Heavy mortars and cannons with a caliber of over 100 mm, as well as RZSO are unusually massively used in Donbass. Multiple launch rocket systems operate on average two to three times more actively than in all previous local wars. Particularly popular are "Grads" and "Hurricanes", which are relatively easy to use for both militiamen and artillerymen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In addition, the advantages of the MLRS include high power, mobility, as well as a huge field of destruction - up to 6 hectares. Finally, Ukraine has accumulated just gigantic stocks of ammo for such artillery systems, albeit expired.
A distinctive feature of the conflict is the fact that both sides are using outdated weapons, among which the most "elderly" are Grady, D-20, all 122-mm artillery and 100-mm anti-tank guns. The self-propelled and towed Msta with Hyacinth, Hurricane and the 120-mm Nona cannon can be called relatively new. The most "young", perhaps, is the most powerful "god of war" of Donbass - RZSO "Smerch".
Artillery is one of the main characters in the war in Donbass.
According to the former Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Volodymyr Tereshchenko, the main problem of artillery is the barrel resource of 1, 5-2 thousand rounds. On average, one gun in the Donbas fires its resource in one, maximum two months, and then it must be sent to the rear to replace the barrel. In Ukraine, there are no artillery pieces of their own production, and the stocks of cannon barrels are not unlimited. Obviously, some help will be provided by the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, but the end is inevitable: Ukrainian cannon artillery from Soviet stocks will finally order a long life. "Tochka-U" could become a panacea for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, although the very fact of the use of such weapons in the course of a civil war is disconcerting. But in the army, it seems, there are no specialists left to work with such equipment: the missilemen cannot correctly enter the flight program. The Americans tried in vain to help in guiding missiles with their own satellite system, but the age of the Tochka-U electronics in this case played into the hands of the militias.
The next "highlight" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was communication, which is practically not protected by anything. 95% of operational information is transmitted through the mobile phones of generals, officers and soldiers, and the remaining 5% falls on foreign digital stations for special forces. However, even the elite units do not always use such equipment correctly, often not observing the radio silence mode. Practice shows that when communicating during the march, the radio signals of the Armed Forces units are easily taken by the militia, and artillery strikes are delivered at the places of broadcasting. Of course, such an experience does not pass without leaving a trace for the Ukrainian military: at present, such incidents are becoming isolated. But the Armed Forces used cellular communications and, obviously, will continue to use them. Such telephone communication is becoming an invaluable information source not only for the militias, but, paradoxically, for the ATO command.
So, on July 11, 2014, the ATO headquarters learned about the actual destruction of the 24th mechanized brigade after the wife of one of the surviving fighters was able to get through to the general. Such situations are not unique in the Ukrainian army. Often, the results of the operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces can only be learned from the personal "Twitter" or "Facebook" of the unit commander, and sometimes details of the upcoming offensive appear on such pages. In addition, the danger of the active work of the ATO headquarters on the air is the possibility of determining their location by the militia using triangulation methods. Taking into account the low mobility of the headquarters, the probability of an artillery strike on them multiplies.
The destroyed 24th separate motorized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Zelenodolye. Disregard for engineering training in the ranks of the Ukrainian army is clearly visible.
The bullet-proof vest has become a cult in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
A real cult of body armor and personal protective equipment, with almost complete disregard for fortification, has also become the hallmark of the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the southeast. In this sense, the example of the operation to blockade Sloviansk is indicative, when equipment, people and tents were placed in an open space with an area of about a hectare. Now it becomes clear why the militias are so effective in using the MLRS. During the offensive operations of 2014, the equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the parking lots almost never dug in, or deepened to insufficient depth. The soldiers slept on beds in tents set up directly in the open field, even without embankment. The equipment was often placed crowded "side to side" - this is natural, in the case of an artillery attack, increased the loss of combat vehicles.
A series of destroyed equipment, located virtually side by side.
In many ways, this slovenliness is a consequence of the undemandingness of the ATO command in the first years of the conflict to the engineering support of the troops. Tanks at checkpoints are not dug in, and fortifications are built from tires, planks and bricks. Over time, the Ukrainian army understands that even the most advanced NATO body armor is inferior to the usual trench in defense conditions. This is especially true in the possibility of massive use by the enemy of all types of artillery. In fact, now military clashes in the south-east of Ukraine are bypassed without direct contact between the parties, and are taking place around checkpoints and control points.
The operational-tactical sterility of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is clearly manifested in the unblocking of the encircled groupings and attempts to cut off the LPNR from the border with Russia. Those surrounded, as a rule, do not receive any outside help and are forced to surrender en masse, perish, or, at best, break through on their own. So, near Ilovaisk on August 12, 2014, after a series of unsuccessful attempts to take the city "head-on", the command sent a battalion tactical group to attack from the north. And they succeeded - the group with a dagger blow broke through between Mospino and Ilovaisk, and then moved in the direction of Zelene - Fedorovka. There was no support for further advance from the APU, and the militia launched flank attacks, slamming the BTG in a mousetrap.
Approximately this is how equipment is dug in in Ukraine.
The reason for such failures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the battlefields was the ignorance of the senior command personnel, as well as the lack of elementary combat skills among middle and junior commanders. People are often appointed to positions in command not based on professional qualities, but on ideological grounds. The whistle dance in the General Staff also played a role, when five people were replaced in the post of defense minister in a short period. One of them was Valery Geleta, who spent only two years in the army, the rest of the time he served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Equally important is the American influence on the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - specialists from West Point are trying to translate the tactics of warfare of the Ukrainian army in their own way. The trouble is that the Ukrainian army has forgotten how to fight even according to Soviet canons, not to mention overseas standards. Offensive operations are extremely difficult for the ground forces. This is largely due to the low motivation of the infantry, which refuses to fight without the support of armored vehicles, and this very technique, with its breakdowns, often disrupts even the usual transfer of troops along the front. The low level of engineering service does not allow for effective repair of out-of-order armored vehicles, which often fall into the hands of the militia, and they, in turn, are very attentive to such gifts and successfully restore vehicles. They do not know how to effectively command tank forces in Ukraine, so they limit themselves to pinpoint strikes by groups of 6-8 vehicles. They pinned their hopes on the Hummers in the 95th separate airmobile brigade from Zhitomir, but they are poorly armored, do not like Ukrainian dirt and are difficult to repair due to a lack of spare parts.
Of course, like any other army, the Armed Forces learn from their own mistakes and, over time, increase their combat potential. However, the effect of a low starting base is still affecting, as well as a much more effective growth in the capabilities of the LDNR army in recent years.
