Part 1. Buy weapons. Expensive
Most recently, we were all delighted with one interesting news, namely, the fact that the Russian Ministry of Defense has finally decided on the purchase of Italian IVECO LMV M65 armored cars for the Russian army, while abandoning the domestic analogue (GAZ-2330 "Tiger"), which was put into service three years ago. In addition, according to a number of media reports, it is planned, in the future, to supply the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB with new Italian armored cars, although representatives of these departments have not yet commented on such assumptions.
JSC "Russian Technologies", where the assembly of machines will be organized, confirmed the information that the company is negotiating with IVECO. According to a company representative, a trial batch will be created this year, and serial production will begin next year. It is assumed that the minimum turnover will be 500 cars per year.
The volume of supplies for the Ministry of Defense has already been agreed upon, the Kommersant newspaper writes. In the next five years, the defense department wants to purchase 1,775 IVECO LMV M65 vehicles. In 2011-2012, it is planned to purchase 278 vehicles per year, over the next two years - 458 units per year, in 2015 - 228, and in 2016 - 75 armored cars.
At the same time, it is reported that, in total, the Ministry of Defense allocates 30 billion rubles for this. Rostekhnologii clarified that each piece of equipment will cost no more than 300 thousand euros.
According to various observers, as well as near-military analysts, Russia is simply "addicted" to foreign weapons. It is possible that the Russian Defense Ministry will purchase weapons from European countries and Israel for 10 billion euros in the next 5-6 years. One of the largest and most discussed orders will be the purchase of Mistral helicopter carriers from France. Now the scheme "2 + 2" is being considered, which implies that Russia will buy 2 ships ready-made, and assemble 2 more at its shipyards.
In addition, work is underway to conclude a contract with the Israeli company IAI ("Israeli Aviation Industry") on the licensed production of unmanned aerial vehicles in Russia. Along with this, the Russian Federation is negotiating with the French Thales and Safran groups on the supply of additional batches for the assembly of thermal imaging systems and aircraft target designation containers in Russia. It was also reported that the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is going to purchase from the Safran corporation a limited batch of FELIN "soldier of the future" equipment for the GRU special forces.
Part 2. A little about the army or "Whoever comes to us with a sword …"
For none of us who are even slightly interested in the Armed Forces (AF) of Russia, it is no secret that their composition and strategy of application is determined by the current military doctrine adopted in the state on the basis of law. So, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 5, 2010 No. 146 "On the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" and entered into force from the moment of signing (published in the "Rossiyskaya Gazeta" on February 10, 2010), the main tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during the period of imminent threat of military aggression:
a) the implementation of a set of additional measures aimed at reducing the threat of aggression and increasing the level of combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops in order to conduct mobilization and strategic deployment;
b) maintenance of the nuclear deterrent potential in the established degree of readiness;
c) participation in ensuring the regime of martial law;
d) implementation of measures for territorial defense, as well as the implementation of civil defense measures in accordance with the established procedure;
e) fulfilling the international obligations of the Russian Federation on collective defense, repelling or preventing, in accordance with the norms of international law, an armed attack on another state that has applied to the Russian Federation with a corresponding request.
In addition, in wartime, the main tasks of the Armed Forces are:
- repulsing aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies;
- inflicting defeat on the troops (forces) of the aggressor;
- forcing him to end hostilities on conditions that meet the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies.
That is, apart from the tasks of peacetime, the main purpose of the armed forces is to be a "punishing sword" in the hands of the state, which is designed to ensure freedom and independence for all citizens of the Russian Federation from an external aggressor.
True, in the modern doctrine of the Russian Federation, among the tasks of peacetime, there are a number of points that in the old days were not that "unusual" for the armed forces - no one even thought to load the Army with such tasks.
So, for example, one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces in peacetime are:
- the fight against terrorism;
- participation in the maintenance of public order;
- ensuring public safety.
The participation of the regular army in suppressing unauthorized rallies and demonstrations, riots and even various kinds of armed conflicts on the territory of the state itself contradicts the very nature and purpose of the armed forces, which becomes especially clear when considering them not in isolation, but in conjunction with other elements of the state's power mechanism. Such use of troops leads to an aggravation of their relations with the people, undermines the authority of a person in uniform.
I would like to consider the use of army units for purposes unusual for them as a forced, temporary measure to compensate for the weakness of other instruments for maintaining or restoring order and stability within the country. Moreover, in our state there are plenty of other law enforcement agencies that are close to such functions, and most importantly, it is they who are called upon to solve these problems.
For example, internal troops (IV). The main tasks of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia are:
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in the localization and blocking of areas of emergency or areas of armed conflict, suppression of armed clashes in the indicated areas and the separation of the warring parties, in the confiscation of weapons from the population, in carrying out measures to disarm illegal armed formations, and in the case of the provision of armed resistance by them - in their elimination;
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in the adoption of measures to strengthen the protection of public order and public safety in areas adjacent to areas of emergency or areas of armed conflict;
- participation in suppressing mass riots in settlements, and, if necessary, in correctional institutions;
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in taking urgent measures to save people, protect property left unattended, ensure the protection of public order in emergency situations and other emergencies, as well as in ensuring the state of emergency;
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in the fight against crime in the manner determined by this Federal Law;
- participation, together with the internal affairs bodies, in the protection of public order by carrying out patrol and guard service in settlements, as well as in ensuring public safety during mass events;
- the allocation of forces and means to the border agencies of the FSB to participate in border searches and operations in the manner determined by joint decisions of the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Director of the FSB.
- formations and military units (subdivisions) of the internal troops, in accordance with the regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, participate in counterterrorist operations and ensure the legal regime of counterterrorist operations.
A separate issue is the role and place of the army in the power mechanism. International experience confirms that states use armed forces to suppress illegal attempts to change the state system, territorial integrity, and in some cases to invade neighboring states to overthrow the existing state system there. It can be assumed that the use of the armed forces not for their intended purpose is fraught with the danger of turning them into an active means of resolving domestic political and domestic confrontation, especially in situations that are tense for the country.
In other words, someone very persistently and carefully decided to duplicate the functions of the internal troops in peacetime tasks by the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
Part 3. "Shield and sword", or each IVECO mine
But I would like to talk not about the cost of IVECO LMV M65, not about the advantages or disadvantages of this technology in comparison with domestic developments, or about the quality of writing laws that regulate the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I would like to talk about the place and appropriateness of the use of equipment such as IVECO LMV M65 in the ranks of the RF Armed Forces.
It would be unfair not to say anything about the design features of this type of technology, which so interested our Defense Minister A. E. Serdyukov. and his faithful deputy for armaments, Popovkin. For example, an LMV armored personnel carrier can withstand the detonation of an explosive device under the wheel or bottom, corresponding in power to 6 kilograms of trinitrotoluene, and is distinguished by the 6th class of protection. And some time ago, Iveco published a list of cases of LMV explosions located in Afghanistan: cars were fired at with machine guns and grenade launchers, blown up with mines and land mines - there were no dead, the fighters did only with minor wounds.
As Iveco experts say, this is a merit of the design: to provide maximum protection for the crew, the "habitable" compartment is separated from the engine and cargo compartment, so that when a shock wave is blown up, only the front or rear of the vehicle is destroyed. Moreover, the crew seats are resiliently fixed to absorb impact, and the bottom of the fighters is protected by a U-shaped bottom (this shape guarantees good reflection of fragments), made of two types of armor: steel and composite. The picture is complemented by inserts in the wheels, which allow you to move around on shot-through tires.
But since the sellers of IVECO LMV M65 started talking about the merits of this type of machine when exploding with mines and landmines, then it is worth recalling a little historical experience gained by our armed forces in Afghanistan.
The war in Afghanistan was very cruel for our soldiers, including because of the frequent explosions on mines. The mine war in Afghanistan is, first of all, a war on the routes of movement. As a rule, the Mujahideen chose road structures for the installation of mine-explosive barriers: mountain passes, narrow entrances to valleys, sharp turns of roads, ascents and descents on them, walking and pack paths, entrances to caves and abandoned buildings, approaches to water sources, entrances to kanats, oases and groves, tunnels. The explosion of the charge was supposed not only to cause damage, but also to delay the advance of the troops for as long as possible, and when setting up an ambush - to deprive the maneuver. Having good intelligence, the Mujahideen often knew in advance about the upcoming advance of the columns, which allowed them to conduct appropriate preparations for their actions. But we should not forget that all questions of mine explosives and mine warfare tactics were taught to the Afghan mujahideen by Western instructors in Pakistani camps.
It would be fair to say that in Afghanistan, Soviet troops received unprecedented experience in modern combat with mines and land mines, as well as with those who lay them on the roads. Yes, of course, there were losses in personnel and equipment, this is Openel's secret. But, if you read the memoirs of the participants in those events or the military-scientific literature of those times, then you can trace a very interesting picture. As a rule, the Mujahideen attacked those columns that were either formed from a small amount of equipment, or those that did not have sufficient forces and means to cover the flanks of the column, vanguard and rearguard. In other words, these were separately moving groups of equipment, not combat units.
You understand that it is much easier to destroy a convoy of two KamAZ trucks and one infantry fighting vehicle than to inflict serious damage on a convoy of a motorized rifle battalion with a sufficient amount of heavy weapons, trawling equipment, radio suppression, including from sappers to a chemist-dosimetrist, walking with a marching guard, exactly in accordance with the combat regulations of the ground forces (now this document is called a little differently, but the essence of this does not change). In mountainous terrain, it is incredibly difficult to organize the implementation and observance of all measures that ensure the maximum level of safety of the column, but it is still possible, and in order, in a stupid way, not to lose equipment and people, it is also necessary. But, according to our popular custom, the exact, “literal” implementation of all the prescribed measures is considered optional, and in Chechnya, especially during the first campaign, such events were often not carried out at all. That is, in spite of the fact that “the charter was written in blood,” everything is the same with us. "A mess is not a mess, it's such an order."
If we turn to the primary source - the combat manual, then, in the face of the threat of a clash with the enemy (which was constantly in Afghanistan), the troops generally have to move ("march", to be absolutely precise in military terminology) exclusively as part of subunits.
In order not to be unfounded:
“A march is an organized movement of troops in columns along roads and convoy routes in order to reach a designated area or a specified line. It is the main mode of movement of the battalion (company). A march can be carried out in anticipation of engaging in battle or without the threat of a collision with the enemy, and in the direction of movement - towards the front, along the front or from the front to the rear. In all cases, the march is carried out covertly, as a rule, at night or in other conditions of limited visibility, and in a combat situation and in the deep rear of its troops - during the day. In any conditions, subunits must arrive at the designated area or at the specified line on time, in full strength and in readiness to carry out a combat mission.
In the event of a threat of an attack by a ground enemy, depending on the nature of the terrain, head and closing patrols, or patrol squads, are sent to a distance, providing observation of them, supporting them with fire and excluding surprise attacks by a ground enemy on the guarded column."
The question arises: why is everything so great on paper and so bad in a real combat situation?
And probably because in the same Chechnya, as a rule, it was not well-coordinated military units "sharpened" for a war with an external aggressor, but hastily formed consolidated military units that did not have not only weapons for a full staff, but were often too limited in both ways and methods of dealing with bandits who ambushed the roads.
We often heard from news media reports: here and there in Chechnya there was an attack on an OMON convoy.
And OMON is still the police, albeit of a special purpose. She has not been trained in actions in a combat situation, which are regulated by the combat regulations.
Its specificity is completely different. And the measures that were carried out in Chechnya clearly demanded from the heads of the combined divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs the appropriate (missing) knowledge, experience and skills. If it was reported, for example, that a strategic nuclear missile launched by the head of the ROVD did not hit the target, would anyone be surprised?
As you can see, a contradiction arises. On the one hand, combat (according to the combat regulations) actions must be conducted by units of the Ministry of Defense, which exists to repel an attack from the outside, and cannot act against the citizens of its country. On the other hand, the establishment of social and constitutional order within the country is the function of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but the police units and their command are not prepared to “act according to the combat regulations” in a “combat situation”, and they are not able to hide what. One more negative factor is added. Often, the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent to Chechnya absolutely "civilian" leaders from all GOVD and ROVD for the sole purpose of obtaining "combat" experience and, corresponding to this experience, privileges. So the loss is half on their conscience.
Part 4. "Organizational conclusions"
So what am I talking about? Still, is it necessary or not necessary for the Russian army IVECO LMV M65? You can answer boldly and without looking back - machines of this class in the armed forces would not be superfluous and, perhaps, would occupy their niche.
By the way, the same NATO units stationed in Iraq are forced to use this type of equipment, because what they are doing there, quite reasonably presupposes the widespread use of this type of machine.
For example: on the next patrol of the streets of Baghdad, the American infantrymen will shoot the next passing cars of peaceful Iraqis, kill a dozen people who are to blame only for the fact that they live in Iraq, and by the will of fate, their state has large reserves of oil. Indeed, in this case, one should be afraid that some offended resident of Iraq, out of hatred for the American soldiers sowing democracy, will bury a land mine on the road and blow up another jeep armored car. From this calculation, of course, it is worth buying vehicles with armored capsules and putting them into service to protect your soldiers.
But, as far as I know, unlike the American one, the Russian army does not seem to be going to ride, for example, across Iraq and is not having fun with "post-fire" on civil structures and civil vehicles, thereby causing the just indignation of civilians of the Middle East state.
In other words: twist - do not twist, but in the presence of the entire existing spectrum of military equipment in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the maximum for which IVECO LMV M65 class vehicles can be useful is to carry the brigade (battalion) commander and other army commanders. But for the Internal Troops and other units, which are called upon, first of all, to take measures to strengthen the protection of public order and public safety in areas adjacent to areas of emergency and areas of armed conflict and to fight terrorism (as well as those involved in suppressing mass riots in settlements, and, if necessary, in correctional institutions), equipment of this class would be very useful.
