Naval power is characterized by interchangeability and responsiveness. Due to the relative openness of the sea, ships and fleets can move between ports and crisis zones, conducting hostilities or exerting influence. In fact, one of the key factors in the attractiveness of naval power is that ships are capable of responding to a crisis in various locations without requiring long-term political commitment and commitment and powerful infrastructure.
But of all the major maritime powers, Russia remains the most firmly bound hand and foot by its unfortunate maritime geography. Its warships are based in the Arctic and Pacific Ocean, the Baltic and Black Sea, and therefore cannot provide each other with operational support. This problem was most dramatically demonstrated by the Russian-Japanese war of 1904, during which the imperial Japanese fleet essentially destroyed the Pacific and Baltic fleets of Russia. The Black Sea Fleet escaped the same fate only because of the inflexibility of the Ottomans. Russian naval policy suffered from similar difficulties during the First and Second World Wars, as well as during the Cold War.
Consequently, every time Russia makes a decision to base its ships, it faces a strategic dilemma. Due to the great remoteness of the fleets, ships operating in one area during times of crisis cannot be quickly transferred to another area, and the influence that the fleet has in the surrounding region cannot be transferred to other regions. In short, Russian naval power is neither interchangeable nor responsive. Other states face similar problems, but usually not to the same extent. Therefore, the deployment of the forces and means of the Russian Navy must correspond to the level of political and strategic importance of a particular region, which is not required by the strategic planning of other states.
These facts must be taken into account when analyzing the threats and prospects of Russian naval power. The opportunities that a partnership with a friendly Russian Navy can provide, as well as the threats that a hostile Russian fleet can create, are limited by the same geographic factors.
Analysts differ in their assessments as to what designs in Russia's grand strategy for the future may reflect the planned deployment of the Russian Navy's forces and assets. Army Lt. Col. John Mowchan recently published an article in the US Navy Institute Proceedings, arguing that plans to build up the combat capabilities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet pose a threat to US and NATO interests in the Caucasus. On the other hand, Dmitry Gorenburg claims that Russia's naval potential in the Black Sea does not pose a threat to NATO. On the contrary, Gorenburg argues, Russian forces in the Black Sea can support NATO operations in the Mediterranean as part of Operation Active Endeavor, as well as off the coast of Somalia. Moreover, he notes, in reality, Russia's naval future lies in the Pacific Ocean. Gorenburg reports that Russia plans to send the first two French-built Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to the Pacific Fleet. It seems that this fact confirms his point of view.
More broadly, this debate is taking place against the backdrop of a continuing decline in Russia's naval power. Yes, the Russian Navy has several modern ships, but many of them are nearing the end of their normal operation. Despite some signs of life that have recently been shown by Russian shipbuilding, the state of this industry can be characterized by something in between the words "problem" and "agony." The rate of construction of new ships lags behind the rate of aging and decommissioning of old ones. Plans to build new aircraft carriers in addition to the Admiral Kuznetsov have been postponed indefinitely. The latest most important Russian project was a plan to purchase four Mistral-class amphibious assault ships from France. Two of them will be built in France and two in Russia. One of the key reasons for the Mistral deal is that it will help revitalize the Russian shipbuilding industry. For many months Moscow stood firmly on the defensive in the course of difficult negotiations with France, ensuring that two ships were built at Russian shipyards, and not one, as the French insisted on.
There is a certain danger in Russian decisions in terms of an external perspective. But shifting the focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific seems like a smart move for Russian naval strategists. Generally speaking, the navies of Western Europe are in decline. The British Navy will be significantly reduced as a result of austerity measures. France indefinitely postponed the construction of a second aircraft carrier. Other major navies in Europe, including the Italian and Spanish, are maintaining a fairly decent level, but not increasing. Consequently, even in the conditions of a decrease in Russia's naval power, the degree of its protection from the West from the sea does not decrease. The Black Sea remains a concern for Moscow, but Russia has territorial superiority over Georgia and has good neighborly relations with most other Black Sea countries.
If the maritime threat from Europe is declining, then the Asian fleets are strengthening and expanding, and Russia's position as a Pacific naval power seems increasingly fragile. Traditionally, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces and the US Navy play a key role there, but new powerful players are also emerging in this region. The most important among them was the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which today includes a large number of surface ships and submarines, and may soon begin their first experiment with aircraft carrier aircraft. The South Korean Navy is also pumping up its muscles, and today it includes some of the largest and most advanced naval formations in the world. India is also implementing its ambitious plan for the development of the Navy. Consequently, the geographic center of naval power has shifted to the east, at a time when world maritime trade has also largely shifted to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Therefore, it makes sense for the Russian Navy to follow the rest in its priorities.
But if the strengthening of the grouping of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean can calm and console the Georgians, then it does not remove the long-term strategic problems of the United States. On the contrary, the return of the Russian fleet to the Pacific Ocean significantly complicates the naval situation in Asia. In the long term, the planning authorities of the US Navy may receive a more acute headache from the Russian Pacific Fleet than from the tightly confined Black Sea Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet will give Russia the opportunity to "threaten" Japan or, say, to influence the situation on the Korean Peninsula in a crisis situation.
On the positive side, the Russian Pacific Fleet can help implement the Non-Proliferation Assurance Initiative and contain the growing Chinese influence. (Ironically, in the naval rivalry between Russia and China, which may arise in the future, Russian ships will oppose the Chinese, which are either purchased from Russia or built according to its projects.) In addition, the problems of piracy, smuggling and human trafficking are not confined to Somali waters. And the strengthening of the naval presence where these problems exist will help in solving them.
Undoubtedly, the naval hawks in the United States will find a lot of reasons and grounds to start sounding the alarm, regardless of where the bulk of the Russian fleet will be based: in the north, on the Black Sea or in the Pacific Ocean. But US military strategists must remember that the Russian navy will continue to suffer from serious geographic obstacles that limit its ability to act on the operational basis of naval power. Whether the US Navy sees the Russian Navy as an adversary or partner, they must take this key flaw into account anyway.
