Over time, the history of the American drone intercepted by the Iranians was somehow forgotten. Perhaps the audience of this news was intercepted by more recent events, or maybe the point is the extreme scarcity of available information. However, in the weeks it took to scrutinize the Iranian press release, a myriad of versions have been put forward. And their number is slowly but surely increasing.
Soon after the announcement of the hijacking of the RQ-170 Sentinel UAV, The Christian Science Monitor published an interview with an engineer who allegedly had the most direct relation to the interception. As a result, this material served as the basis for most versions, guesses and suggestions on the topic. According to this source, the interception was carried out in two stages. First, with the help of electronic warfare (EW) equipment, the radio channel was muted, through which data was transmitted between the drone and its control panel. Having stopped receiving commands, the RQ-170 turned on the autopilot. It is argued that in the event of a signal loss, these devices independently return to the base. In this case, the GPS satellite positioning system is used for navigation. The Iranians, the engineer claims, knew about this and at the right time "slipped" the wrong coordinate signal to the drone. As a result of these actions, the Sentinel mistakenly began to "think" that one of the Iranian airfields is American, located in Afghanistan. The lack of an inertial navigation system played a cruel joke with the drone - if the Iranian engineer was really involved in the operation, then orientation solely by GPS became the main factor that influenced the entire interception as a whole.
But the Americans deny this scenario. According to the official data of the Pentagon, the unmanned vehicle was lost due to a malfunction of the onboard equipment, and it did not crash due to a fortunate coincidence. Although many American military personnel, including those with "big stars", openly doubt that the device presented by Iran is really a working RQ-170, and not a skillfully made layout. In addition, the version of the anonymous engineer can be refuted using the architecture of the GPS system. Recall that it has two levels - L1 and L2 - intended for civilian and military use, respectively. The signal in the L1 band is transmitted openly, and in the L2 it is encrypted. In theory, it is possible to hack it, but how practical is it? At the same time, it is not known what range was used by the equipment of the American drone, military or civil. After all, the Iranians could drown out the encrypted signal with interference, and the civilian with their own, with the necessary parameters. In this case, the Sentinel's autopilot would search for any available signal from the satellite and would take for it the one that the Iranian radio electronics engineers "planted" on it.
And here we come to the most interesting aspect of this whole unmanned epic. Iran has not hitherto been seen in the creation of world-class military electronics. The conclusion about help from abroad suggests itself. In the context of the Iranian operation, the Russian electronic intelligence complex 1L222 Avtobaza has already been repeatedly mentioned. But can only Russia be “involved” in the interception? The 1L222 complex is by and large only an element of a large and complex electronic system. In Soviet times, not only enterprises located on the territory of the RSFSR were engaged in the creation of such equipment. So after the collapse of the USSR, developments on relevant topics could remain in the now independent states. Not all such enterprises were able to survive the hard times of the nineties, but those that remained continued to work. In particular, several design bureaus remained in Belarus at once. It is worthwhile to make a small reservation right away: this country is considered as a possible "accomplice" primarily due to the fact that, like Iran, it is often classified as unreliable. Well, in general, good equipment in this case is in some way an addition to the political side of the matter.
The leading Belarusian enterprise in the field of radio-electronic equipment for military purposes is the Minsk design bureau "Radar". The range of its products is quite wide: from stations for detecting a radio signal source to jamming systems for cellular communications. But of all the jammers in the context of the story with the RQ-170, the Optima-3 and Tuman complexes look the most interesting. They are originally intended to jam the signal of the American GPS satellite positioning system. "Optima-3" creates a dual-frequency interference signal of a complex structure, which allows you to reliably jam all the components of the satellite signal. However, the Optima might not have been used by the Iranians. The fact is that the Belarusian GPS jamming stations have compact dimensions and are adapted for quick transfer from place to place. This affected the signal strength. According to the available specifications, "Optima-3" outputs a signal of more than 10 watts. On the one hand, a kilowatt is also more than ten watts, but the declared figures may not be enough for reliable action on targets located at high altitudes. At the same time, the declared operating range is up to 100 kilometers.
But the aforementioned "Fog" looks like a more realistic option for suppressing the navigation signal. The Tuman system is designed to operate at the frequencies of the GPS and GLONASS navigation systems. Its modification called "Fog-2" - to suppress satellite telephony Inmarsat and Iridium. The main difference between "Fogs" and "Optima" lies in the method of installation. Optima-3 is a purely ground jamming station, while Fog is installed on helicopters, airplanes, or even unmanned aerial vehicles. In terms of the structure of the emitted signal, the airborne system is approximately similar to the ground one. The range of the "Mists" is all the same one hundred kilometers. With proper preparation for the operation, both Belarusian GPS suppression systems could equally effectively interfere with the navigation of the American drone, although there are some doubts about practical application and performance.
The suspects seem to have been sorted out. However, not everything is simple. If that anonymous Iranian engineer is really an Iranian engineer and is really connected with the interception of RQ-170, then it remains to find the system that "planted" the wrong coordinates for the drone. Theoretically, a jamming station can not only clog the air with noise, but also transmit a signal of certain parameters. This is a theory, and to what extent it is applicable to Belarusian jammers is unknown. It is quite possible that Minsk engineers have foreseen such a possibility, but they are trying not to dwell on it.
As you can see, not only the United States and the Russian Federation have equipment of their own production for jamming or replacing the signal of GPS satellites. But for some obscure reason, most of the US military and analysts continue to nod toward Russian equipment. Only one story with "Avtobaza" is worth something. For example, the former US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, recently assessed very well the characteristics of Russian electronic warfare equipment, although he did it very indirectly. His statement went something like this: if Russian jamming equipment gets into Iran, America will have very serious problems. For some reason, he did not speak about Belarusian electronics. Maybe he just doesn't know about her. But they might know about her in Tehran. Or even not only know, but also exploit. This means that the December RQ-170 may become not only the first, but also not the last.
