Having conceived the series of articles "Myths of Tsushima", I considered it sufficient to offer the respected readers an argument that refutes many of the established views on the Battle of Tsushima. Views that for many decades were considered indisputable facts, although they were not. In my opinion, this was enough to at least raise doubts about the well-established perception of the Tsushima battle, the training of Russian sailors and the abilities of Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky. However, after carefully studying the responses to my series of articles, I realized that the materials I have presented do not cover a number of issues of interest to a respectable audience.
The following statement seemed to me the most interesting: Rozhdestvensky fought passively, while it was necessary to decisively approach the distance of dagger fire - 10-20 kbt, which could be affected by the advantage of Russian shells in armor penetration, which, according to many readers of "VO", could have led to different results of the battle.
Interestingly, critics of Rozhdestvensky are surprisingly unanimous that the Russian squadron was not ready to fight the Japanese fleet, but they adhere to completely opposite points of view on what the Russian admiral should have done in this situation. Some write that the Russian commander had to take the squadron back by his own will or, perhaps, interned, thereby avoiding a crushing defeat and saving the lives of the people entrusted to him. The latter believe that Rozhdestvensky should have fought the battle in an extremely aggressive manner and be ready to sacrifice anything in order to just meet the Japanese at a short distance.
On the first point of view, I have no comments, since the armed forces, in which the commanders will decide whether it is worth following the orders of higher commanders, or whether it is better to leave the battlefield, saving the lives of soldiers, is simply impossible. It is well known that the armed forces are based on one-man command (“one bad commander is better than two good ones”), from which the inviolability of the orders given follows. Armies that neglected this postulate suffered crushing defeats, often from an enemy inferior in numbers and equipment - of course, if this enemy was determined and ready to fight to the end. In addition, there is one more consideration that is not related to military discipline: Rozhdestvensky's personal decision to return the squadron back could (and would) be regarded as a terrible betrayal, there would be no limit to popular indignation, and this indignation could result in such forms, against the background which any conceivable casualties of the squadron would instantly fade. The admiral himself spoke of it this way:
It is clear to me now, and then it was obvious, that if I turned back from Madagascar or Annam, or if I preferred to intern in neutral ports, there would be no borders to the explosion of popular indignation.
Therefore, in no case can Rozhestvensky be accused of following the order and leading the squadron to break through to Vladivostok. Questions should arise exclusively to those who gave him such an order.
Of course, it was impossible to send the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons into battle. The only sensible use of Russian ships would be to use their power in a political battle. It was necessary to hold off the squadron (possibly off the coast of Indochina) and, threatening the Japanese with a general battle at sea, try to conclude a peace acceptable to the Russian Empire. The Japanese could not know the true balance of forces of the squadrons, sea luck is changeable, and the loss of Japanese supremacy at sea completely canceled all their achievements on the mainland. Accordingly, the presence of a formidable Russian squadron could become a powerful political argument, which, alas, was neglected. The blame for this should be shared between the Russian autocrat Nicholas II and General-Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who had a well-deserved nickname "in the world": "7 pounds of the most august meat." Of course, neither one nor the other could foresee the disaster that occurred in Tsushima, but both had all the necessary information to understand: the combined forces of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons are weaker than the Japanese fleet, and therefore count on the defeat of Togo's ships and Kamimura is not allowed. But the Russian squadron retained its political weight only as long as it remained a factor unknown to the Japanese. If the Russian squadron had lost the battle, or if the battle had led to an indefinite result, then even if Rozhestvensky's ships had gone to Vladivostok, their presence there could no longer serve as a serious political argument. Accordingly, the above-mentioned persons sent the squadron into battle, hoping for magic, for the miraculous victory of the Russian fleet, and this, of course, was pure adventurism, which the country's top leadership should never be guided by.
Nevertheless, Admiral Rozhdestvensky received an order … It remained only to decide how this order could be carried out.
Of course, it would be best to first go to Vladivostok, and from there give battle to the Japanese squadron. But was it possible? As in Russian folk tales, Rozhdestvensky had three roads: the Tsushima or Sangar Strait, or bypassing Japan. Admiral Rozhdestvensky, in his testimony to the Investigative Commission, said:
I decided to break through the Korean Strait, and not the Sangar Strait, because a breakthrough by the latter would present more navigational difficulties, would be fraught with great dangers in view of the fact that the Japanese publications secured themselves the right to resort to the use of floating mines and obstacles in suitable places in that strait. and because the comparatively slow movement of the squadron towards the Sangar Strait would certainly have been accurately tracked down by the Japanese and their allies, and the breakthrough would have been blocked by the same concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet that were opposed to our squadron in the Korea Strait. As for the passage in May from Annam to Vladivostok through the La Perouse Strait, it seemed to me absolutely impossible: having lost some of the ships in the fogs and having suffered from accidents and wrecks, the squadron could be paralyzed by a lack of coal and become an easy prey for the Japanese fleet.
Indeed, to climb into the narrow and inconvenient for navigation Sangar Strait, where it was quite possible to expect Japanese minefields, meant the risk of incurring losses even before the battle, and the chances of passing unnoticed tended to be zero (the minimum width of the strait was 18 km). At the same time, the Japanese would have had no difficulty in intercepting the Russians upon leaving this strait. As for the route bypassing Japan, it is perhaps more interesting because in this case the Japanese would most likely have intercepted the Russians only near Vladivostok, and it is easier to fight on their shores. But it had to be borne in mind that for such a transition it was necessary to really fill up with coal everything, including the admiral's closets (and it's not a fact that this would be enough), but if Togo somehow managed to intercept the Russians on the approach to Japan, then Rozhdestvensky's ships turned out to be would be practically incapacitated due to excessive overload. And if this had not happened, taking on the battle on the approaches to Vladivostok with almost empty coal pits is a pleasure below average. The Tsushima Strait was good in that it was the shortest road to the target, moreover, it was wide enough for maneuvering and there were practically no chances of flying into Japanese mines. Its flaw was its obviousness - it was there that the main forces of Togo and Kamimura were most likely to be expected. However, the Russian commander believed that regardless of the route he would choose, a battle awaited him in any case, and in retrospect it can be argued that in this Rozhestvensky was absolutely right. It is now known that Togo was expecting the Russians in the Tsushima Strait, but if this had not happened before a certain date (which would mean that the Russians had chosen a different route), the Japanese fleet would have moved to the area from where it could control both the La Peruzov and the Sangar straits. Consequently, only an extremely happy accident could prevent Togo from meeting Rozhdestvensky, but a miracle (due to its irrationality) could have been expected in the Tsushima Strait. Consequently, one can agree or disagree with Rozhdestvensky's decision to go specifically to Tsushima, but such a decision had its advantages, but the vice admiral obviously did not have a better option - all the paths had their merits (except, perhaps, Sangarsky), but also and disadvantages.
So, the Russian admiral initially assumed that he would not be able to go to Vladivostok unnoticed, and that it was a breakthrough that awaited him - that is, battle with the main forces of the Japanese fleet. Then the question arises: what exactly would be the best way to give battle to Admiral Togo?
I suggest a little mind game, brainstorming, if you like. Let's try to put ourselves in the place of the Russian commander and, "got into his epaulettes", draw up a battle plan in the Tsushima Strait. Of course, rejecting our afterthought and using only what Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky knew.
What information did the admiral have?
1) As I wrote above, he was sure that the Japanese would not let him go to Vladivostok without a fight.
2) He believed (again, rightly) that his squadrons were inferior in strength to the Japanese fleet.
3) He also had reliable information about the events in Port Arthur, including the naval battle of the 1st Pacific Squadron with the main forces of Admiral Togo, known as the battle at Shantung or the battle in the Yellow Sea. Including - about the damage to Russian ships.
4) As an artilleryman, Rozhestvensky knew the main design features of the shells available on his ships, both armor-piercing and high-explosive.
5) And, of course, the admiral had an idea about the main characteristics of enemy armored ships - not that he knew them perfectly, but he had a general idea of the design of battleships and armored cruisers in Japan.
6) But what Rozhestvensky could not have an idea about was the effectiveness of Russian fire at Shantung and the damage that Japanese ships received.
What plan can we make out of all this? To do this, let's first turn to the battle at Shantung:
1) The battle began at a distance of about 80 kbt, while the first hits (into Russian ships) were recorded at about 70 kbt.
2) In the first phase of the battle, the Japanese squadron tried to put a "stick over the T", but was unsuccessful, but otherwise fought a very cautious battle - although the Japanese did not regret shells, they preferred to fight at very long distances. Only twice did they approach the battleships of Vitgeft, diverging with them on counter courses for the first time at a distance of about 50-60 kbt, and the second time approaching 30 kbt.
3) According to the results of the first phase of the battle, the Japanese did not achieve any goals - they did not manage to defeat or even seriously damage the Russian battleships, while Vitgeft led his ships to a breakthrough and did not want to return to Arthur. The same, on the contrary, found himself in a disadvantageous tactical position - behind the Russian ships.
4) What was left for the Japanese admiral to do? Evening and night are just around the corner, and no tactical "delights" by Heihachiro Togo have helped. Only one thing remains - a decisive battle "chest on chest" in the wake columns at a short distance. Only in this way could one hope to defeat or at least stop Vitgeft.
5) And Togo in the second phase of the battle, despite the unfavorable tactical situation for himself, goes into a clinch. The battle resumes at a distance of approximately 42 kbt, and then a gradual convergence of 23 kbt and even up to 21 kbt follows. As a result, the Russian commander dies, and his flagship "Tsarevich" rolls out of action. The squadron immediately disintegrates, losing control - following the "Tsarevich" "Retvizan" undertakes a risky maneuver, sharply approaching the Japanese ships, but the remaining battleships do not follow him, and the damaged "Tsarevich" does not manage to occupy the ranks. The lagging "Poltava" is just catching up and only "Peresvet", "Pobeda" and "Sevastopol" remain in the ranks.
So, the tactics of the Japanese admiral in the last battle, although they do not shine with skill, are still understandable and logical. The task of Vitgeft was a breakthrough to Vladivostok, where, having united with the cruisers of the VOK, the 1st Pacific Ocean could wait for reinforcements from the Baltic. Togo's task was in no case to let the Russian ships into Vladivostok. Accordingly, it was required either to destroy the main forces of the 1st Pacific in battle, or to drive them back into the mousetrap of Port Arthur. Despite the high professionalism of the artillerymen, the Japanese could not achieve anything at long ranges in the first phase of the battle, and for a decisive result they had to look for a "short" battle. And only by converging with the Russian battleships by 20 kbt, the Japanese managed to upset the order of battle of the 1st Pacific, but to destroy not that the main forces of the Russian squadron, but even at least one battleship, the Japanese could not. Moreover:
1) Not a single Russian battleship received serious damage that significantly reduced its combat effectiveness. For example, the most injured, who received about 35 hits from the squadron battleship "Peresvet", had three 254-mm guns (out of four), eight 152-mm (out of eleven), thirteen 75-mm (out of twenty) and seventeen - 47-mm. (out of twenty). In addition, two boilers (out of 30) were put out of action, and for some time the average vehicle was out of order in battle. Human losses were also very moderate - 1 officer and 12 sailors were killed, another 69 people were injured.
2) In total, the Russian battleships received about 150 hits. Of these, about 40 enemy shells hit the vertical armor of the hull, as well as the wheelhouses, towers and other armored units of the Russian battleships. At the same time, it was able to penetrate the armor of exactly 1 (in words - ONE) Japanese shell.
3) In those cases when Japanese shells exploded in unarmored parts of ships, it was very unpleasant, but no more - the explosions caused moderate damage and did not cause large fires.
From all this followed two very simple conclusions, and here is the first of them: the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea clearly indicated that the Japanese artillery did not have sufficient firepower to destroy modern squadron battleships.
It is interesting that when Rozhestvensky was asked about the coloring of Russian ships, he replied:
The squadron was not repainted gray, because matte black better hides ships at night from mine attacks.
When I first read these words, I was shocked by their obvious absurdity - how was it possible, being afraid of some destroyers, to make excellent targets for the Japanese artillerymen from the ships of the squadron ?! However, if you plan the battle in Tsushima based on the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea, it becomes obvious that just the same night torpedo attacks should have been feared much more than Japanese artillery fire!
And further: the upcoming battle of Tsushima bore an obvious resemblance to the battle in the Yellow Sea. The task of the Russian admiral was to break through to Vladivostok. The task of the Japanese is not to let the Russians pass, which could have been achieved only by defeating the Russian squadron. But the battle at long and medium distances could not stop the Russians, which was proven in the Yellow Sea. From this follows a largely paradoxical, but completely logical conclusion: in order to stop the battleships of Rozhdestvensky, Heihachiro Togo had to seek close combat himself!
This conclusion is so obvious that we do not notice it. As the saying goes: "If you want to hide something really well - put it in the most conspicuous place." And we are also overwhelmed by the knowledge that in Tsushima the Japanese had shells that made it possible to effectively disable Russian battleships at medium ranges. And, since Togo had such shells, then why should he go into close combat?
But the fact of the matter is that Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky did not know about this weapon of Admiral Togo, and he could not have known. "Suitcases" in the Yellow Sea were either not used at all, or in extremely limited quantities, so that the descriptions of the battle in the Yellow Sea do not contain anything similar to the effect of the Japanese 305-mm land mines in Tsushima.
The famous Japanese "furoshiki" - thin-walled 305-mm "suitcases" containing 40 kg of "shimosa", the Japanese created shortly before the Russo-Japanese War. However, creating a projectile and supplying them to the fleet is, as they say in Odessa, two big differences. And so the Japanese ships used a lot of different shells: they did something themselves, but most of the guns and ammunition for them were purchased in England. At the same time, it is known that at least part of the British armor-piercing shells already in Japan was modified with the replacement of the standard explosives for "shimoza", although of course such a mass of explosives as in "furoshiki" could not be achieved. Whether there were such shells as armor-piercing or high-explosive - I cannot say. Again, it is not known for certain how many and which shells were upgraded. In addition, in the battle in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese with might and main used not only high-explosive, but also armor-piercing shells, and such shells were up to half of the total consumption. In Tsushima - much less, out of 446 consumed 305-mm shells, only 31 (possibly fewer, but not more) were armor-piercing. Therefore, it is very likely that in the Yellow Sea Togo used mainly armor-piercing and British high-explosive shells with their "native" explosives, which is quite consistent with the nature of the damage received by the Russian ships.
And from this it follows this: we know that in Tsushima Togo could defeat the Russian fleet, fighting at a distance of 25-40 kbt. But no one on the Russian squadron could know this, and therefore any plans that could be drawn up by the Russian commanders should proceed from the fact that the Japanese armored ships of the line would necessarily "climb" into close combat, in which the Japanese fleet with shells of the "battle at Shantung”could only count on inflicting decisive damage on the Russian battleships. In order to force Admiral Togo into close combat, it was not at all necessary to "sink the pedal to the floor", trying to catch up with the Japanese in squadron speed. And to allocate "fast" battleships in a separate detachment was not necessary either. Essentially, only one thing was required - firmly, without deviating from the course, GO TO VLADIVOSTOK! This was exactly the case when the mountain does not need to go to Mohammed, because Mohammed himself will come to the mountain.
Heihachiro Togo has established himself as an experienced but cautious naval commander. There was no doubt that at first the Japanese admiral would "try on the teeth" the Russian squadron, and at the same time, using his tactical advantages, he would try to put Rozhdestvensky "a stick over T". This, of course, could not be allowed - with the concentration of fire, which provided this method of naval warfare, even at 20-40 kbt, there was a risk of receiving serious damage, even with shells of the "battle at Shantung" model. But, excluding the "stick over the T", the battle at medium distances in the outset of the battle, when the Japanese would have sought to press on the "head" of the Russian column, Rozhestvensky was not particularly afraid: at the head of the Russian squadron was an "armored turtle" of four newest battleships of the " Borodino ", low-vulnerability at a distance of 30-40 kbt for Japanese shells of the" battle at Shantung ". And what if the main armor belt of these battleships was almost completely hidden under the water? This was even for the better - the second, upper 152-mm armor belt of the Russian battleships guaranteed them the preservation of buoyancy, successfully performing the functions of the main one, since, as it was known from the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese shells did not penetrate the armor. But with some luck, a heavy projectile could fall into the water right in front of the battleship's side and go "under the skirt", hitting below the main armor belt, where the ships of those years were protected by almost nothing. The armored belt that went into the water perfectly protected against such a blow, so that, in general, the waterline of the newest Russian battleships was protected even better when overloaded than with their normal displacement.
As for the Russian artillery, here, putting ourselves in the place of the Russian admiral, we will come to no less interesting conclusions.
Alas, the first doubts about the quality of Russian shells appeared only after Tsushima. The officers of the 1st Pacific Squadron wrote a lot about the fact that Japanese shells do not penetrate Russian armor, but practically nothing - about the weak blasting action of Russian shells. The same applied to the sailors of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. It was only noted that Japanese shells often explode when hitting water, which made it easier to zero in. Before Tsushima, Russian sailors seriously considered their shells to be quite high-quality weapons, and they did not bother to carry out tests that could show their failure in the Russian Empire, regretting 70 thousand rubles. Thus, putting oneself in the place of the Russian admiral, the Russian shells should be considered quite capable of inflicting serious damage on the enemy.
At the same time, speaking about 305-mm Russian shells, it should be understood that despite their formal division into armor-piercing and high-explosive, in fact, the Russian imperial fleet had two types of armor-piercing shells. The explosive content in the "high-explosive" Russian projectile was slightly higher (almost 6 kg instead of 4.3 kg in the armor-piercing one), but it was equipped with the same type of fuse and with the same deceleration as the armor-piercing one, which was well known in the Russian fleet … True, the Russian battleships went to Tsushima with "high-explosive" shells, equipped, according to the MTK, not with "double shock pyroxylin tubes", but with "ordinary tubes of the 1894 model", but even those did not have an instant effect. Probably, the strength of the hull of the Russian "land mine" was somewhat inferior to the armor-piercing one, however, as you know, even a thin-walled high-explosive projectile is quite capable of penetrating half of its own caliber armor (unless the detonator detonates earlier), and the Russian projectile was certainly not thin-walled when it hit I was in no hurry to explode into the armor. Let's look at the armor penetration of the Russian and Japanese artillery.
At a distance of 30-40 kbt Russian 305-mm "high-explosive" shells, of course, could not penetrate the main armor belt, barbets and armor of 305-mm installations of Japanese battleships. But they were quite capable of relatively weakly armored ends of Japanese ships, 152-mm armor of Japanese casemates and towers of 203-mm guns of armored cruisers. Therefore, a 30-40 kbt battle for the Russian squadron, whose armor could be considered invulnerable for the Japanese, but whose artillery could still penetrate some of the Japanese armor, was quite profitable - especially considering that the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons were superior Japanese fleet in the number of large-caliber guns. But this, of course, if the Japanese fleet is equipped with shells of the "battle at Shantung" and if we assume that our shells were capable of causing harm to Japanese ships - we know that this is not so, but the commander of the Russian fleet could not think otherwise.
Of course, for a decisive battle with the Japanese, a distance of 30-40 kbt was not suitable - not suffering much damage from Japanese shells, the Russian ships did not have the opportunity to inflict truly serious damage, which was again justified by the experience of the battle in the Yellow Sea - yes, the Japanese did not managed to knock out not a single Russian battleship, but after all, the Russians did not succeed in anything like that! (Again, the situation could have become completely different if the gentlemen from under the Spitz had bothered to establish the production of high-explosive shells with 25 kg of pyroxylin, providing the factories with high-grade steel.) In order to inflict decisive damage on the enemy, it was necessary to get closer to him by 10 15 kbt, where there would be almost no obstacles for Russian armor-piercing shells. However, one should take into account not only the benefits, but also the dangers of such a convergence.
As you know, many naval theorists of those times considered the main weapon of a modern battleship not 305-mm, but rapid-fire 152-mm artillery. The reason was that before the appearance of the "rapid-fire" battleships tried to protect from monstrous shells of the main caliber, and if the first battleships in the world had a fully armored side, then with the growth of the size and power of naval artillery, the armor was pulled into a thin belt covering only the waterline, and then not along the entire length - the extremities were left unarmored. And these unarmored sides and extremities could be completely destroyed by frequent hits of 152-mm shells. In this case, the battleship was threatened with death even if the armor belt was not pierced, whole machines and mechanisms.
Of course, the designers of the ships quickly found an "antidote" - it was enough to increase the armor area of the side, cover it with a thin layer of armor, and the high-explosive 152-mm shells immediately lost their value, since even an armor-piercing 152-mm shell of 10 kbt could hardly overpower 100- mm armor, let alone a high-explosive. The Japanese navy was relatively young, so that of the dozen ships in the line, the Fuji alone did not have adequate protection against rapid-fire medium-caliber artillery. But of the Russian ships, only 4 battleships of the "Borodino" type had such protection - the other eight were vulnerable. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that, being greatly inferior in protection against rapid-fire artillery, the Russian squadron was no less far behind the Japanese in the amount of this very artillery. The Japanese on their 4 battleships and 8 armored cruisers had as many as 160 six-inch guns (80 in an onboard salvo), all of which were of the latest design. The Russian squadron had only 91 such guns, and only 65 of them were rapid-fire. The remaining 26 guns (on the Navarin, Nakhimov and Nikolai I) were old 35-caliber guns, with a firing rate of no more than 1 round / min. There were also twelve 120-mm guns on the coastal defense battleships, but these guns had a shell twice as light as a six-inch one. Thus, if the Russian ships got on with the Japanese "short-circuited", and 80 Japanese 152-mm rapid-fire riflemen Rozhestvensky could oppose only 32 new and 13 old six-inch guns, and even six 120-mm guns, and a total of 51 barrels.
This inequality is further aggravated by the fact that the technical rate of fire of the six-inch Kane, with which the newest domestic battleships of the Borodino type were armed, was approximately half that of the Japanese guns located in casemates. This was the price of placing guns in the towers - alas, our "six-inch" towers were not perfect enough and provided no more than 3 rounds / min., While Japanese guns of the same caliber, located in casemates, gave 5-7 rounds. / min. And the distribution of six-inch guns in the wake columns turns out to be quite catastrophic - considering that 4 Japanese battleships will tie the four head Borodino in battle, the Japanese could fire 54 guns of their armored cruisers against the weakly protected ships of the second and third Russian detachments, against which 2 The 3rd and 3rd Russian detachments could only have 21 six-inch barrels, of which only 8 were the newest, and 6 additional 120-mm guns.
I have repeatedly heard that the Russian 152-mm cannons of the Kane system were much more powerful than their Japanese counterparts, but unfortunately, this is a completely erroneous opinion. Yes, the Russian cannons could fire 41, 5-kg projectiles with an initial speed of 792 m / s, while the Japanese fired 45, 4-kg projectiles with an initial speed of 670 m / s. But higher energy is interesting only for armor-piercing shells, while the use of such shells against battleships and armored cruisers did not make any sense - too low armor penetration six-inch did not allow their shells to get to something of any importance. The meaning of the six-inch artillery was to destroy the unarmored parts of the battleship at short combat distances, and here the initial high speed was not needed at all, and the most important characteristic was the content of explosives in the projectile. In this, the Japanese shells traditionally outpaced ours - the Russian high-explosive 152-mm shell contained 1 kg (according to other sources, 2, 7 kg) of explosives, in the Japanese - 6 kg.
There is one more nuance - six-inch guns in all battles of the Russo-Japanese War showed significantly less accuracy than their 305-mm "older sisters". For example, in the battle at Shantung, 16 305-mm guns and 40 152-mm guns participated in the side salvo of the 1st Japanese detachment. Of these, 603 305-mm and over 3.5 thousand 152-mm shells were fired. But the main caliber "achieved" 57 hits, but the six-inch shells hit the Russian ships only 29 times. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that with a convergence of 10-15 kbt (almost direct fire), the accuracy of six-inches can significantly increase.
In addition, there was another danger - although the "instant" Japanese fuses provided the detonation of shells of the "battle at Shantung" model when in contact with the armor, but when approaching 10-15 kbt, there was a risk that Japanese shells would nevertheless begin to penetrate the armor (at least not the thickest) or explode at the moment of breaking through the armor, which was fraught with much serious damage than our battleships received in the Yellow Sea.
According to the above, the following tactics can be seen "for the Russians". Our squadron had to keep the enemy at a distance of 25-40 kbt as long as possible, being in the zone of "relative invulnerability" from Japanese shells and at the same time where the Russian "high-explosive armor-piercing" could cause very serious damage to Japanese armored ships. This tactic made it possible to count on the weakening of the enemy fleet before the inevitable "transition to clinch", especially in terms of disabling the average artillery of the Japanese. The more heavy guns at this stage would shoot at the Japanese, the better, so it was imperative to bring the ships of the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments into battle.
At the same time, the Russians should have kept the ships of the 2nd and 3rd detachments in the ranks to the maximum extent for rapprochement with the Japanese: being (with the exception of the battleship "Oslyabya") either strongly outdated or frankly weak (the same "Asahi" outnumbered " Ushakov "," Senyavin "and" Apraksin "taken together), they did not have high combat stability, but provided the only advantage that could be decisive in close combat: superiority over the Japanese main forces in heavy artillery. Accordingly, the Borodino-class battleships should have attracted the attention of the 1st squadron of Togo with its four battleships, without interfering with the Japanese armored cruisers spinning around the old Russian ships - from a distance of 30-40 kb, their 152-203-mm guns could hardly inflict decisive damage to our "oldies", but the 254-mm - 305-mm Russian artillery had good chances to seriously "spoil the skin" of Kamimura's ships.
And this means that in the first phase (until the moment when Togo decides to get close by 20-25 kbt), the battle should have been fought in a close column, "exposing" the "armored forehead" of the newest ships of the "Borodino" type to the 305-mm guns of the Japanese … This was the only way to bring into battle the heavy guns of the 2nd and 3rd detachments without exposing them themselves to the crushing fire of the Japanese battleships. Of course, the Russians should have avoided the "stick over the T", but for this it would have been enough to simply turn parallel to the Japanese whenever they try to "undercut" the course of the Russian squadron. In this case, the 1st Japanese detachment will be located in a better tactical position than the 1st armored detachment of the Russians, but since the Borodino-class battleships are hardly vulnerable to shells of the "battle at Shantung" (but others were not expected!) could be tolerated. But when Heihachiro Togo, seeing the futility of a fight at an average distance, would have decided to enter "clinch", approaching 20-25 kbt and following parallel to the Russian formation (as he did in the battle at Shantung) - then, and only then, having given full speed to rush at the enemy, reducing the distance to lethal 10-15 kbt and try to realize your advantage in heavy guns.
P. S. I wonder why Rozhestvensky on May 13 ordered the squadron with a signal from "Suvorov": "Tomorrow at dawn to have the steam in the boilers divorced for full speed"?
P. P. S. The plan presented to your attention, according to the author, could well have worked, had the Japanese had the shells that they had at Shantung. But the massive use of "furoshiki" radically changed the situation - from now on, combat at a distance of 25-40 kbt became fatal for Russian ships. It was impossible to foresee the emergence of such a "wunderwaffe" among the Japanese, and the question was how quickly the Russians will be able to understand that their plans are not suitable for battle and whether they will be able to oppose something to the global superiority of the Japanese fleet in speed and firepower?
