In the previous article, we showed the main oddities in the descriptions of the outbreak of the battle at Gotland on June 19, 1915, admitted in various domestic and foreign sources. Now let's try to draw up a consistent picture of the actions of the 1st brigade of M. K. Bakhirev and the detachment of Commodore I. Karf (in fact, it would be correct to write "I. Karpf", because the name of the German commander is Johannes von Karpf, but in the future we will adhere to the "transcription" of his naming familiar to a Russian lover of naval history).
At 07.30, Russian time, the Germans discovered smoke, and at the same time they themselves were spotted by the cruiser Bogatyr, which was the third in the convoy of Russian ships. I. Karf immediately turned to the west, in the direction of the Swedish territorial waters, increased the speed to full and called on the radio "Roon" and "Lubeck". Five minutes later, at 07.35, on the flagship "Admiral Makarov" I. Karf's ships were identified as "Augsburg", a cruiser of the "Undine" class ships, which in Russian historiography are usually called cruisers of the "Gazelle" type) and three destroyers. As soon as the German ships were "explained", M. K. Bakhirev immediately turned around, leading the enemy to a course angle of 40 degrees, and walked across to him.
German sources do not indicate the speed of the German detachment at the time of contact with the Russians, but, most likely, it was 17 knots. It was precisely this speed that the "Augsburg" kept, returning after completing the assignment, as reported by I. Karf in his radiogram, and Rengarten relayed this information to M. K. Bakhirev. Not a single source mentions a radiogram in which the communications service of the Baltic Fleet would indicate a change in the speed of the German detachment. It follows that the course of interception on the "Admiral Makarov" was calculated based on the enemy's seventeen-knot speed, and since M. K. Bakhirev was able to intercept the Germans, it can be assumed that they continued to support 17 knots before the start of the battle.
As for the 1st squadron of cruisers, before the detection of the enemy, they went at 19 knots, but in battle it was as if they were holding 20. Such an "addition" of just one knot looks somewhat strange, and it can be assumed that the Russian cruisers did not increase their speed after meeting with enemy. Perhaps, going to intercept, M. K. Bakhirev developed the maximum squadron speed, which, as you know, is somewhat lower than the maximum speed of an individual ship in a detachment. And which for the 1st squadron just had to be 19-20 knots.
It is not entirely clear what time the Admiral Makarov opened fire. Most likely, from the moment the enemy was identified (07.35) and until the opening of fire, two or three minutes passed, and maybe more, because it was necessary to give an order to change the course and carry it out, to raise top flags. Thus, most likely, the cannons of the flagship of M. K. Bakhirev started talking at the earliest, somewhere in 07.37-07.38, although the Germans (G. Rollmann) believe that it was at 07.32. However, such a discrepancy of several minutes in a combat situation is more than understandable, especially since, as can be judged by the reports, their constituents often tend to "round off" the time. The gunners of the Russian flagship ship believed that the distance between Admiral Makarov and Augsburg at the moment of opening fire was 44 cables.
Sources say that three minutes later (it turns out at 07.40-07.41) “Bayan” entered the battle, and “Oleg” and “Bogatyr” started shooting at 07.45. At the same time, armored cruisers fired at Augsburg, armored cruisers - at Albatross. Finding that he was opposed by four Russian cruisers and having fallen under their dense fire, at 07.45 I. Karf turned another 2 rumba to the right. Judging by the maneuvering schemes, M. K. Bakhirev discovered the turn of the enemy and turned it around himself, continuing to keep the German ships at a course angle of 40 degrees.
But in the next 15 minutes of the battle, from 07.45 to 08.00, quite a lot of events took place, the exact time (and even the sequence) of which is not possible to establish. As we have already said, the German detachment was in full swing, but it was different for all German ships. Cruisers of the "Mainz" class, to which the "Augsburg" belonged, were developed on tests up to 26.8 knots. The minelayer "Albatross" had a maximum speed of 20 knots. and was probably able to develop it - it was a relatively young ship that entered service in 1908. The destroyers of the series, to which the G-135 belonged, showed 26-28 knots, while the S-141 and S -142 "- 30, 3 knots. Nevertheless, G. Rollman claims that their speed was 20 knots. the G-135 and a little more for the other two destroyers. This assessment raises serious doubts for two reasons. First, it is completely unclear why the relatively old German destroyers (the G-135 entered service in January, and the other two destroyers in September 1907) experienced such a drop in speed. Second, an analysis of the maneuvering of the sides shows that the destroyers actually went faster than at 20 knots.
Unfortunately, the author of this article does not have information about the exact position and courses of the German and Russian units, on the basis of which the determination of the speed of German ships would be reduced to solving a not too complicated geometric problem. We only know that I. Karf indicated in his report an increase in the distance from 43, 8 to 49, 2 cables, but G. Rollmann does not give the exact time when the distance was 49, 2 kbt., Saying only what the distance is was between the opponents at the time of the start of the torpedo attack. If we assume that the torpedo attack took place somewhere between 07.50 and 07.55, which looks most likely, it turns out that the German ships managed to increase the distance between them and the Russians pursuing them by 5, 4 cables in 15-20 minutes. This means that the distance between Augsburg and Admiral Makarov increased at a speed of 1, 6-2, 2 knots. Why not faster, because the Augsburg outnumbered the Russian cruisers in speed by six knots? Obviously, the fact that the Russians were going across the Germans, as well as the forced maneuvers of "Augsburg", which had to "zigzag" on the course to avoid coverings, had an effect.
Thus, the interval between 07.45 and 08.00 looks like this - "Augsburg" and the destroyers, having given the fullest forward even at the beginning of the battle, continued to break away from the less fast Russian cruisers and from the relatively slow-moving "Albatross", which, of course, lagged behind (which is perfectly combined with a description of the battle of G. Rollman). But if I. Karf, it seems, was thinking only about his own salvation, then the commander of the destroyer battalion considered himself obliged to try to help out the Albatross and therefore raised the signal for a torpedo attack.
In fact, and without a doubt, the German commanders on the destroyers understood the suicidal nature of such an attack and did not rush into it at all. In order to have at least a shadow of a chance to hit the Russian cruisers with torpedoes, it was necessary to get closer to them by 15 cables (the maximum cruising range of the outdated German torpedoes with which the destroyers were armed is about 16 kbt.), In a good way - by 10, and a similar approach with four cruisers was, of course, fatal to three destroyers. The maximum that they could achieve with their attack and at the cost of their death was to force the Russians to turn away for a while from the Augsburg and Albatross in order to shoot the destroyers on the retreat, and then continue pursuing the cruiser and the minelayer. Nevertheless, they attacked, and did so without orders from above.
In the opinion of the author of this article, the destroyers launched an attack somewhere around 07.50 or a little later, rushing across the course of the Russian ships, and by 0800 had approached the Admiral Makarov to about 33-38 cables (according to Russian sources). In fact, the most likely figure is 38 cables, and the figure 33 cables most likely originated from the book by G. Rollmann, who indicates that the German destroyers fought (fired at Russian cruisers) in this period and until they left the battle from a distance of 38, 2-32, 8 cables. It should be assumed that the smallest distance between the ships of M. K. Bakhirev and the destroyers were later, when they turned after the Augsburg and crossed the Russian course, therefore, at the moment we are talking about 38 cables. On Russian cruisers at 07.55 we even "saw" the traces of torpedoes that passed between the "Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan".
Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev reacted to the attack exactly as it should. He did not deviate from the combat course and did not order to transfer the fire of 203-mm or at least 152-mm artillery to destroyers - only three-inch armored cruisers "worked" on them. The Russian commander obviously saw that the Augsburg was breaking the distance, and tried to give his gunners maximum time to hit the German cruiser. The three-inch shells posed little threat to the more than 500-ton German destroyers. In the Russo-Japanese War, guns of this caliber could not stop even 350-ton ships, nevertheless, their fire "hinted" that the actions of the destroyers were noticed and to a certain extent made their commanders nervous. Let us repeat once more - already in the Russo-Japanese war, it was possible to effectively repel the destroyer attacks only with the fire of 120-152-mm guns, the range of the German torpedoes on the Russian ships could not know, and the fact that M. K. Bakhirev continued to hold the enemy at a course angle of 40 degrees, walked across I. Karfu and did not use his six-inch to repel an attack, testifies to anything, but not about the timidity or excessive caution of the Russian commander.
But I. Karf, it seems, simply fled, waving his hand at the leadership of the battle. He did not order the destroyers to go on the attack, but he also did not cancel it when they went into it. Instead, at about 07.55, shortly after the start of the attack, apparently making sure that he was enough to break away from the Russian cruisers to slip under their noses to the German coast, I. Karf turned his ship north and gave a radio message to the Albatross »Break into neutral Norwegian waters.
To be honest, the author of this article has the feeling that from the very discovery of the Russian cruisers, I. Karfa was seized with panic, and he simply flew headlong to the territorial Swedish waters. And then, seeing that his destroyers went on the attack, he realized that the perfect moment had come to turn south, passing under the noses of the Russian cruisers, while they were busy repelling the destroyer attack. This feeling of the author, no doubt, is not and cannot be a historical fact. But there is indirect evidence confirming this point of view, we will consider them below.
So, after the start of the attack of the destroyers "Augsburg" went against the Russian course and ordered the "Albatross" to break through into neutral waters. And here another mystery of that distant battle arose. The fact is that domestic sources describe in such a way that after the Augsburg signal to the Albatross, the German destroyers abandoned the attack, turned behind the Augsburg and set up a smoke screen, which temporarily covered both Augsburg and Albatross from fire of Russian ships. Then M. K. Bakhirev ordered the 2nd half-brigade of cruisers to “act at their discretion,” after which the Bogatyr and Oleg, who made it, turned north. As a result of this maneuver, the Russian cruisers parted - "Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan" continued pursuing the Germans on their previous course, and "Bogatyr" and "Oleg went north, as if taking the enemy in pincers.
The Germans describe this episode differently. In their opinion, when the Augsburg began to lean to the left and gave a radiogram to the Albatross to go into Swedish waters, the Russian cruisers turned north. Then the destroyer battalion commander, seeing that his flagship was running, and the Russians had changed course, considered his duty fulfilled, abandoned the torpedo attack and turned after the Augsburg. That is, the difference in the German and Russian versions seems to be small - either the German destroyers stopped the attack after the Russian cruisers turned to the north, or before it. At the same time, the 1st brigade of cruisers, as we know, did not turn north, but at about 08.00, the Bogatyr and Oleg went there, which (theoretically) could seem to the Germans as a turn of the entire brigade to the north.
According to the author of this article, the Russian version of events is much more credible than the German, and here's why. The fact is that at the moment when the Germans abandoned the attack and began to put up a smoke screen, they had about 25 kbt left to cross the Russian course. Why so many? The fact is that when "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" turned north (at about 08.00), they came out from behind the smoke screen and saw the Albatross only at 08.10. The cruisers were sailing at 19 or 20 knots, and taking into account the turnaround time, they should have covered about two and a half to three miles to the north in 10 minutes from the beginning of the maneuver. And this means that it was there (that is, two and a half or three miles to the north) that the edge of the smoke screen began, therefore, at the time of its setting, the German destroyers were there.
Just in case, we present a diagram taken from the book by M. A. Petrova "Two Fights"
By and large, for the attack of the destroyers it was completely unimportant whether the Russian cruisers turned north or not. Roughly speaking, the Russians were going east, the Germans were crossing their course from north to south. Have the Russians turned north? Fine, it was enough for the destroyers to turn eastward, and they would again run across the Russian course. At about 0800, the Russian cruisers and German destroyers found themselves as if on the opposite peaks of the square, and no matter which side the Russians went, the Germans had the opportunity to attack, following the enemy's course. Thus, the turn of the Russian cruisers to the north, "imagined" by the Germans, did not prevent the torpedo attack at all.
Nevertheless, the commander of the destroyer flotilla refused to attack. Why? What changed? Only one thing - he learned that the commander of the operation I. Karf decided to abandon the Albatross. This was quite clear from the fact that the Augsburg went against the course of the Russian cruisers and gave a radiogram ordering the Albatross to leave for Swedish waters. But in the report it is not so easy to write the rationale for the decision to stop the attack: "My immediate superior fled, and why am I worse?" Moreover, an interesting nuance arose: of course, the commander of the German destroyers had a certain degree of independence and had the right to act at his own discretion. But after he raised the Torpedo Attack signal, Commodore I. Karf did not recall it. This means that the Commodore agreed with the decision of his subordinate and believed that a torpedo attack was necessary. The flotilla commander decided to stop the attack on his own, and it turns out, as if contrary to the opinion of his commander expressed earlier … Of course, tacit approval is not an order, but it would still be nice to find other reasons to stop the attack. And the fact that the Russians just at about the same time seemed to have turned north - is that not the reason? Well, yes, in fact, they turned a little AFTER the German destroyers withdrew from the battle, and not BEFORE … followed suit.
I ask you to understand correctly - all this, of course, is speculation and nothing more. But the fact is that all the contradictions of the German reports and the description of the battle near Gotland on June 19, 1915, made by G. Rollmann, simply fit perfectly into the version that:
1) German destroyers prepared to die heroically and rushed into a suicidal attack;
2) Then, seeing that their flagship was running, they chose to follow his example;
3) Subsequently, they were "embarrassed" of their retreat and tried to give their actions … eghkm … let's say, more "tactical brilliance".
The author of this article went through many other options, but the version about the deliberate distortion of reality in the German reports looks the most reasonable. Well, let's say the Germans imagined that the Russians were turning north and the destroyers turned away, but after all, only Bogatyr and Oleg went north, and Admiral Makarov and Bayan continued to follow the same course. And what, the Germans did not notice this, being less than four miles from the Russian cruisers? By the way, Mr. Rollmann “played out” this episode just brilliantly - the fact is that after the Augsburg radio message on the Albatross, quite sensibly trying to use any chance, no matter how ghostly it was, radioed “Please send underwater boats . And so, according to G. Rollman, the Russians, frightened by these very boats, jumped to the north, but then, after a while, their armored cruisers turned east again, and the Bogatyr and Oleg continued to move in the same direction …
Suppose, in fact, reality is distorted not in German, but in Russian reports, and in fact M. K. Bakhirev, fearing a destroyer attack, turned to the north and maneuvered as shown by G. Rollmann. But, if he saw such a significant threat in them, why then did he not order to shoot at the German destroyers with at least six-inch guns? And if he did, why don't the Germans celebrate this?
Thus, let us focus on the version that, after the German destroyers attacked, "Augsburg" for some time went the same course, and then turned to the south-west, across the Russian ships and ordered "Albatross to break through into neutral waters. The German destroyers stopped the attack and followed their flagship, setting up a smoke screen. In response, M. K. Bakhirev continued to move forward, but ordered "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" to act at their own discretion, and they turned north … by the way, why?
This act is traditionally criticized in Russian historiography. They say that instead of "decisively approaching" the enemy and "rolling out" him, they started a complex maneuvering and useless coverage from both sides. The rationale was also summed up - the coverage and positioning of the enemy "in two fires" was a classic tactical technique, as was the coverage of the head of the enemy column. And so the Russian commanders, being timid dogmatists of a narrow-minded mind, were intimidated, did not take the initiative, but instead acted stereotyped, "according to the textbook" ….
Let's put ourselves in the place of the commander of the 2nd cruiser demi-brigade.
Where was he to go? He could, of course, continue to follow the armored cruisers of the 1st semi-brigade, "Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan" (on the diagram - Option 1), but why? On "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" they would no longer see the "Albatross" at which they fired, and what the German ship is doing there behind the smoke screen, no one knows. But how, using the invisibility that the smoke screen gave him, would he run north, break the distance and hide in the fog in order to try to escape to Libau or to make an attempt to break through to the German coast? Look for his fistulas later. And, besides, if M. K. Bakhirev would like his armored cruisers to follow him, he would not raise a signal allowing them to act independently. What else? Turn straight into a smokescreen (Option 2)? And if the German destroyers, seeing such a stupidity of the Russian commander, turned around and met the Russian cruisers shortly when they entered the smoke?
Here, by the way, the double standards of some Russian authors are well traced - the same A. G. Sick did not say a single bad word about the English commander of the Mediterranean fleet, E. B. Cunningham, when he did not dare to lead his squadron into the smokes set by the Italians in the battle of Calabria (World War II). This battle is also called "the battle of one shell", because after a single hit on the flagship battleship, the Italians fled from the battlefield. But if the British admiral did not waste time bypassing the smoke screen, then not one shell, but a slightly larger number of them, could have hit the Italians.
Nevertheless, the Englishman did absolutely right - the enemy had enough destroyers to arrange the real Tsushima for the heavy British ships in the smoke. And the commander of the 2nd half-brigade of cruisers did the same right in the battle of Gotland on June 19, 1915, when he led his cruisers around the smoke screen. He could, of course, take the risk and gain a little distance to the Albatross, but was it worth the risk of losing the Bogatyr or Oleg? Each of which was more than twice the size of the Undine-class cruiser, which, according to the Russian commander, he was chasing? At the same time, domestic sources, scolding the commanders of the cruisers, do not seem to notice that their proposed path of rapprochement with the Albatross led through a smokescreen set by the destroyers. In fact, the turn to the north, bypassing the smoke, was at that moment a reasonable and quite optimal decision, the commander of the 2nd semi-brigade took it, and M. K. Bakhirev, subsequently, completely agreed with him.
The only moment that categorically does not want to fit into the above reconstruction of events is that domestic sources claim that the Augsburg and the destroyers crossed the course of the Russian cruisers at 08.00. If M. K. Bakhirev kept the enemy at a course angle of 40 degrees, something like that is impossible geometrically. The fact is that the moment of the start of the destroyer attack, the relative position of Admiral Makarov and Augsburg is easy to describe using the simplest right-angled triangle, one angle of which is 40 degrees, and the hypotenuse (the distance between the Russian and German flagships) is 49 cables …
Obviously, no matter where the German destroyers began their attack, in order to cut the course of the Russian ships at 08.00, while being at the same time 33 cables from them, they would have to be at least a third faster than the Russian cruisers in speed (that is, to develop 24, 7-26 knots), even if they went directly with the Augsburg and moved the shortest route to the desired point. But they did not go that way, since at first they tried to go into the attack, that is, they would get close to the Russian cruisers as quickly as possible. As a matter of fact, from this position, in principle, it is impossible to cut the course of Russian ships 33 cables away from them, without having an advantage in speed, which means that the information that the G-135 could not go faster than 20 knots is false. In addition, if the German destroyers began to place the smoke screen close to the point of intersection of the course of the Russian cruisers, then the "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" who turned to the north would not need so much time (until 08.10) in order to, having turned north, resume shooting at the Albatross.
After the start of setting up the smoke screen (at about 08.00), first the Albatross, and then the Augsburg, were hidden from the Russian gunners for some time. Then at some period of time (perhaps 08.10 08-15 or so) "Augsburg" and destroyers cut the course of the Russian ships. At that moment, the destroyers were separated from the "Admiral Makarov" by about 33 cables, and the "Augsburg" by 50 cables. Then the German ships switched to the left shell of the Russian cruisers and at 08.35 the opponents finally lost sight of each other.
In principle, already closer to 08.00, the shooting at Augsburg lost its meaning - it went across the course of the Russian cruisers in the interval between 07.55-08.00 and now, in order to keep it at a constant heading angle of 40 degrees, Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev would have to turn away from the hiding behind the smokescreen of the Albatross. At the same time, "Augsburg" was at the limit of visibility - it was separated from the Russian cruisers by about 50 kbt, in addition, it was hiding behind a smoke screen. Sadly it was to admit it, but "Augsburg" still managed to leave unchecked, and now all that was left was to destroy the "Albatross". "Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan" followed (roughly) to the east, "Bogatyr and" Oleg "- to the north. At about 08.10 ("Admiral Makarov" - a little earlier) they all rounded the smoke screen of the Germans and saw the "Albatross". Alas, it is not known exactly at what distance he was at that moment from the Russian cruisers, but it was hardly more than 45 kbt.
At 08.20, two significant events took place in their own way. 10 minutes after the opening of fire (08.10), the first Russian shell finally hit the Albatross, damaging the upper deck and the side in the stern, after which the German minelayer was hit regularly. G. Rollman describes the second event as follows:
"Augsburg" from 08.20 to 08.33 was able to fire once again from a great distance the flagship, for which he turned on it in order to divert attention from the Albatross and cause a chase. But given the variable visibility, which ranged from 5 to 7 miles, the Commodore in any case adhered to a cautious course."
It is rather difficult to agree with the first statement of G. Rollmann, if only because nothing of the kind was observed from Russian ships, and the German historian did not even consider it necessary to note the heroic turn of the Augsburg towards the enemy on the diagram given in the book. But the second statement concerning the cautious course of actions of I. Karf, without a doubt, is completely true. "Augsburg" so carefully fired at the Russian flagship for 13 minutes that the "Admiral Makarov" did not notice the shelling.
Most likely, it was like this - while the "Augsburg" was running away to all the blades, it was covered by the smoke curtain of the destroyers, so that it lost sight of the Russian cruisers. Then the light cruiser entered a strip of fog, or some other weather condition that reduced his visibility, and lost the Russians by 08.20. After that, “Admiral Makarov” (or “Bayan”) was spotted on the flagship of I. Karf and opened fire on it on the retreat - the distance between the opponents quickly increased and at 08.33 the “Augsburg” stopped seeing the enemy. This correlates very well with the Russian data - the Augsburg and destroyers were no longer seen on armored cruisers at 08.35. The difference in a couple of minutes is more than explainable by the visibility features (one side of the horizon is seen worse than the other) or by simple rounding of the time in the report. At the same time, the shooting of "Augsburg" did not deserve to be noted separately - well, the enemy cruiser was running, it is clear that it was firing back at the same time, so what's wrong with that? Questions here arise only to Commodore I. Karf, who, apparently, even here slightly “embellished” his report, presenting the shootout on the retreat as a heroic attempt to distract the enemy by himself.
Be that as it may, at about 08.10 the Russian cruisers focused their fire on the Albatross. Absolutely all authors, both domestic and foreign, did not find good words for the Russian artillerymen. In their opinion, the shooting was poorly organized, the Russian gunners were inept, and in general, the shooting of the Albatross turned into a big embarrassment. Let's try to figure out what really happened.
