed over "Roon" to catch up with him after the latter disappeared from sight was completely pointless. But the Russian commander could not know the circumstances of the beginning of the battle between Roona and Rurik. It was possible that the Roon, retreating to the south, would find itself between the Rurik (if it had moved from the south) and the 1st brigade of cruisers M. K. Bakhirev. With an enemy in the north and south, the Roon's detachment had no choice but to retreat to the coast of Gotland, that is, to the west, or Courland, that is, to the east. And in this case, the quick turn of the brigade of cruisers to the south, gave some hope to put the "Roon" in two fires and quickly destroy it.
The game was obviously worth the candle, and Mikhail Koronatovich turned his cruisers to the south. But time passed, and there were still no German ships, and this meant that the Roon nevertheless broke through past the Rurik to the south (which, in general, actually happened), and the "ticks" did not work. In this case, the pursuit of the Germans for the cruisers of the 1st brigade lost its meaning, and M. K. Bakhirev is turning his cruisers to the north. He is still threatened by an unknown squadron near Gostka-Sanden (which in fact did not exist, but the Russian commander, of course, could not know this) and there was no time to waste him looking for a needle in a haystack - it is necessary to connect with the "Tsarevich" and "Glory" and be ready for a big battle with the armored German ships. That is why M. K. Bakhirev did not want the "Rurik" to deviate too much to the south - in this case, it would be difficult to provide assistance to him with the combined forces of cruisers and battleships covering.
Thus, the maneuvering of Russian ships in the third (and last) episode of the battle at Gotland should be recognized as reasonable and sufficiently aggressive. And what about shooting accuracy? Unlike other episodes, we know for sure the consumption of Rurik's projectiles: 46 254 mm, 102 203 mm and 163 120 mm high-explosive projectiles. The first five minutes of the battle (10.45-10.50) "Rurik" fired at "Lubeck", the next half hour - at "Roon", at 11.20 the battle stopped and did not resume further. The Russian sailors believed they had hit the Roon, but in fact not a single Rurik shell hit the German ships.
Why did this happen?
Sources, alas, do not give an answer to this question - usually only a statement of fact follows, without an explanation of the reasons. In some cases, a description is given of the reasons that complicated the shooting of the Rurik, such as the water from the Lubeck salvo, which flooded the rangefinders, why they did not fail for some time, as well as the temporary ceasefire of the bow 254-mm turret, due to the fact that the right gun had a barrel blowing system out of order. The tower was filled with gases with every attempt to blow through the barrel, several people were poisoned. Generally speaking, these reasons are significant enough to explain the low hit rate - but not their complete absence.
As a result, the only reason for Rurik's disgusting firing is the poor training of its gunners. Since (again, according to most sources) the 1st brigade of cruisers did not shoot well at the Albatross (we already know that this is not so), the opinion about the poor training of the Baltic fleet's naval gunners in general has taken root. Meanwhile, there is a reason that very well explains the failure of "Rurik" in the battle at Gotland and it is extremely strange that none of the studies and monographs known to the author mentions it.
As we have said many times in the articles devoted to the actions of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese war, artillery skill must be maintained with regular training - if there are none, then the accuracy of the fire of naval guns sharply "slides" down. As examples, we can cite the story of the reserve, in which in 1911 the ships of the Black Sea Fleet were withdrawn for 3 weeks due to a lack of funds for their combat training. After that, the firing accuracy of the armored cruiser "Memory of Mercury" dropped by almost 1, 6 times, and on other ships of the squadron "almost by half." Indicative in this respect is the example of the Port Arthur squadron, which, having just left the 2.5-month reserve in the battle on January 27, 1904, showed far from the best result - the firing accuracy of large-caliber guns was 1, 1 times lower. than the Japanese, medium caliber (152-203 mm) - respectively, 1.5 times. Nevertheless, at that time it was still possible to talk about some kind of comparability of the training of Russian and Japanese gunners. However, the subsequent six-month standing on the roadstead of Port Arthur (only under S. O.
So, for some reason, domestic sources, when describing the results of shooting "Rurik" at Gotland, miss the following fact. As you know, on February 1, 1915, the strongest armored cruiser of the Baltic Fleet, was put forward to cover a mine laying, which the command was going to carry out with the aim of:
"Create difficulties for him in the transport of troops and equipment through the ports of the Danzig Bay."
Moving in conditions of near-zero visibility (fog and heavy blizzard) in view of the northern tip of the island of Gotland, the cruiser rammed with her bottom a stone bank, not indicated on the maps. Other cruisers of the 1st brigade, also participating in that campaign, had a smaller draft and passed over it. As a result, "Rurik" was seriously damaged, having received 2,700 tons of water. With great difficulty, the ship managed to drag Revel, but its draft was too great to enter the raid, so the cruiser was again aground (this time - a sandy one). 254-mm and 203-mm guns, in this form the cruiser was taken to Kronstadt.
"Rurik" was docked, but repair work on it was completed only by the end of April 1915. Then the ship was taken out of the dock, but work on it continued, and only on May 10 the cruiser left Kronstadt for Revel "for additional equipment and equipment." (not for installing the guns removed from it?). As a result, "Rurik" entered service … in mid-June 1915, that is, just a few days before the raid on Memel.
Thus, the armored cruiser "Rurik" before the battle at Gotland had no artillery practice for at least six months. While the rest of the Baltic Fleet ships were actively recovering their skills after the winter, the Rurik was being repaired in Kronstadt and “re-equipped” in Revel. That, in the opinion of the author of this article, in combination with the above factors (temporary failure of the range finders, the bow tower of the main caliber) and predetermined the failure of his gunners. By the way, remembering that Rurik was under repair for six months before the operation, we can assess the position of the Baltic Fleet Commander V. A. Kanin, who did not want to send this cruiser on a raid on Memel. It is one thing to use a ship that is ready for march and battle in an operation, and it is quite another to send a cruiser there after a six-month gap in combat training.
And finally, the last aspect. S. E. Vinogradov and A. D. Fedechkin “Rurik is the flagship of the Baltic Fleet” on the pages dedicated to the repair of the cruiser in 1915 write:
“Along with the repair of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided in parallel to carry out work on the repair and modernization of the cruiser's artillery, including the replacement of all 10" and 8 "guns that had reached full wear, the bulkhead of Jenny's speed regulators, the bulkhead and cleaning of the rotary and lifting mechanisms of towers"
That is, to cover the mining operation in February 1915, "Rurik" went with completely shot guns, and of course, since the cruiser was being repaired, this deficiency had to be corrected. But there is an interesting nuance: in the source we read about the “adopted decision”, but alas, there is no information about whether this decision was carried out, and it might not have happened, especially considering that the towers of “Rurik” were partially dismantled before his arrival in Kronstadt. Thus, there is a nonzero probability that on June 19, 1915, the cruiser fought with guns that had reached their wear limit. However, the author of this article does not have sufficient data, and can only state the need for additional study of this issue.
I would like to note one more nuance. Usually unsuccessful shooting of "Rurik" is compared with the brilliant result of "Lubeck", which achieved 10 or 11 (data differ in different sources) hits. However, it should be noted that "Lubeck" approached the "Rurik" closer than other German ships, at the moment of opening fire the distance between them was no more than 60-66 kbt. Then "Lubeck" turned and retreated, continuing to shoot at "Rurik" as long as the latter was within the reach of the 105-mm guns of the German cruiser. At the same time, "Rurik" after 5 minutes of battle transferred fire to "Roon", which was much further than "Lubeck" (the distance is 82 kbt.). At the same time "Roon" and "Rurik" did not approach each other by more than 76 kbt, and then the distance between them began to grow again until it reached 87.5 kbt.
So, the sources usually mention the Lubeck's heavy fire (“the fourth volley was fired when the other three were in the air”), but nowhere is the time of hits on the Russian cruiser clearly described. It should be noted that the "Lubeck", armed with 105-mm / 40 SK L / 40 arr 1898 with very modest characteristics - even at the maximum elevation angle (30 degrees), the range of the "Lubeck" guns did not exceed 12,200 m or approximately 66 kbt! Accordingly, it can be assumed that this was the case - the senior artilleryman of the Lubeck, having correctly determined the distance, covered the Russian cruiser with the first volleys. Then he unleashed a barrage of shells on "Rurik", achieving 10 or 11 hits at the very beginning of the battle, until the distance exceeded the 66 kbt limit at which his guns could fire. Then "Lubeck" moved away from "Rurik" and did not take further participation in the battle. At the same time, "Roon", fighting for at least half an hour at a distance of 76-87, 5 kbt. no hits. We know that the gunners of the German armored cruiser were not at all inept, so we can assume that the shooting conditions (primarily visibility) impeded the German gunners, and therefore their colleagues on the Rurik.
In general, according to the third episode of the battle near Gotland, the following can be stated - Russian commanders, including the commander of "Rurik" A. M. Pyshnova acted very professionally and aggressively during the battle, and did not deserve reproach. But … If we consider the actions of A. M. Pyshnova, then we will see a very clear, but not thoughtless implementation of the orders received. Having received the order of M. K. Bakhirev to join the battle, he arrived at the designated square, but did not find anyone there. Nevertheless, he quite correctly decided that the enemy should be looked for to the north of the square indicated to him - having gone there, he was able to engage in battle literally in some 20 minutes after Roon interrupted the battle with the cruisers of the 1st brigade …
However, the following question arises: the fact is that the telegrams of the communication service of the Baltic Fleet, notifying M. K. Bakhirev about the discovery of I. Karf's group could not be given "address" to the flagship of the Russian commander of the special detachment. In other words, all the telegrams that M. K. Bakhireva should have been received on both Novik and Rurik. In this case, it is rather strange that they were ignored on both Russian ships - "Rurik" remained "in the fog" southeast of the place of interception, and "Novik" generally left for winter quarters. We can, of course, assume that neither Rurik nor Novik received these telegrams - radio communications at that time left much to be desired, and even in the same Battle of Jutland we see a lot of sent but not received radiograms. It is also possible that the radiograms addressed to M. K. Bakhirev were encoded in a special way, which could not be disassembled on other cruisers of the detachment, but the author does not know anything about this. Nevertheless, we see that A. M. Pyshnov and M. A. Behrens received the radiograms of their immediate commander, M. K. Bakhirev, and immediately proceeded to implement them, but the radiograms sent to Mikhail Koronatovich passed them - and this is the mystery of the battle at Gotland on June 19, 1915. At least for the author of this article.
